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work, or to accept employment of a seasonal nature. Due to MOS imbalances resulting from differing skill requirements in hostile fire zones, nonhostile fire zones, and CONUS there have been instances of Vietnam returnees not being fully utilized in their primary field. Notwithstanding this situation the Department of the Army Inspector General reports that complaints received from Vietnam returnees are minimal. There is no indication that Vietnam returnees create more than their proportionate share of the overall disciplinary problems.


Mr. SIKES. If all U.S. Army ground combat forces were withdrawn from Vietnam and only aviation forces and logistics and other support forces retained, how many Army military, civilian, and contract personnel would remain in Vietnam?

Secretary RESOR. Hypothetically, if all the ground combat forces were withdrawn from RVN, there would be approximately

Army personnel remaining in aviation, logistics, and other support forces. I have included only the divisions, separate brigades, and separate battalions, such as the armored/air cavalry squadrons, in the category of ground combat forces.

This is not a logical redeployment scenario because we would normally withdraw certain of the support forces in conjunction with the withdrawal of the combat forces. The ratio of ground combat to support redeployment will vary depending on the progress of Vietnamization.

Our experience has shown that the average civilian-to-military

ratio is

The number of contract personnel related to this size force cannot be predicted because contract activity is normally not force related.

Mr. SIKES. General Westmoreland, in view of your experience in Vietnam, and looking at the numbers of troops we have kept in Germany and Korea for many years after these wars were over, if our Vietnamization program is successful, how many U.S. Army troops must we keep in Vietnam for the foreseeable future in order to insure the safety of the country?

General WESTMORELAND. A primary objective of the Vietnamization program is to modernize the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and to improve their military capabilities to a point where the Government of Vietnam (GVN) can maintain current levels of security with reduced U.S. support. The amount of U.S. support which will be required at a given point in time therefore depends upon the improvements which can be made in GVN capabilities. Our ultimate objective is to assist the GVN to assume complete responsibility for the conduct of the war and to reach a point at which only the assistance of a residual advisory force is required.


Mr. SIKES. To what extent are reductions in civilian and military personnel being offset by contractual services?

(Secretary Resor provided the following :)

Reductions in personnel are accompanied by reduced fund availability, therefore, the conversion to contract operations is minimal. DA policy regarding this matter is that "contracts will not be executed when the sole or primary purpose is to avoid the impact of reduced manpower allocation or hiring restrictions."


Mr. SIKES. What Army installations have been closed or ordered closed as a result of funding reductions in fiscal year 1970?

Secretary RESOR. There have been no major Army installations closed or announced for closure during fiscal year 1970 to date. The following Nike-Hercules sites were announced for closure during fiscal year 1970:

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Mr. SIKES. Are further base closings anticipated in fiscal year 1970? Secretary RESOR. In support of the previously announced fiscal year 1970 budget reduction actions and in preparation for the implementation of the fiscal year 1971 budgetary plan DOD is presently preparing an additional reduction announcement for release in the near future. Final decisions have not yet been made concerning specific action to be taken.

Mr. SIKES. Is the fiscal 1971 budget premised on still further base closings in that fiscal year?

Secretary RESOR. As mentioned earlier in the testimony, the Army is going to have to make further base closures, as well as further reductions in military and civilian personnel in order to live within the budget levels. A decision will be announced some time in March.

Mr. SIKES. It would appear that at a time when personnel are being reduced and some installations closed, military construction requirements might be lowered. Yet, this is an area of increase in fiscal year 1971. How do you explain this? Is there an MCA increase in areas other than Safeguard?

Secretary RESOR. For programs other than Safeguard, the budget for fiscal year 1971 is about $80 million less than the budget request for fiscal year 1970. The fiscal year 1971 MCA program includes $42 million for Southeast Asia; in fiscal year 1970 no new appropriations were requested in that area. For requirements other than Safeguard and Southeast Asia, the fiscal year 1971 President's budget for MCA contains $122 million less than the fiscal year 1970 President's budget. It is only after including Safeguard that the requested total obligational authority of $716 million of MCA in fiscal year 1971 is significantly larger than the request of $496.4 million in fiscal year 1970. Our requirements for permanent construction are based on the long-range strength of the Army in the United States rather than the current strength. Therefore, military construction requirements at our permanent installations have not been significantly affected by actual or projected reductions in strength.


Mr. SIKES. In discussing personnel requirements, you do not indicate anticipated withdrawals from Vietnam in fiscal year 1971. I do not think you should give such an estimate. To do so would tell our enemy too much about our plans. Have you been somewhat conservative in estimating withdrawals so that perhaps not all of the money requested for personnel will be utilized in fiscal year 1971 ?

Secretary RESOR. Decisions regarding U.S. force reduction in the Republic of Vietnam have been based on the "cut and try" principle. As the capabilities of the Government of Vietnam improve we can reduce our troop commitment on an incremental basis. We evaluate the effect of each incremental reduction and the increased capabilities of the GVN on a continuing basis. As the rate of improvement accelerates, we can accelerate our incremental troop reductions; conversely, if progress slows or declines, our reductions must be slowed. Our projections of U.S. forces required in the Republic of Vietnam are based on judgments of what the military situation will be, and on how well the GVN will be able to face the enemy threat. Force withdrawal planning is not, in my judgment, conservative. Vietnamization will have to continue to go well to permit implementation of the plan on which this budget request is based.

Mr. SIKES. The table numbered 14 on page IV-3 shows that the total number of Army military personnel onboard in 1965 was 968,000 as compared with 1,240,000 in 1971. If Vietnamization goes according to plan, do you plan to return to the 1965 level and, if so, when?

Secretary RESOR. As Army forces are withdrawn from SVN, the Army will be reduced ultimately to a baseline force. The actual size of the baseline force will be determined by the national strategy announced by the President. The reduction of the Army to the baseline will be contingent upon future decisions concerning the timing of any reduction of U.S. effort as Vietnamization proceeds.


Mr. SIKES. How many civilian personnel did the Army have at the end of fiscal year 1965?

Secretary RESOR. At the end of fiscal year 1965, there were 334,286 civilians employed in military functions. Employment in civil functions accounted for 32,440 employees, for a total Army employment of 366,726.


Mr. SIKES. Also on personnel, those who are calling for more rapid troop withdrawals in Vietnam could take comfort from your statement that nearly 1 million South Vietnamese forces face an entire combined Vietcong and North Vietnamese force of 250,000. I think the record should show why it is necessary that the South Vietnamese who are fighting from their home base need four times as many troops as the enemy has, when at least a part of the enemy forces are hundreds of miles from home at the end of very long and heavily bombarded supply lines. Will you discuss that? I would like both of you to reply.

General WESTMORELAND. I think your observation of a 4-to-1 ratio is generally an accurate one. Your observation that the enemy is fighting at the end of long supply lines whereas the South Vietnamese are fighting with interior lines of communication is a very valid point.

I think to answer that question, Mr. Chairman, we would have to retrace the developments in South Vietnam.

We have a country which had been dominated by the French for many years. Therefore the Vietnamese did not have self-confidence. They did not have free trained political and military leaders. The Communists took advantage of the situation and laid a very well-disciplined political infrastructure within the country. At the appropriate time they invaded with mass forces. We had to come to the rescue, which is now history.

Under this military shield that we have provided, they have developed some stability. They have drafted a constitution promulgated by the people. Appropriate elections have taken place. They have the beginnings of a constitutional democracy, and are getting along quite well, all things considered.

At the time we entered, the government held only a few enclaves. It took a great deal of effort, sweat and blood to expand the enclaves to the point that the countryside opened up. In the process of that, we have had to grind down the guerrilla force, which has been done. Pacification has been extended bringing more people and area under government control.

The indigenous enemy in the south has been reduced. The enemy now has been required to take refuge in remote areas of South Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Laos, and in the DMZ area.

This poses a serious threat to the Vietnamese forces from these


Ultimately, I believe that the South Vietnamese will have the staying power to defeat the Communist enemy. Our rate of withdrawal is dependent upon the development of their self-confidence and the development of their armed forces and their leadership, and upon giving them modern materiel so they have a force with sufficient integrity, aggressiveness, and self-confidence to react to enemy initiatives. In my opinion, that point has not yet arrived. There are still areas in South Vietnam under Communist control. There still is a subsantial enemy political infrastructure in South Vietnam, a skilled and disciplined infrastructure. In my opinion, this should be progressively reduced as pressure is brought to bear on them and, as the government takes its services to the people and attracts the allegiance of the people, a country with some integrity can be developed. This is now in process.

So, I would say long-range they should be able to handle it alone. Short-range, they have had to learn to crawl before they could walk. They are going to have to walk before they can run. It is just a question of timing as to the rate that we wean these people so they stand on their own.

Mr. SIKES. At the time the French gave up the fight in Indo-China, the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese, I would assume, were about the same type of people, and the men who were being brought into the military forces were about the same type of people. As much as I dislike to pay homage to the Devil, apparently the

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Communists have been able to inject a measure of discipline and determination into the North Vietnamese that it has taken us a great deal of time and a great deal of money and, unfortunately, a great deal of American blood to begin to inject into the South Vietnamese.

Is that an unfair statement?

General WESTMORELAND. I do not think it is an unfair statement. The people in the north, of course, were fighting for an ideal that they were very well imbued with, the Communist ideology. Democracy and the doctrine of freedom and independence, of course, had not been well codified in the minds of the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese were fighting based on a negative motivation: that they wanted no part of Communist domination and subjugation. The political turmoil in the south has been of such magnitude that it has created problems in coalescing the people.

Mr. SIKES. You expect people to fight more desperately to defend their own home and their own land and that is the case in South Vietnam?

General WESTMORELAND. Yes; it is the case in South Vietnam, except for the Vietcong, the Vietcong having been very skillfully indoctrinated toward the unification of all Vietnam by force and the imposition of a Communist-type government over the south.

There is one other matter that I would like to mention off the record, if I may.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. I do not think you fully answered the reasons for the requirement of four South Vietnamese to one North Vietnamese or Vietcong. Is it because of the security forces that are required for the countryside in general, and the fact that defense must be maintained against attack from an enemy usually well hidden and the direction of whom cannot be anticipated? Does that enter into this 4-to-1 ratio? General WESTMORELAND. I think so, sir, but I would put it a little different way.

First, I do not think the South Vietnamese forces, albeit four times as large, are trained and ready at this time.

Second, their leadership potential has been stretched to the elastic limit.

Third, the pacification program has momentum, and as long as we do not withdraw too rapidly, that momentum can be continued.


Mr. RHODES. General, in the paper this morning there was quite a lengthy article about the Phoenix program. The article was not the least bit complimentary. Would you care to address yourself to the Phoneix program and give us your own idea as to its efficacy?

General WESTMORELAND. First, let me make the point, Mr. Rhodes, that the Phoenix program is a Vietnamese program, not an American program. However, we do provide advice and some American military personnel, officers, and noncommissioned officers, to serve as advisers.

The purpose of the Phoenix program is to identify the Communist political infrastructure and to attempt to eliminate that infrastructure through capturing them or through driving them out of the community.

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