the use of U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons. A nuclear deputy and staff have been created at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).o

All this has occurred within the last 3 years. It is not an unimpressive record. It is not, however, a completed process. More will be done to increase the knowledge and extend the role of NATO nations in the area of nuclear strategy.

Here we are treading on difficult ground. We are seeking to bring about a more broadly based participation in NATO's nuclear strategy, but we wish to do so without resorting to the creation of additional national nuclear forces. The reason, I think, is clear and generally acceptable. A proliferation of national nuclear establishments would vastly increase the danger of nuclear hostilities; it would sow seeds of fear and suspicion surpassing anything in our recent experience; it would create a series of relatively small-scale forces inviting preemptive attack in time of crisis but incapable of dealing with the major nuclear arsenals in existence today. In short, the multiplication of national nuclear establishments serves to divide and weaken us in the alliance, rather than to build the coordinated strength we seek to achieve.

The natural response to this situation is to look at the problem from the alliance standpoint and to utilize the collective resources and skills of the NATO community to provide nuclear strength of the type desired. On this basis we could create a force which would be militarily meaningful and within the economic capabilities of the individual participating powers. It would be used responsibly, for alliance purposes. And, last but not least, it would provide an element of cohesion impelling the participants toward more intimate cooperation and greater unity. In a time when the fragmenting forces of political and economic nationalism are still strong, any forward move in the direction of integration is surely something to be welcomed.

This is the basis on which we in the United States arrived some years ago at the conclusion that a multilateral nuclear force, organized by NATO nations, could provide the best attainable solution to the NATO nuclear riddle. Under three Presidents-Eisenhower," Kennedy,10 and Johnson "-the United States has held open to its European allies the option of joining with us in the creation of such a force. Today your Government and mine are in broad agreement that such a force does indeed provide the best available approach to a fuller sharing of NATO's nuclear responsibility. I believe that as other European governments now studying the proposal complete their examination, they too will reach the same conclusion.12 I look

Lt. Gen. Florent Victor Paul van Rolleghem of the Belgian Air Force was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander for Nuclear Affairs, Aug. 20, 1963.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 317-319 and ibid., 1961, p. 31, footnote 59.

10 See ibid., 1961, pp. 486-487.

11 See ibid., 1963, p. 483.

22 See ibid., pp. 435–436.

forward to the time, not many years hence, when a multilateral seaborne missile force will be in existence, enlisted in the service of NATO's deterrent effort.

Taking the broad view, then, the elements of agreement on NATO strategy and nuclear power are far-reaching. We face many prob lems, but they can be solved effectively as long as we retain a fundamental consensus along the lines we have discussed today. A healthy NATO is bound to generate differences of opinion on this or that problem of the alliance. We shall have to find solutions for such questions through continuing discussion and accommodation, in order to retain NATO's effectiveness in a period of development and change. In that task, the strength and position of the Federal Republic in the alliance enable your country to make a valuable contribution.

I am confident that the Federal Republic will continue to do this. In her efforts, Germany can rely on the United States to work with her, in the spirit of partnership and of our mutual commitment to North Atlantic defense, toward achievement of our broader common objectives within the Atlantic community.

Document IV-2

Soviet Renewal of the Proposal for a Nonaggression Pact Between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries: MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA, JANUARY 28, 1964 (EXCERPT) 13

4. Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries

The Soviet Government considers it essential to agree to conclude a nonaggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO." The conclusion of such a pact would in no way disrupt the existing balance of forces between the two groups and, at the same time. would introduce into international relations the element of stability and calm which is so much needed.

In the years which have elapsed since the Soviet Government first put forward a proposal for the conclusion of such a pact, this idea has met with the support of statesmen and public figures in many countries. The time has come to discuss this proposal in a businesslike way and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agree ment. Moreover, this is called for by the commitments laid down in the joint communiqué of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of 25 July 1963.15 The Soviet Government reaffirms its willingness to conclude a nonaggression pact with the States members of NATO.

With regard to the form that the non-aggression pact should take, the Soviet Government considers that this question can be solved without any particular difficulty.

13 Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (U.S. ACDA publication 27), pp. 12-17. The remainder of the text is printed post, doc. X-5.

14 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 388-389. 16 Text ibid., pp. 977-978.

Document IV-3

Polish Proposal for Prohibition of Production, Importation, and Transfer of Nuclear Weapons in Central Europe: MEMORANDUM OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, FEBRUARY 24, 1964 16

Document IV-4

United States Contribution of the Missile Bearing Destroyer U.S.S. Biddle to the Mixed-Manning Demonstration Project: ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FEBRUARY 26, 1964 17

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, today announced that, under a plan approved by the President, the U.S. Navy will make available a ship for use as a mixed-manning demonstration ship by Navy personnel of countries interested in the proposal for a multilateral force.

The ship designated by the Navy for the demonstration project is the guided missile destroyer USS Biddle (DDG-5).18

In connection with the continuing study by the multilateral force working group of this proposal, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom have stated their interest in participating with the United States in such a mixed-manning demonstration project.19

The USS Biddle, armed with the Tartar surface-to-air guided missile and the anti-submarine rocket (ASROC), is attached to the Atlantic Fleet and is under the command of Commander Thomas E. Fortson, USN, Virginia Beach, Virginia. The technical equipment on the USS Biddle will not be the same as that being considered for the surface missile vessels of the multilateral force. The USS Biddle will, however, provide operational experience with a complex weapon system.

The ship normally will be based in Norfolk, Virginia, and will operate in the Atlantic area and in the Mediterranean. It will operate under varied circumstances-in company with other units of the U.S. fleet, and possibly at times in company with units of fleets of other participating countries. Basically it is planned that the Biddle will operate with the Second Fleet in the Atlantic and with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean with visits scheduled to ports of participating countries.

16 Post, doc. X-44.

"Department of Defense news release No. 166–64.

18 Renamed the U.S.S. Claude V. Ricketts after the death of Adm. Ricketts, July 6, 1964.

19 Interest in participating in the project expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom was made public Jan. 11; the Netherlands' participation was announced Feb. 20; the Belgian decision not to participate was made Mar. 2, 1964.

It is expected that the process of personnel selection and language training prior to training assignment to the USS Biddle will take six months. The ship has a complement of 18 officers and 316 enlisted men and will provide a relatively wide cross-section of training and manning experience. Present plans contemplate that officers and men from the countries participating will gradually replace part of the U.S. complement for the period of the exercise.

While mixed-manning aboard warships has occurred before, this will be the largest scale mixed-manning operation on a modern warship.

The procedure utilized in administering the current U.S. foreign training program of the Department of Defense will be used in carrying out the demonstration.

Document IV-5

"We Believe in the [NATO] Alliance Because in Our Own Interest We Must, Because in the Common Interest It Works, and Because in the World's Interest It Is Right": REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) ON THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, APRIL 3, 1964 20

Document IV-6

The Need To Increase the Responsibility of NATO for the Security of the Free World: ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) BEFORE THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB OF AMERICA, NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 7, 1964 (EXCERPT) 21

Tonight I should like to discuss some of the specific tasks to which we think the North Atlantic nations should address their efforts.

The first of these tasks is to maintain security in a changing environment. Dangerous issues between the Communist and free worlds remain unresolved. Although the Central European front remains quiet, massive Soviet ground and nuclear forces are still arrayed against Europe. In the absence of assured arrangements for the mutual reduction of arms, it would be foolhardy to dismantle the military strength of NATO. The task is rather to adapt that strength to a changing political and military environment. This means two things:

First: While maintaining our efforts to deter or defeat deliberate attack with every needed weapon, we should continue also to increase NATO's capability to cope with lesser forms of conflict-effectively

20 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1964, pp. 606–608. President Johnson made these remarks at a White House ceremony in observance of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949.

and without automatic escalation to the type of conflict no one can rationally seek.

Second: There is a need to respond, in ways consistent with nonproliferation, to European desires for a responsible role in strategic nuclear deterrence.

Several hundred Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are aimed at free Europe-many more missiles than are aimed at the United States. To cover some of these targets which threaten Europe, two successive NATO Supreme Commanders have proposed that MRBM's be deployed to the European area.22

We believe that it makes more sense to put MRBM's thus deployed to the European area at sea, instead of in heavily populated European areas. One way of deploying sea-based MRBM's would be under procedures involving national Allied manning and ownership of the missile and bilateral United States-Allied control over the warhead's use. New nationally owned and manned strategic missile forces could, however, be divisive within the alliance and unsettling in terms of EastWest relations.

If Allied forces are to participate in MRBM deployment, but not under national manning and ownership, the only remaining possibility is mixed manning and ownership.

These conclusions suggested the need for an imaginative breakthrough to a new pattern of ownership and control of medium-range nuclear weapons-a new pattern involving a greater degree of Allied integration than anything yet attempted.

This is the origin of the so-called multilateral missile fleet or MLF [multilateral force]. Eight nations are now discussing this concept in a working group at Paris, where substantial and encouraging progress has been made.23

The MLF will effectively discharge the task to which it is addressed. General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer has said that its 200 well-protected MRBM's would be effective in covering some of the airfields and missiles threatening Europe. Indeed, its capabilities will be taken into full account in the development of future American forces, because we consider it a reliable component of overall NATO defense.

The MLF plan also would permit nations interested in this specific problem to move ahead, without requiring the participation of nations which do not wish to take part.

Furthermore, the plan follows the classic pattern of Atlantic partnership: The United States will be in the venture from the start, but the concept and structure of the force is such that Europe's role and

* See the address by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Gen. Lauris Norstad) before the Nov. 21-26, 1960, NATO Parliamentarians Conference, Paris (excerpts in NATO Letter, vol. 9, No. 1, Jan. 1961, p. 17); and the address by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer) before the June 4-7, 1963, session of the Assembly of the Western European Union, Paris (excerpts ibid., vol. 11, Nos. 7, 8, July/Aug. 1963, pp. 20-21).

23

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 435, footnote 21; ante, doc. IV-4.