of industrial growth has slowed down sharply and new problems in economic planning and management have been coming to light. At the same time the Soviet peoples want more of the good things of life they have so long been promised. The Soviet leadership is confronted with some dilemmas in allocating resources, as well as in how to increase the efficiency of the Soviet economy.

These difficulties within the Communist world are no cause for complacency on our part. They do not justify our relaxing the defenses of freedom, or reducing our efforts to build the political, economic, and social strength of the free world, or abandoning our search for agreements with our adversaries to reduce the dangers of war. Above all, we must build the peace. As President Johnson said in his state of the Union message:

we must develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between the East and the West, facing danger boldly wherever danger exists, but being equally bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none."

After a classic and sober debate, the Senate ratified the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.50 We have taken bilateral steps to improve our communications with Moscow in order to reduce the danger of misunderstanding in a period of crisis.51 We have joined the Soviet Union and others in affirming that we have no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit. We have agreed on principles of law for outer space.53 We have been exploring with our allies and shall be talking with the Soviet Union about other possible limited measures.

All such measures must meet one hard test: They must offer a better route to security. If they are going to meet that test, they will do so only by meeting the interests of our allies as well as ourselves. We would not, if we could, purchase our own security at the expense of our allies. We shall consult them intensively about the advantages and disadvantages of particular arms control measures. And we shall move ahead together toward a more secure world for all, not down separate paths toward greater insecurity for each.

Two points about the present state of East-West relations deserve special emphasis. The first is that the very limited agreements we have reached with the Soviet Union do not yet amount to a détente. There can be no genuine détente without progress in resolving dangerous political issues, such as the future of Berlin and Germany, Southeast Asia, and Cuba, and without progress in controlling armaments. These are the points which need urgent attention and on which we hope Soviet attitudes can demonstrate a basic desire for peace.

We shall continue to explore these matters. We shall try to avoid the pitfalls of illusion and naivete. But, equally, we shall try hard not to overlook any possibility of advancing, even by small steps, toward a more secure peace.

49 Ante, doc. I-1.

50 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032–1034. 51 See ibid., pp. 522-523.

See ibid., pp. 1082-1083. 53 See ibid., pp. 1087–1089.

Yesterday, in a message to the disarmament conference at Geneva,54 President Johnson called for several important measures to speed progress toward arms reductions under effective safeguards. He proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies agree to explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The development of this concept would be a matter for consultation with our allies before negotiations with the Soviets; the multilateral force that I described earlier could and would be protected.

The President called for a verified agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons. Pending such agreement, he expressed the willingness of this Government to join the Soviet Union in closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis. We have started on this path and hope the Soviet Union will do likewise. The President made clear that we will be prepared to discuss proposals, in consultation with our allies, for creating a system of observation posts as a move in reducing the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. Finally, he called for agreement to stop the proliferation of national nuclear arsenals and for the acceptance of inspection of peaceful nuclear activities to guard against diversion to weapons use. We are convinced that this program of action is in the best interest of the United States and that progress in these areas will lead to a more secure and peaceful world.

We are also trying to see whether anything constructive can be developed from Mr. Khrushchev's message on the nonuse of force in connection with frontier disputes.55 We earnestly hope that the guidelines set forth by President Johnson in his letter to Mr. Khrushchev 56 will commend themselves to the Soviet Government and that it will be prepared to move on to discussion of their practical application.

A steady appraisal of the main trends in the affairs of man justifies, I believe, a sense of confidence in the future of the cause of freedom. Our most enduring asset in this world struggle is our indelible identification with the ideas of freedom: of consent of the governed, of equality under law, of human dignity. Those ideas, which we have done so much to nurture and have fought to preserve, have seized the minds of men everywhere even, I believe, behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

The kind of world we want is the kind of world that most other people in the world want. But that kind of world cannot be wished into being. It must be built by untiring work-and must be unfailingly protected at every stage.

We are making progress. But all the progress we have made could collapse overnight if we should relax our vigilance or our efforts.

There are some who would have us quit the struggle: by drastically reducing our defenses, by withdrawing from danger spots, by slashing our foreign aid, by resigning from the United Nations. That is a policy of surrender, a prescription for disaster.

Post, doc. X-4.

"Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 938-940. 5 Post, doc. X-3.

I don't believe the American people will follow those who would guit. I believe that they are determined to "secure the Blessings of Liberty" to themselves and their posterity, that they intend to win this world struggle to win it by building a world that is safe for freedom, in President Johnson's words, "a world of peace and justice, and freedom and abundance, for our time and for all time to come." 57

Document I-4

...

"The Power in the Hands of the American People . . . Has Not Corrupted Them in Their Basic Purposes and Commitments Toward a Decent World Order": ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) BEFORE THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., FEBRUARY 16, 1964 58

Document I-5

"We Can Best Promote... [Our] Objectives by Adjusting Our Policies to the Differing Behavior of Different Communist States or to the Changing Behavior of the Same [Communist] State": ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) BEFORE THE FULL CITIZENSHIP AND WORLD AFFAIRS CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 25, 1964 59

Document I-6

The Anatomy of World Leadership: ADDRESS BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (STEVENSON) BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB, SAN FRANCISCO, APRIL 3, 1964 60

I do not have to tell you that next year San Francisco will be host to a commemorative meeting of the General Assembly to mark the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. But I can report to you that the members of the United Nations in general and the Secretariat in particular are more than grateful for the interest and generosity of San Francisco and the State of California which will make this meeting possible.

In the twilight of the war and the dawn of a new era, the charter was born here in San Francisco. For those of us who were involved in that historic conference-and there are still some of us aroundthe memories are still there.

And this brings me to what Beardsley Ruml said about the U.N. in 1945. It was one of the better prophecies of our age, and it goes like this:

57 These are the closing words of President Johnson's state of the Union message, an excerpt from which is printed ante, doc. I-1.

58

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 9, 1964, pp. 358–364.

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1964, pp. 390-396. For an excerpt from this address relating to U.S. policy toward Cuba, see post, doc. III-21. 'Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1964, pp. 615-621.

00

At the end of five years you will think the UN is the greatest vision ever realized by man.

At the end of ten years you will find doubts within yourself and all through the world.

At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds are against its ultimate life and success. It will only be when the UN is twenty years old that the UN is the only alternative to the demolition of the world.

we will know that

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing that turned out to be! And I think by now-19 years later-a great many people have arrived at the fourth stage in Ruml's 20-year prophecy-that stage where we know that "the UN is the only alternative to the demolition of the world."

Let me be emphatic: This is not said in any rhetorical sense. It is said in a very down-to-earth sense. The world abounds in conflicts between nations-some old and some new-some silly, some serious— some minor and some potentially climactic. A few of these conflicts may be de-fused by direct negotiation, or by agreement to settle for the status quo, or even by the attrition of time. But many of them will require some changes-in boundaries or people or resources or leaders, or in claims, practices, procedures, positions, or attitudes.

If change is not to be effected by the institution of war, which has been the great instrument of change through the ages, then it must be effected by institutions for peaceful settlement and peaceful changemeaning, inescapably, by international organizations at the regional and global level. The only alternative to the disaster of war is the machinery of peace, because there is no way to exorcise conflict from the human breast or the politics of nations. And international machinery for the peaceful resolution of conflict already has a better record than many people seem to realize.

During the past decade and a half there have been some 20 occasions when the armed forces of two or more nations engaged in active hostilities. In only one case did the fighting end the way wars have ended traditionally-by the surrender of one side to the other. On at least 20 other occasions there has been minor fighting on disputed frontiers, or armed revolts in the outcome of which other states had a national interest. In no case has the fighting spread to international warfare. Fifty-seven international disputes are now on the agenda of the Security Council of the United Nations. Some are settled, others dormant-and some are hardy perennials. One thing is clear about the 57 varieties of postwar disputes: Far less blood has been shed than would have been shed if the disputes had not found their way onto the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.

The Organization of American States 61 and, more recently, the Organization of African Unity 62 have also dealt successfully with violence in their areas.

Hostilities have been opened with gunfire and closed with cease-fires in the Far East, in the Western Pacific, in Southeast Asia, in the MidSee American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 288-290; post, docs. III-29, 41-69.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 628–637; post, docs. VIII-7-10.

dle East, in the Mediterranean, and in Africa-in some areas more than once since the end of the Second World War.

And in the Caribbean, a year and a half ago, a nuclear giant got on-and then got off-a nuclear collision course.63

Meanwhile, the most massive political transformation in history took place as the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch empires were dissolved and the trust territories of the United Nations shifted from tutelage to independence-with astonishingly little bloodshed all around. The world has never seen such a spectacle of peaceful change. But there are too many nuclear and conventional arms to doubt that grave danger to peace in our times still persists. There have been too many confrontations, too many close calls, too many pullbacks in the nick of time, too many rescue operations at one minute before midnight.

Yet, if the record so far is no guarantee of peace, it offers the hope that if hostilities break out somewhere tomorrow, the next step will not be the sound of trumpets but the call to ceasefire. That hope can be hardened if we and other members of the United Nations have the sense and the will to improve the machinery of peaceful settlement and cultivate the profession of peacemaking.

In recent weeks and months there has been a lively ferment about U.S. foreign policy in some of the scholarly and popular publications, in some of the columns and commentaries, and from some of the public platforms in Washington and elsewhere.

Conditions in the world are changing, we are told. I could not agree more. The President, the Secretary of State, and others have noted the point more than once in both general and specific terms. Indeed, I was speaking myself just last week at Princeton about the extraordinary change in world affairs and international relationships in the 3 short years since Dag Hammarskjold was killed-some of which have been discernible only since the resolution of the crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba.64

When President Kennedy took office, a global stalemate, which was the logical outcome of the cold war, was virtually complete but still being tested to see whether steel was backed by nerves. In the less than 3 years that were given to him, President Kennedy had to show force on three occasions.

First, he called up the reserves to convince the Soviets we would no more give in to a third ultimatum on Berlin 65 than we would on the previous two 66-though his first words in office included an offer to "those nations who would make themselves our adversary" to "begin anew the quest for peace." 67

Second, he was forced to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere because the Soviets broke a moratorium in the futile search for an

63

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399–471.
Text in U.S.-U.N. press release 4374, Mar. 23, 1964.

65 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 604 ff.

See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, pp. 908-939; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591-619; ibid., 1959, pp. 588 ff.