would lead to an early resumption of fighting, which might well develop into heavy conflict.

125. If the Security Council decides to extend the Force, I regret to have to report that it will be necessary to obtain a new Commander for it. General P. S. Gyani, the Commander of the Force, informed me before undertaking this assignment that for compelling personal reasons it would not be possible for him to continue in this capacity beyond the original three months' tour of duty, that is, only until 27 June. In response to an inquiry from me as to whether his circumstances have changed in such a way as to permit him to consider service beyond 27 June, he has recently reiterated the necessity of his being relieved then. In expressing his regrets, he informed me that his situation has not changed and that he must leave the command by the end of this month. General Gyani has rendered highly distinguished service to the United Nations in the exercise of his command in Cyprus. He has demonstrated great competence both in the military and diplomatic spheres. I am deeply grateful for the substantial contribution he has made. In view of the eventuality of having to appoint a new Commander of the Force if the Security Council should extend it beyond 27 June, I have made an exploratory approach to General Kodendera Subayya Thimayya of India, former Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, who is now retired. General Thimayya has indicated to me that he would be available, should I call upon him, and it is my intention to appoint him Commander of the Force under paragraph 4 of the Council's resolution of 4 March, if the Force is in fact extended."

126. The approximate amount of voluntary contributions pledged towards meeting the expenses of the Force in its initial period is approximately $5,500,000.1 The provisional estimate of the United Nations financial obligations for the operation of UNFICYP for the three-month period ending 27 June totals $5,430,000. If the Force should be extended for a second period of three months, it is estimated that the additional costs will approximate $7,300,000. This increased amount for the second period is due primarily to the anticipated claims of certain Governments providing contingents to the Force for what is described as "one-time costs" in respect to equipment and supplies taken to Cyprus and also to the fact that not all units have been in Cyprus for the entire period of the first three months. Should the Force be extended, it will remain to be determined whether this increased amount could be raised through voluntary contributions. I have no assurance of this at present.

127. I feel bound to point out that, although I well understand the reasons for it and realize that there is little or no possibility of change, the method of financing the Force in Cyprus as defined in the Security Council resolution of 4 March, is most unsatisfactory. Since funds are available only through voluntary contributions, there is a large degree of uncertainty about what will be actually available, and therefore the planning and advance arrangements essential to an efficient and economical operation are sorely hampered.

128. Parallel with the operations of the Force, efforts at promoting a peaceful solution by mediation and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem, as envisaged in paragraph 7 of the resolution of 4 March 1964, have been maintained continuously since I designated Mr. Sakari Tuomioja as the Mediator on 25 March. In accordance with the terms of reference set out in the resolution, the Mediator has throughout the period been in consultation with the representatives of the Cyprus communities and with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, seeking to find a sufficient measure of common ground on which to encourage the parties to develop the basis for a long-term solution of the problem. Given the circumstances which have prevailed in Cyprus, including the very wide differences between the political viewpoints and objectives of the leaders of the communities, the task of the Mediator could not have been expected to be an easy one, nor likely to lead to positive results

"For a list of the contributions pledged for the period Mar. 27, 1964-Jan. 5, 1965, see post, doc. IV-149.

1U.N. Secretary-General Thant confirmed Lt. Gen. Thimayya's appointment as Commander of the Force after the term of service of the Force had been extended; see post, doc. IV-122.

in a relatively short time. The Mediator's experience has confirmed this and he will continue his patient endeavors with the parties concerned, while reporting periodically to me as envisaged by the resolution of 4 March. It will be recalled that, unlike the mandate of the Force, the Mediator's mandate does not prescribe any fixed period.

Document IV-120

Turkish Decision To Postpone Intervention and To Discuss Settlement of the Cyprus Question With the United States: ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY (INONÜ) BEFORE THE TURKISH SENATE, JUNE 18, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 2

In the middle of May we started preparations [for a landing in Cyprus]. On 3-4 June the United States contacted us. We were asked whether we intended to go into action. Following lengthy discussions, we reached agreement that action should be postponed. A message I received from President Johnson ... [opposed] the intervention. I discussed it with the government and the attempt was stopped. The U.S. President said: "Do not embark on this attempt. Let us discuss the matter together and reach a compromise, an agreement." I shall fully explain this proposal and the reply given to it in a secret session.

What I wish to state clearly is this: We have postponed our right to intervene. I have decided to have talks with the President of the United States. This matter has been exhaustively debated in the National Assembly. First a secret session was held, then I asked the National Assembly for a vote of confidence. After lengthy discussions the debate in the National Assembly ended. Now the assembly will cast its vote.

Honorable Colleagues: I stated in the National Assembly that the aim of the vote of confidence was the final phase of the Cyprus question. Naturally, following this final phase, fresh talks will be held. I have asked for a vote of confidence for those talks.

In this new phase of the Cyprus question we are beginning our contacts with the United States. The United States does not want an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece. It wants an agreement between the two countries. This is what we are going to discuss. I believe that these talks will last fairly long. But our friends . . are of the opinion that a quick form of settlement should be found. This means that after six months the American Government has embarked on serious activity with its allies. I shall learn what they are thinking after I come in contact with them. We cannot allow ourselves to be carried away by an illusion that the matter can be settled immediately.

This is the final phase of the Cyprus question. If I obtain a vote of confidence in the National Assembly tomorrow, I shall leave on Sunday morning. In all probability, if I fail to secure a vote of confidence, the formation of the government and the administration of the country will, in accordance with the constitution, be reorganized. In view of the new developments, the National Assembly must support the government. If the task is entrusted to us, I shall continue to perform my duties in earnest as I have done thus far.

Our right of intervention is valid. When the conditions justify it, it is our duty to exercise this right. As long as we are in power we shall perform our duty with courage. If we fall from power-and this is a natural result-the political parties which vote against us will have to assume duties. The new gov

'Department of State files.

3 Ambassador Hare in Ankara invited Prime Minister Inönü for talks in Washington, June 4, 1964; see post, doc. IV-123.

For President Johnson's letter of June 5, 1964, and Prime Minister Inönü's reply of June 13, 1964, see The Middle East Journal, summer 1966, pp. 386-388 and 388-393.

ernment will include the Cyprus question in its program. When the new government is formed, we shall express confidence in the policy it will pursue in the Cyprus question. The policy on this subject is based on common, stable and unquestionable elements. A government that comes to power after us will pursue these national rights.

Document IV-121

United States Support of a Three-Month Extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 19, 1964 6

Document IV-122

Extension of the Mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for a Period of Three Months, Ending September 26, 1964: RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 20, 19647

The Security Council,

Noting that the report of the Secretary-General [S/5764 and Add. 1] considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months to be useful and advisable,9

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March and 13 March 1964,10

Expressing its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the resolution of 4 March 1964,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 and 13 March 1964;

2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General [S/5764 and Add. 1];

4. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 September 1964.

Prime Minister Inönü won a vote of confidence in the Turkish National Assembly by a vote of 200 to 194, with 2 abstentions, taken June 19, 1964. Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1964, pp. 64-67.

'U.N. doc. S/5778. This resolution, sponsored by the Representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway, was adopted unanimously. Ante, doc. IV-105.

See ante, doc. IV-119.

10 Ante, doc. IV-112.

Document IV-123

Turkish-United States Discussion on Possible Adjustment of Difficulties in Cyprus by Negotiation and Agreement: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT WASHINGTON BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON) AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY (InÖNÜ), JUNE 23, 1964 11

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey and President Johnson have discussed all aspects of the problem of Cyprus. Both leaders welcomed the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit at the President's invitation for a full exchange of views.

The discussion, proceeding from the present binding effects of existing treaties,12 covered ways in which present difficulties might be adjusted by negotiation and agreement. The urgent necessity for such agreement upon lasting solutions was underlined.

The Prime Minister and the President also considered ways in which their countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the safety and security of the communities on Cyprus.

The cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that their peoples are devoted to common democratic principles, to individual freedom, to human dignity and to peace in justice.

Document IV-124

Greek-United States Support of United Nations Efforts for Establishment of Peace in Cyprus: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT WASHINGTON BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON) AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE (PAPANDREOU), JUNE 25, 1964 13

During the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister of Greece conversations were held between Mr. George A. Papandreou and the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and other officials of the United States Government.

The conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordiality, have contributed to the strengthening of the close ties between Greece and the United States.

The visit provided the opportunity to the Greek Prime Minister and the President of the United States to review various aspects of the international situation and to discuss subjects of mutual interest.

"Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1964, p. 49. Prime Minister Inönü visited Williamsburg, Va., June 21-22, Washington, June 22-23, and New York, June 23-26, 1964.

12 See footnote 51 to doc. IV-105, ante.

13

Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1964, p. 50. Prime Minister Papandreou visited Williamsburg, Va., June 23-24, Washington, June 24-26, New York, June 26-28, 1964.

The President of the United States and the Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful exchange of views on the Cyprus situation. Both expressed full support of the efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the island and for rapidly finding a permanent solution. The Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the Greek position on the problem. He emphasized that a permanent solution should be based upon the principles of democracy and justice. The two leaders reiterated their determination to make every effort to increase the understanding among allies.

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep appreciation for the generous support of the United States Government and people in the hard struggle of the Greek people for their freedom and welfare.

Document IV-125

United States Proposal for an Immediate Cease-Fire in Cyprus by All Parties Concerned: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, August 9, 1964 14

All of us who have been present at the discussions of this question have had ample evidence of the depth of feeling that exists between the two communities in Cyprus and the homicidal consequences of their mistrust and bitterness. And we have had repeated and bloody reminders that the danger is not just to the inhabitants of Cyprus. The danger is even greater: The danger is international war.

The responsibility of the Council is to stop hostilities-and until all are stopped, none will stop. Archbishop Makarios says that unless Turkey stops its air attacks by 12:00 noon he will launch a fullscale attack on the Turkish community and forces.15 The Government of Turkey says that until the Greeks in Cyprus stop attacking the Turks the air attacks will continue.16

I repeat that in these circumstances until all hostilities stop, none will stop, and, perhaps in a matter of hours, we will be over the brink and in the abyss. And none can see the bottom. Most of us, perhaps all of us, wanted an immediate cease-fire last night. We didn't get it. Today the situation is even more urgent. The situation demands swift action. Our first responsibility is to stop the fighting before it is too late.

To ascertain and debate the facts, to try to apportion the blame for this deplorable situation, may be an appropriate task for the Security Council when time and circumstance permit. But unless the present flames are quenched, and quenched quickly, they will spread, fanned

14 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 318.

15

Cyprus requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council dealing with Turkish air attacks on Cyprus, Aug. 8, 1964 (U.N. doc. S/5861).

10

18 Turkey requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider Greek Cypriot use of force against the Turkish community in Cyprus, Aug. 8, 1964 (U.N. doc. S/5859).