July 17. 1 CHAP. such a revolution." "To prevent the introduction IX. of monarchy," rejoined Madison, "is, with me, the 1787. real object. Experience proves a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The executives of the states are in general little more than ciphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised on the encroachments of the latter, a revolution will be inevitable." " After explanations by McClurg, four states-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, Madison voting with McClurg-expressed their preference for the tenure of good behavior to the tenure of seven years with a perpetual re-eligi bility by the national legislature.' Massachusetts was among the six states in the negative, though to 20. King, who "relied on the vigor of the executive as a great security for the public liberties," the tenure of good behavior would have been most agreeable, "provided an independent and effectual forum could be devised for the trial of the executive on an impeachment." 19. This discussion brought the convention unanimously to the opinion that if the executive was to be chosen by the national legislature, he ought not to be re-eligible. Those, therefore, who agreed with Sherman, that the statesman who had proved himself most fit for an office ought not to be excluded by the con stitution from holding it, were bound to devise some CHAP. other acceptable mode of election. IX. July The first thought was an immediate choice by the 1787. people. But here Madison pointed out that "the 19. right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the northern states than in the southern; and that the latter would have no influence in the election on the score of the negroes." To meet this difficulty, King revived Wilson's proposition for the appointment of the executive by electors chosen by the people expressly for the purpose; and Madison promptly accepted it as, "on the whole, liable to fewest objec tions." So, too, in part, thought the convention, which, on the motion of Ellsworth, decided, by six states to three, that the national executive should be appointed by electors; and, by eight states to two, that the electors should be chosen by the state legislatures. A preliminary proportional distribution of the electors among the states, as proposed by Gerry, was accepted. From confidence in the purity of the electoral body thus established, the re-eligibility of the executive was again affirmed by a vote of eight states against the two Carolinas;' and in consequence of the re-eligibility, the term of office was, at Ellsworth's motion, reduced by the vote of all the states but Delaware from seven years to six. So the convention hoped to escape from the danger of a corrupt traffic between the national legislature and candidates for the executive by assembling in one place one grand electoral college, chosen by the legislatures CHAP. of the several states at the moment for the sole pur pose of electing that officer. IX. 1787. July 24. 1 To this system Caleb Strong, of Massachusetts, started this grave objection: "A new set of men, like the electors, will make the government too complex; nor will the first characters in the state feel sufficient motives to undertake the office." On the previous day Houston, of Georgia, had directed the thoughts of the convention "to the expense and extreme inconvenience of drawing together men from all the states for the single purpose of electing the chief magistrate."" To him, likewise, it now seemed improbable that capable men would undertake the service. He was afraid to trust to it. Moved by these considerations, but still retaining its conviction of the greater purity of an electoral college, the convention, by seven votes against four, in the weariness of vacillation, returned to the plan of electing the national executive by the national legislature.' But the vote was sure to reopen the question of his re-eligibility. The convention was now like a pack of hounds in full chase, suddenly losing the trail. It fell into an anarchy of opinion, and one crude scheme trod on the heels of another. Williamson, pleading the essential difference of interests between the northern and southern states, particularly relating to the carrying trade, "wished the executive power to be lodged in three men, taken from three districts, into which the states should be divided." "At some time or other," said he, "we shall have a king; to postpone the event 4 as long as possible, I would render the executive CHAP. ineligible."' IX. July 24. In the event of the ineligibility of the executive, 1787. Martin, forgetting the state of anarchy and faction that would attend a long period of service by an incompetent or unworthy incumbent, proposed that the term of executive service should be eleven years.' "From ten to twelve," said Williamson." "Fifteen," said Gerry; and King mocked them all by proposing "twenty years, the medium life of princes." Wilson, seeing no way of introducing a direct election by the people, made the motion,' that the executive should be chosen by electors to be taken from the national legislature by lot. Ellsworth pointed out that to secure a candidate for re-election against an improper dependence on the legislature, the choice should be made by electors. Madison liked best an election of the executive by the qualified part of the people at large. "Local considerations," he said, "must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the southern states, I am willing to make the sacrifice." And now came into consideration an element which exercised a constant bias on the discussion to the last. Ellsworth complained that the executive would invariably be taken from one of the larger states. "To cure the disadvantage under which an election by the people would place the smaller states," Williamson proposed that each man should vote for three 25. July CHAP. candidates.' Gouverneur Morris accepted the princi IX. ple, but desired to limit the choice of the voters to 1787. two, of whom at least one should not be of his own state. This Madison approved, believing that the citizens would give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. We shall meet the proposition again. 25. 26. Lastly, Dickinson said: "Insuperable objections lie against an election of the executive by the national legislature, or by the legislatures or executives of the states. I have long leaned toward an election by the people, which I regard as the best and the purest source. Let the people of each state choose its best citizen, and out of the thirteen names thus selected an executive magistrate may be chosen, either by the national legislature or by electors." From hopelessness of an agreement, Gerry and Butler were willing to refer the resolution relating to the executive to a committee, but Wilson insisted that a general principle must first be fixed by a vote of the house.* On the morning of the next day,' Mason recapitulated all the seven different ways that had been proposed of electing the chief magistrate: by the people at large; by the legislatures of the states; by the executives of the states; by electors chosen by the people; by electors chosen by lot; by the legislature on the nomination of three or two candidates by each several state; by the legislature on the nomination of one candidate from each state. After reviewing them |