United States is determined to guarantee the security of the Guantanamo naval base and does not intend to submit that security or the welfare of the servicemen and their families who live there to further irresponsible actions of the Cuban Government. The President has instructed the Department of Defense to make the Guantanamo base self-sufficient. In response the Secretary of Defense has issued instructions to: 1. Assure the base control over its own water supply both by conversion of sea water to fresh water and by the transportation of water by ship. 2. Reduce the employment of Cuban personnel who are subject to the control of the Cuban Government and whose wages contribute to its foreign exchange. The reckless and irresponsible conduct of the Cuban Government remains a constant threat to the peace of this hemisphere. The consequences of further provocations by Castro should be carefully weighed by all nations. These matters are being called to the attention of the members of the Organization of American States for consideration in connection with charges now pending against Cuba in that organization. They will also be discussed with the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order that those governments can take them into account in connection with their determination of their own policies toward the threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere posed by the Castro regime. Document III-18 United States Attitude Toward Trade With Cuba: REPLIES MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO QUESTIONS ASKED ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA PROGRAM "PRESS CONFERENCE, USA," FEBRUARY 14, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 25 . . . I think it is known that there is a difference of approach on these trade questions [with Cuba and the Soviet Union] between ourselves and our friends in London. The attitude of this country toward trade with Cuba is based upon the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere posed by Cuba. Such acts of interference as the shipment of arms to Venezuela,26 which is now very much a matter of concern to the Organization of American States; such matters as training agents from different countries of Latin America to be re 24 See post, doc. III-20. Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1964, pp. 330-332. The interview was taped for release the following day. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 286. turned to their own countries to support terrorism; and acts of violence against the governments of this area. So that we look upon this as dealing with a threat to the peace. In Britain they have a general trade policy, and this is a matter which falls within a general trade policy, as explained by the Prime Minister at his press conference on the last day of the talks.27 However, I suspect that this is more a matter of a difference in policy than a matter of large and consequential practical effects, because British trade with Cuba is very small. Even if it goes up somewhat, it will not be large. And so I think we should just wait to see what the practical effects of this trade might be. Almost all of our trade with Cuba in 1963, as listed in the trade statistics, had to do with the prisoner exchange and the shipment of drugs and other supplies to Cuba in that connection.28 Now, it is true that we have been employing in Guantanamo a considerable number of Cubans, and their wages have been converted by Castro into foreign exchange which he has picked up. That source of foreign exchange for him is now being reduced under action taken in the last several days. But we have no trade with Cuba at the present time. I don't think that, because certain countries don't agree with us on policy on a matter of this sort, we should simply say, "Well, then, let's everybody take the view of those particular countries," because there are a great many countries who do not trade with Cuba, for example, and are unwilling to trade with Cuba o long as they are a threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. We don't ourselves plan to organize any boycott against the goods. of countries that may be engaged in that trade. I think it is possible there may be some consumer reaction here in this country, here and there, with respect to firms that specifically engage in that trade. But that's something that is in the hands of private citizens; we have no part in that ourselves. The shipping [sanction]29 is somewhat a different problem, because there has been a sharp reduction in free-world shipping in Cuban trade and I would expect that reduction to continue. We have, as you know, made it difficult for those firms with ships engaged in the Cuban trade to use our own ports or to carry our own cargoes. And we think that * Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home of the United Kingdom was in Washington for official talks, Feb. 12-14. See post, doc. IV-161. 28 * See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 249, 276-277, 287. See ibid., p. 287. these steps have been effective over the last year or two and that with time they will become increasingly effective. I think the economy of Cuba has shown a very sharp deterioration in the last 2 or 3 years. They did get something of a lift this year because of the rise in world sugar prices. That gave the sugar crop a greater value than otherwise it would have had. But I think that it is important for the Cuban people not to believe and not to have any reason to believe that this path on which Castro has embarked with them has any future in it. Document III-19 United States Action Against Countries Failing To Curtail Trade With Cuba: STATEMENT READ TO CORRESPONDENTS BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NEWS (PHILLIPS), DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FEBRUARY 18, 1964 30 All governments receiving United States aid which could be affected by section 620 (a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act were informed of its provisions shortly after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act in December.31 As you know, the legislation provides that with certain exceptions no funds available under the act shall be used to furnish assistance to any country that has not taken appropriate steps by February 14 to prevent its ships and aircraft from carrying any equipment, materials, or commodities to and from Cuba. These provisions are subject to the exercise by the President of his special authority under section 614(a). We have concluded that except for the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Morocco, all aid recipient governments which could be affected by the statute had taken "appropriate steps" by February 14. With respect to the United Kingdom, France, and Yugoslavia, the very small residual military training and sales arrangements involved are being terminated. With respect to Spain and Morocco, we are seeking from the two Governments further clarification of the steps which they have taken in order to establish whether they are "appropriate" within the meaning of the statute. Meanwhile except as authorized by section 617 of the statute, no new obligations of funds authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act are being entered into. 30 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1964, p. 406, footnote 2. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1196-1244. Document III-20 Substantiation of Venezuelan Charges Against Cuba of a Policy of Intervention in the Hemisphere: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE OAS, ACTING PROVISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, FEBRUARY 18, 1964 (ExCERPT) 32 V. CONCLUSIONS A In formulating its conclusions, the committee considers it pertinent to make some general observations on the policy of intervention in the hemisphere of the present Government of Cuba, which has been substantiated in the investigation of the charges made by Venezuela: 1. The present Government of Cuba since its institution in 1959 has carried on, supported, and directed in various ways a policy of intervention in the hemisphere through propaganda methods, provision of funds, training in sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the supply of arms to support those movements that seek to subvert national institutions through force in order to install communist regimes. 2. This support of subversion, which generally takes the form of political aggression, has had positive application in the Republic of Venezuela, the primary objective in Cuba's policy of expansion and ideological penetration in the hemisphere. The vast natural resources of Venezuela, its strategic importance in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country were factors that motivated the present Government of Cuba to make use of the subversive action of organizations that employ force and violence to overthrow that democratic government. B 1. The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare. 2. A characteristic manifestation of this policy of aggression has been the systematic and hostile propaganda campaign carried out through information organs that are under the control of the Government of Cuba and that are directed against Venezuelan institutions, the President of the Republic, and other high government officials, inciting the people of Venezuela to rebellion and, in addition, giving direct support to subversive movements. 3. Other manifestations of this policy of aggression are found in the supply of funds and the indoctrination and training in Cuba of numerous Venezuelans who later returned to their country to participate in subversive movements. 4. An important element in this intervention in Venezuela, directed by the Government of Cuba, was the shipment of arms that was found on the Peninsula of Paraguaná in the State of Falcón on November 1, 1963, close to the date of the general elections. The shipment was made up of arms originating in Cuba 32 OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/IV/C-i-658. The Investigating Committee was appointed to investigate Venezuelan charges against Cuba. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 286. that were surreptitiously landed at a solitary spot on the coast, for the purpose of being used in subversive operations to overthrow the constitutional Government of Venezuela. With respect to this shipment, the following facts are noteworthy : a. The perforations and obliterations that were made on the various weapons in places where the Cuban coat of arms and other identifications marks had been stamped, in an effort to hide their well-known Cuban origin. b. The conditioning and packing of the arms for immediate use, the quantity and quality of the arms, and the instructions for their use, which were found in the hands of communist groups. These arms were to be used to support subversive activities and guerrilla action by organizations disciplined and trained for such purposes. c. The discovery, at the same spot where the shipment of arms was found, of a boat with an outboard motor, which motor was sent from Montreal, Canada, to Havana by air on October 1, 1963, for delivery to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform of Cuba, an official institution of that country. 5. The policy of aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba was confirmed by the discovery on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities, of a plan of operations, the "Caracas Plan," prepared for the subversive action of the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation." This plan anticipated the use of arms similar in type and numerical proportion to the shipment of arms mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The objective of the plan was to capture the city of Caracas, to prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1963, and to seize control of the country. 6. Consequently, the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present Government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.33 February 18, 1964 RODOLFO A. WEIDMANN Ambassador, Representative of Argentina Chairman of the Committee ALFREDO VASQUEZ CARRIZOSA Ambassador, Representative of Colombia GONZALO J. FACIO Ambassador, Representative of Costa Rica WARD P. ALLEN Representative of the United States FÉLIX POLLERI CARRIÓ Ambassador, Representative of Uruguay 33 The report was considered at a meeting of the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation on Feb. 24, 1964, where it was decided to circulate it among the home governments and to convoke a new meeting as soon as the opinions of the governments was learned. (OAS doc. OEA/Ser. G/ III/C-sa-536.) At a special meeting of the Council of the OAS on June 26, the date of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation was set for July 21, 1964 (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/ C-sa-548). See post, doc. III-29. |