Document IV-54

European Space Research Organization (ESRO)-United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration Joint Satellite Agreement: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ESRO (AUGET) AND NASA (DRYDEN), JULY 8, 1964 27

Document IV-55

The Importance of Finding an Acceptable Basis for Negotiations on Agricultural Products in the Kennedy Round Negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE EFTA AND FINLANDEFTA COUNCILS, EDINBURGH, JULY 10, 1964 28

Meetings of the Council of the European Free Trade Association and of the Joint Council of Association with Finland were held in Edinburgh on 9th-10th July under the Chairmanship of Mr. Edward Heath, Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development of the United Kingdom. Ministers reviewed the whole range of the Association's internal activities and recent developments in their relations with other countries. They expressed their satisfaction with the progress made toward complete free trade in industrial products by the end of 1966.

EFTA Ministers discussed recent contacts with members of the European Economic Community and with the Commission. They stressed the importance of minimizing adverse consequences of the progressive establishment of two trading groups in Europe and avoiding serious divergencies on questions of commercial policy or such technical matters as standardization and patents.

On the basis of a complete report by Austrian Ministers, there was a full discussion of the exploratory talks which had taken place between Austria and the Community.

EFTA Ministers also reviewed the information policy of the Association and approved measures designed to promote a fuller understanding of the Association's objectives and achievements.

EFTA Ministers, together with their Finnish colleague, reviewed the extensive programme of internal work under way in EFTA, dealing with both industrial products and with agriculture. Member States are now entering the final stages of eliminating tariffs and quantitative restrictions; it is therefore important to ensure that the advantages of the large single market are not frustrated by other barriers to trade. Special attention was devoted to the work of the Economic Development Committee; Ministers approved its report, and gave instructions for its work to be carried forward. The effective role played by the EFTA Consultative Committee was also welcomed.

In reviewing the outcome of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Ministers stressed the importance of continuing to work for constructive solutions to the outstanding problems of developing countries. EFTA countries import more per capita from developing countries than any other major trading group, and six EFTA countries are to be represented on the Trade and Development Board.

31

27

Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 10, 1964, pp. 204-205. For the establishment of ESRO, see ante, doc. IV-48.

28 EFTA Bulletin, vol. V, No. 6, July 1964, p. 1.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 456-457.

29

See ante, docs. II-32 et seq.

31

Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See ante, doc. II-38.

The Ministers examined the current prospects for the Kennedy Round. They reaffirmed their resolve to work for a 50% linear cut in tariffs with a bare minimum of exceptions justified only for reasons of overriding national interest, but they stressed the importance of finding an acceptable basis for negotiations on agricultural products. The Kennedy Round offers an unprecedented opportunity to open markets for the benefit of the developing as well as of the industrialized countries and to reduce the barriers between the two European trading groups. It was agreed that the next Meeting of the two Councils at Ministerial level will be held in Geneva on 19th-20th November 1964.3

Document IV-56

The French Pursuit of a European Policy Independent of United States Leadership: REPLY MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC (GENERAL DE GAULLE) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A News CONFERENCE, JULY 23, 1964 (EXCERPT) 34

Europe, provided that it wishes it, is henceforth called upon to play a role which is its own.

Undoubtedly it should maintain an alliance with America in which, in the North Atlantic, both are interested so long as the Soviet threat remains. But the reasons which, for Europe, made this alliance a form of subordination are fading away day by day. Europe must assume its share of the responsibilities. Everything indicates, moreover, that this event would be in accordance with the interest of the United States, whatever may be its merit, its power and its good intentions. For the multiplicity and complexity of the tasks henceforth go beyond, and perhaps dangerously, its means and its capacity. That is why the United States declares that it wishes to see the old continent unite and organize itself while many among the Gallic, Germanic and Latin people cry out "Let us build Europe!" But which Europe? That is the question. Indeed, the established conveniences, the accepted renunciations, the deep-rooted reservations do not fade away easily. According to we French, it is a question of Europe's being made in order for it to be European. A European Europe means that it exists by itself for itself, in other words in the midst of the world it has its own policy. But that is precisely what is rejected consciously or unconsciously by some who claim, however, to want it to be established. In reality, the fact that Europe, not having a policy, would be subject to the policy that came to it from the other side of the Atlantic appears to them, even today, normal and satisfactory.

We have seen many people-quite often, what is more, worthy and sincere advocate for Europe not an independent policy, which in reality they do not visualize, but an organization unsuited to have one, linked in this field, as in that of defense and the economy, to an Atlantic system, in other words American, and consequently subordinate to what the United States calls its leadership. This organization, entitled federal, would have had as its bases on the one hand a council of experts withdrawn from the affiliation to the States, and which would have been dubbed "executive"; and on the other hand a Parliament without national qualifications and which would have been called "legislative." Doubtless each of these two elements would have supplied that for which it would have been fitted, that is to say, studies for the council and debates for the Parliament. But, without a doubt, neither of the two would have made what indeed no one wanted them to make, that is a policy, for if the policy must take the debates and studies into account, it is another thing entirely than studies and debates.

32 See post, docs. XI-14 et seg.

See post, doc. IV-60.

"Speeches and Press Conferences No. 208, July 23, 1964, of the French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York, pp. 5–7.

A policy is an action, that is to say a body of decisions taken, of things done, of risks assumed, all this with the support of a people. The governments of nations alone can be capable of and responsible for making policy. It is of course not forbidden to imagine that a day will come when all the peoples of our continent will become one and that then there could be a Government of Europe, but it would be ridiculous to act as if that day had come.

That is why France-refusing to let Europe get bogged down, becoming bogged down herself in a guileful undertaking that would have stripped States, misled peoples and prevented the independence of our continent-took the initiative of proposing to her five partners of the Rome Treaty" a beginning for the organization of their cooperation. Thus we would begin to live in common, pending the time when habit and evolution would gradually draw the ties closer together. We know that the German Government adhered in principle to this project. We know that a meeting of the six States in Paris," then another one in Bonn," seemed at first on the road to success, but that Rome refused to call the decisive meeting, its objections, joined with those of The Hague and Brussels, being powerful enough to halt everything. Finally, we know that the opponents invoked two arguments, moreover contradictory. The first argument: the French plan," which maintains the sovereignty of the States, does not conform to our conception of a Europe having as its Executive a commission of experts and as its Legislative a Parliament cut off from national realities. The second argument: although Britain does not agree to lose its sovereignty, we will not enter into any European political organization to which it would not belong.

39

The French plan for European organization not being adopted by Italy and by the Benelux countries; moreover, integration not being able to lead to anything other than an American protectorate; finally, Great Britain having shown throughout the interminable Brussels negotiations that it was not in a position to accept the common economic rules and," by the Nassau agreement, that its defense force, particularly in the nuclear domain, would not be European for lack of being autonomous in relation to the United States"-it seemed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Government of the French Republic that their bilateral cooperation could have some value. It was then that, on the proposal of the German Government, the French-German Treaty of January 22, 1963 was concluded, which I had the honor of signing right here with Chancellor Adenauer."

However, it must be noted that, if the French-German Treaty made possible limited results in some areas, also if it led the two Governments and their services to establish contacts which, for our part, and altogether, we judge can be useful and which are, in any case, very pleasant, up to now a common line of conduct has not emerged. Assuredly there is not, and there could not be any opposition, strictly speaking, between Bonn and Paris. But, whether it is a matter of the effective solidarity of France and Germany concerning their defense, or even of the stand to take and the action to pursue toward the East, above all the Moscow satellites, or correlatively of the question of boundaries and nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe, or of the recognition of China and of the diplomatic and economic mission which can be opened to Europe in relation to that great people, or of peace in Asia and particularly Indochina and Indonesia, or of the aid to give to the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, or of

*Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 426-518. See ibid., 1961, pp. 508-509.

$7 See ibid., pp. 513-514.

See ibid., 1962, p. 597; European Parliament, Political Committee, Towards Political Union: A Selection of Key Documents (General Directorate of Parliamentary Documentation and Information, Jan. 1964), pp. 43–48.

40

See ibid., pp. 11-14, 17-19, 25-34.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 515 ff.; ibid., 1963, pp. 441 ff.

the organization of the agricultural common market and consequently the future of the Community of the Six-one could not say that Germany and France have yet agreed to make together a policy and one could not dispute that this results from the fact that Bonn has not believed, up to now, that this policy should be European and independent. If this state of affairs were to last, there would be the risk, in the long run, of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among the German people and, among their four partners of the Rome Treaty, an increased tendency to leave things as they are, while waiting, perhaps, to be split up.

But, throughout the world, the force of things is doing its work. In wanting and in proposing the organization of a Europe having its own policy, France is sure of serving the balance, the peace and progress of the world. Moreover, she is now strong enough and sure enough of herself to be able to be patient, except for major external changes which would jeopardize everything and therefore lead her to change her direction. Besides, at the last meeting just held between the Governments in Bonn and Paris, Chancellor Erhard gave an indication of a forthcoming German initiative." In waiting for the sky to clear, France is pursuing, by her own means, that which a European and independent policy can and should be. It is a fact that people everywhere are pleased with it and that for herself it is not an unsatisfactory situation.

4.3

[United States Disavowal of Any Interest in Dominating Europe or Any Other Area of the World: STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, JULY 24, 1964-Ante, Doc. IV-20]

Document IV-57

"France Would Withdraw From Membership in EEC if the Agricultural Market Were Not Organized as It Should Be": STATEMENT MADE BY THE FRENCH MINISTER OF INFORMATION (PEYREFITTE) AFTER A MEETING OF THE FRENCH CABINET, OCTOBER 21, 1964 45

The President of the Republic, the Premier, and the government have, once more, emphasized that France would withdraw from membership in EEC if the agricultural market were not organized as it should be." The determination to make the agricultural Common Market the "touchstone" of the construction of Europe was expressed categorically. France holds that there is no possibility of useful negotiations with the United States as long as EEC is not organized.“ And it will not be organized as long as the agricultural market itself does not exist.

42

'Reference to meetings between President de Gaulle and Chancellor Erhard at Paris, Feb. 15-16, and Bonn, July 3-4, 1964.

"See post, doc. IV-58.

45 Le Figaro, Oct. 22, 1964; English-language text as printed in F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (Stanford, Calif., Stanford U. Press, 1965), p. 325.

40 The problem over the agricultural market was due to French-German differences on the level of proposed common grain prices in the European Economic Community. See ante, doc. IV-53; post, doc. IV-62.

47

See post, docs. XI-11 and 14 et seq.

Document IV-58

German Proposals to the Other Member States in the European Communities "for Cooperation in . . . Foreign Policy, Defense and Culture, and . . . for Further Development of European Unity in ... Economic and Social Policy": ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED BY THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOVEMBER 6, 1964 48

Document IV-59

Council of the European Economic Community Preparation of an Industrial Exceptions List for Submission in the Kennedy Round Trade Negotiations Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EEC, NOVEMBER 15, 1964 49

Document IV-60

The Need for Removal or Reduction of the 15 Percent Charge on Imports Into the United Kingdom: COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE EFTA AND FINLAND-EFTA COUNCILS, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 20, 1964 50

The EFTA Council and the Joint Finland-EFTA Council held meetings at Ministerial level in Geneva on November 19/20, 1964. The Right Honourable Douglas Jay, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (United Kingdom), was in the chair.

Ministers considered the report of the working party which had been studying the recent British economic measures and their implications for EFTA."1

53

The other Ministers pointed out to the British Ministers that the application of the 15 per cent charge on imports into the United Kingdom was inconsistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention 52 and the Association Agreement. It was generally urged on British Ministers that a firm date in a few months' time should be fixed to removing or reducing the charge. It was also urged that the charge should be reduced to 10 per cent in a matter of weeks; that imports should be exempted from the charge in all cases where there was bona fide evidence that contracts were concluded before 27th October, 1964 and that the charge should not be applied to goods subject to quantitative restrictions (import quotas or others) in the United Kingdom.

British Ministers, while not claiming that the charge came within the terms of the Convention and the Association Agreement, pointed out that Article 19 provided for the use of quantitative restrictions on imports to correct a serious bal

4 Unofficial translation transmitted by the Reuters and printed in The New York Times, Nov. 7, 1964. The German Government put these proposals before the Council of the EEC and the Member Governments in a memorandum, Nov. 4, 1964; see Bulletin of the European Economic Community, Jan. 1965, pp. 8-11. Bulletin of the European Economic Community, Dec. 1964, p. 5. The deadline for presentation of this list to the Kennedy Round trade negotiations in Geneva was Nov. 16, 1964. See post, doc. XI-17.

49

"EFTA Bulletin, vol. VI, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1965, p. 12.

51 The U.K. Government announced the introduction of a 15 percent surcharge on imports and tax incentives on exports, Oct. 26, 1964.

52Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 335-351.

53

See ibid., 1961, p. 512.