by a process of reaction, with the "Student's Hume," that Marlborough really did win the battle of Blenheim. But this "serious document" is of no importance. What is important is that France, despite the hatred of her politicians, is gaining a clearer knowledge of English literature, and is expressing her opinion without rancour and without intemperance. NOVEMBER. THE one lesson of the war is the need of efficiency—in men, in arms, in generalship. Before all parties, before all policies, stands the imperative duty of Army The need of reform. We must lack nothing which shall efficiency. protect our colonies and, in the last resort, defend our own shores. Neither false economy nor private pique can be allowed to interfere with the safeguard of the country. What matters it that we pack our Treasury and flatter all our general officers to amiability if, with the enemy at our door, the defences of England are not perfect? It boots little that a large surplus is there to be given the invader; it boots less that the keys of London are surrendered by a soldier, who has no fault to find with the War Office. No matter what the cost be in money and temper, the Army must be reformed; and the country which has given the present Government a free hand will be content with nothing less than efficiency. At the beginning of last session the Government was rich in promises. A Royal Commission, most wisely chosen, was appointed to examine the working of the War Office. Its suggestions were admirable, and worthy the men of business who made them; but a Royal Commission is little better than a conscience-soother, and we shall be better satisfied when the suggestions are duly applied. Nor was Mr Brodrick idle: he brought forward a scheme, adversely criticised it is true, but a scheme, nevertheless, which shone with one ray of hope. No general, it was promised, would be appointed to the command of an army corps in time of peace who was not fit to command in time of war. Here, at least, was a guarantee that, if we were ever called upon to take the field, our commanding officers would not merely be competent, but would be linked to the Army by the bond of familiar sympathy. And among the first generals appointed to the command of an army corps were Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Evelyn Wood. As a masterpiece of cynicism this could hardly be outdone. Almost a year ago Sir Redvers returned from Africa with more than one black mark against The appoint- his name in despatches; and even if Sir Evelyn ment of Sir Redvers were not afflicted by deafness, he is not the Buller. officer who above all others commands the confidence of the Army. The reason of the appointments is profoundly mysterious; but whatever it may be, it is a reason wholly unconnected with military efficiency. Probably it will be said in defence that these two generals have been chosen to stop a gap; that as the pick of our officers are still in South Africa with the army corps, it does not matter very much who command at home, provided that they have a fair knowledge of the War Office. It may be argued that for some time to come the chief duty of Sir R. Buller and Sir E. Wood will be to despatch fresh drafts from Aldershot and Salisbury, and that until the Army comes back its reorganisation is impossible. This excuse is sound in its way. If Sir Redvers and Sir Evelyn are mere stop-gaps, it matters little. If there are no army corps, perhaps it is immaterial who commands them. But Mr Brodrick has not offered this explanation, and his statement leaves us no room to doubt that if we went to war to-morrow the two army corps would be commanded by Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Evelyn Wood. Now, in the speech incautiously delivered by Sir Redvers Buller some weeks since, he complained, very properly, of inexpert criticism. He declared with absolute truth that the Press had not : given the Army fairplay,—that it had blamed the slightest incident which looked like a failure, without adequate knowledge of the officer's intention or difficulty. The effect of such criticism upon the officers in command is obvious if the loss of a dozen men is to be described as a crime in the newspapers, the bravest officer may be forgiven if now and again he is beset by timidity. "If I sacrifice a handful of men," says he to himself, "I gain a certain advantage; on the other hand I am held up to ridicule, as Gough was held up, by ignorant critics." The answer to this is simple: a British officer is so far superior to the Press that its criticism cannot and should not touch him. He has no more to do than obey orders, and serve his country in the best way he can. At any rate, he need admit no journal within his quarters, and can show himself resolutely indifferent to an irresponsible judgment. That the critics have prolonged the war is quite possible; but it may be remembered that the blameworthy critics have not all been civilians. We have heard of generals, fresh from the dust and heat of the campaign, delivering harangues; and until the War Office imposes a dignified silence upon all officers, it cannot check the chatter of Fleet Street. But there are two episodes in the career of Sir Redvers Buller, duly censured by the Commander-in-Chief, which render him unfit for a high command.1 The A famous famous despatch now printed in the Blue-Book despatch. is familar to all, yet our readers may once more be reminded of its terms. "On the 6th of February," writes the Field-Marshal, Lord Roberts, "I received a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller, reporting that he had pierced the enemy's line, and could hold the hill which divided their position; but that to drive back the enemy on either flank, and thus give his own artillery access to 1 As we go to press it is officially announced that the Commander-inChief has recommended that Sir Redvers Buller be relieved of his command, and that he has been placed on half-pay. the Ladysmith plain, ten miles from Sir George White's position, would cost him from 2000 to 3000 men, and success was doubtful. General Buller inquired if I thought that the chance of relieving Ladysmith was worth such a risk. On the same day I replied that Ladysmith must be relieved, even at the cost anticipated. I urged Sir Redvers Buller to persevere, and desired him to point out to his troops that the honour of the Empire was in their hands, and to assure them that I had no doubt whatever of their being successful." But despite the clear order and the splendid encouragement, Sir Redvers decided to make no attack, and to take the honour of the Empire out of their hands. "I withdrew my men," said he, "because I thought that they could not get through; and I would not lose a man unless I could get something for it." Yet the same man now declares that, in the present situation of affairs, "every single man who risks men and loses men, so long as he kills one Boer, ought to be praised by the Press, and not blamed." That is true to-day, but never at any time was the necessity of striking a brave and reckless blow greater than it was before Ladysmith. "Ladysmith must be relieved, even at the cost anticipated "—such is the unmistakable declaration of Lord Roberts; and it is difficult to understand how General Buller shrank from the execution of so definite an order. Inside Ladysmith 10,000 troops were shut up, and Sir Redvers hesitated to risk 2000 or 3000 for their relief. But inaction was not his worst fault. So certain was he that the beleaguered garrison could not hold out, that he "spatchcocked" a sentence into a telegram addressed to Sir George White, suggesting that it might be necessary to destroy his cipher, disable his guns, and surrender with all his troops. It is not pleasant to think upon, and even though Sir George White did not take the chance offered by the "spatchcocked" sentence, we cannot contemplate without despair what the result might have been had Sir Redvers Buller conducted |