immediately at the other. And according to recent reports this pattern of activity has even been repeated.

Within the context of what has been done in the past, the Council should, we believe, now recommend ways to make such incidents less likely to occur in the future. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff offers us some specific steps.

In paragraph 24 of his report, as has been noted, he asks: "Is the reconstructed Israeli track entirely, as asserted by Israel, on the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line or does it at some places encroach upon Syrian territory, as asserted by Syria?" 39 A clear answer to that question should prevent the possibility of further encroachment or even the suspicion of it.

Such an answer could be provided by an independent survey of the line, the results of which we would hope could be accepted by both parties. Syria and Israel have implied their willingness to cooperate in that undertaking. The representative of Israel said a few days ago that Israel was prepared to agree to the continuation of the survey to establish the position of the track in relation to the border. And the representative of Syria has also cited in a recent statement before the Council paragraph 24, which sets forth the advantages of an independent frontier survey, and has declared his Government's belief that the question of the relocation of the Israel track in relation to the armistice line should, and I believe I quote him correctly, "not be left in abeyance." Mr. President, upon the success of limited surveys depends the possibility of more general ones. The former is at present a necessity. The latter is desirable in the future.

We would urge both sides to avoid any further provocative acts and to take seriously the counsels of self-restraint contained in paragraph 25 of the report, that is, to submit complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission, rather than to commence shooting, and to suspend activities about which a party has complained if the chairman of the Commission deems it necessary during an investigation or after its results are known. These are not trivial or temporary exhortations. They embody the elements of cooperation without which the General Armistice Agreements would be dishonored and ineffective.40

In paragraph 26 of the report the Chief of Staff points out the crippling effect which a semioperated Mixed Armistice Commission has upon UNTSO's effort to effect an orderly truce. Full participation in the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commission more than any other single act would increase the chances for a more effective observance of the truce by both sides. Full participation by both parties would add greatly to the authority of the Commission and reduce the suspicion and the uncertainties which give birth to these repeated acts of violence.

"Ibid. Tension on the Syria-Israel armistice demarcation line related to the question whether the reconstructed road in the Tel-El-Qadi (the Israel "Tel Dan") area used by Israel encroached on Syrian territory.

"For the text of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 719 724.

All of us here know that peace is more than the absence of war. A Council table in New York cannot legislate peace to the people who live in the settlements in the towns near Tel El Qadi, nor can the Council dictate to the Governments of Israel and Syria that they must live at peace with each other. We can only recommend, urge, plead with all of our energy that the mechanisms for peaceful settlement and not guns be used. If they were, it is not beyond hope that we should never again discuss this subject which has come so often to this Council table.

Document VII-20

Proposal for Maintaining Peace on the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line: DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE U.K. AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES (JACKLING AND YOST) TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 17, 1964 41

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1964.12

1. Deplores the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line on 13 November 1964 and deeply regrets the loss of life on both sides:

2. Takes note in the report of the Secretary-General of the observations of the Chief of Staff in paragraphs 24 through 27. and in the light of these observations, recommends:"

43

(a) That Israel and Syria co-operate fully with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in his efforts to maintain peace in the area:

(b) That the parties co-operate promptly in the continuation of the work begun in 1963, of survey and demarcation as suggested in paragraph 45 of document S/5401, commencing in the area of Tel El Qadi, and proceeding thereafter to completion, in fulfilment of the recommendations of the Chief of Staff's reports of 24 August 1963 and 24 November 1964;

44

(c) That Israel as well as Syria participate fully in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council by 31 March of the progress that has been made toward implementing these suggestions.

"U.N. doc. S/6113, as amended; the Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 18. 1965, p. 87. The draft resolution was put to the vote at the 1182d meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Dec. 21. The vote was 8 (including the U.S.) in favor to 3 (including the U.S.S.R.) against, and the resolution was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council (U.S.S.R.). The U.S.S.R. had previously supported a Moroccan draft resolution (S/6085 and Rev.1) condemning Israel air action of Nov. 13, 1964, against Syria. The Moroccan draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 3 (including the U.S.S.R.) in favor to 0 against, with 8 (including the U.S.) abstentions at the 1179th meeting of the Security Council, Dec. 17, 1964.

42 U.N. doc. S/6061 and Corr. 1-3 and Add.1; see supra.

43

"An amendment proposed by the Moroccan Representative for deletion in operative par. 2, of the word "special" after the word "Takes" and deletion of the word "specifically" after the word "recommends" was adopted by a vote of 7 to 0, with 4 abstentions (including the U.S.), taken Dec. 21, 1964.

"U.N. doc. S/5401 and Add.1-4.

Document VII-21

United States Call on Syria and Israel To Carry Out Recommendations for Peace Vetoed by the Soviet Union: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (YOST) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 21, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 45

My delegation does very much regret that the Council because of the exercise of the veto has been unable to endorse at least the constructive recommendations of the United Nations Chief of Staff [Lt. Gen. Odd Bull]46 in regard to the continued maintenance of peace along the demarcation line."

We believe that the draft presented by the United Kingdom and ourselves did reflect the Council's best judgment as to how it might continue its longstanding responsibility in the maintenance of peaceful conditions between Israel and Syria. Obviously, it was impossible to give perfect satisfaction to any of us, but these were constructive steps based squarely on the recommendations of the Chief of Staff which certainly would have seemed to us worthwhile to approve.

... May I say in this connection that the clause in the draft resolution which we submitted in paragraph 2(b) which dealt with the survey and demarcation of the armistice line was based on the reports of General Bull of August 1963 48 and November 1964,9 and provided clearly while commencing in the area of Tel El Qadi for proceeding thereafter to the completion of the full survey. It is heartening to note that the majority of the Council are in favor of the continued strengthening of the U.N. peacekeeping role in this crucial area and that the majority do endorse the Chief of Staff's efforts to improve the present situation.

Further and finally we should like to stress that lack of unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Council in this matter derogates in no way from the responsibility of the parties to carry out in cooperation with General Bull the terms of the General Armistice Agreement.50 We consider the vote which has just taken place on this resolution to represent a strong consensus on the part of the Council, and we firmly believe that in carrying out the recommendations approved by the majority of the Council the parties would be setting their feet on the path that would lead to more peaceful conditions in the area. We earnestly hope that they will do so.

"Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 18, 1965, pp. 86-87.

Of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). 4 See supra.

48 U.N. doc. S/5401 and Add.1-4.

4 U.N. doc. S/6061 and Corr.1-3 and Add.1.

For the text of the Israel-Syrian General Agreement of July 20, 1949, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 719-724.

C. Relations With Certain Countries and Concerning Certain Problems of the Area

IRAN

Document VII-22

Visit of the Shah of Iran to the United States: EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON) AND THE SHAH OF IRAN (MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI) AT A WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON, JUNE 5, 1964 1

ISRAEL

[See ante, docs. VII-10-21.]

JORDAN

Document VII-23

Jordanian-United States Concern for Maintaining a Just Peace in the Middle East: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT WASHINGTON BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON) AND THE KING OF JORDAN (HUSSEIN I), APRIL 15, 1964 2

King Hussein of Jordan and President Johnson have completed two days of discussions on matters of mutual interest and concern. Both welcomed the opportunity presented by the King's visit at the invitation of the President for a full exchange of views.

The President presented the views of the United States on various world problems, including those of the Middle East. He emphasized the strong desire of the United States for friendly relations with all Arab states and its devotion to peace in the area. King Hussein put forward the views of Jordan and the other Arab states on various

1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, vol. I, p. 748. The Shah and Empress Farah of Iran made an unofficial visit to the United States. While here, the Shah held talks with President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, et al.

2 Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1964, pp. 697-698. King Hussein visited the United States, Apr. 13-29, 1964. He was in Washington, Apr. 14-16, 1964. While here, he conferred with President Johnson, Acting Secretary of State Ball, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Attorney General Kennedy. He also conferred with U.N. Secretary-General Thant in the presence of the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Stevenson) at New York, Apr. 17, 1964.

Middle East problems and their impact on relations between the two nations. Cordiality, good will and candor marked the discussions. A common concern for preserving and strengthening a just peace in the area was evident throughout the talks.

The two leaders declared their firm determination to make every effort to increase the broad area of understanding which already exists between Jordan and the United States and agreed that His Majesty's visit advanced this objective.

The President expressed the intention of the Government of the United States to continue to support Jordanian efforts to attain a viable and self-sustaining economy.

His Majesty and his party will spend a few days travelling in the United States before returning home.

FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA INCLUDING ADEN

Document VII-24

United States Call for Negotiations on Ending Hostilities Along the Yemeni-South Arabian Federation Frontier: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 6, 1964 3

The Security Council has before it the complaint by the Yemen Arab Republic that the British forces in the South Arabian Federation have committed acts of aggression against the Yemen, especially on 28 March 1964, when British aircraft attacked a fortress near Harib on the Yemen-South Arabian Federation frontier.

We also have before us a letter of 28 March 1964 [S/5628] from the United Kingdom representative, outlining the circumstances which preceded and surrounded the air attack to which I have referred. In his letter, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the British attack was launched after several attacks on South Arabian Federation territory, and that the United Kingdom counter-attacked because it felt bound to take measures in defence of the Federation.5 During the debate, we have heard detailed statements of the Yemen Arab Republic's grievances against the United Kingdom, which have been renewed by the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic. The Yemen delegation has claimed, as I understand it, some forty hostile acts against Yemen in the past year and a half. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has referred to some fifty-two hostile acts against the Federation. It is obviously difficult to determine precisely

U.N. doc. S/PV.1108, pars. 63–73.

The Federation of South Arabia consists of 17 states, including, since Jan. 18, 1963, the former colony of Aden.

On Mar. 19, 1964, the Federation of South Arabia announced that it had asked the United Kingdom for protection against air attack from Yemen. The request was granted.

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