their own security. He speaks for the Government of this country, and we shall back him in every possible way.43

Now, the immediate problem, which has been under discussion, is that of unity within the leadership and relations between the civilian authorities and the military authorities. It is not for us to insist upon a particular detailed pattern. There are many ways in which governments can organize themselves. But, nevertheless, on the initiative of the military authorities themselves, there was brought into being a civilian government to undertake the normal civilian responsibilities of government." And the military authorities indicated that it was their desire to restrict themselves to their military duties and get on with the war against the Viet Cong.

Now, what is important is not detail. What is important is not even personality. What is important is unity, the setting aside of personal rivalries or lesser issues in the interest of maintaining the strength and the unity of the country.

We believe that all those who have positions of leadership or responsibility might well put their personal considerations aside, just as the vast number of ordinary South Vietnamese put personal considerations aside, and just as our Americans, who are out there in the field assisting them in their great struggle, put personal considerations aside.

And so we hope very much that in this period of discussion that is now going on, and to which I cannot from here go into detail at this moment without perhaps getting in the way of discussions going on in Saigon-we hope very much that this overriding need for common effort and unified action will impress itself upon all elements there, because unity would be worth many, many divisions and unity would open the way for a more prompt and manageable solution to the severe problems that exist in that country.

45

Our interest in Southeast Asia has been developed and expressed throughout this postwar period. Before SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] came into existence, we and Britain and France were in very close touch with that situation. SEATO underlined the importance we attached to the security of the countries of that area.

But, actually, the American interest can be expressed in very simple terms. Where there is a country which is independent and secure and in a position to work out its own policy and be left alone by its neighbors, there is a country whose position is consistent with our understanding of our interests in the world. It's just as simple as that.

If we have military personnel in Southeast Asia, it is because we feel that they are needed to assist South Viet-Nam at the present time to maintain its security and independence. If South Viet-Nam's neighbors would leave it alone, those military people could come home.

43 See supra.

"See footnote 36 to doc. IX-142, ante.

45

For the text of the SEATO Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 912-916.

We have no desire for any bases or permanent military presence in that area. We are interested in the independence of states. That is why we have more than 40 allies. That is why we are interested in the independence and security of the nonalined countries. Because, to us, the general system of states represented in the United Nations Charter is our view of a world that is consistent with American interests. So our own interest there is very simple.

But it is very important, because we feel that we have learned in the last many decades that a persistent course of aggression left to go unchecked can only lead to a general war and therefore that the independence of particular countries is a matter of importance to the general peace.

Now the problem is out in the Pacific. And we have a large interest in the way these problems evolve in the Pacific, because we have allies and we have interests out there. Southeast Asia is at the present time the point at which this issue of militant aggression against one's neighbors for ideological reasons is posed.

I don't want to get into details of what might happen on such a question of that sort [-the possibility of curtailment or withdrawal of U.S. aid if a unified government is not achieved in South VietNam].46 Obviously, if there are problems of unity, there are certain kinds of assistance that are simply not feasible. In other words, developments in the civilian field that could be very promising, from the point of view of the South Vietnamese economy and the South Vietnamese people, can be impaired if there is not an effective administration having the full support of all elements in the country to put it into operation. But I wouldn't want to get into detail on that.

On Dec. 22, as a result of the dissolution of the High National Council (see footnote 41 to doc. IX-144, supra), American officials in Saigon had suspended talks on implementation of the agreement to increase U.S. aid to South Viet-Nam (ante, doc. IX-143) until the civilian government was restored. On Dec. 26 orders were given for American advisers to refrain from participation in advance planning of all but routine military and civilian operations in Viet-Nam pending clarification of the future status of United States aid.

On Dec. 28 President Phan Khac Suu and Premier Tran Van Huong issued a communiqué deploring the military coup and stating that "the executive agencies no longer represent the government by civilians. (Excerpts in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965–1966, vol. No. XV, p. 20652).

Part X

DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AND THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

A. United States Arms Control Machinery

Document X-1

Activities of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 1-December 31, 1964: INTRODUCTION TO FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 1, 1965 1

The year 1964 brought dramatic evidence of the urgency of arms control in the nuclear age. While Ranger 7 photographs of the moon's surface heralded a future of great astronautical achievement," an explosion at Lop Nor on the mainland of China warned of the danger of nuclear spread and reminded the world of the unrelenting threat posed by these awesome weapons.3

Four American Presidents since World War II have been preoccupied with arms control. They have understood that an increasing stockpile of thermonuclear weapons cannot in itself insure national security. There is a measure of progress to be recorded in the fact that this long-held American conviction is shared increasingly by the nations of the world, and particularly by the great nuclear powers. It is this fact, along with the realization that "war is senseless" in the nuclear age, that is the basis for our belief that prudent agreements to avoid catastrophe are possible.

A major goal of U.S. policy, then, is to bring the arms race to a halt. It is the task of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to translate this goal into specific and realistic proposals.

The most urgent and immediate of ACDA's objectives are to keep the arms race from expanding and to find ways to reduce the risk of war which is inherent in the very existence of mighty nuclear

1 Fourth Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1964-December 31, 1964 (U.S. ACDA publication 25, 1965), pp. 1-4.

The appropriation for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, was contained in Public Law 88-527, Aug. 31, 1964, and amounted to $9 million (78 Stat. 733).

arsenals. The list of arms control achievements in 1963 has contributed to easing the intensity of the arms race, and has underlined the importance of continuing the search for new agreements.*

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 stipulates that policy in this area "must be consistent with national security policy as a whole." 5 It is and must be interwoven with defense policy. It touches vital political and economic chords as well. The problem of bringing the arms race under control is, therefore, one of extreme delicacy and complexity, both at the domestic and the international level.

8

The impact of events on possibilities for arms control is difficult to overestimate. Early in 1964 the two great superpowers began to give public expression to concern over the costs of their respective military establishments. Both the United States and the Soviet Union announced cuts in their military budgets. In his state of the Union message in January of 1964 the President told the Congress that production of uranium would be cut back by 25 percent and that four plutonium reactors would be shut down. When this action was folfowed 3 months later by a still further U.S. cut in fissionable materials production, it was accompanied by simultaneous announcements in the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of an intention to cut back their planned production for use in weapons. These actions were taken unilaterally and not by any formal agreement. The United States explained it was cutting back production because there was no reason to manufacture weapons material beyond its needs. It is fair to assume this consideration influenced the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom as well. Nevertheless, in a world grown accustomed to the continuing pileup of weapons on an almost unimaginable scale, this commonsense action was a heartening sign. At Geneva, when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened January 21, President Johnson presented the conference with the most far-reaching arms control measures yet to come before that body. His five-point program aimed directly at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and at preventing any further East-West buildup of stockpiles of strategic delivery vehicles both missiles and bombers. The weight and seriousness of intent embodied in these proposals, combined with the improved atmosphere brought about by the agreements of 1963, was reflected in the conference for the remainder of its 1964 sessions.

While no formal agreements emerged, the accomplishments of 1963 helped the conference come of age. Even the deepest areas of disagreement were for the most part approached with more rational exposition and less polemic than at any time in the past. As always, external political events impinged on the Geneva deliberations.

*See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 886 ff.

Among these were such questions as the relationship of the proposed NATO multilateral force to proposals on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union extended its drive against the MLF to the Geneva forum, and refused to enter negotiations on an agreement to halt nuclear spread unless MLF was abandoned. In Washington and New York, as well as in Geneva, the United States continued its 2-year effort to convince the Russians that the multilateral force idea was put forward as a "viable alternative" to proliferation.10

The orientation of U.S. defenses to the concept of "flexible response" and the constantly evolving technology in weapons systems have had an impact on arms control concepts and made tremendous demands on the ingenuity of our technical experts. In addition, changes in the level and pattern of defense spending during 1964 brought about the closing of defense plants and installations and the possibility of resulting economic disturbances in various parts of the Nation. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is required by its statute to assess the effects of arms control measures on the economy; and while the closing of bases has not been the result of arms control, the economic impact is the same. The President has pointed out the importance of improving our knowledge of the effects of such action in our communities, and ACDA is involved at both the study and action level.

The year 1964 also brought new governments to the three great nuclear powers-the United States, the United Kingdom," and the Soviet Union.12 And during that dramatic period of a few weeks, Communist China made its bid for entry into the nuclear club. Renewed emphasis on disarmament problems was immediately evident in Britain's new Labor government. A Ministry of State for Disarmament was established, and the new Minister, Lord Chalfont, came to Washington to acquaint himself with the staff and organization of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Subsequent to this, an expert group to perform functions similar to ACDA's was organized within the British Foreign Office.

In the Soviet Union, the new rulers hastened to reassure the West that the course of Soviet foreign policy would remain essentially unchanged, which-for the time being at least-served to keep open possibilities for further arms control agreements. The East-West dialog continued at several levels. Late in the year, Secretary of State Dean Rusk met in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Mr. Gromyko also met with President Johnson in Washington. Meetings between the Cochairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, ACDA Director William C. Foster and Semyon K. Tsarapkin of the U.S.S.R., were held in New York and Washington. Among other disarmament questions on the agenda of these talks was the priority item of how to stop further nuclear spread.