partially garrisoned with Prussian troops. It is scarcely necessary to enumerate the circumstances that followed. Prussia forbade the sale. The Franco-German war took place as an indirect consequence, and the German Empire became the principal neighbour of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which now only marches along the French frontier for a few miles.

Of course, in the interests of the balance of power this addition should not have been made to the territories of France but to the all-too-small Kingdom of Belgium. Linguistically, and in matters of race and religion and past history, the artificial barrier should have been abolished, and the whole of the former Duchy of Luxemburg have been united to the country over which the King of the Belgians was ruling. The French acquisition of Luxemburg would have been a direct and permanent threat at the independence of Germany, just as the German possession of Metz, so long as it lasts, is a paralysing threat to the national security of France.

Every effort should be made in the future, whenever European diplomacy can direct the political drift of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to assimilate its interests with those of Belgium; while so far as British aspirations are concerned nothing could be more desired than a strong alliance between Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, a "League of the Low Countries," which might by Great Britain be treated de puissance en puissance, and as an ally in the maintenance of the world's peace.

And France with her altered aims and ideals, France with her eyes now fixed wisely on the creation of a vast North African empire, her face turned away from the North Sea she once sought to govern, towards the Mediterranean and the east Atlantic France can desire nothing better than to feel secure, once and for all, on her north-east frontiers by the establishment of a strong yet unaggressive union of Fleming, Hollander, Frieslander, Saxon, and Walloon.

There are at this moment two cities upon whose ultimate fate pivots the peace of Europe and Asia-Metz and Salonica. However much these questions may be shelved by prudent diplomatists and uneasy Cabinets, they underlie in one way or another the discussions of all Peace Conferences, affect the undercurrents of politics in the Old World from Morocco to Tibet, the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope.

Why is France fettered in her attempts to carry through at

(1) From an international, sentimental, and linguistic point of view, Metz and the Seille-Mosel frontier is the only portion of Alsace-Lorraine to the restitution of which France has any strong moral claim.

once the regeneration of Morocco on Tunisian lines, which would be a godsend to North Africa and to the world's commerce? Because she is one of the agencies which is barring the way of a Germanisation of the Balkan Peninsula with all that it may entail, and Germany in revenge paralyses her action in Morocco. Germany holds Metz, aspires to control Luxemburg, infiltrates Belgium with her influence, and is rapidly making of Antwerp an alternative to Trieste. This attitude she will pursue (according to the writings of certain German publicists last year) until Russia, France, and Great Britain cease to oppose her-or Austria's-plans in the Balkan Peninsula.

Germany, a nation of seventy millions, with the best educated people and the finest army in the world, must have an outlet for her energies in some direction. Is it to be the North Sea or the Egean? Asia Minor or South-west Africa? The Dutch Possessions or the Persian Gulf? The present writer feels in questions of such gravity it does not comport with his insignificance to suggest a solution. He only desires as one somewhat better acquainted with Holland and Belgium than many of his fellow countrymen to express an ardent desire for the consolidation of their joint interests (why cannot Holland assist Belgium in the Congo Free State-if the latter needs assistance?), and for the steady development of close and friendly relations between both these North-Sea Powers and Great Britain.

It would seem that the only obstacle to such an entente at the present time is the outstanding question of the reorganisation of the Congo State. We have no reason whatever to suppose that the Imperial German Government condones or supports King Leopold's misuse of the powers conferred on him by his recognition as King-Sovereign of the Congo State rather the contrary. Some recent German writers and explorers have been as ready as British and American writers and travellers to condemn these misdeeds. But there are other German publicists and one or two Dutch who would seem to be striving [like certain Irish-Americans] to make bad blood between British and Belgians by endeavouring to fasten on to Belgium a dispute which at present is entirely one with the Ruler of the Congo Independent State. It could only become a quarrel with Belgium if this latter country deliberately annexed the Congo State on terms directly contradictory to the provisions of the Berlin Act and entirely oblivious of native rights-rights which the principal British Envoy at the Berlin Conference specially referred to when he intimated his country's adhesion to the creation of the Congo State under the personal sovereignty of King Leopold. "Why do you fuss so about native rights'?" I was asked

by a Belgian journalist the other day; "we understand the annoyance of your missionaries that they cannot obtain sites for their stations; well, that can be set right. And we could remedy the monopolist conditions as to trade-we have given your people some large concessions as it is--" My reply was an attempt to show him that we were as much concerned, materially, in the welfare of the Congo races under French, Belgian, and Portuguese rule as we were in the contentment and tranquillity of the native populations under our own sway. If there were misgovernment and profound native discontent, this might lead to a general rising against the white man, or to inconvenient immigration into British territories from lands less well administered.

That we offer at present no opening for a tu quoque reply is merely due to the fact that we have made our own mistakes, committed our own blunders or crimes in times past (not so much in Africa as elsewhere), and have been brought to realise that it does not pay in the long run to maltreat or rob subject races. Having profited by our experience we are able to administer the affairs of many millions of brown and black people with no great charge on the Imperial exchequer. We find ourselves able at present to maintain law and order among something like 350,000,000 of Asiatics, Australasians, Africans, and American Indians by the employment of scarcely 150,000 soldiers and civilians of our own race. What the Belgians apparently will not realise is that as a nation, as an African Power, we are far more anxious that the problem of native rights should be settled in the Belgian terms of annexation than that the other privileges and facilities due to us and other nationalities under the Berlin Act should be duly provided for. If any exemplar is wanted as to how native rights may be settled in a statesmanlike, practical fashion, beneficial alike to native and European commerce, I would point to the Protectorate of Sierra Leone. If the Congo thrives under direct Belgian rule as Sierra Leone has thriven since native rights were honestly defined and recognised, Belgium will have no reason to dread any drain on her home exchequer.

Her profit will lie in the benefits which must accrue-even without undue favouritism-to Belgian commerce and industries, to the importance of Belgium in the world's eyes as a great African Power, as one of those nationalities who are privileged to educate the backward races of the world, to help on general

(1) Just as France and Germany have every right to expect us to govern Nigeria properly, because trouble arising there from misgovernment would immediately affect the adjacent German and French possessions.

civilisation, to save themselves from oblivion in the history of mankind as Rome, Phoenicia, Athens, and Holland have done.

By those who for purposes of their own are trying to arouse enmity between the British and Belgian peoples-men not as a rule born either Belgians or members of the Roman Catholic Church, yet now posing as jealously tenacious of Belgian rights and eager to restrain the scope of Protestant missions (an advocacy quite unasked by the official missionaries of the Roman Church), it is asserted that the British critics of King Leopold's actions, or those of the concessionnaire companies he has founded, have cast a general obloquy over all Belgian deeds in Congoland, and have denied or left unmentioned benefits which have accrued from the suppression of the Arab slave-trade, the putting down of cannibalism; most of all, the construction of railways with Belgian money and by Belgian engineers, which, by doing away with the intolerable strain of human porterage, have distinctly lightened the burden of life for the black man in these regions.1

If responsible critics have done so-but I cannot trace the fact -I dissociate myself entirely from this portion of their crusade. Apart from the benefits which have accrued from the railway construction of Colonel Thys and his colleagues and the railway works of the State itself-benefits to Africa to be ranked with that of the Uganda railway-there is no doubt that many a servant of the State has been a benefactor of the Congo peoples, has put down cruel customs of native origin, spread the knowledge of useful arts and industries, and won the approval alike of British, Belgian, American, or Swedish missionaries. The history of the war conducted by Dhanis and his colleagues against the whole force of the slave-trading Arabs in East Congoland will always remain, despite some regrettable incidents, amongst the brilliant achievements in the history of Africa, and in the cause of freedom and civilisation. And the present condition of Eastern Congoland (outside the domain of certain concessionnaire companies) is of itself sufficient justification for that war, even with the horrors attendant on all fighting in savage Africa a free, cheerful, well-clothed, settled agricultural population, in place of Arab task-masters and naked cannibal serfs.

As a rule, wherever the official of the Congo State-Belgian, Italian, or Scandinavian-has not had to enforce the extraordinary commercial policy of King Leopold and his concessionnaires, his rule has been just, clement, and productive of

(1) Congoland negroes did not escape this corvée of porterage in the years before the white man entered and ruled the inner Congo basin. For centuries there has been a coastward-setting trade, to supply which enormous numbers of serfs have had to carry loads to and fro.

happiness and greatly improved civilisation and intellectual development among formerly bloodthirsty savages. But how much of the area of the Congo State lies outside the special scope of the Domaine de la Couronne and the concessionnaire companies? Less than one-third. Over the other two-thirds the conditions of life for the unfortunate people have been either worse or no better than those which prevailed under their native rulers before the Congo State came into existence-not as a money-making concern but a philanthropic enterprise.

Do not let us be distracted from the only point at issue: the definition and safeguarding of native rights in any scheme of annexation which Belgium may be ready to accept, and which in some form or other must come under the cognisance of the other signatory powers of the Act of Berlin. Of course, as a signatory of that Act, Belgium, if she takes over the Congo State, will be as much bound to enforce the provisions of the Act of Berlin in her share of the Congo Basin as Britain, Germany, France and Portugal are in their allotments of this area. In 1884 the Powers at the Berlin Conference presented a blank cheque to King Leopold, the cousin of Queen Victoria, the grandson of the King of the French, the husband of an Austrian Archduchess, the ruler of a European State in the first rank of intellectual progress; never imagining he would proceed to pay in the proceeds to his own order. In other words, in dealing with a personage of such august position they thought the fate of fifteen or twenty millions of unconscious savages, their just rights and claims, perfectly safe without further definition.

The turn which events have taken since 1896 has shown that they bestowed their confidence wrongly. No further change in the status of the Congo State could therefore take place (with Great Britain's sanction) unless some guarantee were given in an explicit form that native rights would be considered, defined, and respected.

Some apologists of King Leopold have asked why, if the majority of the inner Congo tribes are the bloodthirsty cannibals they have been depicted by trustworthy writers, they can be considered to have any claims at all: ought they not to be grateful for the mere privilege of undisturbed existence which the King's intervention has conferred on them, and not bother about any rights as to land or the natural produce of the land? We are also reminded as to the monopolisation of the minerals or of other natural products of the soil in Rhodesia or in certain British colonies or protectorates by British Chartered Companies or by the overruling British Government.

The answer to the last thesis is that in all these cases such