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The Wagner Labor Relations Act

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES E. MURRAY

OF MONTANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Wednesday, March 5 (legislative day of

Wednesday, February 19), 1947

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER], in the March issue of Sign magazine, has presented a very brief and intelligent reappraisal of the act which bears his name. Before the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee report a bill on labor relations, I hope the members of these committees will afford themselves an opportunity to digest this rare bit of wisdom on this vital problem.

I want to take this opportunity to commend the editors of Sign Magazine for the splendid public service and social good they are performing by publishing articles of such character.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WAGNER ACT-A REAPPRAISAL

(By Senator ROBERT F. Wagner) Congress is currently engaged in reviewing our national labor policy. If this examination is to be fruitful, we in Congress and the public generally must guard against being sucked into the swirling pools of misleading propaganda which have surrounded so fundamental a measure as the National Labor Relations Act. In a democracy, where the ultimate sanction of any public policy depends upon public acceptance, an informed public opinion is of crucial importance. Yet, a recent Gallup poll disclosed that only 10 percent of the pepole claim to know what the National Labor Relations Act provides.

If we are to look about us for the blueprints of a postwar labor policy, it is well that we examine critically the operation of our present policy. Not, mind you, to appropriate the divine prerogative of looking upon our work and calling it good. But before we determine whither we go, it is well that we know whence we come and where we are.

We may begin with a single fact: organized labor has grown in membership from about 3,000,000 when the National Labor Relations

Act was passed in 1935 to about 15,000,000 in 1946. This is a simple fact, but of elemental significance. It shows that as soon as the obstacle of employer interference was removed, American workers eagerly sought to exercise their right of self-organization.

Moreover, all the propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, the phenomenal growth of labor organization has taken place without any diminution of the employers' constitutional right to free speech in labor relations. The talk of restoring free speech to the employer is a polite way of reintroducing employer interference, economic retaliation, and other insidious means of discouraging union membership and union activity, thereby greatly diminishing and restricting the exercise of free speech and free choice by the working men and women of America. No constitutional principle can support this, nor would a just labor-relations policy result from it. The National Labor Relations Board under the supervision of the courts (whose chief duty is to uphold the Constitution) should continue to accommodate the right of the workers to organize and the employers' right to free speech in the context of the circumstances of specific cases.

Organization is the spirit of the times. I therefore consider as an attempt to turn the clock back any proposal which would completely eliminate ahy group of American workers from the protection of the act, whether by contracting the coverage of the statute or by excluding foremen and supervisors. The industrial "middle class" should not be denied the protected right to organize which has been exercised by both rank and file workers and their employers. To do so would be to invite industrial strife and to undermine the already precarious economic position of an important sector of the middle class, one of the mainstays of a democratic society.

The grave forebodings now so widely broadcast concerning the consequences of foremen's collective bargaining are contradicted by actual situations where such bargaining does exist, and will prove as groundless against the experience of the next decade as the equally dire prophesies of a decade ago concerning the effect of collective bargaining generally. I am not among those who are frightened by the stresses and strains incldent to the adjustment of conflicting interests. The orderly accommodation of conflicting interests is the peculiar genius of democracy.

It is well to recall these dire prophecies now that collective bargaining has become accepted as our industrial way of life, as is evidenced by pronouncements of all political parties and business organizations.

As collective bargaining grows in maturity, labor-management cooperation-to increase efficiency, reduce waste, and improve products-grows apace. This is evidenced by con

tract provisions to that effect and by day-today industrial relations. Organized labor realizes that its share of the industrial income depends ultimately upon industrial productivity. Labor's increasing interest in the operation and conduct of industry carries with it responsibility for results. Even in the few exceptional crafts and industries where make-work schemes, generally known as featherbedding, are practiced, labor's interest in productivity would prevail were the fear of unemployment banished.

The

Ill-advised as these practices are, their effect on our economy is insignificant compared to capital monopoly and cartel restrictions of production and price-fixing. ultimate solution for the elimination of make-work schemes lies in providing full employment and adequate social security. By enhancing the worker's security through elimination of seasonal fluctuations of employment, welfare funds, and through guaranteed annual wage plans, collective bargaining can do a great deal more than it has already done to remove obstacles to industrial efficiency. But collective bargaining alone is inadequate to provide for full employment and adequate social insurance in our complex society. That responsibility rests upon the Government. This has been recognized by our social-security laws and the Full Employment Act of 1916. Our system of free enterprise and political liberty cannot survive without economic security for the mass of our people.

Labor problems cannot be treated in isolation. They must be handled within the broad framework of our whole economy. Nevertheless, collective bargaining must remain the chief means of working out the delicate adjustment between the demands of industrial efficiency and the workers' welfare and security.

Cooperation between labor and management to promote industrial efficiency and employee ɛecurity would be abruptly cut short by the incredible proposals to prohibit industry-wide bargaining. This type of bargaining, as in Great Britain and Sweden, has characterized maturity in labor relations in the United States. Stabilization of business practices and the elimination of sweatshop wages and working conditions in the needle trades and other industries have gone hand in hand with the establishment of industry-wide bargaining. Industrial strife, chaos, and ruin would follow the outlawing of industry-wide bargaining. It would bring back the cycle of wage and price cutting which was characteristic of the coal industry and other industries in the twenties and early thirties, precisely because there was no Nation-wide organization and collective bargaining.

To apply the antitrust laws to business encourages competition in prices and is economically desirable. To apply the antitrust laws, however, to break up unions would promote competition to reduce wages and the purchasing power of the workers. The way to industrial peace is not through rendering unions impotent to raise and protect the standard of living and the purchasing

power of the mass of consumers. That is the route to ruin, not only for labor but for business as well.

In still another sector of labor-management relations, collective bargaining can show a rich and varied experience. Griev ance procedures to settle disputes that evitably arise under collective agreements have become commonplace. Under impetus of directives of the National War Labor Board, voluntary arbitration as the terminal point of grievance machinery is more and more coming in favor as a means of avoiding deadlocks that might lead to strikes or lock-outs during the life of a contract. The President's national labor-management conference of November 1945 included voluntary arbitration as a final step in grievance adjustment among its recommendations.

Giving point and emphasis to procedure for the settlement of disputes under collective agreements are remedies, sanctions, and penalties which are provided in case of contract violation by either party. Company security has become as accepted in labor relations vocabulary as union security.

In case of an unauthorized strike, in violation of the contract, sanctions and penalties are provided against those who are responsible or who participate in it, including the union, union leaders, and the employUnder the National Labor Relations Act, employees may be and have been discharged for violation of an agreement.

ees.

I personally believe that as employers, union leaders, and employees gain maturity in the process of collective bargaining, the unauthorized strike will have gone out of

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existence irrespective of the presence or absence of sanctions in the trade agreement. But I welcome, nevertheless, the variety of practices that are being tested by the parties themselves to achieve mutual responsibility. I would not call a halt to this salutary development as would those who want to throw the settlement of labor disputes into the courts. Even now unions may be sued as entities in the Federal courts and in many of the States. Contrary to expectations, employers would suffer most from court litigation because there are many more grievances of employees against employers than vice versa.

More important, the courts lack the time, expertness, and informed sympathy to be the proper forum for the settlements of labor disputes. This conclusion is abundantly demonstrated in the record of the courts in labor injunctions. Compliance with contract terms must ultimately depend upon the parties themselves, supplemented by expert and impartial arbitration. Collective barga.n ing, somewhat like marriage, is a social relationship which depends upon continuity. It is a living together which cannot be safely interrupted while the bones of contention are being rattled in the courts.

It is in the give and take of collective bar. gaining that frequently conflicting demands are made to serve common purposes. Thus it came to be recognized that it is only under

a union shop or maintenance of membership that union leaders can most effectively maintain union discipline, which is so essential to avoidance of unauthorized strikes. Union security is not opposed to but, on the contrary, strengthens company security. Through impartial arbitration, provided for by contract, employers find that they can protect their work force against possible arbitrary expulsion from the union.

Protection of the individual members against discriminating action by the union is not left entirely to collective agreements. A favorite and oft-repeated charge is that the National Labor Relations Act is onesided because it imposes obligations on the employer without imposing corresponding duties on the unions, particularly for the protection of the individual union member against arbitrary union leadership. This claim ignores a whole body of case law by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts, which constitutes an ever-growing system of union regulation having as its purpose responsibility by the union to the rank and file.

The Supreme Court itself has declared that Federal protection of collective bargaining has imposed upon unions obligations analogous to those of a legislature to protect equally those they represent. Unions may not discriminate against nonmembers whom they represent. They may not use closedshop contracts to eliminate those who were formerly affiliated with a rival union. Collective agreements may not provide for job discrimination on account of race or religion. Nor will the National Labor Relations Board recognize a bargaining unit organized along racial lines or certify a union which does not equally represent all workers irrespective of race. It may be inferred that political minorities would be held to be equally protected against discrimination by unions.

Our constitutional system does not consist solely of the few pages of the written document but of the whole living framework of laws, court decisions, and political practices. Similarly, the National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted and applied by the NLRB and the courts, has, through the inner logic of its relationships, become a bill of rights for the protection of individual and minority rights. I welcome the deepening of this trend.

Together with my fellow Americans I am, however, deeply disturbed at the rash of strikes which have occurred during reconversion from war to peace. It would be well, though, that in examining proposals dealing with this problem we should not mistake hysteria for statesmanship.

The recent headline strikes have not been organization strikes but those arising out of differences over conditions of employment, chiefly wages. The National Labor Relations Act has proved successful in its purpose of reducing to a minimum strikes arising over union recognition which in the past loomed largest and were the most difficult to handle. In 1937 only 76 percent of strike idleness was due to organizational

strikes, while in 1945 such strike idleness declined to 29 percent of the total.

It wouldn't do to take refuge in irrelevant issues such as the proposals made in regard to picketing. The current wave of strikes, with a few minor exceptions, has been as free from violence of a Sundayschool picnic. The elimination of the labor spy, saboteur, and strikebreaker and the thorough organization of labor have eliminated violence and the sit-down as strike factors.

There is little evidence that local authorities are unable to deal with picket-line violence. The attempt to revive the labor inJunction might hamstring labor and result in bloodshed, but would contribute not an iota to reducing the number of strikes.

Similarly lacking in reality are proposals that would make strike votes mandatory. The strikers are those who sustain greatest economic loss and risk losing employment through being displaced in strikes. Despite this, strike leaders have had the unbroken support of the rank and file, in many cases the strike pressure coming from below.

More in point are proposals dealing with the settlement of labor disputes and limitations on the right to strike. Here it must be emphasized that to the extent that we limit or eliminate the right to strike we must substitute for private collective bargaining the decision of a third party or the Government, for otherwise the terms of employment would be determined unilaterally by the employer.

The proposal for strike limitation calling for the "cooling-off" period has been discredited by our war experience as a solvent of labor disputes. The incidence of strikes was greater after the passage of the War Labor Disputes Act than before, even though it contained a strike notice provision.

Prohibition of the right to strike can be effective only in dictatorships under a system of industrial serfdom. Compulsory arbitration has not been successful in eliminating strikes where it has been tried in democratic countries such as Australia and New Zealand.

There is no short-cut panacea for the solution of the strike problem within the framework of a democratic system. Ultimate reliance in industrial democracy, as in its political counterpart, must be placed, not on suppression, but on the willingness of the parties involved to resolve their differences by mutual accord.

There has come to public notice significant evidence that labor and management are relearning the art of collective bargaining neglected during the war. The United Steelworkers Union and United States Steel have extended their contract for a few months while negotiations are proceeding for a new contract, thus in effect establishing a "cooling-off" period by voluntary agreement. In the building industry a labor-management agreement was just made for establishment of machinery for the voluntary settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation of contracts as well as the making of new contracts.

The wave of postwar strikes appears to have subsided as the reconversion period comes to its end. With the end of war fatigue and the quieting of war nerves, with the disslpation of inflationary pressures by full production, and with the bridging of the gulf between wages and the cost of living, we can

expect more maturity in collective bargaining-if it is given a chance. With this will come an era of industrial peace and harmonious labor-management relations, fulfilling the objectives of the act of which I am very proud to be the author.

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VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON LABOR

LEGISLATION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I desire to discuss at soine length today some of my views and proposals on labor legislation. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare has just completed several weeks of public hearings on the multitude of suggestions and recommendations which witnesses and Members of the Congress have offered as legislative remedies for some of the Nation's labor ills. These have been excellent hearings which I have attended as faithfully as my other Senate duties have permitted.

When I have not been able to be in attendance at the committee hearings, I have read the prepared statements of witnesses which have been filed with the members of the committee, in most instances 24 hours before the testimony was given. I have followed the transcript of the record of the hearings very carefully. I wish to commend the chairman of the committee the senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] for the way the hearings have been conducted and for their thoroughness, in spite of the limited time which could be set aside for public hearings.

It seems to me that the hearings have covered just about every conceivable point of view that could be presented on labor legislation. As the chairman of the committee suggested when the public hearings were closed last Saturday, we could go on and hold hearings on this subject for many more weeks, and I am sure there would be plenty of additional witnesses to hear, but such a procedure would be cumulative because the record we have already made in the few weeks we have conducted hearings contains much repetition of the same points of view and suggestions.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the committee will have the benefit in its executive meetings and discussions of the records of the public hearings which the Senate Committee on Education and Labor conducted on proposed labor legislation during the Seventy-ninth Congress. The chairman of our committee has made it very clear that the views of those witnesses who testified at our hearings during the Seventy-ninth Congress, but who were not recalled at the hearings of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare just closed, will be

made available to the members of the committee.

Of course, it should be recognized by all that the most important work of the committee must now be done in executive sessions, at which meetings and discussions their job will be to thrash out the merits of the conflicting points of view of the many witnesses who have been before us, as well as the differences of points of views of the members of the committee itself, to the end of trying to come forward with the most fair, reasonable, and effective proposals for labor legislation that a majority of us can agree upon.

In other words, I think that our task is to write a committee legislative program rather than recommend as a committee, without any changes, any of the bills now pending before the committeeincluding my own.

I do not know how many of the other members of the committee feel the way I do about it, but I shall not be surprised to find that such a view is pretty much the consensus of opinion. I do not know of any member of the committee who wants to do injury to the legitimate rights of either labor or industry. If the result of some of the legislation proposed would do grievous injury to the legitimate rights of labor, industry, and the public-and I think the passage of some of the legislation would result in such injuries-I am convinced that no member of the committee is motivated by any desire to accomplish such undesirable and unfair results.

I know how easy it is to attribute motives and designs to holders of public office, because each one of us in the Senate is frequently victimized by such unfair tactics. However, differ as we may within the committee, I am satisfied that each and every member of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare is motivated by only one desire, and that is to do what he thinks is best for his country, by way of labor legislation, without any motivation to injure the rights of labor, employers, or any other group in the country.

As I have listened to the witnesses appearing before our committee, I have at the same time been working on a series of proposals for amendments to the Wagner Act. I would be less than honest if I did not say that the many conflicting points of view which have been presented