II., c. 13, reduced it to six per cent.; and, finally, the 12 Anne, c. 16, which is the English "statute of usury" at the present day, reduced it to five per cent.

A reason (which we alluded to above) for the prejudice against usury, was founded upon the assertion of Aristotle, "that all money is, in its nature, barren and unproductive," and, therefore, to make money beget money is contrary to the law of nature. And so, in 3 Inst. 153, Sir Edward Coke refers to the statutes of Henry VII., in which all usury "is danned" and denominated a dry exchange-" Usura contra naturam est, quia usura sua natura est sterilis, nec fructum habet."

The absurdity of this dictum can in no way be better manifested than by applying the same principle to the hiring of coaches; the leasing of houses; or the chartering of ships; which coaches, houses and ships, certainly do not generate things of their own species; and yet, no one ever disputed the moral right of letting them for reward.

That money was originally designed for the purposes of exchange, and not for profit, may be very true, and we shall not go out of our way to dispute it; but it must be considered that money originated at an early age of the world, when its applicability to commercial purposes was not taken into view. The present is essentially a commercial day, and if interest should be abolished, the characteristic of the age will be destroyed, and commerce must die. It cannot exist without borrowing and lending-if interest were interdicted no man would lend his money, for there would be no corresponding benefit resulting from the loan, to indemnify him for the hazard he might run, or the inconvenience he might suffer. It is well known that in those tyrannical ages when interest upon loans was entirely prohibited, the little trade that was carried on was monopolized by the Jews, and so continued to be until the advance of civilization and knowledge, and the consequent revival of commerce, restored the doctrine of interest.

We would not defend an excessive demand for the hire of money, any more than we would defend an exorbitant demand for the use of other necessaries or conveniences of life. The moral wrong inflicted upon the community would be as great in the one case as in the other. But the question is whether the regulation of the prices of money comes more within the scope of legislative authority than the regulation of the prices of other merchantable commodities. We contend that it does not. The value of money in a trading community depends upon several circumstances: first, the amount of the supply in the hands of lenders, and the extent of the necessity for the use of it felt by borrowers; second, the inconvenience of parting with it for the present, and the risk of losing it altogether.

Now, unless a government should impose restraints upon its citizens which would limit them in the amount of their commercial operations-unless they should say to the merchant, such shall be the quantity of your purchases and sales, and such the price you shall receive for your merchandise, it is not possible for laws to fix a just and undeviating value to the currency of a country. The supply of an article in the market, and the demand for that article, do not entirely depend upon each other. At one time there may exist a heavy demand with a limited supply; at another there may be an abundant supply with very little demand. In no article of traffic is this more constantly the case than with money. How, then, can there be any uniformity in legal regulations of interest. The rates of interest have varied from age to age, and from country to country. Among the Romans, at the time of Justinian, it was at twelve per cent. In England, at the time of Henry VIII., as we have seen, it was fixed at ten per cent. Subsequent statutes successively reduced it to eight, six, and five. In some parts of Asia it is at ten and twelve, and in Constantinople it has sometimes been at thirty. In a moral point of view there can be no difference between the highest and the lowest rates. What is it, then, that indicates the expediency of any particular rate, but the convenience of the borrower and lender? and what is it which manifests that convenience but the consent of the parties? A is in want of $1000 for the furtherance of a commercial operation; B would lend it to him at two per cent. a month for four months, if the law forbade him not; but this, in Pennsylvania, is an illegal, usurious transaction, because the act of 28th March, 1723, prohibits the taking of more than six per cent., under penalty of forfeiture. Now B will not lend his money at six per cent., because, by employing it in his own business he can realize more than thrice that amount. In his own hands, therefore, it is clearly worth to him twenty per cent., because he can make that sum out of it. A, however, holds out an inducement to him to make the loan, by offering him at the rate of twenty-four per cent.; but this contract cannot be made without a violation of law, (which is always attended with risk,) and it may be of conscience also.

Now what right has the legislature to step in and thus hamper us in our business transactions? What man, or what set of men are so competent to judge of the ability and mutual convenience of parties to a contract, as the parties themselves? A is willing to pay $80 for the use of $1000 for four months; he wishes to employ it in an enterprise which will produce him a clear profit of fifty per cent. upon the sum employed. After the repayment to B of the loan, with its interest, amounting to $1080, A would have in his own coffers a surplus profit of

$420. But no, say our paternal lawgivers, you must not make such a contract. Why not? Because, in the first place, it is contrary to the divine law, and therefore a moral sin; and, in the next place, we wish to restrain projectors and speculators.

Contrary to the divine law! Then we ask you, gentlemen, why do you not carry out the principle to its fullest extent, and prohibit usurious interest in all business transactions? Why have you placed a legal sanction upon whatever rate of interest may be agreed on between the parties, in bottomry, and respondentia, and policies of insurance, and annuities upon lives? Where is the difference, in point of moral sin, between taking high interest upon a promissory note, and upon a respondentia bond? Something, you say, must be allowed for the hazard. But does that make any difference in regard to the morality of the transaction? if it does, we assert the difference to be in favour of the note, for the other savours strongly of gambling.

To pass a law prohibiting the taking of usury, upon the ground that it is a contravention of the Mosaical precept, and yet to make the distinction in the cases to which we have just referred, upon the principle of allowing indemnity for hazard, appears to us to be the ultima Thule of legislative absurdity and inconsistency.

Well, but independently of the moral consideration, it is said, that a check must be placed upon the visionary schemes of projectors. Who are these projectors? upon what men, or class of men, is intended to fall the stigma of this odious appellation? We answer, upon those who devote their attention to the cultivation of the useful arts; upon those who require money to aid them in their plans of invention; upon those who would project new, or make improvements upon old, devices of human contrivance. In short, this legislative restriction effectually operates upon all that human ingenuity projects for the benefit of mankind.

The application of the steam engine to the propulsion of boats, was the work of a projector, and money was found necessary to carry the work into effect. When Robert Fulton accomplished that splendid object, he gave an impulse to his name, which will transmit the remembrance of it down to the last generation of the world. The discovery of the western hemisphere was the work of a projector, and the author of that discovery has written his great name upon the records of immortality. The genius of men like these is frowned down by the narrow policy of ephemeral legislators. Now how is it that this class of men would be affected by an operative law, limiting the rate of interest? Suppose the act of March, 1723, were really effectual in preventing usury (which, not to speak irreverently of the laws, it happily is not,) look at the result.

The great object of the capitalist who comes into the market with his money, is to lend it at the highest interest within his reach, and upon the best security he can get. If he should place it out upon bond and mortgage, he will be content with an interest below its real market value, because he has a lien upon landed property, generally worth two or three times as much as the money loaned. A pledge of good stock certificates would be a security, nearly if not quite as firm, and the rate of interest, therefore very little higher. The calculation of interest, in both these cases, takes into view simply the inconvenience suffered by the lender in parting with his money; there being no hazard, no addition is made on that account. But suppose the loan is made on personal security; the interest will be calculated in a compound ratio made up of the inconvenience and the hazard; so that if the current value of money be eight per cent., the interest demanded will be perhaps ten per cent., allowing two for the hazard run. We now come to those men denominated projectors. Let one of this unfortunate class present himself in the market, in search of a loan of money. If he have no remarkably good security to offer, it is probable that in nine cases out of ten he can obtain no loan, unless through motives of friendship, or the expectation, founded upon strong grounds, of deriving a collateral advantage from his project. Money lenders are loth to hazard their capital solely upon the chances of success of a scientific discovery, or an invention in the mechanic arts. But suppose the lender to be convinced of the merit and probable success of the invention, (to carry which into effect his money is wanted,) still he will not make the loan, even with the ordinary security, at the same interest that he would to a person engaged in a solid and established business, because the hazard is so much the greater. He will add a heavy per centage to the current rate of interest, in order to indemnify himself for the risk he runs. Even if the security offered were unexceptionable, this would be the case to a certain extent, on account of the dangerous and uncertain purposes to which the money is to be applied. Cases may, however, occur, in which a loan might be effected for such an object. An ingenious mechanician, we will suppose, has made an improvement in the steam engine, by which the motive power is increased, at a diminished expense, and the danger of explosion entirely removed; he must have money to bring his invention into operation, but has no security to offer for a loan; he convinces a capitalist of the certainty of his ultimate success, and that that success will secure to him the acquisition of a splendid fortune; the capitalist is willing to jeopard the loan,. but the hazard is very great, and the interest must be proportioned to it, the lender must have forty per cent. for his

money. Here the law interposes and forbids the contract, and the unfortunate "projector," is defeated and driven from Change. After all his efforts to raise money have failed, as a last resort he parts with the patent right of his invention to a company,he sells, for a paltry thousand, that which may realize hundreds of thousands to the purchasers. This, it may be argued on the other side, is too strong a case. If it be so, it is because the usury laws of Pennsylvania are ineffectual in preventing usurious contracts: were the act of 1723 operative to the full extent that it was intended to be by the legislature, such cases might constantly occur.

Now the question recurs, why these "projectors," as they are sneeringly called, should be singled out as the objects of legislative restraint? Is it for the protection of the community from visionary schemers? Who is it that suffers, but the projector himself, when his inventions are unfortunate or unsuccessful? Certainly not the public; and if the public were the sufferers, they are sufficiently competent to their own protection, without the interposition of an act of assembly to shield them from imposition. The trading community has arrived at years of sufficient discretion, to enable it to walk without the aid of leading strings. We say, then, (for these and other reasons which will be apparent to the reader without enumeration by us), that this law, so far as it is intended to operate as a restraint upon native ingenuity, is unjust and impolitic to the last degree. Genius is too rare and precious an endowment to be discouraged and tied down by legislative enactment. It should rather be fostered and protected, and assisted by every species of encouragement in the power of the legislature to bestow.

We know not what other considerations influenced the passage of the act of 1723, nor do we know whether peculiar circumstances did not exist at that time, which rendered its passage advisable. Legislation, however, should be adapted to the character of the people and the condition of the times; and a law which may have been very politic a century ago, in a country like this, (which is in a state of perpetual revolution), may be exceedingly impolitic now. Not being aware, then, of all the causes which operated in producing the law of 1723, we proceed to the dissection of an argument against usury, upon which our opponents of the present day are continually harping. We allude to the supposed influence of the law in preventing prodigality.

Now we have had this assertion dinned into our ears, almost from time immemorial; and we have never yet been able to comprehend the manner in which the law effected this object. So long as the prodigal is in possession of ready money, he certainly stands in no need of loans. But let his ready cash be