You have your own difficulties. We watch with friendly confidence in your capacity to merge differences in the grand dream of Canadian design.

But there is also much, Mr. Prime Minister, which we share.

In the world we seek peace, and mounting fulfillment for man. Here we work together, from ocean to ocean, in resources and science, to enrich the life of our two peoples, to elevate the quality of our two societies.

Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, "Democracy is the form of government which guarantees to every generation of men the right to imagine and to attempt to bring to pass a better world."

That has been the story of your life, Mr. Prime Minister. It is also the strength of our two countries.

And I believe that future generations will have cause for gratitude that two great democracies-Canada and the United States-shared the most generous continent which God has ever granted to man.

E. Antarctica

Document III-103

"The Antarctic Treaty . . . Serves . . . as an Outstanding Example of Practical Cooperation Between Nations and a Positive Step Toward a Peaceful World": LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) TO THE CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 2, 1964 1

1

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1964, pp. 402-407. The President was transmitting to Congress a special report on United States policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica (H. Doc. 358, 88th Cong., 2d sess.). The full report included, in addition to the letter of transmittal, an introduction, a historical background of Antarctic exploration, and sections on Antarctica and the International Geophysical Year, Post-IGY activities in Antarctica, 1959-1960, Negotiations of the Antarctic Treaty and developments during its ratification (1960-1961), and the consultative meetings of 1961 and 1962, together with three annexes: Annex I, Exchanges of Official Representatives on Antarctic Expeditions; Annex II, Examples of International Cooperation in Providing Logistic Support and Rescue Services; and Annex III, Documents (texts of pertinent documents).

Part IV

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND WESTERN EUROPE

A. The Atlantic Community-NATO and the OECDEfforts To Develop Multilateral Nuclear Strategy and Economic Cooperation

[NOTE: See Part X, Section C, post, for documents on the general problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons.]

Document IV-1

The United States Commitment To Use Nuclear Weapons in Defense of the Atlantic Community: ADDRESS BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (MCGHEE) BEFORE THE GERMAN ATLANTIC SOCIETY, FRANKFURT, JANUARY 15, 1964 (EXCERPT)1

NATO

the NATO military structure, as it now exists, is the central factor of our common security.

Both

Our two Governments, cooperating with those of other NATO members, provide a high proportion of total NATO military strength. Come what may, I expect that this will continue to be the case. the late President Kennedy and President Johnson have reiterated the intention of the United States to maintain in Europe the equivalent of the six divisions now stationed here, as long as they are needed.2 We do not foresee any change in this respect. At the same time we recognize the major contribution made by the rapid growth of the Federal Republic's armed forces in the total strength of NATO in Europe.

The existence of separate national forces-both those just mentioned and others would not in itself guarantee the safety of the alliance

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1964, pp. 338-344.

* See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 423-425, 436437.

if their use, and the planning for their use, were not coordinated through the military structure built up in NATO since its inception. The NATO military authorities and the major NATO commanders plan and prepare incessantly for a wide range of contingencies which might threaten the safety of the alliance. Over the years they have built up a degree of military integration within NATO which, with out impinging on basic national sovereignty, coordinates our separate national elements in a powerful fighting force prepared to respond to any attack. It must, I think, be a primary objective of NATO policy to preserve unimpaired and, as necessary, to strengthen this military sword and shield.

I have no illusions about the difficulty of doing this in a period when the danger of attack may appear somewhat remote. Your countrymen, like mine and like those of other alliance members, are heavily burdened to maintain the forces we have in being. However, we recognize that the defensive strength we now possess is our best insurance against disaster. It is not to be sacrificed for settlements which could prove illusory or for temporary reliefs impairing our ultimate security.

If we are agreed on this premise, then, I believe we can assess at their proper worth the differences of opinion we quite naturally observe within the alliance on questions of strategy and forces. These differences have been substantial-some are still-but they have been and I am convinced can be resolved without impairing the fundamental elements of NATO defense. I would now like to outline to you in specific terms those crucial matters of policy and strategy on which I believe the members of the alliance are broadly united.

First, I think, is the proposition that the alliance has the strength to defend itself effectively if it has the political will to organize itself for this purpose. Whether one looks at it in terms of population or gross national product or technical capacity, one must, I believe, come to the conclusion that NATO is clearly a match for its potential opponents. We have, of course, many problems in bringing the full weight of our strength to bear. We operate over vast distances; the multiplicity of our separate defense establishments and their equipment creates technical difficulties; as free countries we are naturally limited to a defensive rather than an aggressive posture.

In short, we sustain, and sustain gladly, the disadvantages inherent in the democracy and diversity that are the glory of our free civilization. Nonetheless, the whole function of NATO as a military organization is to weld the separate national forces of the member states into an efficient team and by so doing to make our combined strength greater than the aggregate of our separate national capabilities. NATO has made notable progress in this task, and as long as NATO continues vigorously to carry out that role in the future I have no fears regarding our fundamental security.

Second, we are united in our determination to meet our treaty commitments for the defense of NATO territory. This means all NATO territory. It means, among other things, that the Allies are pledged to defend the soil of the Federal Republic, wherever and

however it may be violated. That defense begins at the German frontier; it is, if you will, a forward defense designed to hold what we have. The United States is acutely sensitive to this obligation. Our troops would share with yours, and with those of other allies positioned with us, the brunt of any attack from the very first moments. For we recognize that if such an attack were ever to occur, it would endanger not only the Federal Republic but all of NATO, including ourselves.

A third area of agreement is, I am convinced, our common intention to use any and all means necessary for the defense of the alliance. We do not, and we could not sensibly, limit ourselves exclusively to an all-conventional strategy or an all-nuclear strategy. To do so would be to tie one hand behind our backs before we even began to fight. At enormous cost, my Government has built up an unparalleled strategic deterrent nuclear force, which stands poised for instant action.

In Europe, too, the United States makes the major contributions to the nuclear strength of the NATO forces. The total power of such NATO weapons, many of them prepared for use by Allied delivery systems, has been increased by more than 60 percent in the last 2 years.3 As Secretary McNamara pointed out on November 18, "the thousands of U.S. warheads deployed on the Continent for the immediate defense of Europe have a combined explosive strength more than 10,000 times the force of the nuclear weapons used to end the Second War."4 Specialists may argue among themselves as to the precise moment at which we should begin to release specific portions of this nuclear arsenal. As military planners, they are right to do so. It is their business to study contingencies. For us, as citizens of the Atlantic community, the essential point is that the commitment we have made to join in defense of our territories envisages the use as required of all military means, including nuclear weapons.

The indispensable corollary to this element of NATO defense, it goes without saying, is our common recognition that we must not unnecessarily trigger off an all-out nuclear war that would result in the prompt incineration of a large portion of the Northern Hemisphere. This is a fourth area of basic agreement. Those who experienced the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 appreciate the chilling prospect of the imminent possibility of nuclear destruction.5

I venture to suggest that easy talk about the deterrent effect of threatening massive nuclear retaliation-which would lead, of course, to counterretaliation-in the event of situations short of clear-cut aggression, will be somewhat less than completely credible when such a case actually arises. Indeed, if we should allow our conventional forces to dwindle in the expectation that all incidents can be handled by threat of massive nuclear retaliation, we should have brought ourselves to a sorry pass. For then we might be limited in the event of

'U.S. tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe were increased by 60 percent during the period 1961-1964.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 425-433. 'See ibid., 1962, pp. 399-471.

some minor emergency to the intolerable choice between nuclear holocaust and surrender.

We should not by neglect of our conventional arms invite a potential enemy to confront us with so grim an alternative. If we keep both our nuclear and our conventional weaponry strong, we need not do so. In this case a deliberate attack on NATO will be unlikely, and we can deal with smaller incidents, possibly arising through accident or miscalculation, through means appropriate to the threat. NATO, in other words, must be sufficiently strong in both nuclear and nonnuclear components to be able to choose the type of response it would make to any particular act of aggression. The response would have to be effective that is clear-but it should be not greater than required for success. Otherwise, a relatively minor incident might explode into a nuclear inferno.

A fifth point of agreement among us would, I think, be that the force levels we need for an all-round defense, nuclear and nonnuclear, are within our grasp if we have the will and perseverance to attain them. We are not required to make vast numerical increases in manpower under arms, or to put ourselves on a war footing in fiscal or industrial terms. The force goals accepted by the alliance for planning purposes call in general for only moderately larger forces. But they also call for better forces; for higher quality; for better equipment, better training, better reserves, better logistic support. This will raise costs, but in expanding economies even the allocation of a constant share of the gross national product to defense will increase the available resources. And in some NATO countries the percentage of GNP devoted to defense seems to us still to be too small.

NATO is now engaged in restudying its overall force requirements. We can expect, therefore, to see in due course an updated analysis of the ways in which an acceptable portion of ÑATO resources can be devoted to national force structures in order to achieve given strategic objectives. There is no reason to believe, however, that this will involve any change in the general hypothesis that we can, if we wish, maintain an adequate conventional force structure without inordinate extra effort.

Finally, there is general recognition of the problem of sharing responsibility for the control of NATO power. We have made measurable progress in unraveling this knotty problem in recent years. We have established guidelines for the use of nuclear forces; we have given undertakings to consult if possible before their use. The United States has divulged increasing amounts of information on the capabilities and characteristics of nuclear weapons to other NATO powers. American Polaris submarines and British bombers have been assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), extending the power and reach of his strike forces. European NATO officers are being assigned to U.S. Strategic Air Command Headquarters at Omaha to work with U.S. officers in coordinating plans for

6 See post, doc. IV-42.

7

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 486-487; ibid., 1962, pp. 541-543, 635–637; and ibid., 1963, pp. 408-409, 437–439.