This deliberate new provocation on the part of the American military authorities proves that the American side has not taken the necessary measures to put a stop to violations by the American Air Force of the airspace of the German Democratic Republic, thereby to prevent dangerous complications. The intrusion of military planes of the U.S.A. within the borders of other countries with hostile intent cannot be called a suitable means for reducing international tensions and strengthening trust among states. On the contrary, such actions on the part of the American military authorities can only be qualified as acts aimed at exacerbating the international situation.

The disclaimers that American military planes supposedly stray "by accident" from their course and find themselves unwittingly within the borders of other states cannot be accepted, the more so as these planes find themselves precisely in those regions in which American intelligence is showing heightened interest. It must be concluded, consequently, that orders are given to the crews of the American military planes, as has been already pointed out in connection with the similar incident on Jan. 28, 1964."

The Soviet government is obliged to warn that, in view of the provocational conduct of the American military authorities and the continuing flights of planes of the U.S. Air Force carrying nuclear loads along the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, as well as in view of repeated instances of violation by American planes of the frontiers of socialist countries that are allies of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Armed Forces have confirmed the order to counteract any violation of Soviet frontiers and of the frontiers of its allies by foreign military aircraft.

If military planes of the NATO countries find themselves in regions for whose security the Soviet Air Force is responsible, these planes, if they refuse to obey orders to land, will be destroyed with all the necessary means of defense.

The Soviet government resolutely protests in connection with the new aggressive act of the U.S. Air Force and emphasizes that the whole responsibility for this incident and its possible consequences lies with the American side. The Soviet government regrets that the American military authorities undertake such actions, which are clearly at odds with the task of improving relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., for which the American side has repeatedly expressed a desire. The Soviet government expects the government of the United States of America to take the necessary measures to prevent a repetition in the future of such violations, which jeopardize the cause of peace.

Document IV-68

The March 10, 1964 (U.S. Air Force RB-66) Incident (East Germany): STATEMENT READ BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NEWS (PHILLIPS), DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 12, 1964 12

Ambassador [at Large] Llewellyn Thompson this afternoon made. the following representations to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding the U.S. aircraft shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft over East Germany on March 10:

1. The U.S. Government categorically denies as contrary to fact the allegation in the Soviet Government's note of March 11 that the U.S. aircraft in question was "engaged in a military intelligence mission".13 2. The U.S. Government expects the Soviet authorities to return to

United States custody without delay the three U.S. personnel who were members of the crew of the aircraft in question.14

Document IV-69

The March 10, 1964 (U.S. Air Force RB-66) Incident (East Germany): REPLIES MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO QUESTIONS ASKED ON THE CBS PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION," MARCH 22, 1964 (EXCERPTS)

15

I am glad to be able to tell you that we have just had word from the Soviet Government that Captain Holland and Captain Kessler, the other two fliers [of the U.S. Air Force RB-66 shot down over East Germany, March 10, 1964], will be returned to the United States in the very nearest future.i

16

Now, it is important that when an accidental incident of this sort occurs, that we do everything we can not to permit it to inflame general relationships.

This plane was off course. And President Johnson has given instructions to take additional measures to insure that this sort of accident does not occur.

But we were very grateful that these men, in the first place, were safe, because they did escape by parachute, and that they will shortly be back in this country.

We hope that this matter can now be closed and that we can get on with the other important matters before us.

No-[The release of the fliers is not in exchange for something;] they [the Russians-] are simply releasing them. I think that this is a matter that pursued its normal course. I think that if this had happened the other way around, that we would want to know a good deal about just exactly what was involved.

So far as we know, the Soviets came to their own conclusion that these men should be released.

As you know, Lieutenant Welch was released the other day," and he is now in the hospital in Europe.

But we hope very much now that this matter can be taken off the books and that we can get back to normal business.

I think this is a case where navigational error sent these men over East Germany. They were 120 or 130 miles off course, at least. And it is important that we not permit these incidents to occur and that the other side also not permit them to occur.

14 In reply to questions asked at an earlier news conference of Mar. 12, 1964, Mr. Phillips said that Soviet authorities had not permitted the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, East Germany, to approach the crash site and had not given any information on the whereabouts of the three airmen. The Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, Gen. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., had written to the Commander of Soviet Forces in East Germany, Gen. Ivan A. Yakubovsky, requesting his cooperation. (Department of State files.)

15

Department of State files.

16 Mar. 27, 1964.

17 Mar. 21, 1964.

We also would hope that when, if by any chance, accidentally some such incident does occur, that both sides would adapt their own procedures so as not to create a hot issue, but to deal with it in a normal way, so that we can guide planes to their proper destinations and that we not let instances of this sort disturb general relations.

. . I think over the last ten years there have been cases of Soviet planes coming across, or East German planes coming across the demarcation line; but for rather limited distances, perhaps on a turn or something of that sort. I do not have the full answer to that. But I think it is important for both sides to do what they can to insure that these violations of the demarcation line do not occur.

I think that the question of what the effect of this particular incident might have been on [Soviet-American] relations-I hope that it is now a dead letter. I mean it is clear that our plane was where it was not supposed to be. We did express our regret on that particular pointand we discussed this with the Soviet Government.

That is correct [-we had no dealings with the East German regime in getting these fliers released]. Our discussions have all been with the Soviet Union.

Document IV-70

German-United States Exchange of Views on Free-World Defense Policies: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT BONN BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MCNAMARA) AND THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER (VON HASSEL), MAY 11, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 18

The Ministers exchanged views on free-world defence policies, including the U.S. hope for the support of the other NATO partners, for instance in South Vietnam, against the Communist threat in other parts of the world. They agreed that the defence of the free world is indivisible and that its security must be preserved wherever it is threatened.

The Ministers signed a memorandum of understanding on the production of three guided-missile destroyers equipped with the latest Tartar missile systems, surface search radar, and anti-submarine weapons.19 This understanding also made provisions for assistance in aiding technical personnel designated by the F.R.G. to obtain the "know how" required to facilitate development of eventual capability of German commercial firms to produce specified related spare parts and components in Germany; and to furnish such assistance as may be

18

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, vol. No. XIV, p. 20131. Secretary of Defense McNamara visited Bonn, May 9-11, 1964.

19 This memorandum of understanding of May 11, 1964, provided that the United States supply the Federal Republic of Germany with 3 guided-missile destroyers of the 4,500-ton Charles S. Adams class to be delivered by 1970.

required for providing the administrative organization and facilities for logistics and maintenance support of the ships.

the Ministers noted the special importance of arrangements between the two Governments whereby dollar receipts of benefit to the F.R.G. balance-of-payments resulting from U.S. forces' expenditures in Germany are balanced by F.R.G. defence procurement in the U.S.A. These arrangements had been given special attention by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard in their Texas discussions.20 During the Texas meeting, President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard agreed that these arrangements should continue. In the discussion of the last few days between the two Ministers, direction was given for specific procurement planning to proceed for the calendar years 1965 and 1966 with the aim of achieving the results envisaged by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard.

Document IV-71

United States Rededication to the Goal of a United Berlin Within a Germany United by Self-Determination: TOAST OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON) TO THE GOVERNING MAYOR OF BERLIN (BRANDT) AT A WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON, MAY 18, 1964 21

["Wise and Skillful Development of Relationships With the Nations of Eastern Europe Can Speed the Day When Germany Will Be Reunited": REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) AT THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, LEXINGTON, VA., MAY 23, 1964 (ExCERPT)-Post, Doc. V-4]

Document IV-72

The German Position Regarding German Borders With Czechoslovakia and Poland: ADDRESS BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (ERHARD) BEFORE THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, JUNE 11, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 22

German reunification through self-determination is in the best interest of the people; it is in the best interest of all East European peoples. At any rate, it offers better guarantees of security and prosperity than the current kind of imperialism based on terror and suppression still practised in the Soviet Zone of

20 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 481-483.

21 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, vol. I, pp. 694–695. Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin visited the United States, May 13-21, 1964.

Excerpts in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963–1964, vol. No. XIV, p. 20262. Chancellor Erhard subsequently visited Washington; see post, doc. IV-75.

Germany. We hope, and there are beginning to be slight indications to justify this hope, that this conviction is gaining ground even in the Soviet Union. . . . I state here clearly and explicitly-the Munich agreement of 1938 was torn to pieces by Hitler." The German Government has no territorial claims whatsoever with respect to Czechoslovakia and separates itself expressly from any declarations which have given rise to a different interpretation.

... The German Government feels that the German-Polish border should be established in a peace treaty in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement," a treaty that can only be concluded with an all-German Government. Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany have a common interest that this condition be established, which will make it possible for the two peoples to live together in peace.

...

Document IV-73

Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation, SIGNED AT MOSCOW BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE U.S.S.R. (KHRUSHCHEV) AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE GERMAN "DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC" (ULBRICHT), JUNE 12, 1964, ENTERED INTO FORCE, SEPTEMBER 26, 1964 25

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic; Guided by the desire to continue to develop and strengthen the fraternal friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic, which is in line with the basic interests of the peoples of both countries and of the commonwealth as a whole;

On the basis of the fraternal all-round cooperation which is the cornerstone of the policy determining the relations between both states and which has assumed a still closer and cordial nature after the conclusion of the treaty on the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic of Sept. 20, 1955;20

Expressing firm intention to contribute to the cause of consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the world and to follow unswervingly a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems;

Fully determined to unite their efforts in order to counteract effectively, on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955," the threat to international security and peace created by the revanchist and militarist forces which are striving for a revision of the results of World War II;

And to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both states from any attack;

Being of unanimous opinion that the German Democratic Republic, the first state of workers and peasants in the history of Germany, which has carried into

"Text in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, vol. II (Department of State publication 3548), pp. 1014-1016.

24 Text in 1945 Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. II (Department of State publication 7163), pp. 1478–1514. 25 The New York Times, June 13, 1964. The U.S. Ambassador (Kohler), the U.K. Ambassador (Trevelyan), and the French Chargé d'Affaires (de Laboulaye) in Moscow made similar oral statements on the treaty at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, June 12, 1964; not printed. (See infra.)

"Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955, edited by Paul E. Zinner for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 108-111.

"Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1239-1242.