Document III-21

"There Will Be No Retreat From Our Policy Toward the Castro Regime in Cuba": ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) BEFORE THE FULL CITIZENSHIP AND WORLD AFFAIRS CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 25, 1964 (EXCERPT) 34

On our doorstep another Communist regime incites and supports subversion, terror, and guerrilla warfare against its Caribbean neighbors. More than 2 years ago, the Organization of American States unanimously declared this regime to be incompatible with the interAmerican system.35 The OAS has taken various steps to isolate Castro's Cuba and to curb its capacity to do harm. It is now considering further steps.36

There will be no retreat from our policy toward the Castro regime in Cuba as long as it continues to threaten the security and stability of other nations in this hemisphere. Moreover, we regard this regime as temporary. With the other nations of this hemisphere, we expect the Cuban people to regain their freedom and rejoin the interAmerican system.

Recently a large quantity of arms was shipped into Venezuela to be used in an effort to overthrow the freely elected government of that country. The OAS has conclusive evidence that those arms came from Cuba. Consequently, it is considering further steps to protect the free nations of this hemisphere from subversion and aggression, indirect as well as direct, based on Cuba.

The free nations who sell to Cuba goods and equipment important to the Cuban economy are interfering with the efforts of the free nations of this hemisphere to curb this danger. In the missile crisis of 1962 it was evident that what happened in Cuba could directly affect the security of the entire free world. That is still so.

37

...

Document III-22

That His

"Mr. Castro Knows Connection With Moscow and His Attempt To Interfere in the Affairs of Other Countries Are Insuperable Obstacles to... Normal Relations Between Himself and the Rest of This Hemisphere": REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED at a News CONFERENCE, MARCH 27, 1964 38

"Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1964, pp. 390-396.

38

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 320–331. See supra.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399 ff.

Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1964, pp. 570–571.

Document III-23

Cuban Complaint of Violation of Its Airspace by United States Aircraft: ADDRESS BY THE PREMIER OF CUBA (CASTRO) ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, HABANA, APRIL 20, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 39

Who is responsible for those aggressive actions, provocations, and violations of our air space? We have not authorized them, we have not sanctioned them, and we will not legalize them. We will not legalize those violations of our law and our sovereignty.

They are provoking us. These things are simply intolerable. We are going to be calm. . . . We are going to proceed in two ways: not only with intelligence but also with valor.

And I say this so that [the] imperialists will know, so the world will know, that we are not disposed to tolerate certain things that go beyond admissible, tolerable bounds. For we had rather disappear as a revolution, as a nation, and even geographically as an island. It is well for the imperialists to know this and what they can expect. . . . If what they want is to provoke war, or provoke a problem, they will have one, but they may have a more serious one than they imagine. And if what they want is to wipe this island off the map, let them prepare to do so; we will be swept away rather than see this nation's proud, honorable, heroic head bowed.

...

Let us prepare ourselves, comrades. Let us prepare our combat units; let us prepare our land, sea, and air forces. Let us prepare our surface-to-air missiles. And let the imperialists decide. If they want peace with our nation, there will be peace; but if they want war, we are not afraid of war.

Document III-24

United States Position on Inspection Flights Over Cuba: REPLY MADE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NEWS (PHILLIPS), DepartMENT OF STATE, TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, APRIL 20, 1964 40

First, I would recall that the overflights are a substitute for the onsite inspection agreed to by the Soviets in October 1962, but which Fidel Castro refused to permit."1

Second, I would point out that the surveillance flights are thor'oughly based on the resolution approved by the OAS [Organization of 'American States] on October 23, 1962.42

39

'Department of State files. The speech was carried on Cuban radio and television networks. The Cuban complaint was directed at U.S. inspection flights over Cuba (see infra). Concerning the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 292 ff.

40 Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1964, p. 744.

41 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 439-440, 443– 444, 459-460.

Ibid., pp. 408-410.

Third, I would remind you of the various statements made by the late President Kennedy and by Secretary Rusk during the past 15 months on this subject, making it unmistakably clear that we regard the overflights as a necessity to avoid the deception which was practiced against us in 1962.

Fourth, I would recall that Secretary Rusk said, in March a year ago: "If there were any interruption with our surveillance. . . that could create a very dangerous situation." 43

Our publicly expressed position on this question remains unchanged."

Document III-25

Reduction of Soviet Military Strength in Cuba: REPLY MADE BY THE PRESIDENT (JOHNSON) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, APRIL 23, 1964 45

I said... that from the high point 46 [Soviet military] strength [in Cuba] had been reduced considerably. They still have some people there. I would not calculate the exact number because I don't want to get into the numbers game, and I don't think we can do it with. any accuracy. I think our people know in general terms what a good estimate is, and we know that there have been substantial reductions in the past, but we know they still have a number of people there.

Document III-26

The Need for Collective Measures Against Cuban Subversive Activities: ADDRESS BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (BALL) BEFORE THE OMICRON DELTA KAPPA SOCIETY, ROANOKE, VA., APRIL 23, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 47

What is the nature of the threat imposed by existence of a Communist regime in Cuba?

43 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 1, 1963, p. 467.

44 On Apr. 21, 1964, during the question and answer period at a White House meeting with a group of editors and broadcasters, the President restated this position as follows:

"I do think that it is essential that we maintain surveillance and know whether any missiles are being shipped into Cuba. We will have to maintain our reconnaissance and our overflights. Any action on their part to stop that would be a very serious action. We have so informed them and informed their friends." (Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1964, p. 744.)

In a 19-page note to U.N. Secretary-General Thant, made public on Apr. 24, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raúl Roa, told the United Nations that U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba were "intolerable" and should be ended. The note was circulated to all members of the United Nations but did not call on the Security Council for any specific action; see The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1964. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. I, p. 526.

"I.e., Oct. 1962. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399 ff.

"Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1964, pp. 738–744.

It is not, in our judgment, a military threat to the United States. We shall never permit it to menace our own strategic power, as our actions in October 1962 demonstrated.48 We are taking constant and effective measures to insure that such a threat does not occur again— and we shall continue to take those measures.

Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed forces are large and equipped with modern weaponry. They are by all odds the most powerful military establishment in Latin America. But Cuba does not possess air- and sealift sufficient to permit it to take offensive action against its neighbors, and, in any event, we maintain overwhelming military forces in the area to prevent Cuba from attacking other American Republics.

The menace of Castro communism to Latin America is of a different and-perhaps I might say-a more modern kind. It is the menace of subversion, the undermining of existing governments, the arming of organized Communist minorities, and the mounting of campaigns of sabotage and terror.

Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is greatest where social injustice is widely prevalent, where anachronistic societies remain dominated by small elitestight little oligarchies that control the bulk of the productive wealth. In some places these oligarchies have only recently and reluctantly— begun to make concessions to the insistent demands of the millions of economically submerged peoples for a measure of social justice and a decent standard of living.

For Latin America, as has been frequently remarked, is in the throes of a great transformation from a continent of backward societies to a continent of new, modern nations. During this period of change and tension, it offers a tempting target for the Communists. They are at least as conscious as we of the importance and weakness of the area. They are at least as determined as we to see that the brew produced by the Latin American ferment is to their liking. They have, therefore, regarded the establishment of a Communist government in Cuba-a Communist Latin American state at the very doorstep of the United States as a major asset for communism.

In their determination to establish a center of subversion for Latin America in Cuba, the Communists have found a natural lieutenant in Fidel Castro. Castro regards himself as the "liberator" of all Latin America. A born revolutionary, driven by a hunger for power and prestige, he looks upon the southern half of the American Continent as a proper field for the fulfillment of his ambitions. He seeks a revolutionary millennium in which the example of Cuba will have swept the continent, and his position of liberator and leader-not of the small island of Cuba, but of all Latin America-will have been assured.

This vision springs from his psychological and political needs. It is necessary to the man and equally to his followers, whose revolutionary enthusiasm must be constantly fed on the prospect of further advance beyond the confines of the island—an island which they look

48 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399 ff.

upon as the base from which the continent-wide revolution will be propagated by word and deed.

That Castro intends to extend Communist power, and that he is actively seeking to do so, have been clearly shown. The most recent and dramatic evidence is the three tons of arms sent from Cuba to Venezuelan Castroist insurgents. As you know, an investigating committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) was appointed to study all aspects of this case. It found that the evidence clearly substantiated the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban intervention and aggression. The committee's report provides the basis for further collective OAS action against Cuba, and the members are consulting now among themselves to determine the collective measures which should be taken.

49

By strengthening the Latin American nations through collective political, economic, and military measures we are increasing their ability to resist subversion. But at the same time we must actively pursue measures against Cuba to limit its ability to subvert.

In this effort we are exploiting the propaganda potential to the fullest. But an information program must be regarded primarily as a supplement to substantive policies. Given the present limits of action, we must rely, as our major instrument, on a systematic program of economic denial.

This is the only policy-short of the use of force that gives promise of having a significant impact on Cuba and its continuance as a Communist base in the Western Hemisphere. Such a program, in our judgment, can and does work effectively to achieve objectives that are in the manifest interest not only of the United States and Latin America but of other free-world nations.

In discussing the effectiveness of this program, let me make one point quite clear. We have never contended that a program of economic denial-short of an act of war such as a military blockade that would cut off bloc as well as free-world trade-is likely by itself to bring down the present Cuban regime. The objectives which this program can accomplish are more limited. They are four in number:

First, to reduce the will and ability of the present Cuban regime to export subversion and violence to the other American states;

Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests;

Third, to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere; and

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.

Those are the objectives which we seek to achieve by a program of economic denial against Cuba. That program reflects the purpose of the Organization of American States. In our opinion, it is real

49 Ante, doc. III-20.