maintain the U.S. participation in NATO as an essential requirement of American foreign policy. The President's Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's points out that we are entering an age of nuclear parity. As the strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact approach parity, the likelihood of the use of such weapons declines. Conventional forces then increase in significance as a means for exerting military or diplomatic pressure. Adequate nonnuclear land forces are indispensable to deter those nonnuclear threats which the Soviets would never believe we would counter with nuclear weapons. We must have land forces in place; and we must have an unambiguous and flexible capability to reinforce-flexible in the sense of providing Presidential options suited to the situation. Mr. SIKES. Mr. Secretary, as you have stated, Western Europe has, next to the United States, the greatest aggregation of economic, political, and ideological strength in the world and a population and economic prosperity substantially greater than those of the Soviet Union. If we can "Vietnamize" the army of the relatively poor country of Vietnam, can we "Europeanize" NATO? Secretary RESOR. I assume that the parallel which you draw with Vietnamization has to to with the degree that we can turn over responsibility for the defense of Europe to the Europeans. First, as you know, there has been a considerable Europeanization of NATO over the years. The U.S. contribution has progressively become a smaller percentage of the total NATO capability, particularly as the Federal Republic of Germany has been rearmed. As recently as 1968 we redeployed 28,000 troop spaces from Europe and now depend on our improved strategic lift to permit their early return. However, a great deal of the strength of the organization and of the Allied Command, Europe, derives from the U.S. contributions and participation. We are deeply involved in a long-standing treaty organization and a combined and integrated military command. We contribute an important part of the conventional option which gives this country and our European allies an alternative to immediate and complete reliance upon nuclear retaliation. At the same time, our nuclear capabilities also assure that the Soviets must face uncertainty concerning the possibility of escalation to nuclear war. This combination has succeeded in stabilizing Europe for a long time. Although modifications will undoubtedly take place over the years ahead, our national policy is one of continued U.S. participation and continued U.S. support of the conventional option. European stability is a matter of high importance to this country and our policy is not to take unilateral action which would upset the balance from which that stability derives. Mr. SIKES. What have been the trends in NATO support in the past 5 years by the NATO partners other than the United States? Have the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, and other countries reduced their NATO forces or returned forces committed to NATO to their home country? (A classified statement was submitted.) Mr. SIKES. Is it possible that as long as we are willing to tax our people to defend Western Europe, the Europeans have little incentive to raise their own taxes to provide their own defenses? Secretary RESOR. Yes, it is possible but it is also possible that a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe could cause the We maintain that the value of the U.S. contribution to NATO, though costly to our people, must be measured in terms of its overall essentiality to U.S. security. The credibility of the U.S. commitment is of the greatest importance We feel that our NATO allies can and should do more to contribute to the combined defense of Western Europe. We have in the past, and we will continue to urge them to do so. Mr. SIKES. For many years, American Presidents, Secretaries of State and Secretaries of Defense have tried with little success to persuade the countries of Western Europe to meet NATO force goals. In 1966, new, more flexible force planning procedures were established. Does this indicate that the Western Europeans do not share our concern over a possible ground war in Europe? Secretary RESOR. Up until 1966, NATO force goals were derived solely from military requirements and did not take into account realistic political and economic considerations. NATO authorities, including the United States, recognized that the attainment of these military force goals were not economically nor politically feasible and, in this regard, a new NATO force planning procedure was established in 1966. This new procedure considered political and economic requirements as well as military. In this respect, Western Europeans continue to share our concern over a possible ground war, and they are attempting to meet the NATO force goals within political and economic limits, improving their force posture through modernization, and continuing to look to the United States to set the example. Mr. SIKES. Since Western Europe has the population and resources to establish very substantial military forces, could a significant American withdrawal result in a buildup of military forces by the countries of Western Europe? Secretary RESOR. It is possible but there is no assurance that Western European nations would increase their military forces if the United States were to withdraw significant forces from Europe. I believe that a large U.S. withdrawal from NATO would more likely have a definite negative psychological impact on NATO solidarity and resolve. Mr. SIKES. How was the determination made that troops are required in Western Europe today? Army (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SIKES. How many European nationals are employed by the Army now? Secretary RESOR. As of December 31, 1969, there were 2,977 direct Mr. SIKES. How many U.S. civilian employees of the Army are now Secretary RESOR. As of December 31, 1969, there were 10,651 U.S. Mr. SIKES. How does the percentage of gross national product spent on defense in the NATO countries compare with that of the Secretary RESOR. Since 1960 the percentage of gross national prod- uct spent on defense in the NATO countries has averaged approxi- DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES (CALENDAR Mr. SIKES. How do the compulsory military training laws in the NATO countries compare with requirements in the United States? Secretary RESOR. The United Kingdom and Canada have volunteėr armies. Other NATO nations have conscription requirements gener- ally similar to U.S. service responsibilities. Call-up ages range from 18 in West Germany to 21 in Portugal. Length of service varies from 12 months (Belgium, Norway) to 36 months in Portugal. Mr. SIKES. Does the administration have any plans to reduce U.S. forces in Europe to any significant extent at any time in the foreseeable future? It has been stated that reductions will be made after June Secretary RESOR. The President has made it clear that we will stand firm with our NATO Allies and that he does not contemplate signifi- cant reductions of U.S. military forces there in the near future. This does not mean that we do not continually seek economies. Based on decisions made last year, we will reduce our support forces by about 1971. These reductions are actually reflections of management im- ́ Mr. SIKES. In a war in which nuclear weapons were not used, how General WESTMORELAND. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SIKES. How do income taxes in the NATO countries compare Secretary RESOR. All NATO countries have graduated income tax Mr. SIKES. To what extent have the troops in NATO forces, other than U.S. troops, increased in the past year? Secretary RESOR. There have been no troop increases in NATO land forces during the past year. Mr. SIKES. How do the foreign exchange balances in the other NATO countries compare with that of the United States? (Secretary Resor provided the following tabulation :) The table below reflects the foreign exchange positions of the NATO countries as of December 31, 1969: Foreign exchange position of NATO countries as of December 31, 1969 Mr. SIKES. What was the balance-of-payments drain as a result of maintaining our Army forces in Europe in fiscal year 1969? What offset agreements are now in force? Secretary RESOR. As a result of maintaining our Army forces in Europe, Army expenditures entering the international balance of payments in fiscal year 1969 have been reported at $858.2 million. The only offset agreement currently in force is with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Under the agreement the FRG will offset $1.52 billion of the foreign exchange costs of the U.S. forces in Germany in the fiscal years 1970 and 1971. This will be achieved by $925 million procurement of U.S. goods and services and $595 million of financial measures. In addition due to the revaluation of the deutsche mark by 9.3 percent, discussions are underway with the FRG as to its impact on the current agreement. (The following tabulation was provided:) FRG offset of U.S. military expenditures in Germany in fiscal year 1970 and 1971 Millions Military procurement in the United States__ FRG loan to the United States (repayable after 10 years). $800 250 Purchase by FRG of loans held in portfolio of Eximbank and of outstanding Marshall plan loans-- 118.75 Civil procuremnt in the United States by FRG_ 125 Creation of fund in United States by FRG to encourage German investment in the United States.. 150 Advance transfers by the FRG for debt repayment to the United States 43.75 32.50 1, 520 Mr. SIKES. On page I-7, you state that we should seek ways to decrease our European "overhead" but not at the expense of the soldiers' |