author, in an altered and mutilated form, which altered copies did not contain the passage in question; therefore I must consider that passage as of doubtful authority?” Does not the absurdity of such reasoning appear, in a manner too glaring to require to be pointed out? Does it not appear at once, that the mere negative evidence against the genuineness of a passage, which is supposed to be afforded by the absence of that passage from certain copies of a work, avowedly altered and mutilated, cannot weigh one feather, against the whole accumulated mass of positive evidence in its favour, which is supplied, by its existence, in every known copy of the same work, in its entire and perfect state? Is it within the limits of rationality to admit or entertain, for a moment, a doubt of the genuineness of the passage in question, for any reason, (or rather no reason) of this kind?

And supposing even further, that in addition to our knowledge of the character of the possessors of these copies of the mutilated work, we have other and totally independent reasons for believing that some part of this omitted passage must be genuine; and yet further still, supposing that the very first sentence in these garbled copies, is known to have contained a gross and palpable error:-Is it, I again ask, within the limits of rationality, upon the strength of such evidence, to admit one part of the passage to be genuine, and assert the remainder to be spurious? Surely if the evidence of these garbled copies is of any force at all, in a question of this nature, it must be of force against one part of the passage as well as against the other: and if it is not worthy to be relied upon in the former case, so neither is it in the latter.

My reason for making these observations will appear hereafter.

But it is time that we proceed to the second part of our discourse, in which it was proposed,

II. TO SHOW THE DUTY OF PRESERVING THE CANON OF SCRIPTURE IN ITS INTEGRITY.

On this part of our subject, it will not be necessary to treat at any considerable length. It will at once appear obvious to every reflecting mind, that as soon as it is clearly ascertained, that we are in possession of the genuine works of any inspired author, it can no longer remain a question, what parts of his writings are to be received as of divine authority, and what parts are not to be so received. It will follow, as an inevitably necessary consequence, that the entire work must be regarded as the "WORD of GOD," and that every part of it is entitled to that unsophisticated simplicity of reception, that profound respect, that unhesitating credit, that ready obedience which cannot be withheld, without affront to that divine wisdom and authority from whence it proceeded. To do otherwise, would be altogether absurd, as well as impious in the extreme. If, indeed, the whole sum of divine truth were known to us, independently of the Volume of Inspiration, we might then detect any redundant parts by which that volume might be supposed to be encumbered. But, where then would be any need, or any use of Revelation at all?

But, while, on the contrary, we can know nothing of the truths peculiar to Christianity, except what we are taught taught too, in this very Volume of Scripture now in our hands, and which we acknowledge to be inspired of GOD: to take upon ourselves to select portions of that inspired record, and to say this we will, and this we will not believe is evidently a proceeding which admits of no rational defence. It is not merely to place the learner in a position superior to his teacher, but to make him the arbiter of the science itself which he is professing to learn.

It is to place the creature of a day, in the attitude of dictating to the ALMIGHTY, what He shall teach, and what He shall not teach. It is to assume a prerogative superior to that which belongs to omniscience. It is the climax of folly, presumption, and impiety.

"But suppose,❞—I will now imagine some inquirer or objector to demand.-"Suppose we should find in the writings of one or other of these authors, whom we regard as Inspired, some statement which is either selfcontradictory, or which can be shown to be at variance with the truth:-What is then to be done? Must we receive such a statement as true, when we know it to be false? Is not this too much to demand of us? Are we not at liberty to confine our credit to such parts of these writings, as our judgment determines to be established upon sufficient evidence? And may we not reject the authority of passages of the character supposed?"

Now, in answer to this inquiry, I observe:-that the case supposed, is one which cannot possibly occur in practice or reality. The very idea of Inspiration is utterly opposed to all supposition of the presence of error. And should any really erroneous statement be found, in the genuine writings of a reputedly inspired author; that erroneous statement would be of itself proof sufficient and irrefragable, that the author in question was not so entirely under the immediate teaching, and superintendence of ALMIGHTY GOD, as to be preserved from error: or, in other words, that he was NOT inspired. I admit, therefore, according to the terms of the supposed objection, that any erroneous statement, so discovered, must be rejected, as claiming to be of divine authority: but I assert, that it must not be rejected ALONE. Such passages must, it is true, be excluded from the Canon of Scripture, but, together with them must be excluded also the whole

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work in which they are found. No ground, therefore, can be afforded by any genuine book of inspired Scripture, for any such proceeding as that now supposed; that is, for the rejection of any of its single parts. Let a Book be once shown to be genuine, and admitted to be inspired, and it must then be received whole and entire, without mutilation or alteration of any kind.

The foregoing remarks, it is plain, can apply only to those passages, (supposing such to exist,) in any reputedly inspired author, which are either really self-contradictory, or containing statements really opposed to some historical, or other well-established and approved truth. And it may be worth while to remark, that they have no application whatever, to those which are apparently only, and not really such. Many statements, doubtless, are to be found in the Volume of Sacred Scripture, to which this latter character may, in greater or less degrees, belong; which may be thought to involve a contradiction to themselves, or to established facts or principles, when such contradiction exists only in the imagination of the parties entertaining such an impression. The Scriptures, it is most true, do contain statements of facts, which have no parallel in any other historical record; which differ, in their principal circumstances, from any which have fallen under our own observation, or which occur in the ordinary course of nature. Such, in fact, are the statements which relate to the nature of God himself. Such are those, also, which relate to the miraculous Incarnation of our Lord, and to the union of the divine and human natures in Him: as well as many others.

Statements of this kind, supposing them to be true, cause us to feel, in a more than usual degree, conscious of the very limited extent of our own intellectual capacities: and it may, perhaps, be more than suspected, that a secret

unwillingness to submit to this kind of humiliation, may so operate upon the minds of many, as to cause them to suppose many things to be erroneous, merely because they are mysterious; or to be impossible, merely because the modes in which they subsist-not the facts themselves— (for the latter are often extremely plain, while the former far transcend the powers of human, or it may be, of even angelic intelligence) —are not within the range of their intellectual comprehension.

At the risk of being thought to diverge, in some degree, from the main purpose of this discourse, I will venture to offer a few remarks on one of those doctrines of the Gospel, to which allusion has been already made, and which are of this mysterious character: namely, the great and Cardinal Doctrine of the TRINITY-the grand and characteristically Christian verity of God subsisting in three persons—a primary article of the belief of us, who constitute the vast majority of those who bear the Christian name, but impugned and denied by those, whose sentiments are, in the present course of Lectures, to be brought under review.

Now the plain statement of this doctrine is, that there is one God and one only-the single, the exclusive object of all lawful adoration and worship. And that this ONE GOD subsists in three persons-the FATHER, the Son, and the HOLY GHOST. This statement will, I think, be allowed to be clear and intelligible: and because it is clear and intelligible, it is, therefore, capable of being believed, provided it be supported by proper and sufficient evidence. Let it be well observed, however, what I say. I do not say that the mode in which God subsiststhat the manner, in which God is one in substance, and three in personality, is clear and intelligible, but that the statement of the fact that He does thus subsist is so-and