there was no United States Navy or United States Coast Guard ship in the area at the time and place specified. In both of the other cases in the Soviet note of August 5, United States vessels were in the vicinity of Soviet vessels, but did not engage in any dangerous maneuvers. The Soviet note charging that a Coast Guard vessel on June 1 approached within 50 meters of the Soviet vessel "Dalni Vostok," is in error. The Coast Guard vessel confirms, however, that it witnessed another ship, which was not of United States registry, run parallel to the Soviet vessel and cut across the bow of the Soviet ship.

United States commanders are under strictest instructions not to approach foreign vessels closer than is necessary for common practice of establishing identification in international waters. The United States adheres to the rights of all ships and aircraft to engage in peaceful operations in and over international waters without harassment and United States vessels and aircraft are instructed to perform accordingly.

On the other hand, on a number of occasions in recent months, United States vessels have encountered harassment by Soviet ships. In the last three months alone the following incidents occurred: On June 30 at a position of 40°35′ north and 65°43' west, the Soviet trawler "Rauda" P5054 with stern designation "2516-Port Dayoda," maneuvered dangerously within 150 yards of the U.S.S. "D.A. Joy" causing the United States vessel to sound the danger signal and use emergency speeds to avoid collision. On August 18, 1964, the Soviet vessel Dubna," in passage between Cuba and Haiti, maneuvered irresponsibly near the U.S.S. "Dash" and created a dangerous situation. In bringing these incidents to the attention of the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States assumes that the Soviet Government will take the necessary measures to assure that Soviet pilots and masters do not violate international practices.

Part VII

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

A. Regional Developments and Policies

Document VII-1

The First Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, January 13-17, 1964: STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE COUNCIL OF KINGS AND HEADS OF STATE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, JANUARY 17, 1964 (EXCERPTS)1

The Council of the Kings and Heads of States of the Arab League in its first session held at the Arab League premises in Cairo from January 13-17, 1964, upon the suggestion of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic;

Having studied the threats, and the continuous acts of aggression practised by Israel, since it evicted the Arab Palestine people from their home, and since it established an occupying imperialist force on their territory, practising racial discrimination against the Arab minority, adopting the policy of aggression and de facto as its base, and insisting on ignoring the resolutions of the United Nations which assure the natural right of these people to return to their home, belittling the repeated condemnations recorded to its account by the organs of the International Organization;

3

Having examined the dangerous new aggression about to be mounted by Israel against Arab waters, by diverting the course of the River Jordan, and the grievous damage done to the rights of Arabs benefiting from these waters with the object of realising Zionist expansionist policies by bringing more aggressive forces, and setting up further centres of aggression against the security and progress of Arab countries and world peace;

1 The First Arab Summit Conference, Cairo (13-17 January 1964) (Cairo, U.A.R. Information Department), pp. 17-19. This conference was attended by the heads of state of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, Yemen, and by the President of the Lebanese Council of Ministers (Karami) and the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Libya (Hassan el-Rida el-Senussi), King Hassan II of Morocco left the conference, Jan. 15, 1964; Maj. Gen. el-Hafez, President of the National Council of the Command of the Revolution and President of the Syrian Council of Ministers, walked out of the conference, Jan. 16, 1964. (See The New York Times, Jan. 16-17, 1964.) A representative of Palestine (Shukairy) also attended.

'Suggested in his speech of Dec. 23, 1963, at Port Said (p. 5 of the source text); proposed in a note of Dec. 24, 1963, from the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry to the General Secretariat of the Arab League (ibid., pp. 6-7).

* See post, docs. VII-10-21.

'See post, doc. VII-11.

And in pursuance of the legitimate right of self-defence;

Fully persuaded of the sacred right of the Palestinian Arab people to selfdetermination, and emancipation from the Zionist colonialisation of their nation, and that Arab solidarity is the means to offset avaricious imperialist designs, and to realise equitable joint Arab interests, and to raise the standard of living of the majority, and implement construction and rehabilitation programmes;

5

Has adopted the practical resolutions essential to ward off the imminent Zionist menace whether in the defensive or technical domains, or in the field of organising the people of Palestine and enabling them to play their role in liberating their fatherland and attaining self-determination;"

The Council meetings also resulted in the Kings and Heads of State unanimously agreeing to settle all differences, to clear the Arab atmosphere of all blemishes, to suspend all campaigns by information media, to consolidate relations between the Arab sister-states, to ensure collective cooperative reconstruction, and to ward off the aggressive expansionist designs menacing all Arabs alike;

8

The Council also considered that the convening of more of these meetings at the highest levels is a matter necessitated by supreme Arab interests;

The Council decided that the Kings and Heads of State, meet at least once a year, and that the next meeting be held in Alexandria in the month of August 1964.

The Arab Kings and Heads of State declare that the Arab nation calls upon those nations and people of the world which cherish the rights of individuals in their homelands, and the rights of peoples to utilise their resources, and to self-determination, to extend to it the staunchest support in repelling the new Israeli aggression.

They affirm that, adopting this just and defensive stand, they will regulate their political and economic relations with other countries according to the stands of these countries towards the Arabs' legitimate struggle against Zionist designs in the Arab world.10

The Arab Kings and Heads of States further affirm their conviction in the Justice of the Arab struggle and in the need of supporting this struggle against imperialism in the occupied Yemini South " and in Oman," as well as their belief in the justice of the national struggle in Angola,13 South Africa" and in every part in the world, for the causes of liberty and justice are integral and indivisible.

The resolutions were secret.

In a news conference of Jan. 17, 1964, the Secretary-General of the Arab League (Hassuna) said the conference appointed U.A.R. Lt. Gen. Aly Amer, Commander-in-Chief of a Unified Military Command and had agreed to finance $14,437,500 of the cost (later estimated at $160 million) of a proposed 18-month Arab Jordan River diversion project. (See pp. 20-26 of the source text; The New York Times, Sept. 12, 1964; and footnote 54 to doc. VII-8, post.)

'The conference entrusted Ahmed El Shukairy with the task of bringing about an Entity of Palestine. (See pp. 21-22 of the source text; and footnote 55 to doc. VII-8, post.)

Jordan and the United Arab Republic agreed to resume diplomatic relations, Jan. 15, 1964.

D See post, doc. VII-8.

10

See footnote 58 to doc. VII-8, post.

"See post, docs. VII-33-37.

12 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 599.

13 See ante, doc. II-44.

14 See post, docs. VIII-40-51.

Document VII-2

"Any Intended Victim of Any Would-Be Aggressor [in the Near East] Can Count on Our Support": ADDRESS BY THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (JOHNSON) BEFORE THE CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 20, 1964 (EXCERPT) 15

Our objectives in the Middle East are clear and can be briefly stated. First, as a fundamental contribution to world peace, we are deeply concerned with helping to create political stability, to advancing economic development, and to modernizing the social systems of the area. Our concern is both for the sake of the peoples involved and for strengthening the free world against expansion by those hostile to it. Second, we are concerned to limit hostile Soviet influence in the Arab experience with the Soviet Union since 1955 has tended to increase awareness that the Near East in fact shares in larger measure mutual interests with the West.

Third, there should be an accommodation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which we believe is the only way in which the area as a whole can develop political stability, self-sustained economic growth, and, thus, true independence. We know this is difficult, but we also know it is important to our national security interests and to the attainment of our objectives in the area.

Fourth, the continued flow of oil at economically reasonable rates to Western Europe is of great importance. Europe's economic strength, so essential to free-world strength, relies on an elastic supply of Near Eastern oil at reasonable cost. The oil-producing states, conversely, have an interest in Western markets.

Fifth, access to the air and sea routes to and through the Near East is important to us commercially and militarily.

In trying to achieve these objectives, we face certain forces and factors that may enhance or hinder our efforts. Among the more important are:

1. Arab nationalism. On its positive side, the drive for Arab unity and national dignity is based on the dream of a national, unified, and prosperous Arab future. Although Arab nationalism has a large component of neutralism, it is also one of the strongest forces resisting Soviet expansionism in the area.

Negatively, Arab nationalism contains the strains of resentment and suspicion engendered by the colonial past and by the frustrations of the mid-20th century. In the past year ideological and practical differences between various Arab national groups have even been the cause of regrettable violence, governmental upsets, and continued instability. We are not opposed to Arab unity. We do believe, however, that all the peoples of the area have a right to determine how and when it will be realized.

15

Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 10, 1964, pp. 208-211.

2. The historical gap in social, cultural, and political understanding poses serious difficulties of communication between us and the peoples and governments of the area. Bridging this gap is in itself a continuing major challenge to our Government, for without a bridge our efforts to be helpful may be misunderstood and stultified.

3. The Soviet drive for domination is demonstrated by the continued Soviet efforts to create dissension and undermine any trends toward peace and stability in the area. The Soviet position and Communist potential in the Near East have markedly declined in the past few years, but the Communists have by no means given up their objectives.

4. The Near East is important to us in its own right, but we live in one world. Our Near Eastern interests must be fitted into and sometimes must necessarily be modified by our worldwide security and strategic concerns. At times what we would like to do in the Near East may be obstructed by what we must do elsewhere in the world.

Those are the main forces and factors constituting the policy environment in which we seek to attain our Near Eastern objectives. In that policy environment we are faced constantly with choices. Practically speaking, we are faced with such questions as:

1. How can we deal with a single Arab state without alienating other Arab states temporarily at odds with it? Or

2. How can we maintain constructive relations with the more conservative and traditional states without stifling modernist democratic forces in the area? Or

3. How can we act to insure the security and integrity of the individual states of the area, including Israel, without becoming directly involved in their disputes and losing our ability to act as a moderating influence in area disputes? How can we most effectively pursue our bilateral relationships with individual Arab states without appearing to stand in the way of the attainment of Arab unity?

Over the years we have found that an essential element in a workable Near Eastern policy is to avoid taking sides in regional disputes. This does not mean that we will stand idly by if aggression is committed. We have shown we will not. Nor does it mean that we will not use appropriate occasions to be helpful to disputing parties or to discuss frankly possible solutions to issues and problems as we see them. We do this constantly. Whenever possible, we also do it quietly. We have an interest in the independence and well-being of all the states of the Near East. Instability, uncertainty, and insecurity in one Near Eastern state may quickly spread into the region as a whole. We cannot afford to pick and choose. We must maintain constructive and balanced relationships with the area as a whole. This we have endeavored to do. It was in this spirit that last May 8 President Kennedy publicly reiterated our general policy. He said in part:

The United States supports social and economic and political progress in the Middle East. We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. ... We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East,