Submitted to the same interrogatory as Mr. Gurney, Louis could only stammer out that monsieur was a stranger to whom he had given a seat in his vehicle.

"For what reason, then, did you leave it? This person was found alone. Your absence has been prolonged. Relate what you know about this Englishman."

Louis vowed and protested that he was ignorant of the quality of his companion, but while his asseveration did him no good, it told against the other.

A man not known, one surreptitiously introduced, one whose passport was informal, one who refused to cry "Vive la république !" that man's antecedents, that man's present conduct, were suspicious.

So said the mayor's substitute, and the crowd, hot with impatience, cried out: "A spy, a royalist spy! Down with the English! Vive la république !"

Once more the welkin rang with "Vive la république!" mingled with threats and phrases untranslatable. It was a truly joyous occasion for the mob. They had met with a ripple in the current hitherto so smooth-too smooth for their complete enjoyment. Their heated imaginations beheld in the solitary Englishman the forerunner of a royalist host, aiming at the subversion of the republic. One man, with the voice of a Stentor, struck up the Marseillaise, and instantaneously, from a thousand throats,

Aux ar-mes, citoyens !-Aux ar-mes, citoyens!

burst forth the warlike chorus.

The egotism of the song was the safety of the prisoners-poor Louis and the Englishman Gurney-who, surrounded by gendarmes, were hurried along till the flood of population overflowed in the Marché aux Herbes.

"What is the matter?-what is the matter?" cried the knot that was gathered beneath the windows of the Coq d'Or.

"Tell us then, Marie, what is going on out there. You can see from where you are standing. Say, Madame Lalouette!"

But the innkeeper called in vain. Those to whom he appealed were no longer there.

ABROAD AND AT HOME.

WHEN last we addressed our readers the tide of war was flowing swiftly, and everything portended the accomplishment of the ambitious programme with which the Emperor of the French heralded his aggressions on Austrian Italy. Unprecedentedly favoured by fortune, and successful-though at a heavy sacrifice of life-in every contest, he had already crossed the Mincio, his own troops were before Verona and Mantua, those of his allies were besieging Peschiera, a fresh corps d'armée had replaced the losses of Solferino, a large naval and military force was about to attack Venice, and, to judge by the past, victory seemed to be the probable, if not the inevitable, issue of his expected operations. At that moment, when every ear was strained to catch the sound of another triumph, came the sudden intelligence that "the Liberator of Italy" had paused in mid-career, and that, instead of fighting a battle, he had proposed an armistice. This was surprising enough, but what followed immediately was stranger still. Not only was an armistice arranged, but before the ink was dry which fixed its duration, the Emperor of the French was again—an intercessor we must not call so mighty a victor-a negotiator for peace!

And peace was forthwith concluded: the peace of Villafranca, which -can it be doubted?-secured to Italy all the objects for which the Emperor of the French had taken up arms!

Let us see what those objects were, as set forth in a Manifesto, addressed by Louis Napoleon to the French Legislative Body.

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sion,
to liberate.

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The leading principle of this declaration was contained in the phrase : Italy must be free to the shores of the Adriatic!" And this was further amplified: "I boldly avow my sympathies for a people whose history is mingled with our own, and who groan under foreign oppresWhen France draws the sword, it is not to dominate, but The object of this war is to restore Italy to herself, not to impose upon her a change of masters, and we shall then have upon our frontiers a friendly people, who will owe to us their independence. We do not go into Italy to foment disorder or to disturb the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced upon his throne, but to remove from him this foreign pressure, which weighs upon the whole peninsula, and to establish there order based upon legitimate satisfied interests."

We shall not stop to examine the question of Austrian right to rule over Lombardy and Venice-though, as Count Buol declared, in his well-known Circular, that right was "solid"-but confine ourselves to the simple terms of the Imperial announcement, than which nothing could be more definite or unequivocal.

Admitting, for argument's sake, that Lombardy and Venetia groaned under the yoke of Austria-that a foreign pressure, which it was necessary to remove, weighed upon Parma, Modena, and Tuscany-that it was the mission of the Emperor of the French to "liberate" those provinces, and seeing that, with this end in view, the armies of France advanced along the modern "Via Sacra," and fought six bloody battles in as many weeks, it may fairly be asked-History will one day ask

VOL. XLVI.

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how far the result of this great war corresponded with the pretext on which it was based?

You went, you say, to rescue Italy from the oppression of foreign rule! We will not quarrel with the generous impulse. You emancipated Lombardy, you freed the Duchies, you removed from the States of the Church all fear of future tyranny, you restored to the Queen of the Adriatic that liberty for which she so long had languished. All this you did, of course, for you had conquered Austria in Northern Italyor, if not conquered, had raised your trumpets to blow the blast which should cause the walls of Mantua and Verona-like those of Jericho-to fall before it!

But, no! the trumpets were not blown-at least, not then. Neither were any of the magnificent promises fulfilled which had made the heart of Italy beat with such joyful anticipation; for the transfer of the Milanese to Sardinia-just as one would toss a franc to a facchino for his hire-was, after all, little in accordance with the real wishes of republican Lombardy. Instead of freeing Italy from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic-a bombast circumstance,

Horribly stuff'd with epithets of war—

and bearing a strong family resemblance to the threat of "mon oncle," when he promised to drive the Leopard into the sea-the Emperor of the French no sooner set his foot within the famous Quadrilateral-the Austrian Torres Vedras-than he made the discovery that "the better part of valour is discretion." There is Louis Napoleon's own authority for arriving at this conclusion, else we might have supposed, in common with those who extolled his "moderation," that generosity and magnanimity were the sentiments by which he was inspired: the generosity of giving away a kingdom-the magnanimity of forbearing to strike a fallen foe. For how stands the fact, as we now find it set down in the apologistic allocution of the Emperor of the French, in reply to the adulatory addresses of Monsieur Troplong (beaucoup trop long), the Count de Morny, and Monsieur Baroche, when they threw themselves at his feet in the Salon de Mars, at Saint Cloud?

"When, after à successful campaign of two months, the French and Sardinian armies arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as well in a military as in a political aspect. I was fatally obliged to make a front attack upon an enemy entrenched behind great fortresses, and protected on his flank by the neutrality of the surrounding territory; and in commencing the long and barren war of sieges, I found myself in face of Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our successes or aggravate our reverses.'

It was impossible to give better reasons for refraining from carrying out the pretentious programme of the war. Without doubt there was the enemy entrenched behind great fortresses, there were the sieges in perspective, there was the neutral territory. But, for one so far-sighted as the Emperor of the French it was scarcely necessary to cross the Mincio to make the discovery. The strong fortresses were not mushrooms, sprung up in a single night-sieges, if you wish to capture them, are ordinarily their concomitants-and as to the neutral territory, that we presume had never changed its position. All these things were as

well known to Louis Napoleon at Saint Cloud as when he came into disagreeable proximity with the stubborn facts at Valleggio.

"Nevertheless," continued the Emperor of the French, "the difficulty of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution, if the means had not been out of proportion to the results expected."

The results expected-or, at any rate, declared-were "the restoration of Italy to herself"-the removal of "that foreign pressure which weighs upon the whole peninsula." Surely, with such an object originally in view-and this we may suppose, if words imperial have any meaning-no means could have been out of proportion to so desirable an end!

These disproportionate means were the fruits of another discovery: "It was necessary to crush boldly the obstacles opposed by neutral territories, and then to accept a conflict on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. It was necessary to fortify ourselves openly with the aid of revolution. It was necessary to go on shedding precious blood, which had already flowed too freely, and at last risk that which a sovereign should only stake for the independence of his country. If I have stopped, it was neither through weariness nor exhaustion, nor as abandoning the noble cause which I desired to serve, but because there was something which in my heart I deemed more precious—the interests of France.”

But the attitude of confederated Germany was scarcely a greater novelty than the Quadrilateral or the neutral territory: was the aid of revolution not contemplated when Klapka and Kossuth were encouraged -when countenance was given to every act of the insurgent duchies? Ah! but something yet remained: "The interests of France ?" And the interests of Italy? The interests, too, of Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, where the status quo is to be established malgré tout.

Enough, however, of the task of criticising a declaration which kept the word of promise to the ear and broke it to the hope. The solution of the mighty riddle is, we believe, to be found in considerations remote enough from those avowed which touch us nearer. To conquer your enemies in detail, to humiliate them to a certain point, and then forbear -if prudence counsels forbearance-appears to be the idée fixe of him who is called the inscrutable. Russia and Austria have each had their turn, Prussia may follow, and England, peradventure, remains for the bonne bouche-unless, indeed, we take warning from the past and lose no time in setting our house in order, so as to set at nought the danger of invasion.

On this subject a well-timed and strongly written article has appeared in the number of the Quarterly Review, just published. The writer demonstrates in the most convincing manner the utter inefficiency of our present means of defence, and the almost hopeless condition of the country in the event of a surprise, the danger which should ever be present to our thoughts with neighbours such as those who are only separated from our shores by an interval of a few hours. As to the motive for an invasion of England by France, hear what the writer of this article says, and consider its truth. The "one idea" of the Frenchman, he observes, "is the might and majesty of an armed host conquering the world and lording it over subject nations. The form of patriotism which he appreciates is his desire to see his country thus made powerful, and

thus respected; and his greatest pride is to form a fractional part, however insignificant, in this great mission." The applicability of this feeling as regards England is thus set forth: "Ludicrous as it may sound in our ears, it really seems to be felt by the French people as an intolerable grievance that any country should exist in Europe over which the tricolor has never floated; and it is this, and not any sober calculation of the risk of the attempt or of the ultimate gain that may result from it, which would induce France to invade our shores. Now that her armaments both by land and sea are, to say the least of it, equal to those of any other continental nation, nothing that human foresight can discern will prevent her from making the attempt to avenge the past, and to realise what she conceives to be the destiny of the future." We lay far too much stress, continues the same writer, on the individual character or intentions of the present emperor. “Our conclusions must not be based on the interest or ambition of any individual ruler who may happen to be on the throne of France, but on what we know and all history teaches us of the feelings and aspirations of the great body of the people of France. The present emperor may or may not be desirous of undertaking the task; but the crown of France will certainly be one day offered to any man who can and will raise the standard against England."

The motive thus clearly shown, attention is drawn by the Quarterly Reviewer to the actual condition of the warlike resources of the two countries. A terrible, though it may be a too-highly charged picture, is painted of the fearful perils in which England stands, but thus much cannot be gainsaid: that every means in our power ought to be employed to meet the possible catastrophe, and make us as well prepared as the French when the hour of trial shall arrive. "There, in fact," says the Reviewer, "lies our whole danger. They can choose their own moment for picking a quarrel and declaring war, and will, of course, do it at such time as we are least and they are best prepared." The Reviewer reiterates his belief in the absolute certainty of the invasion being one day attempted. "On one point," he says, "no man need deceive himself-that the fleet, which is now being built in the harbours of France with such skill, and at such enormous cost, will one day be applied to the purposes for which it is avowedly being constructed; and when the time arrives, it will be the most serious danger that England has ever incurred since the days of the Spanish Armada. The attack will, probably, be like the tiger's springstealthy, but vigorous; and, if successful, may be fatal to us. The stake for which the game is to be played is so enormous, and the risk so great, that every man with a spark of patriotism in his bosom ought to look the danger fairly in the face, and be prepared to do what he can to save himself, his children, his fellow-citizens, and his country."

As regards individual exertion, there can be no safer course than the instant formation of volunteer artillery and rifle corps in every part of the kingdom, nor should we cease their organisation till the former are adequate for all our coast defences, and the latter are spread over the length and breadth of the land, leaving neither nook nor coign of vantage to the invader. We may then rely upon our national boast, and-come what may-defy the world in arins.

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