The first sentence of Article 19 says in simple and clear terms that a Member subject to its provisions shall have no vote in the General Assembly. It does not say that the General Assembly has any discretion with respect to such a Member; it does not say that the General Assembly shall vote as to whether the delinquent shall have no vote; it simply says that the delinquent shall have no vote. The first sentence of Article 19 in the French text is even more emphatic: it says the delinquent Member cannot vote "ne peut participer au vote".

The second sentence of Article 19 does provide for a vote; a delinquent Member whose failure to pay is due to conditions beyond its control may be permitted by the General Assembly to vote. But there is no discretion as to a delinquent Member whose failure to pay is not due to conditions beyond its control, no discretion as to a Member which refuses to pay.

The United States hopes that those Members about to be confronted by Article 19 will take the action necessary to avoid the confrontation. The way to avoid the confrontation is for those subject to the terms of Article 19 to make the necessary payments.

The United States does not seek the confrontation-but if on November 10 the plain and explicit terms of Article 19 do become applicable, there is no alternative to its application.

It is not only that Article 19 means what it says-that the Member shall have no vote-it is that failure to apply the Article would be a violation of the Charter which would have far-reaching consequences.

Failure to apply the Article would break faith with the overwhelming majority of Members who are paying their peacekeeping assessments often at great sacrifice as obligations binding under the Charter.

Failure to apply the Article would be a repudiation of the International Court of Justice and of that rule of international law whose continued growth is vital for progress toward peace and disarmament.

Failure to apply the Article would mean the discarding of the only sanction which the United Nations has in support of its capacity to collect what its Members owe it.

Failure to apply the Article would undermine the only mandatory power the General Assembly has-the power under Article 17 to assess the expenses of the Organization on the Members.

Failure to apply the Article would tempt Members to pick and choose, with impunity, from among their obligations to the United Nations, refusing to pay for items they dislike even though those items were authorized by the overwhelming vote of the Members. Indeed, the Soviet Union has already said that it will not pay for certain items in the regular budgets. How could any organization function on such a fiscal quicksand?

Failure to apply the Article to a great power simply because it is a great power would undermine the constitutional integrity of the United Nations, and could sharply affect the attitude toward the Organization of those who have always been its strongest supporters. Failure to apply the Article could seriously jeopardize the support

of United Nations operations and programs, not only for the keeping of the peace but for economic and social development.

The consequences of not applying Article 19 would thus be far worse than any conjectured consequences of applying it.

We believe that it is the desire of most Members of the United Nations that the situation not arise which makes Article 19 applicable, and therefore we believe that it is up to the Membership to see to it that the confrontation is avoided through the means available under the Charter for avoiding it-the making of the necessary payments.

J. CONCLUSION

The United Nations is faced with a financial and constitutional crisis which must be solved if the Organization is to continue as an effective instrument. The Charter cannot be ignored. Faith cannot be broken. Commitments must be met. Bills must be paid.

The problem is one which is of crucial importance to all Members, and a solution can be found only if all Members work together in a search for common ground.

The issue is one between (a) the countries that have brought on the crisis by their refusals to pay and (b) the other Members of the Organization. It is now the task of all those other Members to get the help of those who have thus far refused to pay in solving the crisis that faces the entire Organization.

This memorandum has dealt, among other things, with Article 19 and its applicability. The consequence of not applying it, if it becomes applicable, would be to undermine the very integrity and capacity of the U.N. Let all Members cooperate in finding that common ground which would make possible the receipt by the United Nations of the funds which would make Article 19 inapplicable and which would enable the Organization, thus strengthened, to look forward to continued effective usefulness and Man's best hope for a peaceful world.

Document II-19

"[The U.N. Financial and Constitutional Crisis] Is in No Sense a Bilateral Issue": REPLY MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (RUSK) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 8, 1964 (EXCERPT) 96

This [matter of peacekeeping assessments and loss of voting rights] is not an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is an issue between the Soviet Union and certain other countries who have not paid their assessments in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly and all the rest of the United Nations. The attitude of the Soviet Union on this matter is somewhat like the troika

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1964, pp. 576–577.

proposals. Their attitude deeply affects the constitutional structure of the United Nations. Now, the ability to assess contributions is the only mandatory authority which the General Assembly possesses, and this is the only mandatory authority in which the great bulk of the United Nations membership participates. Every small country member of the United Nations has a stake in this constitutional issue in the United Nations itself; so the issue here is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The question is whether the United Nations is going to continue on the basis of the charter, and article 19 is very precise and specific on this point.98

So that we hope very much that some arrangement can be made by which this issue is removed. We are not asking for or looking for some disagreeable and bitter confrontation on this point. But we do recognize that this point is essential to the future integrity and structure of the United Nations and that every member has a stake in it. Now we hope that somehow some arrangement can be made, some payments made, some solution found before the General Assembly opens in November. But we have no doubt whatever that there is involved here a basic constitutional issue for the United Nations as a whole. It is in no sense a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Document II-20

"Not. . . a Single Kopeck... for the Unlawful [United Nations] Operations in the Middle East and the Congo": STATEMENT MADE BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE (FEDORENKO) IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, OCTOBER 9, 1964 99

Document II-21

Decision To Postpone the Opening Date of the Nineteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly From November 10 Until December 1, 1964: NOTE VERBALE FROM THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (THANT) TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES, NOVEMBER 2,

19641

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 39-40; ibid., 1961, p. 73.

**Text of the U.N. Charter is in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

"U.N. doc. S/PV.1160, pp. 12-13.

1U.N. doc. A/5773. The opening date of the General Assembly had been originally postponed until Nov. 10 at the request of several member states after an exchange of correspondence in April and May between their representatives and the Secretary-General (A/5708). The postponements were requested because of the financial crisis and the threat of certain member states to invoke art. 19 of the U.N. Charter to deprive those members in arrears of their payments on the U.N. peacekeeping forces of their voting rights in the General Assembly.

Document II-22

Soviet Reaffirmation of the Position That "Without a Security Council Decision . . . No One Is Bound To Share in Covering the Cost of United Nations [Peacekeeping] Operations": STATEMENT TRANSMITTED BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (FEDORENKO) TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (THANT), November 7, 1964 2

Document II-23

"The Law [of the U.N. Charter] Either Is Applicable to All Impartially or Inapplicable to All Impartially": LETTER FROM THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (STEVENSON) TO THE NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (ADEBO), NOVEMBER 9, 1964 3

4

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of November 3 [4] and also to convey to you his warm appreciation for your kind remarks on his election to the office of President of the United States.

He wishes you to know that he shares your concern for the welfare and effectiveness of the United Nations which prompted your letter. As you noted, the provisions of the Charter will be applicable when the General Assembly convenes. The law of the Charter is explicit on this. The practical implications are equally clear, for the law either is applicable to all impartially or inapplicable to all impartially.

5

However, we all hope that before December 1 the necessary steps will have been taken so that this issue will not arise. The United States has been cooperating with others to help achieve a generally acceptable solution and will be pleased to work further to this end. We have put forward three main ideas, as you are aware:

First, without derogating from the power and authority of the General Assembly, in which all United Nations members are represented, we would be glad to cooperate in strengthening the primary role which the Charter gives to the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Second, we will be glad to cooperate in establishing arrangements under which the Assembly, in making assessments for major peacekeeping operations, would take more fully into account the views of those who, such as some of the states now in arrears, would be expected to share the main burden of supporting future peacekeeping activities. Third, we have consistently said that, as far as the United States is

2U.N. doc. A/5777.

4

3 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1964, p. 826.

Text ibid., p. 827. The letter, written in Chief Adebo's capacity as Chairman of the Working Group of Twenty-One (see footnote 82 to doc. II-17, ante), requested President Johnson to make renewed efforts, particularly “in association with President de Gaulle of France and the new leaders of the Soviet Union and Great Britain" to help solve the financial crisis.

See ante, doc. II-21. Text of the U.N. Charter is in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

concerned, the current financial difficulties can be settled in any number of possible ways consistent with the Charter.

I believe that these ideas conform with your desire that a solution be found.

We have in fact held discussions with the U.S.S.R. and with other members of the Working Group, as you know, and we have been willing throughout the year to discuss the issue with anyone at any time. We have reiterated this willingness to the U.S.S.R. and others in recent days.

We recognize that this question does not involve the big powers alone. A satisfactory settlement is of greatest import to all United Nations members, big and small, since it goes to the core of what kind of world organization the membership is prepared to support. We would be glad to consider any ideas which you or others may have for a generally acceptable solution consistent with the Charter.

You may be sure that, in all the work before us, the United States will fully share in your endeavor to make the United Nations "stronger to fulfill its purposes, foremost among which is the maintenance of peace and security in the world."

Document II-24

"Voluntary Payments ... Will Be Satisfactory to the United States": REMARKS BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (STEVENSON), NOVEMBER 13, 1964 €

6

The United States hopes that any conflict of opinion over assessments for peacekeeping operations will be resolved before December 1.7 I am encouraged by the initiative of the Group of Four.8

The United States is ready to discuss peacekeeping arrangements for the future at any time with anyone at any place, and has been ever since last March.

Voluntary payments could be made without prejudice to the Soviet's or anyone else's legal views. Any arrangements for such payments consistent with the Charter and satisfactory to the Secretary-General will be satisfactory to the United States.

We don't want to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union or France or anyone else. What the world needs is better relations and less tensions with so many serious problems of peace and security confronting us.

The United States also feels we need ever stronger peacekeeping operations.

'Department of State Bulletin. Dec. 7, 1964, p. 827. The remarks were made following a meeting with the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant).

See ante, doc. II-21.

The informal Group of Four had been organized on Nov. 7 to attempt to reach a compromise solution which would avoid a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union when the General Assembly convened on Dec. 1. It was composed of Carlos Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela). President of the 18th General Assembly, Chief S. O. Adebo (Nigeria). Abdul Rahman Pazhwak (Afghanistan), and Sivert A. Nielsen (Norway).