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at that time, and then I went back again in September, last September, and this last one.

The core of my first findings were that the way the IDPs were being treated around Khartoum, even if the services that were being rendered were actually being received or said to be rendered were being received, the fact that these people were pushed into a marginal area around Khartoum definitely made them feel not as citizens of the order, but as people who were rejects.

And therefore my recommendation was let us help people move to areas as close to their natural areas as possible and give them the help they need to settle there.

Alternatively, every Sudanese, as long as we are one country, should have the freedom to go wherever he or she wants. But if you must keep them in the camps, then you should improve the conditions of the camp, to compensate them for the negatives of being rejected within their own country.

When I went back in September, I found that there was some progress in that people were being allotted land around Khartoum to be allowed to integrate or to settle and maybe build what could become eventually permanent homes. There were still a few in camps that were absolutely destitute, and again, I discuss with them how to deal with those.

The issue of return, I have been negotiating with them, particularly with respect to the IBA project that Roger Winter and I have just been there recently, and we are considering USAID involvement in that along with other. Now we wanted to hold a seminar or a workshop, which was initially agreed upon, that will bring together all the major U.N. agencies, donor committee, to discuss comprehensively the problem of internal displacement in the country, and to also hold a similar meeting in areas under SPLM control.

Negotiations have not been easy on this because the government itself reflects different points of view and interests. Some are very open to it, and particularly want to get them to be held internally within the Sudan. Others say we should make it regional so that Sudan does not look targeted. Others say we should have our own personal discussion of the situation before we involve others because of sensitivity on issues of sovereignty.

I must say though that I have impressed upon the Sudan, and indeed all the other countries of the 23 missions I have undertaken, that while I respect sovereignty, my understanding of sovereignty is not as a barricade against international cooperation, but as a positive concept of state responsibility, which one can carry out in cooperation with the international community.

But if your people suffer in large numbers and you close doors on the international community, in this day and age there is no way you can enjoy that sovereignty. The world will find a way of getting involved. So the dialogue continues.

My sense in the other areas of humanitarian involvement you suggested is that there is a considerable ambivalence on the part of the Sudanese authorities. On the one hand, they find it morally, at least within the system there are people who feel morally that they cannot stand against international involvement with humanitarian work, but there are people who want to see this, the human

itarian aspect as part of the war, and therefore if not justifying it, at least explaining it away as the inevitable consequences of the

war.

What this means, I think, is if the peace process is taken a lot more vigorously in earnest, it should also make it easier to negotiate the humanitarian issues. Obviously, humanitarianism by definition means even if a war continues there are things that should be done to alleviate human suffering. But it certainly helps if we are more serious about peace and do things that are seen visibly moving in that direction, that it would also make, I think, people a lot more receptive.

The question is then a question of disparity because, as people say, if one side becomes too strong and the other side too weak, then what my friend Bill Zadman calls ripe for resolution connected with a hurting stalemate, no one can be too strong or too weak and still negotiate meaningful.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Tancredo, did you want to comment.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, just one quick question.

You mentioned in your testimony that the radicalized Islamic government that exists in Khartoum today is just a, in a way a reflection of all of the previous and existing parties that exist in the south-in the north; that they had sort of espoused that predilection in the past but this is the implementation of that.

Did I understand you correctly?

Mr. DENG. Right.

Mr. TANCREDO. Is there, and I guess then if that is the case, can you point to any political process in the north, any political entity, any possible pressure group that exists today that would accept a confederacy that allows for the kind of religious freedom that we expect from any sort of settlement?

Mr. DENG. I think it was you who characterized it earlier as a form of conflict of cultures. And frankly, although Huntington's theory is of course being contested and one does not want to identify too much with that.

Mr. TANCREDO. I do. I do. I accept it.

Mr. DENG. I would say that it is a clash of two visions for the Sudan, and frankly, at least the stated view of the SPLM/SPLA is that the war is about creating a new Sudan to which everybody would belong on equal terms. But how can you achieve that if the two positions, the two visions are absolutely incompatible?

I think what is going to happen even if we did not have the south today by the way, the north is going to discover itself because it has a distorted self-perception which is the result of a history of discrimination that has favored

Mr. TANCREDO. If I could, I am sorry. Is there a single entity to which you can point today in Khartoum, in the north, that actually represents that point of view politically or even philosophically?

Mr. DENG. Well, I will have to say that at least formally all the political parties have more or less agreed that they will accept anything short of just breaking up the country.

But if you take the west, the political parties know, except for general agreement, that there is now an acceptance of self-exam

ination by the parties, and an interim arrangement that will be close to that. But you see my preference would be to avoid labels because if we say "federation," what is in Khartoum today is federation. This is not acceptable to the south.

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. DENG. If we say "confederation," they hear you say separation. But if you take people in western Sudan, even the Nuba, who in the first war were fighting on behalf of the north and actually seen as Arabs, today they are, you know, obviously sharing that point of view. I think it is a matter of time. People in western Sudan, therefore, would easily accept that kind of a framework, but the political part is right now, I do not see anyone that would accept that.

On the other hand

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay.

Mr. DENG [continuing]. In private discussions they tell you, short of breaking up the country, we would accept.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much.

By the way, I have had those same discussions with representatives of the north, only to be at some point down the path disabused of the idea that they are serious about that. But I guess we can hope. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Payne, very briefly.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Deng, very nice to see you again, and I will not hold you up. I understand you have to leave, but I would just also like to say that, as Mr. Tancredo, every time there was someone who seems like they were trying to make concessions or discuss things with the government of Khartoum, they would show their true face. When former President Carter was in Khartoum he felt that, you know, there could be a possibility that Khartoum would understand and that perhaps they would be more sympathetic to the plight of the people in the south. But as he went to visit a feeding site, they bombed the area.

When special envoy under President Clinton, former Congressman Jack Johnson, who chaired the Subcommittee, went, as he sat in the government's office in Khartoum; they bombed.

Three or four months ago when people were standing in line, just unarmed civilians, 40 people were killed at the time with Sudan's new helicopters, when Senator Danforth was there talking about, or his people were there trying to see about some kind of appeasement.

So I just question whether this government has the ability to really I just think that there is something radically wrong, something essentially evil, something malfunctioning in the body politic. And so I certainly respect, I know of no one who is more thoroughly acquainted with the problem, and I just hope you will continually work on trying to come up with a solution.

Thank you very much.

Mr. DENG. Congressman, if I may just say, I think I could take the lead from something you said earlier referring to September 11, and the dramatic changes that took place as a result of the clear message that went out of here. I think it is also a question of how committed the international community, and in particular the

United States working with others, how committed they are to pressure for a just peace in the country.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Dr. Deng, and I do want to thank our other panelists for your courtesy in extending this additional time because of the schedule.

Our next panelist is John Prendergast, who is Co-Director of the Africa Program at the International Crisis Group. He has worked as special advisor on African conflicts at the Department of State, and Director of African Affairs at the National Security Council.

Mr. Prendergast has worked for a number of NGOs on issues of human rights and humanitarian assistance in Africa, and has authored a number of books and journals on Africa.

Ken Isaacs is the International Director of Projects for Samaritan's Purse; he has been associated with the Christian-based relief organization since 1987. He manages five national offices and 12 international field offices with a national staff numbering more than 1,200 people in activities including shelters, rehabilitation, refugee care, orphanages, AIDS program, hospitals and public health clinics, and much more.

He also recently assumed responsibility for the world medical mission, the medical arm of Samaritan's Purse, where medical professionals are sent around the world on short-term humanitarian assignments.

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Eric Reeves of Smith College in North Hampton, Massachusetts. Although an academic by training, Dr. Reeves is now in his 4th year of full-time work as a Sudan analyst and human rights advocate. He has written extensively on Sudan and especially on the consequences of oil development in that country.

Dr. Reeves has served as a consultant to a number of humanitarian and nongovernmental organizations, and has been widely published as a result of his growing research and has been interviewed on various issues relating to Sudan by leading news organizations around the world. He has testified on Sudan and oil development before our Committee before, and we welcome you back, Dr. Reeves.

Mr. Prendergast, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think none of us have ever seen Francis Deng talk for such a short time, so I think you can assume that we will be similarly disciplined in our efforts here today to try to comply with the clock's demands. I just returned this week from a visit to the oilfields in western upper Nile, which is really the front line now in the war in Sudan. This is the fifth visit that I have made in the last year since I left the State Department. And I have got to say the figure of 2 million dead that everyone this morning has cited really is just a warm up. I think the real game is beginning now.

Casualty rates are skyrocketing on the battlefield today because of the increased lethality of weapons that are being purchased, particularly by Khartoum, the increasing stakes for which this war is

being fought, the increasing commitment of the government to clearing civilians out of the oilfields, and the increasingly intense conventional engagements that we are seeing represented in the war today.

Is peace possible in Sudan? That is certainly the question that underlies the answer, which would dictate what U.S. policy ought to pursue over the next few months.

I would agree with Walter and the Administration's team, we really do not know and we really must try, to try to make peace. But it is fantasy, I think, to believe that any solution is possible without extremely serious, diligent, and concerted international pressure on Khartoum.

The most visible missing ingredient right now of a potentially successful peace process in Sudan through the IGAD peace process is any coordination whatsoever or organization of the pressures that need to be placed on the parties, again particularly Khartoum. To be effective, this leverage has to be multilateral. The U.S. has to organize this. This may be the most important thing that the United States can do in the context of the peace process in Sudan. Now, I have outlined a number of carrots and sticks in the paper here in the written testimony. I will just highlight a couple of them right now.

It is crucial that we maintain the counterterrorism pressure that we have built up over the last 8 years on Khartoum. Fundamental change on the issue of counterterrorism is not going to occur until the kind of change that occurs through a comprehensive peace agreement happens.

Secondly, this issue that was raised earlier about the opposition of our assistance through the World Bank and IMF to the regime in Khartoum, this is also a crucial element, particularly because the government needs debt relief. Every weapon system they purchase increases the debt expidientially, as does interest on the debt. It is growing rapidly. They need Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief. They are not going to get it as long as the United States votes against it on the board of the IMF and World Bank. We need to hold the line on that, and I think the Representative that spoke earlier about that was absolutely right.

Third, pressure on investors in the oil industry clearly translates into indirect pressure on the government. Therefore, as all three of you have articulately, I think, presented today, passage of the capital market sanctions provisions of the Sudan Peace Act is a critical leverage point for the United States and needs to at least be continued to be pressed with the Senate.

Fourth, diplomatically, and I want to build here on what Francis was talking about, support for self-determination with the full scope of possible outcomes, meaning independence as one of the possible outcomes of self-determination, is a crucial lever to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached for the interim period that will inevitably occur if a peace agreement is reached in Sudan.

And, fifth and finally, another issue that has direct implications for the Congress, only a fraction of the $20 million that Congress has authorized in economic support funds for protection of civilians in southern Sudan and for a number of other purposes has been

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