as well as other interested governments in New York. But such plans must be firmly grounded on the Assembly's charter power to make binding assessments and the members' charter obligation to pay those assessments as made. As the Cyprus experience suggests, any other course holds grave dangers for the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace.

I do not believe the nations of the world will be so easily frightened into undermining what has served them so well. The African states, for example, will not readily be persuaded that the U.N., in helping to establish a unified Congo while keeping the cold war out of their continent, was really embarked on a colonialist adventure. The countries that watched the world tremble on the brink at Suez will not soon be convinced that their safety lies in depriving the United Nations of the capacity for effective action in that kind of situation.

As debate and discussion proceed, the question of article 19 will increasingly be perceived as fundamentally a question going to the U.N.'s capacity to act to preserve the peace. It will be seen also as implacating the basic commitment to the rule of law in world affairs.

When these things are understood, I believe that, as in the past, the nations will rally to the support of their charter. And when that prospect becomes clear, the response of the Soviet Union will not be, I predict, to take a walk. Also running true to their past performance, the Soviets will find some way to live with and by the decision of the organization.

In thus confirming the fiscal authority of the United Nations we will have taken another step in fashioning from the words of the charter a living organism to serve our world.

Document II-12

"When the Security Council Adopts Decisions To Establish and Finance United Nations Armed Forces . . . the Soviet Union Will Be Prepared To Take Part . . . in Defraying the Expenditure": MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (FEDORENKO) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (BENHIMA), JULY 10, 1964 52

Post, doc. X-3.

U.N. doc. S/5811. The title of this document was: "Memorandum of the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security". The memorandum was circulated to all U.N. members.

Document II-13

"The Financial Situation of the Whole Organization Is Critical. I Did Not Get the Impression That... the Government of France and the Government of the Soviet Union Are Prepared To Change Their Policies": REMARKS AND REPLY MADE BY THE U.N. SECRETARYGENERAL (THANT) TO A QUESTION ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, JULY 31, 1964 (EXCERPTS) 53

I came back with the definite feeling that all the leaders of the countries I visited have one objective in common, that is to see the United Nations strengthened. They all desire to see the world Organization developing into a really effective instrument for the performance of the functions outlined in the Charter. I am convinced of it. There is no division of opinion on the objectives, but there is a very wide divergence of views regarding the means to achieve these objectives. I feel that in the next few weeks the Member States should concentrate their attention on the basic problem before the United Nations. It seems to me that the basic problem is to come to some sort of agreement, at least a consensus, on the functions of the General Assembly vis a vis the Security Council regarding certain activities, functions which are not. in my view, explicitly defined in the Charter. If the United Nations has to grow and has to have a future I think the Member States should focus their attention in the weeks to come on this basic issue.

... As I have explained on a previous occasion, it was not my intention to try to influence Member States to change their policies [on the questions of finances and dues paying]. In my position it would not be proper for me to attempt to change the policies of Member States, large or small. I presented the case as I see it. As I see it, the financial situation of the whole Organization is critical. I did not get the impression that the Member States, particularly the Government of France and the Government of the Soviet Union are prepared to change their policies for the moment at least.

54

Document II-14

"[No] Permanent Member of the Security Council Has the Right Under the Charter Wholly To Prevent the United Nations Fulfilling Its Peace-Keeping Role": NOTE TRANSMITTED BY THE U.K. DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (JACKLING) TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (THANT), AUGUST 5, 1964 55

5U.N. press release SG/SM/131. Aug. 1, 1964. The Secretary-General spoke at an impromptu news conference on the occasion of his return from a two and one-half week trip to Europe, Asia, and Africa, in the course of which he visited Paris and Moscow, where he had conversations with President de Gaulle and Chairman Khrushchev on a variety of topics including the U.N. financial situation and the dispute over arrears of payment owed in connection with the peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. France and the Soviet Union were among the nations refusing to make such payments. On Aug. 20 the Secretary-General commented as follows on a visit made by him to Washington on Aug. 6, wherein he talked with President Johnson about U.N. finances: "I returned from Washington with a deep impression that the attitude of the United States Government towards this problem also remains unchanged." (U.N. press release, Aug. 20, 1964.) For an elaboration of the U.S. position, see ante, doc. II-11.

54

55U.N. doc. A/5726. This document had been delivered by H.M. Embassy in Moscow on July 24 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in reply to the Soviet Memorandum of July 10 (cited ante, doc. II-12).

Document II-15

United Nations Payments by Member States: CONCURRENT RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS, AUGUST 20, 1964 (EXCERPT) 56

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the Permanent United States Delegate to the United Nations to continue efforts toward securing payment by members of the United Nations of their assessments in arrears. It is further the sense of the Congress that if, upon the convening of the Nineteenth General Assembly,57 the arrears of any member of the United Nations equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years, the President should direct the Permanent United States Delegate to make every effort to assure invocation of the penalty provisions of article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations.58

Document II-16

Soviet Analysis of the Question of the Financial Situation of the United Nations: MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED BY THE SOVIET DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. (MAKEEV) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (MOROZOV), SEPTEMBER 11, 1964 59

The financial situation of the United Nations has been attracting universal attention lately. Frequent references are even made to "the financial crisis of the United Nations".

This problem is taking on especial significance for the United Nations, and not only because the financing of the United Nations is important in itself. The main point is that, in this matter as in others, some States are trying to compel the United Nations to violate its Charter," in order to justify illegal acts which have been committed under the United Nations flag in the past, and in order to make it easier to violate the Charter in the future.

The effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and international co-operation can be assured only if individual States, as well as the Organization as a whole, abide by the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Violation of the provisions of the Charter, on the other hand, may have serious adverse consequences for the international situation and may even lead to the collapse of the United Nations.

It is universally known that the existing financial difficulties of the United Nations have been caused by the expenses incurred in maintaining the Emergency Force in the Middle East and the operations in the Congo.

What would the position be with regard to the payment of such expenses if the United Nations Charter was adhered to?

"H. Con. Res. 343; 78 Stat. 1213.

See post, doc. II-21.

Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

"U.N. doc. S/5964.

*Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

I

The operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations operations in the Congo lay no financial obligations on Members of the United Nations, inasmuch as these operations have been conducted otherwise than in accordance with the requirements of the United Nations Charter.

The United Nations was established in the same way as other international organizations; namely, through the conclusion of an international treaty-the Charter. This treaty determines, in particular, the competence of United Nations organs, their procedure, and so forth. Under the United Nations Charter, States have assumed certain obligations which cannot be altered without a new agreement among the Members of the Organization. It is perfectly evident-and this situation is universally recognized-that the Charter does not place the United Nations above States, that it does not authorize it to act without regard for the provisions of the Charter.

It is natural, therefore, that financial obligations for the Members of the United Nations can arise only out of such actions of the United Nations as conform to its Charter. As to expense connected with actions which do not conform to the Charter, such actions cannot give rise to obligations for Member States with regard to the payment of expenses.

It is precisely to this category of expenses that the cost of maintaining the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the cost of the United Nations operations in the Congo belong.

The United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was established on the basis of resolutions 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted at the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly.

61

The USSR Government has repeatedly emphasized that the establishment of the Emergency Force in the Middle East was carried out in violation of the United Nations Charter.

In matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations Charter clearly delimits the competence of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. According to the Charter, only the Security Council is empowered to decide questions relating to the taking of action to maintain international peace and security; the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East falls into this category.

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, the Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", and have agreed that "in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf" (Article 24). The States Members of the United Nations have assumed an obligation to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council (Article 25).

The General Assembly may, as provided in Article 11, "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" and "may make recommendations with regard to any such question". However, as stated further on in the same Article, "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion".

Under Article 39 of the Charter, it is specifically the Security Council which "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security". Each succeeding Article of Chapter VII of the Charter contains provisions confirming, reinforcing and crystallizing the proposition that all questions relating to the establishment and use of United Nations armed forces lie within the competence of the Security Council.

61 Texts in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 661, 666667.

Guided by these provisions of the Charter, the USSR representative at the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in 1956 had the following to say about the decision to establish the Emergency Force in the Middle East:

"As regards the creation and stationing on Egyptian territory of an international police force, the Soviet delegation is obliged to point out that this Force is being created in violation of the United Nations Charter.

"The General Assembly resolution on the basis of which it is now proposed to form this Force is inconsistent with the Charter. Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council, and the Security Council only, not the General Assembly, to set up an international armed force and to take such action as it may deem necessary, including the use of such a force, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a Memorandum on the procedure of financing the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations operations in the Congo, transmitted to the International Court of Justice in 1962, drew the following conclusion:

"Thus, as the Emergency force for the Middle East was set up in violation of the United Nations Charter, circumventing the Security Council, its financing cannot be regarded as an obligation upon the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter."

62

The basis for the conduct of the United Nations operations in the Congo was the Security Council resolution (S/4387) of 14 July 1960, which was adopted at the request of Patrice Lumumba's Government in consequence of the Belgian aggression in that country. Thereafter, however, in the course of the operations of the United Nations armed forces in the Congo, both this resolution and the United Nations Charter were grossly violated.

64

According to the Charter, the Security Council shall determine which States shall take part in carrying out its decisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 48 of the Charter provides that: "The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine". In violation of these provisions of the Charter, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, bypassing the Security Council, himself determined the group of States which were invited to take part, with armed forces or otherwise, in the United Nations operations in the Congo. As early as the Security Council meeting of 20 July 1960, the USSR representative was compelled to protest against the actions of the Secretary-General, which were undertaken in violation of the Security Council resolution of 14 July.

65

Furthermore the provisions of the Charter were not observed in relation to the direction of the United Nations operations in the Congo.

The decisive criterion for the legality of the actions of a United Nations armed force in any eventuality is, of course, their consistency with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is possible to conceive a situation in which the requirements of the Charter are satisfied as regards the establishment of United Nations armed forces, but the activity of those forces is so directed as to produce results which are diametrically opposed to the purposes set forth in the Charter. This is precisely what happened in the Congo.

The texts of the advisory opinion of the I.C.J. and related papers are printed in International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1962, pp. 150-308. The text of the summary of the advisory opinion is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 109-115.

Text ibid., 1960, p. 528.

See ibid., p. 524.

"For the text of a statement made by the Soviet Representative in the U.N. Security Council meeting of July 20-21, 1960, see ibid., pp. 531-532.