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to Greece until they have a government that is more acceptable to the Socialist governments of northern Europe, which to me is extremely foolhardy reasoning.

Secretary RESOR. Mr. Chairman, on Turkey, our deliveries to Turkey have been running at the rate of about

cast for this fiscal year is

Mr. SIKES. What do you propose to deliver to them?

a year. The fore

Secretary RESOR. I will have to supply that for the record. I do not have the actual equipment. I just have the total dollar value. (A classified response was provided.)

Mr. SIKES. What is the total for Greece this

year? Secretary RESOR. For Greece, we estimate in fiscal 1970,

That compares with

in 1969, and

Mr. SIKES. What about 1970?

Secretary RESOR. 1970 is

(A classified statement was provided.)

- in 1968.

Mr. SIKES. Have deliveries been completed for those 3 years? Secretary RESOR. They would not yet have been completed for fiscal year 1970.

Mr. SIKES. Have they been completed for the other years?

Secretary RESOR. Yes. Those figures represent deliveries in those fiscal years.

Mr. SIKES. When is it proposed to make delivery on the fiscal 1970 equipment?

Secretary RESOR. I do not know. I will have to supply that.

(The information follows:)

Deliveries to Greece this fiscal year against the fiscal year 1970 military assistance program will probably be limited to repair parts, some wheeled vehicles, small arms ammunition. The Department of Army can only make an estimate at this time because the late passage of foreign assistance legislation precluded issuance of the funded program and the establishment of firm supply plans and delivery schedules.


Mr. SIKES. Turning briefly to the problem of the effects of military cutbacks on the overall economy, particularly from the standpoint of unemployment, if we are cutting the Defense budget to an extremely austere level-and I believe it is called a very austere budget-and we are going to generate 1 million additional unemployed in the process, if that triggers a recession, which it could well do, then the Congress and the country are going to be called upon for economic pump-priming resulting in spending possibly billions of dollars to bring prosperity back.

I know this is not something that is decided at your level, but has anyone, to your knowledge, given consideration to the fact that we may be not only hurting the Defense of the country by slowing our weapons modernization, but in the long run, it could cost us more for pump-priming required because of the consequences to the economy? Has anyone talked about that?

Secretary RESOR. I think the Secretary of Defense's overall feelinghe, of course, will speak for himself when he is here is that this budget represents as severe a cut as one can reasonably make in Defense without having the adverse effects of which you speak, and that there is

some risk that one might have such adverse effects on unemployment. Certainly, this is the maximum cut that one can sensibly make in view of the serious problem of the adverse effects on unemployment.

The figure you gave of 1 million men is Defense-wide between June of 1969 and June of 1971. It includes 551,000 military, 131,000 civilians, and 344,000 prime contractor personnel.

I would like to point out it will cause a further ripple effect on the subcontractors, a significant one, and that is not included in that 1,026,000 figure which we have been discussing.

Mr. WHITTEN. I would like to make a point that I have made repeatedly in years past. We can all see the shock which will occur if we slow down Defense spending and personnel in a sizable way. By the same token, it is my recollection that we have about $11 billion of public works projects that are standing by, waiting for funds, which mean jobs for people.

The present administration, as I recall, for the current year has held up three out of four new starts in public works projects.

It strikes me that this is a good time to point out that those in control in the highest level should have plans, as you in the military have war plans, for various contingencies which would absorb the unemployed as quickly as possible.

Everybody recognizes there would be some period of adjustment. The more thoroughly you prepare yourself for that shift from one program to the other, the more quickly you do it and with less ill effects.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Mr. SIKES. Yesterday we discussed briefly, and again today to some extent, the possibility of cutbacks in U.S. forces in Europe and a proportionate buildup by our NATO Allies to assume a greater share of the Defense budget for Europe.

I have a series of questions which I think will spell out in quite complete detail the picture on possible reduction of forces in Europe. I am not an advocate of any major reduction in forces in Europe, but I would like our record to be complete, for I anticipate that this will be a subject of considerable discussion, particularly in the Senate. I think that our record should be as complete as possible on this matter.

Mr. Secretary, in these days of high taxes and growing economic inflation, we must reevaluate all of our programs involving Government expenditures. Many Americans, including 51 Members of the Senate who are sponsoring the so-called Mansfield resolution and many Members of the House, are calling for a reevaluation of our policies concerning our support of NATO. Your statement indicates that the present administration has closed its mind to any policy revisions in this area. Is this the position of the administration?

Secretary RESOR. The President has stated that "the peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world. This truth, a lesson learned at a terrible cost twice in the 20th century, is a central principle of U.S. foreign policy. For the foreseeable future Europe must be the cornerstone of the structure of a durable peace." It is thus clear that Europe remains vital to our security, and that the administration intends to

maintain the U.S. participation in NATO as an essential requirement of American foreign policy.

The President's Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's points out that we are entering an age of nuclear parity. As the strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact approach parity, the likelihood of the use of such weapons declines. Conventional forces then increase in significance as a means for exerting military or diplomatic pressure. Adequate nonnuclear land forces are indispensable to deter those nonnuclear threats which the Soviets would never believe we would counter with nuclear weapons. We must have land forces in place; and we must have an unambiguous and flexible capability to reinforce-flexible in the sense of providing Presidential options suited to the situation.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Secretary, as you have stated, Western Europe has, next to the United States, the greatest aggregation of economic, political, and ideological strength in the world and a population and economic prosperity substantially greater than those of the Soviet Union. If we can "Vietnamize" the army of the relatively poor country of Vietnam, can we "Europeanize" NATO?

Secretary RESOR. I assume that the parallel which you draw with Vietnamization has to to with the degree that we can turn over responsibility for the defense of Europe to the Europeans. First, as you know, there has been a considerable Europeanization of NATO over the years. The U.S. contribution has progressively become a smaller percentage of the total NATO capability, particularly as the Federal Republic of Germany has been rearmed. As recently as 1968 we redeployed 28,000 troop spaces from Europe and now depend on our improved strategic lift to permit their early return.

However, a great deal of the strength of the organization and of the Allied Command, Europe, derives from the U.S. contributions and participation. We are deeply involved in a long-standing treaty organization and a combined and integrated military command. We contribute an important part of the conventional option which gives this country and our European allies an alternative to immediate and complete reliance upon nuclear retaliation. At the same time, our nuclear capabilities also assure that the Soviets must face uncertainty concerning the possibility of escalation to nuclear war. This combination has succeeded in stabilizing Europe for a long time. Although modifications will undoubtedly take place over the years ahead, our national policy is one of continued U.S. participation and continued U.S. support of the conventional option. European stability is a matter of high importance to this country and our policy is not to take unilateral action which would upset the balance from which that stability derives.

Mr. SIKES. What have been the trends in NATO support in the past 5 years by the NATO partners other than the United States? Have the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, and other countries reduced their NATO forces or returned forces committed to NATO to their home country?

(A classified statement was submitted.)

Mr. SIKES. Is it possible that as long as we are willing to tax our people to defend Western Europe, the Europeans have little incentive to raise their own taxes to provide their own defenses?

Secretary RESOR. Yes, it is possible but it is also possible that a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe could cause the

We maintain that the value of the U.S. contribution to NATO, though costly to our people, must be measured in terms of its overall essentiality to U.S. security. The credibility of the U.S. commitment is of the greatest importance —

We feel that our NATO allies can and should do more to contribute to the combined defense of Western Europe. We have in the past, and we will continue to urge them to do so.

Mr. SIKES. For many years, American Presidents, Secretaries of State and Secretaries of Defense have tried with little success to persuade the countries of Western Europe to meet NATO force goals. In 1966, new, more flexible force planning procedures were established. Does this indicate that the Western Europeans do not share our concern over a possible ground war in Europe?

Secretary RESOR. Up until 1966, NATO force goals were derived solely from military requirements and did not take into account realistic political and economic considerations. NATO authorities, including the United States, recognized that the attainment of these military force goals were not economically nor politically feasible and, in this regard, a new NATO force planning procedure was established in 1966. This new procedure considered political and economic requirements as well as military. In this respect, Western Europeans continue to share our concern over a possible ground war, and they are attempting to meet the NATO force goals within political and economic limits, improving their force posture through modernization, and continuing to look to the United States to set the example.

Mr. SIKES. Since Western Europe has the population and resources to establish very substantial military forces, could a significant American withdrawal result in a buildup of military forces by the countries of Western Europe?

Secretary RESOR. It is possible but there is no assurance that Western European nations would increase their military forces if the United States were to withdraw significant forces from Europe. I believe that a large U.S. withdrawal from NATO would more likely have a definite negative psychological impact on NATO solidarity and resolve. Mr. SIKES. How was the determination made that troops are required in Western Europe today?


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Mr. SIKES. How many European nationals are employed by the Army now?

Secretary RESOR. As of December 31, 1969, there were 2,977 direct

hire and 54,455 indirect hire foreign nationals employed in Europe,

for a total of 57,432.

Mr. SIKES. How many U.S. civilian employees of the Army are now

in Western Europe?

Secretary RESOR. As of December 31, 1969, there were 10,651 U.S.

civilian employees.

Mr. SIKES. How does the percentage of gross national product

spent on defense in the NATO countries compare with that of the

United States?

Secretary RESOR. Since 1960 the percentage of gross national prod-

uct spent on defense in the NATO countries has averaged approxi-
mately 3.9 percent. The U.S. average from 1960 to 1969 was 8.8 per-
cent; projected fiscal year 1970 and fiscal year 1971 data will bring
the overall average for 1960 through 1971 down to approximately 8.6
percent even though the war in Vietnam continues to be supported.
During fiscal year 1969, if we subtracted the Vietnamese increment,
U.S. defense costs would represent only 6.3 percent of GNP.
(The following tabulations was provided :)


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I NATO country figures available on calendar year basis only. (Source, AID economic data book for Europe).

* Fiscal year basis.

Mr. SIKES. How do the compulsory military training laws in the

NATO countries compare with requirements in the United States?

Secretary RESOR. The United Kingdom and Canada have volunteer
armies. Other NATO nations have conscription requirements gener-
ally similar to U.S. service responsibilities. Call-up ages range from
18 in West Germany to 21 in Portugal. Length of service varies from
12 months (Belgium, Norway) to 36 months in Portugal.

Mr. SIKES. Does the administration have any plans to reduce U.S.
forces in Europe to any significant extent at any time in the foreseeable
future? It has been stated that reductions will be made after June
30, 1971.

Secretary RESOR. The President has made it clear that we will stand
firm with our NATO Allies and that he does not contemplate signifi-
cant reductions of U.S. military forces there in the near future. This
does not mean that we do not continually seek economies. Based on
decisions made last year, we will reduce our support forces by about
spaces in fiscal year 1970 and about spaces in fiscal year

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