and we also seek to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people.1 The President also said that in the event of direct or indirect aggression we would support appropriate courses of action in the United Nations or on our own to prevent or put a stop to such aggression. I believe that what the President said on May 8, 1963, contains no ambiguity and lends itself to no misinterpretation. Any intended victim of any would-be aggressor can count on our support. In so saying we do not threaten or cajole. We underline our commitment to our objectives. It may be that some believe they do not need our help, but we are certain all states are aware of our intentions and commitments and of our capability if need be to carry them out. Those who wish our help can count on it when they need it. Our policy in recent years has been predicated on a greater awareness of the aspirations of the Near Eastern peoples, their accomplishments and their potential. It is perhaps mainly this awareness that has brought us whatever successes we may have achieved in the Near East. It is perhaps when we have lacked this awareness that we have had our failures. In the coming months many of our policies will be put to the test. I would not pretend to you that we believe the decisions we reach and the actions we believe we must take will always meet with full approval on the part of the Arab states or of Israel. We will seek their understanding and will value their approval. We will always endeavor to act in such a way as not to damage their interests. But in the final analysis our policies will be based on the United States interest as we see it. Since we sincerely believe there is no incompatibility between our interests and those of the peoples of the Near East, we shall pursue our policies in the full confidence that they are right and fair for all concerned. Document VII-3 United States Support for the Security and Stability of the Near East: STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MCNAMARA) BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FEBRUARY 3, 1964 (EXCERPT) 17 The Near East is another area of great political instability and uneven economic development. While some of the nations in this region-Greece, Turkey, and Iran-border on the Soviet Bloc and are thus directly exposed to Communist military power, the more immediate danger to the peace and stability of the area is internal, and 16 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 581. 17 Department of Defense Appropriation, 1965: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 10939, pt. 1, pp. 18–20. stems from the deep-seated animosities existing between the Arab countries and Israel; 18 the power struggles and rivalries among the Arab countries themselves; and the existence of powerful minority groups within most of these countries, such as the Kurds in Iraq, as well as inequalities which require social and economic reforms. Thus, we are actually confronted in that area with two sets of problems: (1) to provide a sense of security to the three nations directly exposed to Soviet power; and (2) to help create an environment in which each of the nations in the area can maintain internal stability and develop its economy and society in its own way without fear of attack from its neighbors or infiltration and subversion by the Communist Bloc. To meet the first set of problems, we long ago made certain military commitments to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and have for many years provided them with military and economic assistance. Since Greece and Turkey are members of NATO and will be dealt with in that context, I shall not discuss them any further in this section.19 With respect to Iran, our objective has been to help build up their military forces to the point where they could ensure internal security and provide at least an initial defense against a Soviet attack across borders. Although the Iranian military forces, with our aid, have improved significantly during the last decade, they are still not and never can be a match for even those Soviet forces presently deployed along the Iranian borders, even though the terrain favors the defense. Thus Iran could not be expected to stand alone for very long against a major attack from its northern neighbor and would require immediate assistance from the United States; and in this event, the defense of Iran could not be separated from the larger problem of the collective defense of the free world. Despite the strategic vulnerability of Iran, it seems quite unlikely that the Soviet Union would, in view of our mutual cooperation agreement with Iran,20 deliberately undertake a major aggression against that country in the near future. In fact, if Chairman Khrushchev's pronouncement of a few years ago regarding Iran can be taken at face value, the Soviet Union does not believe that military aggression. is necessary to bring Iran into the Soviet orbit. Given the economic and social conditions prevailing in Iran a few years ago, Chairman Khrushchev said that Iran would in time "fall like a ripe fruit" into the Soviet lap. Recent vigorous Soviet efforts to improve relations with Iran and Communist efforts to take credit for the Shah's reforms indicate that Chairman Khrushchev may not be so sure today. Regardless of the validity of that statement, it is certainly clear that the more likely contingency is a covert or ambiguous aggression, using dissident elements in Iran or neighboring nations to pave the way for ultimate Communist takeover. In Iran, as elsewhere in the world, the best defense against the spread of communism is a steady improve 18 See ante, doc. VII-1; post, docs. VII-8, 10-21. 19 Not reprinted here. See ante, docs. IV-90-149, 155–156. 20 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1020-1022 ment in economic and social conditions, which is the primary aim of our economic aid efforts. These efforts are meeting with considerable success in Iran. The modernization of Iranian society under the leadership of the Shah is in full swing and the economic and social reforms generated by the Shah are making Iran an example for other underdeveloped nations. In the rest of the Near East, our Military Assistance Program is essentially confined to training, with the exception of Jordan where we have a small materiel program. Although we do not share with the other Near East countries membership in any formal regional military organization, our interest in supporting stability and peace in the area has been well established and, we believe, is clearly understood by the countries involved. But the maintenance of stability and peace there is extremely difficult. In Yemen, small-scale tribal warfare against the YAR and UAR forces continues.22 With a United Nations mission established,23 Saudi Arabia has suspended support for the royalists and efforts continue to broaden the base of the Yemen regime and expedite withdrawal of UAR combat forces. Iraq and Syria are still rent by struggles for power. The only ostensible objective which all of these Arab nations appear to share in common is the destruction of Israel. And here, Israel's plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River presents a current problem.24 The U.S. objective has long been to keep the Arab-Israeli feud from escalating to overt hostilities. Realization of this objective has been made more difficult by the injection of substantial Soviet Bloc aidboth economic and military-into the region, and particularly into the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. For this reason, the U.S. has, on a very selective basis, provided some assistance in the form of sales of military materiel to Israel and the smaller Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. And it is in this context that the U.S. sold HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Israel to help provide an effective defense against modern fighters and bomber aircraft.25 In addition to our grant aid materiel and training programs, and selective arms sales, we have taken other steps to underscore our interest in arresting any deterioration in the security of that area. Our military forces have engaged in military exercises with those of such friendly countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to demonstrate our capability and determination to lend support when and if required. We have also made our military presence visible through judicious and periodic deployments of elements of our own forces. "See ibid., 1957, p. 1028; and post, doc. VII–23. "See post, docs. VII-33-37. 23 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 607. 24 See ante, doc. VII-1; footnote 54 to doc. VII-8, post; doc. VII-11. U.S. agreement to sell Israel Hawk missiles was reported Sept. 26, 1962 (The New York Times, Sept. 27, 1962). Israel purchase of U.S. Hawk missiles costing about $25 million was announced in Washington, June 28, 1964 (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, vol. No. XIV, p. 19607.) 219-262-67-48 Document VII-4 The Need To Discourage Communists Anywhere From a Policy of Militancy: ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) BEFORE THE CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, APRIL 28, 1964 (EXCERPT) 26 Within the CENTO partnership, there is today a growing consciousness of the mutuality of our goals and a growing sense of community. There has been clear evidence of this in the accomplishments of the highly successful economic meeting in Ankara last month and of the Military Committee meeting which has just concluded here in Washington.27 It is not for me to predict the decisions of this Council session. But I would hope that as a result of this meeting and of subsequent meetings of our colleagues and deputies CENTO would: -strengthen its institutional structure; -complete the extensive capital projects which provide the communication network for the area; -improve and expand cooperative association in developmental and technical assistance activities; and -maintain the defensive shield by effective military cooperation. In a larger sense, also, I believe we have reason for confidence. We in the free world have our problems. But when we look across the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, we see that the Communist world has far-reaching problems to which solutions have not yet been found. Let us not forget that the leaders of both the principal Communist nations proclaim world domination as the ultimate Communist goal. And we must take particular care not to let any Communists anywhere think that they can gain from a policy of militancy. The notion that communism is a shortcut to the future for developing nations has been shattered by actual Communist performance. In terms of economic strength, the free world continues to widen its advantage over the Communist world, both relatively and absolutely. And, despite opposition or lack of cooperation from the Communists, we are moving ahead with the great task of building a decent world order-the kind of world outlined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. The members of CENTO, like other free nations, have a common interest in working toward these goals: -a world free of aggression-aggression by whatever means; -a world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage; 26 27 Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1964, pp. 766–768. -a world of economic and social advance for all peoples; -a world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and which moves steadily toward a rule of law; -a world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law and custom, in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure. If we persevere, we shall eventually reach that goal: a world in which freedom is secure for all mankind. We of the United States delegation once again extend to you a warm welcome and pledge to you our unstinted cooperation as we work together toward our mutual objectives. Document VII-5 Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization, Washington, April 28-29, 1964: COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED APRIL 29, 1964 28 The Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Washington on April 28 and April 29, 1964. The delegates from the five countries participating in this meeting were led by: H. E. Mr. Abbas Aram H. E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali H. E. Mr. Feridun Camal The Rt. Honourable R. A. The Honorable Dean Rusk Foreign Minister of Iran Foreign Minister of Pakistan Foreign Minister of Turkey Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State, United States of The Secretary of State of the United States, as host, was in the chair. In his opening address, Secretary Rusk welcomed the delegations on behalf of President Lyndon B. Johnson.30 The Council of Ministers expressed deep regret at the tragic death of John F. Kennedy, the late President of the United States, and paid warm tribute to his outstanding qualities as a statesman and to his wise and valiant contributions to the cause of world peace. 28 2 Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1964, pp. 768-769. "Observer status; the United States, a member of the CENTO Military Committee, but not of CENTO, is bound to each member state by other defense agreements; see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1257-1259; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 772–774, 776– 777; ibid., 1958, pp. 894-895; ibid., 1959, pp. 1020-1023, 1024, footnote 3. "Supra. |