แ I. June 2. national senate.1 Gerry set in a clear light that the CHAP. election by the national legislature would keep up a constant intrigue between that legislature and the 1787. candidates; nevertheless, Wilson's motion was at that time supported only by Pennsylvania and Maryland; and, from sheer uncertainty what else to do, the convention left the choice of the executive to the national legislature. For relief from a bad selection of the executive, John Dickinson of Delaware, who did not like the plan of impeaching the great officers of state, proposed a removal on the request of a majority of the legislatures of the individual states.' Sherman would give that power to the national legislature. "The making the executive the mere creature of the legislature,” replied Mason, "is a violation of the funda mental principle of good government. "The occasion is so important," said Dickinson, "that no man ought to be silent or reserved. A limited monarchy is one of the best governments in the world. Equal blessings have never yet been derived from any of the republican forms. But, though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. Of remedies for the diseases of republics which have flourished for a moment only and then vanished forever, one is the double branch of the legislature, the other the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct states, which some seem desirous to abolish altogether. This division ought to be maintained, and considerable powers to I. June CHAP. be left with the states. This is the ground of my consolation for the future fate of my country. In 1787. case of a consolidation of the states into one great re2. public, we may read its fate in the history of smaller ones. "The point of representation in the national legislature of states of different sizes must end in mutual concession. I hope that each state will retain an equal voice, at least in one branch of the national legislature." 4. 2 The motion of Dickinson was sustained only by Delaware; and the executive was made removable on "impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neg lect of duty." But the advice on the distribution of suffrage in the national legislature sank deep into the minds of his hearers. 2 Randolph pleaded anew for an executive body of three members, one from each of the three geographical divisions of the country. "That would lead to a constant struggle for local advantages," replied Butler, who had travelled in Holland; and from his own observation he sketched the distraction of the Low Countries from a plurality of military heads." "Executive questions," said Wilson, "have many sides; and of three members no two might agree. All the thirteen states place a single magistrate at the head. Unity in the executive will favor the tranquillity not less than the vigor of the government." Assenting to unity in the executive, Sherman thought a council necessary to make that unity acceptable to the people. "A council," replied Wilson, "oftener covers malprac I. June tices than prevents them." The proposal for a single CHAP. executive was sustained by seven states against New York, Delaware, and Maryland. In the Virginia dele. 1787. gation there would have been a tie but for Washington. The decision was reached after mature deliberation, and was accepted as final. Wilson and Hamilton desired to trust the executive with an absolute negative on acts of legislation; but this was opposed, though from widely differing motives, by Gerry, Franklin, Sherman, Madison, Butler, Bedford, and Mason,' and was unanimously negatived. When Wilson urged upon the convention the Virginia plan of vesting a limited veto on legislation in a council of revision, composed of the executive and a convenient number of the judiciary, Gerry called to mind that judges had in some states, and with general approbation, set aside laws as being against the constitution; but that from the nature of their office they were unfit to be consulted on the policy of public measures; and, after the example of his own state, he proposed rather to confide the veto power to the executive alone, subject to be overruled by two thirds of each branch. "Judges," said Rufus King of Massachusetts, "should expound the law as it may come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation." Gerry's motion was carried by eight states against Connecticut and Maryland." In a convention composed chiefly of lawyers, the organization of the judiciary engaged eager attention; at the close of a long sitting, the Virginia resolution, 4. CHAP. that a national judiciary be established, passed withI. out debate and unanimously, with a further clause 1787. that the national judiciary should consist of one su4. preme tribunal and of one or more inferior tribunals." June 5. 13. 6. A night's reflection developed a jealousy of transferring business from the courts of the states to the courts of the union; and on the fifth Rutledge and Sherman insisted that state tribunals ought, in all cases, to decide in the first instance, yet without impairing the right of appeal. Madison replied: "Unless inferior tribunals are dispersed throughout the republic, in many cases with final jurisdiction, appeals will be most oppressively multiplied. A government without a proper executive and judiciary will be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move." The motion to dispense with the inferior national tribunals prevailed; but Dickinson, Wilson, and Madison, marking the distinction between establishing them and giving a discretion to establish them, obtained a great majority for empowering the national legislature to provide for their institution.' It was unanimously agreed "that the power of the national judiciary should extend to all cases of national revenue, impeachment of national officers, and questions which involve the national peace or harmony." 4 On the sixth of June, Charles Pinckney, supported by Rutledge, made once more a most earnest effort in favor of electing the first branch of the legislature by 'Gilpin, 791; Elliot, 155; and Elliot, i. 160. 'Gilpin, 798, 799; Elliot, 159. * Gilpin, 800; Elliot, 160. Compare Elliot, i. 163, 397. 4 Gilpin, 855; Elliot, 188; Yates in Elliot, i. 409. 1 I. June the legislatures of the states, and not by the people. CHAP. "Vigorous authority," insisted Wilson, "should flow immediately from the legitimate source of all author. 1787. ity, the people. Representation ought to be the exact 6. transcript of the whole society; it is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively." "If it is in view," said Sherman, "to abolish the state governments, the elections ought to be by the people. If they are to be continued, the elections to the national government should be made by them. I am for giving the general government power to legislate and execute within a defined province. The objects of the union are few: defence against foreign danger, internal disputes, and a resort to force; treaties with foreign nations; the regula tion of foreign commerce and drawing revenue from it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone rendered a confederation of the states necessary. All other matters, civil and criminal, will be much better in the hands of the states." " "Under the existing confederacy," said Mason, congress represent the states, and not the people of the states; their acts operate on the states, not on individuals. In the new plan of government the people will be represented; they ought, therefore, to choose the representatives. Improper elections in many cases are inseparable from republican governments. But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature!" 2 1 Gilpin, 801, 802; Elliot, 160. Gilpin, 802, 803; Elliot, 161. 'Gilpin, 803; Elliot, 161. |