other NATO members as well. At this point I would like to pay tribute to the evident superior qualities of the men at Omaha who are entrusted with these grave responsibilities. In closing, Mr. President, I want to thank you both for your boundless hospitality and for the assurances of support in my tasks, a support which I consider absolutely essential to the success of my mission. Document IV-28 Is.. "This Mixed-Manned Ship Demonstration . . . .. Tangible Evidence of Our Earnest Intent To Proceed Toward MLF": REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) ABOARD THE U.S.S. Claude V. Ricketts, WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 20, 1964 15 Document IV-29 German-United States Agreement on Implementation of the Multilateral Force Concept as Soon as Possible After Its Establishment: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT WASHINGTON BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MCNAMARA) AND THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER (VON HASSEL), NOVEMBER 14, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 16 Document IV-30 “The Idea of an Atlantic Community, Far From Excluding, Indeed Presupposes, a United Europe": ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO (BROSIO) BEFORE THE TENTH SESSION OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS' CONFERENCE, PARIS, NOVEMBER 16, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 17 17 The Atlantic Alliance and NATO are closely inter-connected not separate things. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation stemmed from Article 9 of the Treaty which established a North Atlantic Council with power to set up "such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary".18 The Organization could not therefore, exist apart from the Treaty. Theoretically, no doubt, the Treaty could exist without the Organisation: but it would be no more than a statement of mutual obligations with little or no means of meeting the sudden stresses which modern war might impose on us. Although, then, one can establish a logical distinction between the two, practically and politically the Treaty cannot operate effectively without some sort of organization to implement it. Basing ourselves on Article 9, and moving on from one commitment to another, we have built up over the years a complex and effective structure for mutual defence. We could not dismantle that organization or impair its effectiveness without violating the commitments we have made and weakening the Alliance. But equally, we cannot expand that structure, or make changes to it which would profoundly modify its nature, whether in the direction of more or of less integra 15 Ibid., Nov. 9, 1964, pp. 661-662. 16 17 Post, doc. IV-86. Excerpts in the NATO Letter, vol. 12, No. 12, Dec. 1964, pp. 2-8. This conference took place Nov. 16-20, 1964. 18 See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815. 219-262-67 36 Docs. IV-28, 29, 30 tion, without the full and unanimous consent of all concerned. Such changes must be the result of free discussion and free agreement. 19 I should like to say a few words now about the multilateral nuclear force and some of the problems it raises for the Alliance. In doing so, I shall be expressing no opinions and passing no judgments. It would indeed be wrong for me to do so; for the project has not yet been formally introduced into NATO at all. The eight countries which have declared an interest in the project are actively discussing plans; but they have reached no final conclusions and not all of them are even certain at this stage that they will eventually decide to participate in whatever scheme finally emerges. As we are all aware, the new Government in Great Britain is working on new proposals which may profoundly modify the whole approach to the problem and may open the way to other and even more comprehensive schemes." It will therefore be some time before this question is ripe for a full discussion in NATO itself. When that time comes, I shall of course be ready to help in any way I can. But for the present I think I ought to confine myself to describing the background, stating the issues and drawing attention to some of the problems. First of all, the MLF is manifestly an initiative with major military and political implications. Militarily, it is argued that the MLF with some 200 medium range ballistic missiles would be a significant addition to the nuclear defence of Europe. Politically, the arguments in favour of the MLF are that it will provide a way in which the European powers, and in particular Germany, can participate in nuclear matters without any further national dissemination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it will provide a means of linking U.S. forces even more closely with the forces of the rest of the Alliance. All these are arguments which merit serious attention. But in fact they are not accepted by all of our member countries. Some of them consider the proposed MLF to be militarily useless or superfluous. Some think that it will be politically divisive. Others again think that it will involve dissemination of nuclear weapons or lead indirectly to such dissemination. The divergence of opinions goes very deep. It has come right out into the open, and cannot be ignored. If an MLF is formed, some way will have to be found of incorporating it in the political and military structure of the Alliance. So far, as I have said, the MLF has been under discussion not in NATO itself but in an unofficial group of eight countries. They have not yet informed me of the conclusions they have reached on this subject and at this stage, this is as it should be. But militarily, it would seem right that the force should take its place among the forces of Allied Command Europe; and this may well be the answer. Politically, difficult problems may arise over the set-up for the political direction of the force; and some way will have to be found of safeguarding the position of the North Atlantic Council as the supreme political authority in the Alliance, from which all our military and civil forces and our whole organization depend. All these are, after all, technical questions which can be solved if there is a common political will to do so. But if there is no such will, if some countries consider as militarily and politically dangerous an addition of this kind to the Alliance which others favour as necessary and beneficial, then even the simplest problems of organization become very complicated indeed. My predecessor, Mr. Stikker, used to speak of the doctrine of flexibility-by which he meant that when a group of countries within the Alliance wanted to adopt new forms of association, they should be allowed to do so even if others do not participate. The principle is an excellent one, and I should like to see it implemented to the greatest extent possible. But it has its limitations; and these begin to operate when the new proposal is such as to raise fundamental political difficulties for those who object to it. In other words if the MLF-or indeed any other proposal-is regarded by any of the members of the Alliance as being likely to lead, even if they themselves do not participate in it, to a major change in the principles or the structure of the Alliance, then it is the duty of all of us to discuss our differences of opinion freely and frankly. Those who put forward new proposals must explain and justify them. Those who object must argue their case and put forward their counter-proposals. Let me emphasize that I regard this as a principle which applies over the whole field, and not just to the MLF. I believe there is far too much loose talk about the need for reforming NATO. Suggestions that NATO needs reorganizing which are unaccompanied by any practical proposals as to what needs to be done can only create perplexity and cast doubts on the solidarity of the Alliance-strong though we all know it to be. On the other hand serious and constructive plans worked out in detail and offered in a constructive spirit can only strengthen our unity. In discussing the MLF, I mentioned the fears expressed by some members of the Alliance that it might have a divisive effect on Europe. In my view this is not really an Atlantic problem. I am personally profoundly convinced that political unity would strengthen not only Europe itself, but the whole Alliance. But it is nevertheless a fact that we have got along in NATO for fifteen years without European unity; and we can, if necessary, continue to get along without it. There may be and indeed there are differences of opinion and approach in regard to the problem of a unified Europe. There is a danger that these may adversely affect the cohesion of the Alliance. They cannot and must not be allowed to do so; and I think it is the duty of those who are responsible for the existing multilateral organizations whether Atlantic or European, to stress that the two problems are essentially of different orders. In other words, if Europe succeeds in uniting, which is a matter for European countries and them alone let us welcome this and derive from it whatever benefits we can. If it fails, let us not allow the differences of approach between us on the "European" plane to affect our cohesion and solidarity on the "Atlantic" plane. This brings me to another point-which is that I have never been able to see the point of the semantic battle which rages over the concept of "European independence". Discussions of this kind seem to me to obscure what is after all a very clear and simple issue. Those who over-emphasize the independence of Europe run the risk of creating the impression that they are hostile to the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Those who go too far the other way risk the accusation that they want Europe to be subordinated to the U.S. or dependent on them. Both impressions of course are wrong; and both, as I say, seem to me to confuse the issue. It seems quite clear to me that just as at present all the individual members of our Alliance are free, sovereign, equal and independent countries, linked together by the Treaty and limited in their freedom of action only by the terms of the Treaty and the commitments they have progressively assumed in order to ensure its implementation, so a united Europe, when and if it comes into being, would be just as free, sovereign and equal as its constituent parts are now. How such a United Europe maintained its links with the other side of the Atlantic would depend entirely on its own free will and its appreciation of its own best interests. As to that, what brought our Alliance into being in the first place, and what keeps it together now, was the profound conviction of Europe that a close connection with the U.S. and Canada was vital to her survival and security, and the profound conviction of the U.S. and Canada, that if free Europe falls, they cannot themselves long survive as free countries. As long as these two basic hypotheses remain valid-and I cannot see them losing their validity for a very long time to come-the Atlantic Alliance will go on, whether there is a united Europe or not. Indeed, it must go on. It would be a disaster and a tragedy for both sides if they were to drift apart simply because one of them had achieved the political unity which the other has been urging on it so long. What determines the need for an alliance linking the two sides of the Atlantic is not the form of political organization adopted by one or other partner, but the vital interests they have in common. I make no apology for this digression-if indeed it is a digression; for all these arguments have a very close relevance to the current debate about the Atlantic Alliance and about Europe. Inevitably, the two things are connected; but we should not confuse them. Let me repeat that European unity is the responsibility of the European countries themselves; but that the unification of Europe and the problems it involves must not be allowed to complicate the separate and different problems of the Atlantic Alliance any more than we can help. Before I conclude, I should like to go back for a moment and take a rather broader view about our common task and the future of this Alliance. It is our duty not only to sense and interpret public opinion, but also to enlighten and guide it. And if we are to do this, we must look clearly and objectively at things as they really are, and analyse to the best of our ability the underlying causes of the uneasiness and desire for change which is evident. It seems to me and I do not think I am alone in this view-that there are four main such causes. One is the relaxation of tension between East and West, which limited though it may be, has nevertheless made the threat seem less imminent. Another is the change from nuclear monopoly to nuclear balance which has exposed the United States to the threat of direct nuclear attack and raised all sorts of problems in connection with NATO strategy. The third is the economic and political resurgence of Europe which has impelled her to claim a larger rôle in the direction of the Alliance. The fourth is the extension and diversification of the Communist threat, which is now economic and political as well as military and extends far beyond the limits of the North Atlantic area. Some would have us respond to this new situation by transforming the Atlantic Alliance into an Atlantic Community. This, they say, would increase our ability to confront the communist world in peaceful competition; produce a real military unity, and enable us to outface the threat of nuclear war; broaden the scope of our action to the whole world, and associate Europe in an even wider and more comprehensive political structure. But is this a realistic answer? Is it practicable? It is no doubt a wonderful ideal. So, after all, is European political unity. But both, I fear, are pretty far from realization. In any event, just as it would be wrong for the partisans of a united Europe to pursue their aspirations in the hope of undermining the concept of Atlantic partnership, so it would be equally wrong for the advocates of that concept to support an Atlantic Community because they see in it a means of forestalling the formation of a united Europe. On the contrary, on both sides of the Atlantic far-sighted and realistic people are coming increasingly to realize that the idea of an Atlantic community, far from excluding, indeed presupposes, a united Europe. The doctrine of an equal partnership between North America and Europe so brilliantly expounded by the late President Kennedy " makes sense only if there is a reasonable balance of political, military and economic strength between the two sides. As things are today, all of us are equal; but some of us are more equal than others, and one of us is equal to all the rest put together. That is surely a very lop-sided basis for the kind of partnership to which we aspire. All this is perhaps a little visionary; and we must come back to what we have here and now. What we have is the North Atlantic Alliance, which came into being essentially as a military alliance for defence and has since developed into something like a new dimension of international relations. But an Alliance it remains. It is still an association of sovereign states. It may develop in some or all of the directions under consideration; and it may not. But even if it does not, it will, I am convinced, remain fully capable of achieving the objectives it was established to secure, facing the new situations which have undoubtedly developed. and adapting itself to further changes which we cannot now foresee. It can deter the hot war-or fight it, if deterrence fails. It can lead the cold war-if we must go on thinking in such terms. It can ensure the security of Europe; it can keep us active and vigilant; it can extend its action of aid and raising living standards to the whole world; it can improve and adapt its strategy and its defence in response to changing situations. All this it can do, if only it maintains its strength and its moral, political and military solidarity. We must remain alert, responsive to change and adaptable; for only if we adapt ourselves in time shall we save ourselves from having drastic and maybe unwelcome changes forced on us. This is perhaps a very pragmatic See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 552-555. and down-to-earth way of looking at things. But it seems to me that this is the best chance we have of preserving our present and safeguarding our future. I will end with one final word about the relaxation of tension. All of us hope and pray that it will continue. But as I said earlier, we have just had a series of dramatic reminders of what a razor's edge we live on. As long as the fundamental problems-Germany, European security, disarmament and the rest-remain unsolved, we must be prepared for brusque reversals of policy and sudden returns to harder times. And what hope is there for a solution of these problems as long as the other half of the world regards international relations in terms of a life-and-death struggle between two rival ideologies rather than of finding a modus vivendi between differing ways of life? I am-I repeat-an optimist. But I am also, I hope, a realist. It is, I think, true that the hard facts of life in the nuclear world have taught the Soviet leadership a good deal of wisdom. Whether the Chinese have learnt the same lessons remains to be seen. But we cannot be sure, we cannot be safe, unless we keep up our guard. And so let my last words be those which we have adopted as the device of our Supreme Headquarters in Europe "Vigilia pretium libertatis"-Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Document IV-31 United Kingdom Opposition to the Proposal for a Mixed-Manned Surface Fleet: STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (WILSON) IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 23, 1964.22 Document IV-32 German-United States Satisfaction With Progress in Preparation of a Multilateral Force Charter: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT WASHINGTON BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) AND THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER (SCHROEDER), NOVEMBER 26, 1964.23 Document IV-33 "The Safety of the United States Depends Upon the Freedom of Europe, and the Freedom of Europe Depends Upon the Strength and the Will of the United States": STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 28, 1964 24 The present discussion of the Atlantic Alliance that we see in the press and by the commentators, on television and radio, is, I think, partially the result of a neglect of first principles that are worth some new attention this morning. The ultimate essentials of the defense of the Atlantic community are the firmness and the mutual trust of the United States and Europe. The United States position I should make abundantly clear. The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 702, House of Commons, cols. 930 ff. 28 Post, doc. IV-87. "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. II, p. 1611. |