[United States Decision To Defer Its 1965 Pledge to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund: STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. DELEGATE (WILLIAMS) AT THE 1964 U.N. PLEDGING CONFERENCE ON EPTA AND THE SPECIAL FUND, NOVEMBER 16, 1964-Post, doc. II-37]

Document II-25

"Issues Other Than Those That Can Be Disposed of Without Objection [in the General Assembly] Will Not Be Raised": STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (THANT) BEFORE THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 1, 1964 (EXCERPT)

In view of the differences of opinion which have arisen among Member States regarding the conduct of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, I have been in consultation with several delegations for the past week with the sole purpose of avoiding a confrontation. In this connexion, I may mention that there is an understanding to the effect that issues other than those that can be disposed of without objection will not be raised while the general debate proceeds.10

Document II-26

"The No-Voting Agreement . . . [in the General Assembly] Seems Sensible to Us": STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (STEVENSON), DECEMBER 1, 1964 11

11

Our hope right along has been to get started on talks about how the United Nations can clean up its financial situation and arrange about the management and financing of future peacekeeping operations. It now looks as if all parties are prepared to talk about these important constitutional matters, 12 and we share the general hope that these consultations can proceed very rapidly.

It is of course necessary that, while the constitutional discussions are going on, the basic issues involved should not be prejudiced by having votes in the General Assembly. The no-voting agreement that was arrived at today therefore seems sensible to us.

U.N. doc. A/PV. 1286, p. 1.

10 The "understanding" referred to was reached on Dec. 1 just prior to the opening of the 19th General Assembly. That body assented to the Secretary-General's suggested procedure without objection. Those involved in reaching the "understanding" were the representatives of the U.S. (Stevenson), the U.K. (Caradon), the U.S.S.R. (Fedorenko), France (Seydoux), the President of the 18th General Assembly (Sosa Rodriguez of Venezuela), and the Secretary-General (Thant).

"Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 891. The statement was made after the no-voting “understanding" (supra) was reached.

12 On Dec. 2, following a meeting between Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, agreement was reached that talks would continue on all financial aspects of U.N. peacekeeping arrangements as well as on basic constitutional problems raised by the use of peacekeeping forces. The talks continued intermittently through the end of the year. On Dec. 30 the General Assembly adjourned until Jan. 18, 1965.

Document II-27

"Those Who Make Substantial... Financial Contributions to the U.N. Ought To Be Listened to With Considerable Respect": REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 23, 1964 13

We do believe that in connection with the article 19 14 problem there should be a thorough discussion of the future of peacekeeping operations in the U.N. We believe that the Security Council should have what the charter calls "primary responsibility" in this field. We do not agree with those who think that the Security Council ought to have sole responsibility in this field.15 But we hope that procedures can be worked out whereby the Security Council will be given every possible opportunity to carry out its primary responsibility.

The General Assembly also has responsibility in this as in other matters. But we feel that the General Assembly ought to defer, at least for a time, to the Security Council in order that the Security Council's primary responsibility can be made effective.

We also think that those who make substantial economic contributions, financial contributions, to the U.N. ought to be listened to with considerable respect by the general membership. It is true that 5 percent of the contributions to the U.N. control two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly. Now, we have not seen, thus far, irresponsible action taken by the General Assembly in the financial field. But we think that the General Assembly should consult very carefully the wishes of those who do in fact make up the largest financial support for the U.N. to see whether, on the financial side, the plans that are being proposed are feasible or acceptable to those who provide the resources. These are matters which have been raised for discussion. I made a speech in New York on this subject, or, rather, Mr. Harlan Cleveland read a speech for me when I couldn't go.16 They have been discussed among delegations at the U.N. We hope that out of this discussion that has started over the article 19 there can come some improved procedures in this regard.

"Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1965, p. 40.

14 Of the U.N. Charter; text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134–161.

D. Admission of New Members

Document II-28

"We Welcome Malta, Malawi, and Zambia... With the Conviction That Their Future in the United Nations Will Always Serve the Best Interests of the World Community": STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) BEFORE THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 2, 1964 1

1

E. The Nineteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly

[NOTE: Due to the impasse over payment of assessments for United Nations peacekeeping forces and the resultant no-voting understanding (see ante, doc. II-25), relatively few important items of business, were transacted by the 19th General Assembly during 1964. The General Assembly session began after two postponements on Dec. 1 (see ante, doc. II-21) and adjourned on Dec. 30 until Jan. 18, 1965. During the 1964 portion of the session, one outstanding resolution, 1995 (XIX), was adopted (post, doc. II-38). A major speech was made by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Dec. 7, for excerpts from which, see post, doc. IV-37).]

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1964, pp. 919-920. The three nations were admitted to U.N. membership by the General Assembly on Dec. 1 by acclamation (U.N. doc. A/PV.1286, p. 4). Malawi had been unanimously recommended for admission by the Security Council on Oct. 9 (U.N. doc A/5742), Malta and Zambia on Oct. 30 (U.N. docs. A/5769, 5770). Texts of statements by the U.S. Representative in the Security Council (Yost) on these occasions are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1964, pp. 680–681, Nov. 23, 1964, p. 759

F. Economic Development and Technical Assistance

Document II-29

Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (PREBISCH), FEBRUARY 12, 1964 (EXCERPTS)1

PART ONE. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Chapter I. The International Economy: The Past and the Present

1. The United Nations Development Decade and the Potential Trade Gap This second world trade Conference, convened by the United Nations, is meeting under a star very different from that under which the first one met at Havana sixteen years ago.1

The first conference was clearly influenced by experience of the events that preceded the great depression of the 1930s, experience of a system reaching back to the nineteenth century. At that time, the remarkable expansion of world trade, with multilateralism in full swing, acted as a powerful catalyst of spontaneous development in the peripheral countries, which provided the industrial centres with food and raw materials.

The great depression precipitated the break-down of this old order, already undermined by the political impact of the First World War. In view of all this and of the consequences of the Second World War, it is out of the question to think of restoring the old order now. In the not too distant days of Havana it might have been possible to harbour illusions of doing this, but the subsequent course of events has finally dispelled these illusions once and for all.

It is imperative to build a new order with a view to solving the serious problems of trade and development that beset the world, especially the problems that affect the developing countries.

From the standpoint of the developing countries, the Conference will be particularly concerned with a phenomenon that was a subject of controversy until recently, but which is today a matter of understandable general concern: the persistent tendency towards external imbalance associated with the development process. The phenomenon is already well known. While primary commodity exports are, with a few exceptions, expanding relatively slowly, demand for imports of manufactured goods is tending to grow rapidly, at a pace that increases with the rate of development. The resulting imbalance creates a serious external bottleneck which makes development difficult. The imbalance must be rectified if development is to be accelerated in conditions of dynamic equilibrium. One of the main objectives of the United Nations Development Decade' is the attainment of minimum annual growth rate of 5 percent in the income of the developing countries by 1970. This is certainly a rather modest target and not much higher than the average rate 4.4 per cent registered in the 1950s. Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult—if not impossible for many of the develop

1U.N. doc. E/CONF.46/3 (text as printed in Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964 [8 vols.; United Nations, 1964], vol. II, pp. 5–64). This 8-volume collection has the U.N. document number E/CONF.46/141, by which designation it will hereafter be cited. The conference is frequently referred to by its abbreviation: UNCTAD.

"The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment met at Havana, Nov. 12, 1947, to Mar. 24, 1948, and adopted the Charter of the International Trade Organization; text in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, pp. 391–409.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 153-156; ibid., 1962, pp. 145 ff.; ibid., 1963, pp. 122 ff.

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ing countries to achieve and maintain this rate of growth unless the present Conference brings about a policy of international cooperation that would make it possible to eliminate the imbalance in trade.

What are the implications of the 5 per cent minimum growth target for international trade? First and foremost, it should not be expected that, if the income of all developing countries is to rise at the minimum by per cent every year, their imports can increase at a rate much less than 6 per cent. One of the main reasons for this is that any acceleration in the rate of growth requires additional investment; and the import content of this investment is normally much higher than that of income as a whole. Consequently, it is not going too far to conclude that imports would have to rise at a rate somewhat higher than that of total income. This view is supported by estimates based on the experience of developing countries.

The second implication of the 5 per cent growth target is that exports of the developing countries would also have to rise at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, in order to maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium. More precisely, a volume of exports should rise at a rate which, after allowing for changes in the terms of trade, would pay for a volume of imports increasing each year at a rate of 6 per cent.

As we all know, experience during the 1950s was highly unsatisfactory in this respect. The annual rate of growth in export volume of the developing countries during that decade was only 4 per cent per annum, and, if the petroleum-exporting countries are excluded, the average is significantly lower. At the same time, the terms of trade deteriorated, so that the purchasing power of exports over imports rose more slowly still, by under 2 per cent per annum.

Thus, even at existing rates of growth there is a widening gap in the balance of payments of the developing countries; at higher rates of growth consistent with the objectives of the Development Decade, the gap would be even greater if the trends of the 1950s continued.

This, then, has to be the starting-point of the Conference. One cannot posit a 5 per cent rate of development without accepting also all the consequences that this implies for the rates of growth of imports and exports.

There are many ways, of course, in which the external resources of the developing countries could be increased: through additional exports of primary products, through more exports of manufactures, or through greater external aid. To some extent, each of these possible solutions is a substitute for the others. To the extent that one fails in solving the problem under one heading, one increases the burden to be borne under other headings. For example, in so far as one fails to secure any significant improvement in the rate of growth of exports of developing countries, recourse must be had to a great inflow of international finance. And within any given target rate of increase in exports as a whole, the less that is done to widen market opportunities for foodstuffs and raw materials, the greater need will there be to open up new markets for manufactures. A combination of interdependent elements is involved; and it is an essential condition for success that the various measures adopted should be integrated within an over-all policy for achieving the desired result.

4

Unless these measures are adopted, the trade gap of the developing countries will be immense; available estimates show that, if the factors responsible for the present trend in world trade continue, the trade gap may reach an order of magnitude of about $20,000 million by 1970 if the growth rate of 5 per cent is to be achieved. This gap is potential and not real: if the means of bridging the gap are not found, the developing countries will be forced to reduce their rates of growth unless they are prepared to achieve higher rates at an excessive economic and social cost involving serious political consequences.

The rate of growth of 5 per cent per annum, set as an objective of the Development Decade, can in no sense be considered fully satisfactory. It would mean an annual rate of increase of only 2.6 per cent in the average per capita income of the peripheral countries in view of the rapid rate of population

4 This figure has been calculated on the basis of a 5 per cent average rate of income growth. If a minimum growth rate of 5 per cent is used, the figure for the potential trade gap will be higher. [Footnote in source text.]