British practice, but we are sorry that they feel that way." We do not think it is a good contribution to our general relations with the Soviet Union because by making credit for these necessary peaceful purchases available on this long term as 15 years [sic] we allow the Soviet Union to divert other resources to military and unpeaceful purposes, and we do not think that that is a wise course to pursue.32

Document VI-11

Removal of Nikita S. Khrushchev and Election of Leonid I. Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PLENARY MEETING OF OCTOBER 14 OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, ISSUED OCTOBER 16, 1964 3

33

A plenary meeting of the central committee of the C.P.S.U. was held on October 14.

The plenary meeting of the C.P.S.U. central committee granted N. S. Khrushchev's request that he be relieved of his duties as first secretary of the C.P.S.U. central committee, member of the presidium of the C.P.S.U. central committee and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers in view of his advanced age and the deterioration of his health."

The plenary meeting of the C.P.S.U. central committee elected L. I. Brezhnev first secretary of the C.P.S.U. central committee.

Document VI-12

36

Removal of Nikita S. Khrushchev and Appointment of Alexei N. Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.: STATEMENT ON THE MEETING OF OCTOBER 15 OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET, ISSUED OCTOBER 16, 1964 36

The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet met on October 15, with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in the chair.

The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet discussed the question of the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Maudling) said, Sept. 9, 1964, that the United Kingdom would not sell strategic materials to the U.S.S.R. but would grant long-term credits for Soviet purchases of nonstrategic products. (See ibid., Sept. 10, 1964.)

A French-Soviet 5-year trade agreement of Oct. 30, 1964, provided for extension of $357 million in French credit to the U.S.S.R. for a period of 7 years. Soviet News, Oct. 16, 1964, p. 33. This announcement was issued shortly after midnight (Moscow time) on the night of Oct. 15-16, 1964. See the Washington Evening Star, Oct. 16, 1964.

34 Mr. Khrushchev was born in Kalinovka in what is now the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Apr. 17, 1894.

35

Mr. Brezhnev, born in Kamenskoye (now Dneprodzerzhinsk) in what is now the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Dec. 16, 1906, was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, June 21, 1963.

36

Soviet News, Oct. 16, 1964, p. 33. The Soviet News Agency, Tass, issued this announcement shortly after midnight (Moscow time) on the night of Oct. 15-16, 1964; see The New York Times, Oct. 16, 1964.

The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet granted Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's request that he be relieved of the duties of Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers in view of his advanced age and the deterioration of his health.

The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet appointed Comrade Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., releasing him from his duties as First Vice-Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers."

The decrees of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on the release of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev from his duties as Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and on the appointment of Comrade A. N. Kosygin as Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers were adopted unanimously by the members of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet."

The members of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet warmly congratulated Comrade Kosygin on his appointment to the post of Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

Comrade Kosygin heartily thanked the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for the confidence shown in him and gave an assurance that he would do his utmost to discharge his duties.

Document VI-13

United States Readiness for Talks With the New Soviet Leaders in the Cause of Peace: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BROADCAST OCTOBER 18, 1964 39

My fellow Americans:

On Thursday of last week, from the Kremlin in Moscow, the Soviet Government announced a change in its leadership.40

We do not know exactly what happened to Nikita Khrushchev last Thursday. We do know that he has been forced out of power by his former friends and colleagues. Five days ago he had only praise in Moscow. Today we learn only of his faults.+1

Yet the men at the top today are the same men that he picked for leadership. These men carried on the administration of the Soviet Government when he was absent from the Soviet capital, and that was nearly half of the time that he was in power.42

" Mr. Kosygin, born in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), Feb. 20, 1904 was appointed first Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, May 5, 1960. Texts in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XVI, No. 40, Oct. 28, 1964, p. 3.

38

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. II, pp. 1377-1380.

40 See ante, docs. VI-11-12.

"For a report on the criticism of Khrushchev's leadership, see The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1964.

"In the past 7 years Mr. Khrushchev had been away from Moscow 234 years." (Reply made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a question asked on the ABC radio and television program "Issues and Answers," Oct. 18, 1964-Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1964, p. 655.)

Mr. Khrushchev was clearly the dominant figure in making Soviet policy. After Lenin and Stalin, he is only the third man in history to have made himself the undisputed master of Communist Russia.

There were times when he was guilty of dangerous adventure. It required great American firmness and good sense-first in Berlin," and later in the Cuban missile crises to turn back his threats and actions without war.

44

Yet he learned from his mistakes, and he was not blind to realities. In the last 2 years his government had shown itself aware of the need for sanity in the nuclear age.

45

He joined in the nuclear test ban treaty. He joined in the "hot line" which can help prevent a war by accident. He agreed that space should be kept free of nuclear weapons. In these actions he demonstrated good sense and sober judgment. We do not think it was these actions that led to his removal.

We cannot know for sure just what did lead to this secret decision. Our intelligence estimate is that Khrushchev learned of the decision only when for him it was too late.

There has been discontent and strain and failure both within the Soviet Union and within the Communist bloc as a whole.48 All of this has been evident for all to see. These troubles are not the creation of one man. They will not end with his removal.

When Lenin died in 1924, Stalin took 4 years to consolidate his power. When Stalin died in 1953, it was not Mr. Khrushchev who first emerged.

But two men now share top responsibility in the Soviet Union, and their exact relation to each other and to their colleagues is not yet very clear. They are experienced, but younger men, and perhaps less rooted in the past.19 They are said to be realistic. We can hope that they will share with us our great objective-the prevention of nuclear

war.

But what does all this mean for us in America? It means at least four things:

First, we must never forget that the men in the Kremlin remain dedicated, dangerous Communists. A time of trouble among Communists requires steady vigilance among free men-and most of all among Americans. For it is the strength of the United States that holds the balance firm against danger.

Second, there will be turmoil in the Communist world. It is likely that the men in the Kremlin will be concerned primarily with problems of communism. This would not be all good, because there are problems and issues that need attention between our world and theirs.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591-619; ibid., 1959, pp. 588-764; ibid., 1960, pp. 382 ff.; ibid., 1961, pp. 584–670; ibid., 1962, pp. 681-725.

44 See ibid., 1962, pp. 399-471.

45 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 1032-1034.

See ibid., pp. 522–523.

47 See ibid., pp. 1082-1083.

48 See post, doc. IX-35, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 50.

49

See footnote 35 to VI-11, ante; footnote 37 to VI-12, supra.

But it is not all bad, because men who are busy with internal problems may not be tempted to reckless external acts.

Third, this great change will not stop the forces in Eastern Europe that are working for greater independence. Those forces will continue to have our sympathy. We will not give up our hope of building new bridges to these peoples.50

Fourth, our own course must continue to prove that we on our side are ready to get on with the work of peace.

51

The new Soviet Government has officially informed me through Ambassador Dobrynin, day before yesterday, that it plans no change in basic foreign policy. I spoke frankly, as always, to the Soviet Ambassador. I told him that the quest for peace in America had never been more determined than it is now. I told him that we intend to bury no one, and we do not intend to be buried.52 I reminded the Ambassador of the danger that we all faced 2 years ago in Cuba. I told him that any Soviet Government which is ready to work for peace will find us ready in America. I said to the Ambassador that I would be ready to talk to anyone, when it would help the cause of peace. I believe that this was a good beginning, on both sides.

Document VI-14

Soviet $555 Million Military Budget Reduction for 1965 in Response to "Corresponding Declarations... of the United States": REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE U.S.S.R. (KOSYGIN) TO THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET, DECEMBER 9, 1964 (EXCERPT) 53

The Soviet government has examined the question of the further reduction of the Soviet Union's defense expenditures. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers is submitting for your discussion a proposal to stipulate in the 1965 budget a reduction of 500,000,000 rubles" in the expenditures on the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces. Representatives of the U.S. government have made corresponding declarations to us about the plans of the government of the United States. It follows from these declarations that the U.S. government also intends to reduce its military expenditures in the 1965-1966 fiscal year.

50 See ante, docs. V-1 et seq.

51

For the text of an Oct 16, 1964, statement of President Johnson on his meeting that day with Soviet Ambassador Dobryin, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, vol. II, p. 1356.

52 At a Kremlin reception on Nov. 17, 1956, Chairman Khrushchev was reported to have said: "If you don't like us, don't accept our invitations, and don't invite us to come to see you. Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you!" (Time, Nov. 26, 1956.) This was denied by the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, Oct. 5, 1957.

63

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XVI, No. 49, Dec. 30, 1964, pp. 3-13.

84 One ruble equals U.S. $1.11 at the official rate.

"It was reported "that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, might have been told of the Administration's budget plans by Secretary of State Dean Rusk during their recent meetings in New York," Nov. 30, 1964; see The New York Times, Dec. 1, 6, 10, 1964. Mr. Gromyko also met with President Johnson in Washington, Dec. 9, 1964; see ibid., Dec. 10, 1964.

Thus the reduction in the Soviet Union's military expenditures in the budget for the coming year and the expected reduction in the military expenditures of the U.S.A. are a definite positive step in the direction of reducing international tension.56

Soviet-United States Agreement on Fishing Operations in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON BY THE U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (HARRIMAN) AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON (DOBRYNIN), DECEMBER 14, 1964 58

B. Cultural, Technical, and Educational Exchanges

[See also post, doc. X-83.]

Document VI-16

Soviet-United States Cultural Exchange Agreement for the Years 1964 and 1965, SIGNED AT MOSCOW BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR (KOHLER) AND THE STATE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET STATE COMMITTEE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES (ROMANOVSKY), FEBRUARY 22, 1964 1

1

By agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, delegations headed on the United States side by Foy D. Kohler, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and on the Soviet side by S. K. Romanovsky, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, conducted negotiations in Moscow from January 7

50 See President Johnson's Message to Congress on the State of the Nation's Defenses, Jan. 18, 1965; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, vol. I, pp. 62-71. U.S. defense expenditures for fiscal year 1965 were expected to be approximately $2 billion less than 1964, and expenditures for fiscal year 1966 were expected to be lower by another $300 million.

68

57 The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on Dec. 11, 1964, unanimously approved the 1965 budget which provided for estimated expenditures of 99.4 billion rubles (U.S. $110,334,000,000) with a military expenditures reduction of 500 million rubles from the 1964 figure to 12.8 billion rubles (U.S. $14,208,000,000) in 1965. TIAS 5703; 15 UST 2179. This agreement entered into force, Dec. 14, 1964. 1 TIAS 5582; 15 UST 554. This agreement entered into force Feb. 22, with effect from Jan. 1, 1964. For the text of the agreement on cultural exchanges for the years 1962-1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 726-740.

Negotiation of this agreement was delayed by the Barghoorn incident; see ibid., 1963, pp. 556–557.