(AFTERNOON SESSION, 2:30 O'CLOCK, MONDAY, APRIL 27, 1970) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. CHAFEE, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY-Resumed ACCOMPANIED BY: ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS HON. CHARLES A. BOWSHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE REAR ADM. WALTER D. GADDIS, USN, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET BRIG. GEN. E. H. SIMMONS, USMC, DEPUTY FISCAL DIRECTOR, BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. ROBERTSON, USMC, ASSISTANT DEP- CARRIERS: PERSONNEL AND CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONAL COSTS Senator ELLENDER. The subcommittee will please come to order. Admiral, before we go into the third Nimitz flattop, I want to hand you a document which was put in the record last year indicating the total crew for 16 of the carriers, as well as the estimated annual cost of operation. I wonder if you would take this document and look it over and make such changes as would fit the present conditions. You might also add the same information for the two Nimitz class carriers that are now under construction, the cost of the crew, and the total cost of operating. In other words, just bring that up to date. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. (The information follows:) (89) NIMITZ TYPE CARRIER CONSTRUCTION Senator ELLENDER. With respect to the third carrier of the Nimitz class, I understand that the joint study by the House and Senate Armed Services Committee required by section 402 of Public Law 91-121 has been completed, and that group has recommended the approval of the $152 million advance funding for this carrier. Is this correct? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. The joint committee of the House and Senate has completed the hearings. Senator ELLENDER. However, I understand, Senator Stennis stated that no definite conclusion should be reached until the National Security Council makes its decision. Is that your understanding? Admiral MOORER. I have the exact words of Senator Stennis. He said: I will not be in a position to make a firm recommendation for including this additional carrier in the fiscal year 1971 authorization bill until there is a firm request therefor by the executve branch. This study that is to be made by the National Security Council, of course, is not focused on the CVAN-70 carrier per se, but rather on our entire military posture, Senator Ellender. In other words, there is nothing unique about the carrier in this respect. Senator ELLENDER. Whether we should provide funds, according to Senator Stennis, would depend on what the National Security Council advocates? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. He is saying in effect that he wants a firm recommendation from the administration to include this ship in the program. Senator ELLENDER. Now, as I understand [deleted] have recommended that we have 16 attack aircraft carriers during the 1970's. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I must point out that you are referring to discussions that were held concerning the 1972 budget, not the 1971 budget that we are currently addressing. Senator ELLENDER. I said the 1970s. MODERNIZATION OF FORCES Admiral MOORER. Yes, but in the fiscal year 1971 budget under current discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year and I assume that is what you are referring to were unanimous in their recommendation on the carrier force level. We don't discuss these matters in terms of replacements. We discuss primarily force levels and force requirements. It is assumed in these discussions that the force will be kept modern. This particular carrier we are now discussing is one which will modernize the force, and not increase the size of the force-it will replace one of our oldest carriers. TOTAL CARRIERS Senator ELLENDER. You mean to say that you are not planning to have 16? Admiral MOORER. No, sir. Let me make this clear. We have 15 attack carriers plus the ASW carrier that was authorized for use as an attack carrier during the Vietnam War. From the long-range point of view, we think in terms of 15 attack carriers. The Shangri La is the ship that will revert to an ASW configuration as soon as she can be spared from the operation in South Vietnam. It is being used as a CVA as a temporary expedient. COMMISSION AND DEACTIVATION Senator ELLENDER. Do those 16 you are talking about include the two that are now being constructed? Admiral MOORER. When the two that are being constructed are commissioned and in operation, then we would remove the two which are the oldest, the Hancock and Bon Homme Richard, from the attack role. We would not increase the force levels because these ships are commissioned. The instant we commission one, we remove another. So it is a replacement, and not an addition. Senator ELLENDER. Will you tell the committee why you think 16 are necessary? Admiral MOORER. I think the 16 that we are operating today can be shown to be a very valid requirement, in light of the commitments that we have. NAVAL COMMITMENTS Senator ELLENDER. Tell us about the commitments. You mean by treaty? Admiral MOORER. No, sir, I am not referring to treaty commitments. I am referring to the requirement to maintain a credible, deterrent military posture, Senator Ellender. Today we have six carriers in the Atlantic Ocean and nine in the Pacific, plus the one that I mentioned a short time ago, the Shangri La. making a total of 16. Now, with respect to the six in the Atlantic, two of these are continuously in the Mediterranean. In addition to that, these carriers in the Atlantic take their turn and also participate in the South Vietnamese operations. For several years during the Vietnam War, we maintained five carriers continuously on station in the western Pacific. Today, we have four carriers on station there, one of which generally operates [deleted.] The other three operate in the Tonkin Gulf. One can see, then, that with the 16 carriers we are maintaining at least six on station overseas continuously. PEACETIME PERSONNEL POLICIES As you know, during all the years of this current conflict we have been operating under essentially peacetime personnel policies. By that I mean we have not been retaining people involuntarily beyond their regular enlistments, and therefore we have experienced a tremendous personnel turbulence. EQUALIZING EXPOSURE OF CARRIERS Under these conditions the number of carriers we can operate overseas continually is determined not by the ship, but by the personnel, because we have endeavored to the best of our ability to equalize the exposure to combat. In other words, we have not taken one small segment, specifically the Pacific Fleet carrier segment, and forced only them to exposure in the combat situation. We have divided it equally between the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets and we have treated all 16 of these carriers equally in exposure time. The 16 carriers, in our view, are required for this continuous combat and forward deployment posture that we have maintained, as you know, sir, since 1965. CARRIERS MISSION AND TASK Senator ELLENDER. If it were not for the fact that we are engaged there, would you need the 16 or 15 attack carriers? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. We feel we need at least 15. Admiral MOORER. The carrier provides the striking power for the Navy. It has the following capabilities: First, it can be moved any place in the world without first seeking authority from another sovereign nation. In other words, it can operate on the high seas, flying the flag of the United tSates. Secondly, it can project power ashore. It can operate aircraft from the ship to the shore without dependence on a developed base complex. Third, it can arrive quickly on the scene, ready to go. For instance. when the carrier arrives, it has everything in one package. It has its ammunition, aircraft, maintenance facilities, hospitals, command and control the entire, total package that is required to conduct combat operations. In addition to that, all the carriers can be concentrated at one point immediately, without having to develop air fields or obtain operating rights from another country. More importantly, carriers provide the means to maintain air supremacy over the sea. As I explained this morning, there is no valid |