Document IV-19 French Determination To Continue Development of a Nuclear Arsenal: REPLY MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC (GENERAL DE GAULLE) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, JULY 23, 1964 (EXCERPT) 85 The fact that America and Soviet Russia possess their nuclear arsenal provides them with such security and moreover gives them, inside their respective camps, such a reason for exercising hegemony that they will not get rid of theirs, no more than any other State in their place would get rid of its arsenal, whatever its ideology, its nature and its propaganda. The result is that the countries which do not have an atomic arsenal believe that they have to accept a strategic and consequently a political dependency in relation to that one of the two giants which is not threatening them. 86 In these conditions France, while deploring the fact that the two giants in question do not disarm-except, of course, in the form of a momentary agreement which aimed only at a certain slowing down in the rate of production, but which continues to allow them to maintain and increase their gigantic power of destruction-France, I say, as soon as she was able to be herself, judged it necessary to begin the desired effort in order to become an atomic power in her turn. In this respect, it is true, she is suffering from the consequences of a long delay caused first by the war under the occupation, then by the reconstruction of everything that was demolished on her soil, and lastly by the procrastinations for her political, economic and financial recovery. Also in comparison with the United States and Russia, which have widely put to use in their time the assistance of European scientists and technicians, and with Great Britain, which profited from the American experience, France disposes of only French capacities. Lastly, it is clear that the total of our scientific, technical and industrial means is far from reaching that of the two giants. However, we are on the road and we are advancing according to our plan. At the same time the vast research, invention and production activity that atomic development itself involves, introduces a most effective stimulus into our scientific, technical and economic life. And here, at this very moment, we are reaching results. Our first atomic air unit becomes operational this year. In 1966 we will have enough Mirage IV's and refueling planes to be able to carry at one time, over a distance of thousands of miles, bombs with a total power exceeding that of 150 Hiroshima bombs. Furthermore, we are working on moving on from series A fission bombs to series H fusion bombs, the latter launched from either atomic submarines, surface vessels or land. This very day the Premier is on his way to inspect the distant and isolated sites where, under the best testing and security conditions, the necessary tests will take place in due time. We are in a position to think that six years from now our deterrent means will reach a total instantaneous power of 2,000 Hiroshima bombs. This is what certain, obviously unthinking, opponents call France's "little bomb." The field of deterrence is thus henceforth open to us. For to attack France would be equivalent, for whomever it might be, to undergoing frightful destruction itself. Doubtless the megatons that we could launch would not equal in number those that Americans and Russians are able to unleash. But, once reaching a certain nuclear capability, and with regard to one's own direct defense, the proportion of respective means has no absolute value. Indeed, since a man and a people can die only once, the deterrent exists provided that one has the means to wound the possible aggressor mortally, that one is very determined to do it and that the aggressor is convinced of it. That is why France's modern arsenal not only constitutes for her the incomparable guarantee of her security, 85 Speeches and Press Conferences No. 208, July 23, 1964, of the French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York, pp. 8-10. * See post, docs. X-2, 9, 17-19. but also introduces into a dangerous world a new and powerful element of wisdom and circumspection. However, our advent to the rank of an atomic power is not failing to arouse diverse opposition here. To condemn this new force, the classic marriage of eternal demogogy and eternal routine is taking place; a marriage which once caused the failure of our Army's transformation in the face of Bismarck's ambitions and which was thus greatly responsible for our defeat in 1870; a marriage which, before 1914, deprived us of heavy artillery, for the lack of which, during the World War, our human losses far exceeded those of the enemy until we were finally able, after three years of exhausting combat, to equip ourselves with the necessary cannon; a marriage which, on the eve of World War II, led the public powers and military command to refuse to build the mechanized armored force, while Germany gave itself Panzer divisions, the effects of which are known; a marriage which today loudly stigmatizes the so-called excessive cost of atomic weapons, while not only does this cost not annually exceed one hundredth of our national income, or one quarter of our military expenditures, or half what the State pays to its pensioners and retired people, or the total of the social benefits paid to farmers, but permits us to reduce by half our Army personnel and the length of military service. However, this time the opposition does not come only from an over-simple refusal of reform. It is in reality inspired by adherents to two political prejudices, doubtless opposed, but both aimed at France's effacement under the hegemony of one or another foreign State. There are those, on the one hand, who would like to establish a totalitarian dictatorship in our country and who therefore desire to see us deprived of the means with which to defend ourselves against the East. There are, on the other hand, the partisans of the American protectorate who are alarmed at the prospect of a France mistress of herself with regard to her allies. But I believe, less than ever, that these objections, coming from two very different horizons, but both originating with the intention that our country be subordinated, are pursuading the French nation. We will thus continue our atomic effort over the short, medium and long term, convinced to be thereby helping the nation's scientific, technical and industrial development, to be reviving the body and soul of our army as modern times command, and to be giving France the means for her security and her independence, consequently those for her action in behalf of equilibrium and peace in the world. Document IV-20 United States Disavowal of Any Interest in Dominating Europe or Any Other Area of the World: STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, JULY 24, 1964 87 I think most Europeans know that the United States has never had any interest whatever in trying to dominate Europe or any other area of the world. On the contrary, the United States has constantly supported the strengthening of the free nations of Europe. We believe that Europe and the United States have great common interests, common purposes, and common obligations. So we have never supposed that any European country would need to choose between its ties to the United States and its ties to Europe. We believe that any effort to force such a choice would be bad for Europe, bad for the alliance.88 And I have found, I might say, general Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. II, pp. 887-888. See supra; post, doc. IV-56. 90 agreement on this view in my talks with Prime Minister Home,89 Chancellor Erhard, President Segni," and many other European leaders who have been here this year. Document IV-21 "Parallel to the Negotiations on the Declaration [on Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons], the Nuclear Powers Might Engage in a Discussion... To State Whether the Multilateral Force Leads to Dissemination": STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.A.R. REPRESENTATIVE (HASSAN) BEFORE THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA, AUGUST 13, 1964 92 Document IV-22 "The Policy of the United States Aimed at Making, Together With the Federal Republic of Germany and Other Members of NATO, Joint Preparations for Nuclear War Is the Main Obstacle to the Conclusion of . . . [a Nonproliferation] Agreement": STATEMENT MADE BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE (TSARAPKIN) BEFORE THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA, AUGUST 13, 1964 93 Document IV-23 "We Have Retained the Essential Option of Massive Retaliation, but We Have Added to It a Capacity for Rational Measured Support of a Wide Range of Political Objectives": REMARKS BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (VANCE) AT THE CONVENTION OF VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, CLEVELAND, AUGUST 27, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 94 Nuclear power alone is not enough. Our strategic weapons deter nuclear attack because our adversaries have no appetite for suicide. But even in the early 1950s, when we had a near nuclear monopoly, the existence of such massive power was not sufficient, in itself, to deter the limited aggressions to which the Communists have resorted. We have found in one confrontation after another, at trouble spots around the world, that we needed force appropriate to the level of conflict we faced. That is to say, we must be able to cope not only with ballistic missiles, but also with roaming bands of guerrillas-and with all the levels of aggression in between those two extremes. See post, doc. IV-161. "See post, doc. IV-158. * Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 327-333. See also post, doc. X-54. Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 339-351. 94 Department of Defense news release No. 620-64. To this end, we need flexible, usable forces, able to respond with appropriate power to aggression at whatever level we encounter it. Development of this power-with its capability to respond to every level of aggression across the entire spectrum of conflict-is perhaps the most significant achievement in the Defense establishment during the past four years. In Europe, NATO offers a striking example of how we have joined with other countries in common purpose, and how we together have steadily improved our defenses. Between 1961 and today, NATO combat-ready ground forces in the European heartland have been increased in numbers by 20% and in combat effectiveness by approximately 50%. We have substantially re-equipped our Army, pre-positioned equipment for major reinforcements, tested our strategic airlift to Europe, and in the past four years have committed 15 nuclear missile submarines to NATO. The defense spending of NATO's European members has increased by more than 25%. And there has been a 60% increase in the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe. This latter point deserves emphasis. I have already noted the great quantity and diversity of tactical nuclear weapons which we possess. A substantial percentage of these are deployed in Europe under intergovernmental agreements.95 They are made up of a wide range of yields. Many of these will be made available to our allies in the event of war. For example, allied fighter-bomber squadrons are equipped with our weapons; and several of our allies would receive nuclear munitions for their artillery pieces, their HONEST JOHN гockets, or their SERGEANT missiles. It is, of course, the fact that these nuclear weapons cannot be released for use without the authorization of the President of the United States-and this is the way our allies prefer it. You may ask, in sum, what has all this given us-this determination to have what we need, this increase in forces, these new weapons, and the ascending strength of our alliances. Above all, and most importantly, it has given us a strategy of flexible response. We have retained the essential option of massive retaliation, but we have added to it a capacity for rational and measured support of a wide range of political objectives. In a phrase, we now have usable force, giving us full freedom of national action. 95 With Belgium, May 17, 1962 (TIAS 5157; 13 UST 1995; 461 UNTS 3); Canada, June 15, 1955 (TIAS 3305; 6 UST 2607; 235 UNTS 201), May 22, 1959 (TIAS 4271; 10 UST 1293; 354 UNTS 63); France, May 7, 1959 (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 776-779), July 27, 1961 (TIAS 4867; 12 UST 1423; 433 UNTS 29); the Federal Republic of Germany, May 5, 1959 (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 644–648); Greece, May 6, 1959 (TIAS 4292; 10 UST 1429; 357 UNTS 163); Italy, Dec. 3, 1960 (TIAS 4764; 12 UST 641; 410 UNTS 3); the Netherlands, May 6, 1959 (TIAS 4277; 10 UST 1334; 355 UNTS 327); Turkey, May 5, 1959 (TIAS 4278; 10 UST 1340; 355 UNTS 341); the United Kingdom, June 15, 1955 (American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2877-2880), July 3, 1958 (American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1958, pp. 631-638), May 7, 1959 (TIAS 4267; 10 UST 1274; 351 UNTS 458). It has, for the first time, made it clear to our adversaries that we not only can halt massive aggression, but also that we have the will and the tools to defeat aggression at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Document IV-24 The Purpose of the Proposed Multilateral Force To Deter Soviet Nuclear Weapons Directed Against the Atlantic Alliance: LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN Moscow TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, DELIVERED AUGUST 28, 1964 96 The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of July 11, 1964,97 which sets forth the views of the Soviet Government on the question of the creation of a multilateral nuclear force now under discussion among a number of NATO members. The United States presented a full exposition of its views on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the question of the multilateral nuclear force and on the unfounded accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany, in its note of May 18, 1963.98 This note was in reply to Soviet charges in the Ministry's note of April 8, 1963,99 which are similar to those which it now reiterates. In order to clear away any possible misunderstanding, the United States sets forth once again its views on these important issues. First, the proposed multilateral force is entirely defensive in purpose. It is designed to provide NATO with a deterrent against an extensive array of Soviet nuclear weapons directed against the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Its purpose is not aggressive, either in conception or in fact. It is, of course, inconceivable that the nations of NATO should unilaterally deny themselves the weapons necessary to meet the dangers posed by Soviet arms, which the Soviet Government has explicitly threatened to use against them on a number of occasions. Second, the United States reaffirms its longstanding opposition to the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. The MLF is specifically designed to be consistent with this position. The principles of multilateral manning and ownership will assure that the multilateral force could be used only by decision of its governing body on which all members would be represented in accordance with control arrangements consistent with principles of nondissemination. Furthermore, the force would be subject to the same safeguards as **Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1964, pp. 367–368. Ante, doc. IV-18. 98 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 405–407. "Text ibid., pp. 396-400. |