I should like, Mr. President, to express the hope that your Government will correctly understand the motives which guide the Soviet Government, raising anew its voice in defense of the just cause of the Republic of Cyprus, and will take due account of the considerations set forth in this appeal."

Document IV-96

United States Offer To Participate as a Junior Partner in an International Peace Force in Cyprus: REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 7, 1964 (EXCERPT) 19

... As you know, we have made some proposals [for establishment of a peace-keeping force in Cyprus] to the interested governments.20 We ourselves have felt for a period of months, as you know, that the primary responsibility in this matter was for the Government of Cyprus-the authorities on Cyprus-and the three guar

antor powers.

Then there came a moment when it appeared that some new element would have to be injected into the situation if an agreement could be reached,21 and one strong suggestion from those involved was that the presence of forces from some other countries might assist, because Britain, Greece, and Turkey, who have forces on the island, had long connections with the problem and perhaps had had some special difficulties in relation to it.

Well, on that basis, if our friends felt that our contribution toward an international force, in which we would be a junior partner, would be helpful, we were prepared to entertain that, but on the basis that this would be acceptable to all those involved.

Now, these matters are now being discussed further. And I think since they are now being taken up in capitals with the governments with the several capitals involved-that I should not comment on it much further here today.

Document IV-97

The Ball Mission to London, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia for Discussions on Establishment of an International Force in Cyprus: STATEMENT READ BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NEWS (MCCLOSKEY), DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 8, 1964 23

The Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, and aides will fly to London tonight to consult with British officials on the Cyprus situation. He will depart from Andrews Air Force Base. His departure time is

18 For President Johnson's reply, see post, doc. IV-104.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 283.

"See ante, doc. IV-92.

See ante, doc. IV-93.

* See infra.

"Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 284.

11 p.m. In this connection I want to make the following statement: This seems a good moment to reiterate this Government's basic approach to the situation in Cyprus. The United States welcomed the independence of Cyprus in 1960. It has since maintained close and cordial relations with that Republic. It has followed with sympathy and understanding the efforts to work out the problems that have arisen between the two communities in Cyprus.

The independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus are the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus. They have been guaranteed by the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In January officials of the Government of Cyprus as well as of the three guarantor powers indicated their desire that the United States play a more active role in the increasingly difficult Cyprus situation. In response the United States has undertaken to explore ways in which it might usefully contribute to the reestablishment of peaceful conditions as well as to the creation of mechanisms to assist in bringing about a long-term solution.

Against this background the United States has participated in discussions of the proposed creation of an international force that might help to bring about the maintenance of peace and order.24 Those discussions are still proceeding.

The United States wants to make clear that it has no preconceptions or preferences as to the shape or form of final solutions that might be developed for the Cyprus problem. Nor does it have dogmatic views as to the institutional arrangements that should be employed in the present situation or the relationship of those arrangements to the United Nations. It is concerned only that the immediate and longterm problems be solved in ways that will contribute to the welfare of the Cypriot population. It wishes only to be helpful. It does not wish to impose anything on anybody.

At the same time the United States must emphasize that it does have a major interest in the maintenance of peace in the eastern Mediterranean-an interest which it fortunately shares with many other nations. It will do whatever it can to assure that objective.25

Document IV-98

Imminent Transfer of the Cyprus Problem to the United Nations Security Council Following a Deadlock in Negotiations: REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) ON THE VOA PROGRAM "PRESS CONFERENCE, USA," TAPED FEBRUARY 14, 1964 26

No, [the United States is not afraid to let the Cyprus issue come before the United Nations Security Council,] it is on the agenda of

24 See ante, doc. IV-92.

Under Secretary of State Ball visited London, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia, Feb. 9-17, 1964.

26

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1964, pp. 332-333. Text released Feb. 15, 1964.

the Security Council. It has been there before, and I'm sure will be there again, perhaps at almost any time. The problem is not one of fear of having it discussed at the Security Council but to find an answer-find a solution. And we have felt that a negotiated solution would be a much quicker way to come to terms with the problem, to restore peace on the island, to establish the political processes of settlement, than to go into the Security Council just to have a debate without knowing what the result might be. Because such a debate might further inflame the passions on all sides and make the situation more, rather than less, dangerous. But I would suppose this would be in the Security Council very shortly.28

Document IV-99

United Kingdom Request for a Meeting of the United Nations Security Council To Resolve the Dangerous Situation in Cyprus: LETTER FROM THE U.K. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (DEAN) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (BERNARDES), FEBRUARY 15, 1964 (EXCERPT) 29

The present political difficulties in Cyprus have their origin in a dispute between the two communities on the island, which dispute has led to a progressive deterioration in internal security. International concern with this problem stems from the special Treaty relationships to which I have referred and which, as I have noted, impose particular responsibilities on the guarantor Powers. After the request by the Government of Cyprus that the Government of the United Kingdom, in conjunction with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, should use the troops stationed in Cyprus to assist in securing the preservation of the cease-fire and the restoration of peace had been met," it became clear that an augmented force would be required if conditions of internal security were to be restored. The Government of the United Kingdom have been in constant consultation with the Government of Cyprus and with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and with a number of other Governments about the need to associate the forces of other nations in an international peace-keeping arrangement on the island.32

While agreement on these arrangements has been reached among the guarantor Powers and certain other Governments, I regret to have to inform you that owing to the inability so far of the Government of Cyprus to agree, it has not yet proved possible to bring the arrangements contemplated into effect. Meanwhile, security in the island of Cyprus has seriously deteriorated and tension between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has risen gravely. This deterioration culminated in a serious act of violence in the town of Limassol on 12 February 1964.39 In these grave circumstances, I have been

"By virtue of the Cypriot request of Dec. 26, 1963; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 472.

29 See infra.

2 U.N. doc. S/5543.

30 Reference to the Treaty of Guarantee of Aug. 16, 1960, between Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom; Cmnd. No. 1253; 382 UNTS 3.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 475-477.

22 See ante, docs. IV-92-93, 96–97.

Communal fighting in Limassol began Feb. 11, was temporarily halted by a cease-fire obtained through efforts of U.K. forces in Cyprus, and erupted again, Feb. 12, 1964.

instructed by my Government to request that an early meeting of the Security Council be called to consider this urgent matter and to take appropriate steps to ensure that the dangerous situation which now prevails can be resolved with a full regard to the rights and responsibilities of both of the Cypriot communities, of the Government of Cyprus and of the Governments party to the Treaty of Guarantee.

Document IV-100

United Nations Appeal for Efforts To End Violence in Cyprus: TELEGRAM FROM THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (THANT) TO THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS (ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS), THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER (PALAMAS) AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER (ERKIN), FEBRUARY 15, 1964 31

Document IV-101

The United Kingdom Decision To Bring the Cyprus Problem to the United Nations Security Council: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.K. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (SANDYS) IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 17, 1964 35

The House will recall that after the serious fighting just before Christmas, the British, Greek and Turkish Governments offered the use of their troops in the island to help restore law and order. The offer was accepted by President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk. A joint force was set up under a British commander, and had some success in halting the fighting."

While the immediate task was to stop the bloodshed, it was clear that there could be no peace in Cyprus without a settlement of the inter-communal problem. It seemed wise, in the first instance, to try to achieve such a settlement through direct negotiation between the parties concerned; and a conference was convened in London for this purpose."

37

At the same time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was invited to send a representative to Cyprus to observe the progress of the peace-keeping operation, and he appointed General Gyani to undertake this task.

However, while the conference was proceeding, the position in Cyprus began to deteriorate and renewed acts of violence in various parts of the island occurred. In the light of this worsening situation, it was agreed in principle by all of the parties at the conference that a more broadly based international peace-keeping force must be established as quickly as possible. However, when it came to decide the composition, terms of reference and method of control of such a force, it was not found possible to reach agreement.

The British Government and the Governments of Greece and Turkey considered that it would be best to invite certain other members of the N.A.T.O. Alliance to provide the necessary troops, though not, of course, as a N.A.T.O. operation or under N.A.T.O. control. There were two reasons why we took this view. The first was that these countries had forces close at hand and immediately available. The second was that all N.A.T.O. members had a direct

4U.N. doc. S/5554. For the texts of the replies to this telegram see U.N. doc. S/5554 and Add. 1.

25

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 689, House of Commons, cols. 840-843.

36

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 475-477.

37 Jan. 15, 1964.

* Jan. 17, 1964; see ante, doc. IV–91.

interest in stopping an inter-communal conflict in Cyprus which, if allowed to develop, could all too easily lead to a clash between two N.A.T.O. allies.

Our first approach was made to the Government of the United States and together we worked out a plan for an international force on these lines." This was approved by the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and by VicePresident Kutchuk, on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

However, Archbishop Makarios felt unable to agree to this plan. Although he accepted in principle the need for an international force, he insisted that it should be under the direct control of the United Nations. He also insisted that, as a first step, the Security Council should pass a resolution designed to deter Turkey from exercising her right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee," which he would wish to be regarded as an act of aggression.

While we are advising restraint to all concerned, we would not, of course, be prepared to support a resolution in the Security Council which could be interpreted as an accusation of aggressive intention against any of the Guarantor Powers " or as over-riding any of the three treaties concluded after Cyprus received her independence."

There seemed to us to be serious objections to the proposal that the United Nations should be asked to assume full responsibility for creating and controlling the required international force. The transfer of the argument to the Security Council would not in itself solve the difficulty in reaching agreement upon the composition and terms of reference of the force.

In fact, these decisions would be made more difficult by the involvement in the Security Council countries who have no direct interest in the maintenance of stability in Cyprus, and who would not necessarily be unhappy to see differences develop between two N.A.T.O. allies. There is also the problem of finance, which might involve reconvening the General Assembly and much consequent delay. Nevertheless, in an endeavour to meet Archbishop Makarios' wishes, we amended our original plan and provided for a continuing link with the United Nations, though not for direct control." We also proposed that the force should no longer be exclusively confined to N.A.T.O. countries. Unfortunately, President Makarios still did not feel able to accept this proposal. Meanwhile, the situation was further deteriorating and the outbreak of violence at Limassol last week gave us cause for serious concern."

While we have sent some further reinforcements we have throughout made it clear that Britain is not only unable, but also unwilling, to bear indefinitely almost the whole burden of the peace-keeping operation, more especially if the two communities are not prepared to give us their full co-operation.

We remain convinced that the revised plan which we proposed offers the most reasonable and rapid means of creating in Cyprus the peace-keeping force which is so urgently needed, if the danger of grave conflict, both internal and external, is to be averted. We are, moreover, satisfied that our endeavour to find a solution to the problem through agreement between the parties concerned, before taking the matter to the United Nations, was not only the most practical course, but was also in full accord with the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, since there seemed to be no prospect of resolving the deadlock, and since the situation in Cyprus was becoming increasingly serious, we felt it

40

Ante, doc. IV-92.

'Of Aug. 16, 1960, between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom (Cmnd. No. 1253; 382 UNTS3).

" Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom.

Treaty of Guarantee of Aug. 16, 1960, cited in footnote 40 above; Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus of Aug. 16, 1960, between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom (Cmnd. No. 1252; 382 UNTS 8); and Treaty of Alliance of Aug. 16, 1960 between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey (397 UNTS 287).

"The United Kingdom would send regular reports to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, who would continue to be represented in Cyprus. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963–1964, vol. XIV, p. 20017 for information on the original plan as amended.