other NATO nuclear forces to prevent its use in an accidental or unauthorized manner.

Third, the United States stands ready to conclude an international agreement on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons, in conformity with United Nations resolution 1665 (XVI) of December 4, 1961.1 Such an agreement has been a continuing goal of the United States in bilateral discussions, in discussions at the Geneva disarmament conference and has been endorsed by the United Nations. If the Soviet Union is sincere in its view that the multilateral force is simply a stepping stone to the transfer of ownership and control of nuclear weapons to a specific non-nuclear power, the signature of an international agreement along the lines the United States has proposed would give additional assurance to the Soviet Union beyond that derived from the unilateral expression of United States policy. As President Johnson indicated in his letter of January 18 to Premier Khrushchev, the United States remains ready at all times to discuss this urgent issue, but with the clear understanding that such discussions cannot be used to frustrate security arrangements for the defense of the United States and its allies.

A principal purpose of the multilateral force is to strengthen NATO and the political ties which bind together the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly we recognize that certain governments will not abandon all objections to this force. However, it is important that the purposes and arrangements governing its creation not be misunderstood, and we are prepared to reiterate these purposes and explain these arrangements.

The United States notes with extreme disappointment that once more the Soviet Government has seen fit to characterize the aims and intentions of the Federal Government of Germany in terms which are nothing short of slanderous. The United States seriously questions whether these unrealistic and unrestrained charges serve any real purpose for anyone, including the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union knows, the Government of the Federal Republic has solemnly declared that it will resolve any international dispute by peaceful

It has voluntarily associated itself for purposes of common defense with other countries of Europe with whom it shares a dedication to the objectives of a secure world peace. The desire to ensure the peaceful reunification of Germany on the basis of selfdetermination is not "revanchist" but a legitimate aim, which the United States fully supports, which it considers essential for a secure and enduring peace in Europe and which is a goal it will continue to seek through negotiation.

The United States expresses the sincere hope that these considerations, in addition to those expressed in its note of May 18 of last year, will receive the most thoughtful study by the Soviet Government.

Document IV-25

United States Views on the Prospects for Agreement on a Nonaggression Pact Between North Atlantic Treaty Organization Members and Paries to the Warsaw Treaty: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (FOSTER) BEFORE THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 10, 1964 (EXCERPT)*

The Soviet delegation and other delegations have today spoken on the question of a non-aggression pact between NATO members and the parties to the Warsaw Pact. These delegations have also spoken on the reduction and withdrawal of troops. Under our rules of procedure, the Soviet Union had the right to indicate the topics on which it intended to speak. Therefore the United States did not object when the Soviet Union announced at last Thursday's meeting that its topics would be a non-aggression pact and the withdrawal of troops.

We deeply regret the fact that in his remarks on these topics the Soviet representative descended to distortions, misstatements and false accusations regarding the policies and intentions of the United States and its allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany. His charges are not new; they have been refuted on many occasions. They are so far from the facts that I can but wonder what his purpose is in raising them again and in attempting to divert this Committee from its responsibilities and opportunities to move towards a world of reduced tension and reduced armaments.

I should like to make it clear why the United States does not consider these two topics appropriate for consideration in this forum. Speaking of a non-aggression pact, Mr. Stelle said at our meeting of 26 April 1963:

We are concerned in this Committee with matters relating to disarmament and to the control of armaments. We are not here seized of general political problems, and we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters."

The United States maintains its view that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is not the appropriate forum for consideration of this question. There are a number of substantive disarmament measures, such as those we have proposed to this Conference, which are of the type of practical, realistic measure upon which agreement is possible and to which the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee could more usefully address itself.

I should like to comment, however, on the allegation by the Soviet representative that the United States has not fulfilled its commitment undertaken in connexion with the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty" to consult its allies on the subject of a non-aggression pact and to

'Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 395–403.

'See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 388-389. U.N. doc. ENDC/PV. 125, p. 20. [Footnote in source text.]

*Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032-1034.

continue the discussion of this matter with the Soviet Government. That charge is not in accordance with the facts. In the agreed joint communiqué issued in Moscow on 25 July 1963 which announced the agreement on the limited test-ban Treaty, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States noted their discussion of the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact and agreed-"to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks". They also stated their agreement: "to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants."

In this connexion I should like to correct a misinterpretation of President Kennedy's position on this matter after the initialling of the nuclear test-ban Treaty in Moscow. In his statement of 26 July 1963 to the people of the United States on this matter, he said:

The Moscow talks reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests."

Subsequently the United States discussed the matter in some detail with its allies. Despite the strong reservations generally felt about a non-aggression pact, certain tentative views emerged from these consultations and were subsequently conveyed by the United States Government directly to the Soviet Government. Though no prospect of agreement emerged from that exchange of views with the Soviet Government, the United States felt that it was useful in clarifying the positions of both sides. There the matter stands among the parties concerned; and I do not intend to enter into the substance of it here. With regard to the question of the withdrawal of troops from Europe, it should be obvious to the Soviet delegation that similar problems are presented by this topic as a subject for discussion in this forum. The United States does not consider this to be a fruitful subject for discussion. The whole question of forces in Europe and its related political aspects, as the Soviet Union is quite aware, is closely related to serious unresolved political problems in that area.

Document IV-26

United States Intention Not To Abandon Multilateral Force Negotiations Because of Soviet Refusal To Conclude an Agreement on Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (FOSTER) BEFORE THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 10, 1964 (EXCERPT) 10

The United States is prepared to negotiate an agreement in response to the Irish resolution. Such an agreement would commit nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of States not now controlling them. Such an agreement would include also a corresponding undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to acquire control of nuclear weapons. We all accept the urgent need for such an agreement. However, the Soviet Union has laboured our differences rather than emphasizing our common interests. It has held up agreement by insisting that certain NATO Governments abandon their negotiations to create a multilateral force.

We have stated repeatedly that the proposal for a multilateral force would not result in the creation of additional national nuclear weapon capabilities. In fact it would provide an alternative to the possible creation of such additional national capabilities. Nuclear components of the force could not under any circumstances be used for the creation of additional national nuclear forces. That would be ensured not only by legal provisions and administrative controls, but also by the principle of mixed manning. Each ship of the multilateral-force fleet would be manned by nationals of at least three countries, with no nation providing more than 40 per cent of the personnel of any ship. The mixed-manning principle would be in force for all significant components and functions of the multilateral force. In no case would more than 40 per cent of any ship's company, including personnel directly concerned with maintenance or control of missiles, be from any one participating nation.

The charter for the multilateral force would provide that its missiles could be fired only by decision of an agreed number of participants, one of which would be the United States. No single nation could fire any of the weapons by national decision.

The force would be subject to the same type of safeguards to prevent accidental or unauthorized use as are nuclear weapons of the United States. These safeguards would make it impossible for any or all of the personnel aboard a multilateral-force ship to fire any multilateralforce missile except on the explicit order of the multilateral control board, which would of course not be aboard the ship. One of the ways by which this result would be brought about would be by inserting a control mechanism in the weapon system which would make it impossible for the weapons to be armed or fired by anyone aboard the

10 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 395-403.

"Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1190.

ship without certain information. That information could be supplied only from outside the ship.

The safeguards would also protect against disclosure of weapon design data. Participation in the multilateral force would not contribute significantly to the design, development or fabrication capability of any participating nation.

The Soviet Union continues to strengthen its missile arsenal targeted on Western Europe. The threat so posed gives the countries targeted a legitimate interest in participation in strategic nuclear deterrence. The multilateral force would provide for a sharing of nuclear deterrent responsibilities among NATO allies without promoting independent national nuclear forces.

For these reasons, the proposal being discussed in Paris will not be put on the negotiating table at Geneva. The United States does not intend to suspend or abandon the multilateral-force negotiations merely because the Soviet Union raises them as an excuse for its refusal to conclude now an agreement in response to the Irish resolution. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union would probably attempt to obstruct almost any effort to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Alliance.

Document IV-27

"It Is an Impressive Experience To See Directly the Proof of American Concern Over the Security Not Only of Your Country and People, but of the Other NATO Members as Well": LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO (BROSIO) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (JOHNSON), OCTOBER 6, 1964 12

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Upon my return to Paris, I would like you to know of my profound gratitude for the very warm welcome you gave me and for the highly useful and satisfactory discussions which took place during my visit to the United States. As a result, I am even more deeply convinced than before that there is no substitute for personal meetings in order to find a complete understanding. I am particularly grateful that you, at a time of heavy personal engagement in domestic affairs, were able to give me so much of your precious time. It was a great honor for me to be your guest at the White House in the midst of such distinguished company, and in your remarks that day I found the most unequivocal assurances of American dedication not only to the ideal but also to the concepts of our Alliance. I need not emphasize the satisfaction with which

I listened to your statements.

The visit to the Strategic Air Command headquarters demonstrated in a most concrete manner the substance of the American commitment to the defense of our freedom." It is an impressive experience to see directly the proof of American concern over the security not only of your country and people, but of the

12

Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1964, pp. 673-674. Mr. Manlio Brosio assumed his duties as Secretary General of NATO, Aug. 1, 1964.

13 Secretary General Brosio visited Washington, Sept. 27-29, Strategic Air Command headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebr., Sept. 29, Washington, Sept. 29-30, and Norfolk, Va., Sept. 30, 1964.

"For the texts of statements made by President Johnson and Secretary General Brosio at Strategic Air Command headquarters, Sept. 29, 1964, see the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1964, pp. 584–585.