utilized in the way that you originally intended. And I would urge you just as diligently as you are working on this issue of capital market sanctions to look at that issue because if that assistance is used in the way that Congress intended, that becomes a very, very potent tool, a very potent form of leverage that you can use in the future. And this can be done, I think, through support for the governing capacity in opposition-controlled areas as well as providing vehicles and fuel and other kinds of things to the civil administration in those opposition-controlled areas where civilian populations are being protected and supported.

I will leave it there, Mr. Chairman. Thanks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify at this propitious moment in Sudan's history. With a dramatically escalating civil conflict and a makeor-break peace process about to get underway, the timing of this hearing is impeccable. Decisive U.S. action holds the potential for moving the parties to peace. Anything less will ensure that war and famine will only intensify.

I just returned this week from a visit to the oilfields of Western Upper Nile in southern Sudan, the civil war's most prominent front line and its new epicentre. This is the fifth visit I have made there since I left the State Department a year ago. The evidence of death and destruction was omnipresent in every location I visited, in the wake of the Sudan government's efforts to depopulate the areas of new oil exploration in a classic scorched-earth counter-insurgency operation.

And yet as horrible as this war is, the worst is yet to come, ensured by the everincreasing lethality of weaponry.

And as difficult as it has been to strike a compromise on the fundamental issues, the worst is yet to come here too, as the divergence widens between the government and the SPLA over the issue of self-determination. The commitment of southern Sudanese to an independence referendum deepens, matched only by the growing commitment of the government to prevent just such an outcome.

FRESH HELL FOR SUDANESE CIVILIANS

Casualty rates are skyrocketing because of this increased lethality of weaponry, the increasing stakes for which this war is fought, and increasingly intense conventional engagements. The bloodiest battles of the war have been fought during this past dry season, as small skirmishes with AK-47s have been replaced by more conventional slugfests with heavy modern weaponry, and as Khartoum continues to escalate the use of its most significant and deadly comparative advantage, air power. The government launched a massive dry season offensive in the oilfields at the beginning of this year, aided by thousands of its forces redeployed as a result of the Nuba Mountains ceasefire. By clearing civilian populations out of Western Upper Nile, the government intended to secure further areas for oil expansion, build allweather roads that could facilitate rainy season military operations and oil company movements, and construct a defensive perimeter around existing and new oilfields. The SPLA, however, held its ground and prevented these things from happening, at a huge cost in terms of manpower and resources. (The government lost even larger numbers of soldiers and irregular militia.) As the SPLA fights what is largely an interdiction operation, and if it cannot mount a significant counter-offensive in the current rainy season, its capacity to defend against the government's next dry season offensive with more and better heavy weapons-will begin to erode.

HARDENING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The issue of state and religion will be an extremely difficult one at the negotiating table. It is the issue of self-determination, however, that threatens to be the ultimate deal-killer in the upcoming IGAD negotiations or in any peace process. In my frequent trips throughout southern Sudan, I have found a growing determination to sacrifice whatever is required to achieve an independence referendum. The attitude is not, "We have sacrificed so much; therefore we must compromise." Rather it is, "We have sacrificed so much; therefore we cannot compromise.'

The International Crisis Group has argued since shortly after Senator Danforth was appointed that a window of opportunity existed for peace in Sudan. We argued that if we did not immediately take advantage of that window by addressing the root causes of the war in serious negotiations, the window would inevitably close. Senator Danforth's efforts resulted in moderate successes on symptomatic humanitarian issues, but eight months have gone by in which root causes haven't been negotiated, our leverage is slowly eroding, the positions of the parties are hardening, and the willingness of the parties to compromise is dissipating. Consequently, the window of opportunity for peace is closing.

IGAD'S LAST STAND

To try to pry this window of opportunity back open, and after nine years of trying to resolve the Sudanese civil war, IGAD is trying to stake a new course. President Moi's Special Envoy General Sumbeiywo has outlined a strict agenda and timeline that will be pursued over the next four or five months in a do-or-die negotiating effort, with the U.S. and its troika partners Britain and Norway as observers.

Left to its own devices, IGAD cannot succeed. Negotiating peace in Sudan will require an enormous effort on the part of the broader international community, in close partnership with regional states. So far, evidence of this necessary level of political will is erratic.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES: STRATEGY AND LEVERAGE

To resolve a war the length and magnitude of Sudan's, key members of the international community will have to pull their weight and pull in the same direction. If peace is to come to Sudan, the U.S. will have to carry the heaviest weight of all, and take the lead in ensuring everyone else that matters is on board. Just as in the Middle East and Afghanistan, such an investment and commitment of diplomatic resources by the U.S. must be substantial. No one else can do it.

The lessons of peace-making in Africa have demonstrated that only with highlevel engagement, a well-developed negotiating strategy, and multilateral leverage can the U.S. help broker peace between determined belligerents. The previous administration demonstrated this in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace settlement, on which I had the privilege of working. That relatively straightforward conflict took over two years of intensive U.S. and African diplomacy to resolve. Sudan's war is far more complex.

The train wreck inherent in the upcoming negotiations is already evident. The issue of self-determination, with secession at its core, will at some point paralyze the talks. A well-developed strategy and serious leverage needs to be ready to be deployed, which means intensive preparations must begin now.

President Bush concluded his recent Oval Office meeting with Senator Danforth a few weeks ago with a firm, "Let's get this done!" What the U.S. is doing thus far to act on that instruction is useful, but not sufficient.

WANTED: A ROBUST PEACE STRATEGY

Because the divergent positions of the parties are so entrenched and will not be reconcilable through conventional facilitation alone, a more forceful and proactive diplomatic intervention is needed, backed by much more leverage than is currently envisioned. A comprehensive plan is needed which involves the following elements:

how to move the parties on key issues

when and what leverage will be deployed;

what substantive proposals will be presented at what junctures in the talks; what back-up plans exist when impasses are reached;

how Egypt will be engaged by the U.S. at the highest levels to ensure buyin, which will require extensive discussions on the issue of self-determination; how to engage both Khartoum and Cairo on what they are willing to do to make unity attractive to southern Sudanese;

how to engage Russia and China on playing a constructive role, which is at present undermined by their provision of military aid to the government;

how to coordinate Track II peace initiatives-particularly competing ones funded by the U.S. and European Union-and utilize them more directly in the service of the current process;

what technical aid to provide to help the parties develop their positions before and during the talks;

when and how to get the National Democratic Alliance parties, the Umma Party, and elements of broader civil society into the discussions about Sudan's future.

As noted, the U.S. and its troika partners will be observers in the next IGAD round. A higher-level presence, however, will be needed on a day-to-day basis, to demonstrate U.S. resolve. That is why the decision will be crucial as to who will be the "Chief Operating Officer"-an idea which originated with President Bushfor U.S. engagement in the peace process. An ambassador that has African experience, an understanding of the Sudan conflict, and experience with negotiation processes would be ideal. Martin Brennan, U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, would be just such a person, given that he is scheduled to be moving soon as part of the regular rotation. David Dunn, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, also fits the description.

WANTED: SERIOUS LEVERAGE

The most visible missing ingredient of a potentially successful IGAD peace effort is any coordination or organization of pressures and incentives.

Leverage does not grow on trees. It is created through leadership in the development of multilateral strategy and the judicious execution of that strategy. Claiming no leverage actually reduces leverage in a self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence, as the parties realize leverage will not be created or used. This defense is usually a smokescreen for lack of commitment.

To be effective, pressures and incentives must be multilateral. The U.S. must organize this. This may be the most important thing the U.S. can contribute. There are a number of carrots and sticks that can be deployed in support of the peace

process:

Maintaining counter-terrorism pressure on Khartoum is critical. Short-term tactical cooperation should not be confused with strategic redirection, which will only be ensured through the kind of change that will accompany a comprehensive peace agreement.

Continuing opposition to aid in the IMF and World Bank makes it extremely difficult for the Sudanese government to rehabilitate the formal economy. Most crucial is the huge debt overhang, one of the largest in the world, that if not addressed will continue to be a major obstacle to economic development and lending. Conversely, removing U.S. opposition to Paris Club financing, IMF lending, and World Bank credits for Sudan would be probably the largest incentive, and opposition to these should be maintained until a peace agreement is signed and there is forward movement on implementation.

Pressure on investors in the oil industry translates into indirect pressure on the government. Passage of the capital market sanctions provision of the Sudan Peace Act is thus an important leverage point.

The IGAD coalition must be reenergized on Sudan. When Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda were working together on Sudan, progress was made at the negotiating table, as these three governments collectively possess serious leverage on both parties. The U.S. should work closely with these governments in bringing pressure to bear on the Sudanese parties. Diplomatically, support for self-determination with the full scope of possible outcomes is a crucial lever to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached for the interim period. Only a fraction of the $20 million in Economic Support Funds authorized by Congress over the last two years has been utilized in the way Congress originally intended. If Congressional intent was implemented, this would maximize leverage. This could be done through support for governing capacity in opposition-controlled areas and the provision of vehicles and fuel to civil administration in areas where civilian populations are being protected and supported.

The construction of international guarantees and specific commitments of support for the implementation of the agreement provide a window for a more robust international role in support of the process. Regional governments and the United States are the key political supporters of the opposition. At key junctures in the negotiations, it will be crucial for these actors to be willing to apply diplomatic pressure on the SPLA and NDA to participate constructively in peace talks.

Any institution-building support for the SPLA/NDA and its civil administration capacity should be terminated if the SPLA becomes the obstacle to a peaceful settlement.

WANTED: A REAL SOLUTION

Despite the desires of Khartoum and diplomatic missions around the world, there is no southern-only solution in Sudan. That was tried at independence, and dishonored by Khartoum; in 1972 to end the first civil war, and dishonored by Khartoum; and in 1997 by a splinter faction of the SPLA, and dishonored by Khartoum. It is crucial to understand that the solution in the south requires reform of the central

government. Since independence, there has been no meaningful sharing of political power and wealth with Sudan's African peoples-sixty five per cent of the population-in the south, the Nuba Mountains, the east and the west. Equal rights have not existed. The war has long ago moved beyond a southern-only one to a national one. To ensure the unity of Sudan, particularly for southerners, power will have to be shared, and rights will have to be guaranteed through constitutional and security arrangements, backed by international guarantees. Any "two systems, one Sudan" proposals which envision separate constitutions for the north and the south without a clearly reformed center will not succeed.

The best way to ensure unity-in other words, to ensure the full implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement—is maintaining the ultimate leverage of people from southern Sudan: the self-determination referendum. There must be a means by which southerners have a direct say over their future. This requires a referendum plus central government reform. Controversy on this issue surrounding early drafts of Senator Danforth's report to President Bush undercuts U.S. leverage. For the international community, a reformed central government is crucial as well, not only to ensure against future rounds of destructive and destabilizing war, but also to ensure counter-terrorism objectives, which require a diminution of the absolute power of the ruling party which hosted Osama bin Laden for the first half of the 1990s.

COUNTERING THE USE OF FOOD AS A WEAPON

During the last three major famines in Sudan (1987-8, 1992-3, and 1998), a common feature was the government's denial of access for humanitarian aid. The same tactic is being deployed again in the oilfield areas of Western Upper Nile, where large numbers of displaced are in the midst of an acute humanitarian crisis.

Senator Danforth's well-meaning effort to secure Days of Tranquillity and localized cease-fires was misplaced. With the leverage the U.S. possessed at the outset of his mission, the objective should have been blanket access for humanitarian aid, which would mean an end to the veto rights of the warring parties over where relief agencies provide assistance to people in need.

The U.S., its donor partners, and the UN must re-focus on this fundamental objective of humanitarian diplomacy: the principle of unfettered access. We have legitimized the veto over and over again, most recently with the focus on Days of Tranquillity.

If Khartoum rejects renewed efforts at the removal of the veto, a system is needed whereby the minute the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is denied access to a particular location, all donor and UN assets are immediately transferred to nonOLS agencies to deliver the goods. This requires a significant upgrading of the capacity of non-OLS agencies.

In response to the immediate emergency in Western Upper Nile, AID Administrator Natsios is right to reject the latest effort to change the terms of the OLS agreement and route food to southern locations through Khartoum. Words must be matched by action. Non-OLS agencies have been on the ground for months waiting for a more significant response from AID in aiding Western Upper Nile, but bureaucracy and other factors have hindered the effort. We need to flood the area now with food and build the air and ground transport capacity of non-OLS agencies in the area.

CONCLUSION

With bold U.S. leadership that matches President Bush's clear desire to help end Sudan's war, there is a real chance for success. But this effort will require highlevel U.S. engagement in the mediation itself and in the deployment of serious multilateral leverage at critical moments in the peace process. In the absence of such a commitment, the best chance in years to end a generation of war will surely slip away.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Isaacs.

STATEMENT OF KEN ISAACS, INTERNATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS, SAMARITAN'S PURSE

Mr. ISAACS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Coming to Washington I find out that 5 minutes does not seem to be as important as I thought it was when I was preparing for this, but nevertheless, I am going to stay on time.

As you said, I have served with Samaritan's Purse for 15 years. This is an organization headed by Franklin Graham. Over the last 5 years I have been in Sudan more than 100 times, and I just returned Friday. We have multiple projects in numerous areas, and in all of the opposition-held areas.

My access through our work has given me an insight that is beyond what most people see, so I am reporting to you today a firsthand account.

I think, first, I just want to be clear on one thing; that there is a radical extremist group, the National Islamic Front, that controls the government of Sudan. They have declared jihad against their own citizens and they work toward that goal to the fullest extent possible, and that this is the very same government that harbored Osama bid Laden for 5 years. We should not forget that point.

I do, however, see a beacon of hope among the opposition groups throughout Sudan. This beacon though is attacked and confounded by the actions and the public relations spins of the National Islamic Front. But the beacon is powerful and I do not believe that it will be denied nor extinguished.

The Sudanese people have a vision of a new Sudan and they speak of a country united where all the Sudanese are participants, where there is separation of religion and state, where people are free to speak, where they can exercise self-determination, and where their children are educated. In this new Sudan there is no slavery and there is no Sharia Islamic law.

The tragedy of Sudan is well known but little understood. Today it has been often cited that 2 million people have died. What does that mean? That is equivalent of one World Trade Center attack every week for the last 13 years. That is staggering if you worked it out proportionally to our population.

Many defined the war as religious, racial, regional or oil-driven. All of these elements exist, but the root of the war lies in a simple but yet a vital concept. The war is about freedom. It is freedom to determine their future, freedom of worship and speech, freedom to elect leaders and to live without terror. The war is about human dignity and liberty. It is between the people of Sudan and the National Islamic Front. It is between the oppressed and the oppres

sors.

The war is not just about Islam versus Christianity. There are many Christians in the opposition in the south, but in the Blue Nile, east Sudan and Nuba and even west Sudan, most of them are Muslims. These Muslim populations experience the same attacks and persecutions as the Christian neighbors.

The war is not just about race. Although there are elements of apartheid and slavery, thousands from the Arabic culture are joining the Black Africans in the fight.

The war is not just about north versus south, although that is where it started. If it were north versus south, how then could you explain the multitudes from the north that are coming to join the forces in the south and the east?