CHAP. supplied by the several states in proportion to the II. whole number of white and other free citizens and 1787. inhabitants and three fifths of all other persons, ex June. cept Indians not paying taxes, in each state. Should any state neglect to furnish its quota of supplies, the United States might levy and collect the same on the inhabitants of such state. The United States might call forth aid from the people to assist the civil officers in the execution of their laws. The trial for a criminal offence must be by jury, and must take place within the state in which the offence shall have been committed. The task of leading resistance to the large states fell to New Jersey. Paterson, one of its foremost statesmen, of Scotch-Irish descent, brought from Ireland in infancy, a graduate of Princeton, desired a thoroughly good general government. Cheerful in disposition, playful in manner, and even in temper, he was undisturbed by resentments, and knew how to bring back his friends from a disappointment to a good humor with themselves and with the world.' In his present undertaking he was obliged to call around him a group of states agreeing in almost nothing. New York, his strongest ally, acted only from faction. New Jersey itself needed protection for its commerce against New York. Luther Martin could bring the support of Maryland only in the absence of a majority of his colleagues. The people of Connecticut' saw the need of a vig 1Dayton to Paterson, 1 Feb., 1801. MS. 2 Gilpin, 862, 863, Elliot, 191, note, wrongly classes New York and Connecticut together. In conduct and intention the delegates of Connecticut were very unlike Yates and Lansing. orous general government, with a legislature in two CHAP. branches. II. June 15. The plan of New Jersey, which Paterson present. 1787. ed on the fifteenth, was a revision of the articles of confederation. It preserved a congress of states in a single body; granted to the United States a revenue from duties, stamps, and the post-office, but nothing more except by requisitions; established a plural executive to be elected and to be removable by congress; and conferred on states' courts original though not final jurisdiction over infractions of United States laws.' "The New Jersey system," said John Lansing' of New York, "is federal; the Virginia system, national. In the first, the powers flow from the state governments; in the second, they derive authority from the people of the states, and must ultimately annihilate the state governments. We are invested only with power to alter and amend defective parts of the present confederation." " Now the powers granted by Virginia extended to "all further provisions necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union." "Fully adequate," were the still more energetic words of Pennsylvania. New Jersey did not so much as name the articles of confederation; while Connecticut limited the discussions of its delegates only by "the general principles of republican government.' 1 Paterson MSS.; Elliot, i. 177; Gilpin, 863-867; Elliot, 191, 193. 2 Yates in Elliot, i. 411; compared with Gilpin, 867; Elliot, 193; Paterson MSS. 994 'Gilpin, 867; Elliot, 193; Yates in Elliot, 411. Journals of Congress, iv. Ap pendix. 16. CHAP. The states, Lansing further insisted, would not ratII. ify a novel scheme, while they would readily approve 1787. an augmentation of the familiar authority of con June 16. Paterson next spoke with the skill of a veteran advocate, setting forth, "not his own opinions," as he frankly and repeatedly avowed,' but "the views of those who sent him." "The system of government for the union which I have proposed accords with our own powers and with the sentiments of the people.' If the subsisting confederation is so radically defective as not to admit of amendment, let us report its insufficiency and wait for enlarged powers. If no confederation at present exists, all the states stand on the footing of equal sovereignty; and all must concur before any one can be bound. If a federal compact exists, an equal sovereignty is its basis; and the dissent of one state renders every proposed amendment null. The confederation is in the nature of a compact; and can any state, unless by the consent of the whole, either in politics or law, withdraw its powers? The larger states contribute most, but they have more to protect; a rich state and a poor state are in the same relation as a rich individual and a poor one: the liberty of the latter must be preserved. Two branches are not necessary in the supreme council of the states; the representatives from the several states are checks upon each other. Give congress the same 1 Gilpin, 868, 869; Elliot, 194. Gilpin, 869; Elliot, 194; Yates in Elliot, i. 412. 4 Gilpin, 869; Elliot, 194. II. powers that are intended for the two branches, and CHAP. I apprehend they will act with more energy and wisdom than the latter. Congress is the sun of our po- 187 litical system. Wilson refuted Paterson by contrasting the two plans. "The congress of the confederacy," he continued, "is a single legislature. Theory and practice both proclaim that in a single house there is danger of a legislative despotism." One of the Pinckneys added: "The whole case comes to this: give New Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples and concur in the national system."" 3 "When the salvation of the republic is at stake," said Randolph, "it would be treason to our trust not to propose what we find necessary. The insufficiency of the federal plan has been fully displayed by trial. The end of a general government can be attained only by coercion, or by real legislation. Coercion is impracticable, expensive, and cruel, and trains up instruments for the service of ambition. We must resort to a national legislation over individuals. To vest such power in the congress of the confederation would be blending the legislative with the executive. Elected by the legislatures who retain even a power of recall, they are a mere diplomatic body, with no will of their own, and always obsequious to the states who are ever encroaching on the authority of the United States. A national government, properly 16. CHAP. constituted, will alone answer the purpose; and this is the only moment when it can be established."1 II. 1787. June 18. On the morning of the eighteenth, Dickinson, to conciliate the conflicting parties, induced the convention to proceed through a revision of the articles of the confederation to a government of the United States, adequate to the exigencies, preservation, and prosperity of the union.' Hamilton could no longer remain silent. Embarrassed by the complete antagonism of both his colleagues, he insisted that even the New York delegates need not doubt the ample extent of their powers, and under them the right to the free exercise of their judgment. The convention could only propose and recommend; to ratify or reject remained "in the states." 4 Feeling that another ineffectual effort "would beget despair," he spoke for "a solid plan without regard to temporary opinions." "Our choice," he said, "is to engraft powers on the present confederation, or to form a new government with complete sovereignty." He set forth the vital defects of the confederacy, and that it could not be amended except by investing it with most important powers. To do so would establish a general government in one hand without checks; a sovereignty of the worst kind, the sovereignty of a single body. This is a conclusive objection to the Jersey plan.* "I have great doubts," he continued, "whether a 'Yates in Elliot, i. 417; Gilpin, 877-879; Elliot, 198; Paterson MSS. 3 Gilpin, 878; Elliot, 198. Yates in Elliot, i. 418. |