what has been happening on the remote frontiers of Southern Arabia during the past several months. We do not believe that this Council is in a position to judge with positive accuracy the merits of the charges which have been made. Some delegations may be tempted to accept automatically the version of one side and to reject that of the other side, as is so often the case in the Security Council. It would appear very clearly that there have been incursions and attacks across the border in both directions. One can draw from this confused and contradictory record of border troubles certain conclusions to which I believe all of us can subscribe. Clearly, these incidents have led to a most regrettable, distressing loss of life. We believe that we can all join in expressing our disapproval of the use of force by either side as a means of solving disputes, a principle that is enshrined in the Charter. And certainly attacks across borders such as have been described, including that on the fortress near Harib, could quickly escalate into full-scale war, and accordingly are proper subjects for consideration by the United Nations. My Government has repeatedly expressed its emphatic disapproval of provocative acts and of retaliatory raids, wherever they occur and by whomever they are committed. Therefore, it seems to us that it would have been much preferable if the border incidents between Yemen and the South Arabian Federation had been placed before this body at an earlier date. It is also evident that neither the interests of Yemen, on the one hand, nor those of the Federation of South Arabia and the United Kingdom, on the other, have been advanced by the incidents which have taken place. On the contrary, with each new attack the situation has become worse. The chances of conciliation have diminished and the situation in an area which dearly needs peace and stability has steadily deteriorated. But instead of dwelling on the past, perhaps it would be more helpful if we tried to isolate from this tangled situation those elements which might lead to an improvement on the Yemen-South Arabian Federation frontier. This clearly would be in the interests of all, especially of the people of the area on both sides of the frontier who need order and security in order to banish fear and bloodshed so they again can take up their peaceful pursuits. My delegation has been encouraged by certain passages in the United Kingdom's letter of 28 March and the Yemen Arab Republic's letter of 1 April 1964 [S/5635]. Both refer in similar terms to their Governments' patience and self-restraint. Both give solemn assurances of a desire to preserve the peace. Perhaps this evidence of good will on both sides can serve as a foundation for keeping the peace. Perhaps the most encouraging development is the revival of the proposal for a withdrawal of forces on both sides in certain sensitive areas of the frontier where most of the recent incidents have occurred. Much of the trouble on this frontier seems to stem from the fact that it has never been defined. It was our hope when these proposals were under discussion last December that an agreement would be reached * See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 603–605, 609-610. between the authorities in the South Arabian Federation and Yemen for a pull back which would have reduced the area of friction between the two sides. Had such an agreement been reached, it is possible that these incidents would never have taken place and that this confrontation in the Security Council would not have been necessary. Unfortunately, the negotiations were suspended because of a general deterioration of the situation, which has finally, through the continued incidents and the further loss of life, brought the matter to the present pass. But it is noteworthy, I believe, that both sides indicated last December a willingness for a pull back to prevent clashes. Neither side rejected that important principle. The main problem to be resolved at that time was the area of the pull back. In view of the present unhappy turn of events, perhaps this possibility can be taken up again. The question now is how to get negotiations under way. We wonder if the Security Council would not wish to consider the appointment of a good officer or would ask the Secretary-General to consider appointing a good officer to assume the task of bringing together the parties to the dispute. Perhaps one could assist the authorities of the Yemen Arab Republic and the South Arabian Federation in considering a plan which holds forth some hope for peace in a troubled and threatening situation. As we have learned on so many other difficult occasions in the past, there are many ways in which the Security Council or an impartial, international person acting on its behalf, or on behalf of the Secretary-General, can help bring about an easing of tensions and a restoration of peaceful conditions. In summary, my Government feels that the real contribution of the Council at this time would be to focus on the future, to attempt to find genuinely constructive means which will contribute to a peaceful solution of this difficult and dangerous problem. Document VII-25 United Nations Security Council Condemnation of United Kingdom Reprisals for Yemeni Attacks on the South Arabian Federation: RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 9, 1964 8 The Security Council, Having considered the complaint of the Yemen Arab Republic regarding the British air attack on Yemeni territory on 28 March 1964 [S/5635], 7 See ibid., pp. 613-614. U.N. doc. S/5650. This resolution, sponsored by the Representatives of the Ivory Coast and Morocco, was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (the U.K., the U.S.). The U.S. Representative (Stevenson) in the U.N. Security Council said "that we do not consider the draft resolution equitable, that it is not responsive to the realities and the facts that have been reviewed here in the Council's debate, and, accordingly, we cannot vote for the draft resolution as we would have liked to have done had it been possible to make the amendments that I have suggested," Apr. 9, 1964. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 1111, par. 7.) See footnotes 10-11 below. Deeply concerned at the serious situation prevailing in the area, Recalling Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter of the United Nations,9 Having heard the statements made in the Security Council on this matter, 1. Condemns reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 10 2. Deplores the British military action at Harib on 28 March 1964: 11 3. Deplores all attacks and incidents which have occurred in the area; 11 4. Calls upon the Yemen Arab Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to exercise the maximum restraint in order to avoid further incidents and to restore peace in the area; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to try to settle outstanding issues, in agreement with the two parties. Document VII-26 Request for Early Removal of the United Kingdom Base at Aden: RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, APRIL 9, 1964 1 12 The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Having considered the question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates, Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the petitioners, Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 13 and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963," Considering that the policies at present pursued by the administering Power have increased tension in the area, Deeply concerned at the continued deterioration of the situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates which is threatening international peace in the area, 9 For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161. 10 The U.S. Representative (Stevenson) suggested amendment of operative par. 1 to read "Condemns both attacks and reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations"; the sponsors of the draft resolution refused to accept this amendment. (See U.N. doc. S/PV. 1111, par. 7.) "The U.S. Representative (Stevenson) suggested replacement of operative pars. 2 and 3 with a single paragraph reading as follows: "Deplores the British military action at Harib on 28 March 1964 and all attacks and incidents which have occurred in the area"; the sponsors of the draft resolution refused to accept this amendment. (See ibid.) 12 U.N. doc. A/AC.109/64. This resolution, sponsored by the Representatives of Cambodia, India, Iraq, Mali, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, was adopted by a vote of 19 to 3 (Australia, the U.K., the U.S.), with 2 abstentions (Denmark, Italy). See footnote 1 to II-44, ante, for the origin and work of the Special Committee of 24. 13 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 110-111. 14 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 593–594. Considering the strong desire of the population for the unity of the Territory, 1. Reaffirms the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence from colonial rule in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; 2. Deplores the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to implement resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII); 3. Urges the administering Power to implement without delay resolution 1949 (XVIII), particularly paragraphs 6, 8 and 10; 4. Urges further the administering Power to: 15 (b) Repeal all the laws which restrict public freedoms; (c) Release all political prisoners and detainees and those who have been sentenced following actions of political significance; (d) Allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities; 16 (e) Cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory, in particular, military expeditions and the bombing of villages; 17 5. Reaffirms that the maintenance of the military base in Aden is prejudicial to peace and security in the region and its early removal is, therefore, desirable; 6. Decides to establish a Sub-Committee on Aden composed of five members to be appointed by the Chairman of the Special Committee; 7. Requests the Sub-Committee to: 18 (a) Study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the Special Committee; (b) Establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII); (c) Arrange in consultation with the administering Power, for visits to the Territory; (d) Make such other visits as may be deemed necessary; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the administering Power and to report to the Special Committee on its implementation; 9. Decides to maintain the question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates on its agenda. Document VII-27 United Kingdom Justification of Military Action Against Subversion in the South Arabian Federation: SUMMARY REPORT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.K. REPRESENTATIVE (KING) IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, MAY 11, 1964 19 Mr. King (United Kingdom) said that the reference in draft resolution A/AC. 109/L.117 to British military actions against the people of the Territory, implying 15 See ibid., p. 595, footnote 13. 16 Beginning in Dec. 1963, authorities of the Federation of South Arabia deported Yemenis believed connected with subversive acts. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963–1964, vol. No. XIV, p. 19993. "Operative par. 5 of this resolution was adopted in the Special Committee of 24 by a vote of 13 to 5 (including the U.S.), with 6 abstentions, taken Apr. 9, 1964. 18 The Chairman of the Special Committee of 24 (Coulibaly) announced on May 21, that the Subcommittee on Aden would be composed of representatives of Cambodia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, (U.N. doc. A/AC.109/ SR.262). 19 U.N. doc. A/AC.109/SR.256, p. 8. that his Government had decided deliberately to attack peaceful tribesmen, was a complete travesty of the true situation." The fact was that the Yemen Republic and the United Arab Republic authorities in Yemen were continuing their wide-spread campaign of subversion against the South Arabian Federation. Arms and military equipment were being smuggled from Yemen to the rebellious tribesmen in Radfan in increasing quantities, and the Government of the Federation was under daily propaganda attack by radio stations in Yemen and the United Arab Republic, whose President, while on a recent visit to Yemen, had made speeches strongly hostile to the Federation." The tribesmen were being used by foreign powers as tools in a deliberate campaign to overthrow the constitutional Government of the Federation by violence and unlawful means and to undermine its progress towards independence. 22 No government had ever asserted that the use of troops to maintain order was never justified in any circumstances, and the Government of the South Arabian Federation, which had appealed for British military assistance, was entirely justified in using its armed forces to protect the inhabitants and maintain law and order in Dhala. Any resolution that arbitrarily censured the military action undertaken there without any reference to the reasons for it was therefore completely unrealistic and unacceptable to his delegation. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Federation, being anxious to see peaceful conditions restored in the border area between the Federation and Yemen, were ready to cooperate with the Secretary-General in measures to settle outstanding problems pursuant to operative paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution S/5650 of 9 April 1964. He suggested that the representative of Iraq might use his influence to persuade Yemen and the United Arab Republic to comply with the terms of that resolution. Document VII-28 "The Special Committee [of 24] ... Deprecates the Military Action Undertaken by the British Authorities in Aden": RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, MAY 11, 1964 24 The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Recalling General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 * and the resolution of the Special Committee adopted on 9 April 1964 on the Question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates (A/AC.109/64),9 20 See infra. For a report on a speech of Apr. 23, 1964, by U.A.R. President Nasser at Sana, Yemen, in which he reportedly vowed to expel the U.K. from Aden, see The New York Times, Apr. 24, 1964. See also ibid., Apr. 25, 1964, and U.N. doc. $/5687. 22 See footnote 27 to doc. VII-28, infra. 23 Ante, doc. VII-25. "U.N. doc. AC.109/74. This resolution, sponsored by the representatives of 11 member states in the Special Committee of 24, was adopted by a vote of 18 to 3 (Australia, the U.K., the U.S.), with 2 abstentions (Denmark, Italy). Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 593–594. 26 Ante, doc. VII-26. |