were located could receive international humanitarian assistance to meet their needs. That was enabled by the fact that there was a peace process then in motion with the former government.

In 1989, on June 30, the current government's party staged a coup, and shortly after that, the whole policy toward humanitarian assistance began to change. A number of us met, in later 1989, with representatives of what was called the Revolutionary Command Council. What they told us was, very plainly, there will not be humanitarian programs in Sudan that do not meet the military strategy needs of the government. Since then we have found manipulation of humanitarian programs to be a regular pattern.

We have taken a number of steps to try to get around that manipulation, but the truth of the matter is that manipulation continues to be a significant problem.

What do I mean by manipulation? Well, just to give you a couple of examples. In January 1998, in Bahr el Ghazal, one of the three principal provinces of the south, as a famine was beginning in the area, the government denied flights of humanitarian assistance into the region. The consequence of that was the famine was much more dramatic than it needed to be. We could have headed off much of the death that resulted. In fact, 100,000 people died because of that action.

Or take Equatoria, one of the other provinces in the south. Much of Equatoria has been closed to humanitarian flights for 4 years, even though there has not been a lot of military activity in the area. It is an obstacle that has terrible consequences on the ground.

Currently, in what we call Western Upper Nile, part of the third historical province of the south, the government of Sudan is seeking to consolidate control of the oil fields. As a result of their military initiatives, they have banned flights for humanitarian purposes into the region. There are no flights of a humanitarian nature officially going into that region right now at all.

In addition, the government has announced that it wants to change the basic framework that we have had for the last 13 years for this more or less neutral access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. What they are proposing is that they would take control of all humanitarian programming. The stress is on "control," not on "humanitarian."

What they would do is they would require all flights to pass through government-controlled locations. They are talking about closing the southern sector base in Lokichokio, Kenya. They are talking about requiring visas for humanitarian workers even if they are working the south. The U.N. is resisting on all of these efforts by the government, and we are supporting the U.N. in that regard, but there are limits to what the U.N. can do when it is dealing with a member state of the United Nations system. If these kinds of things were put in place, it would be the ultimate manipulation. It would be the end of Operation Lifeline Sudan as we know it, and of course we here in the U.S. support a major non-Operation Lifeline Sudan program. The Sudanese government would simply target that program militarily.

Administrator Andrew Natsios has called the proposal of the government absolutely unacceptable. We need, frankly, and this is the

recommendation from USAID, an entirely new arrangement to avoid the government of Sudan being able to veto humanitarian access to the conflict zones in Sudan. We need to have a process which is neutral; we need to have a process which is transparent; we need to have a process that serves all conflict areas, the needs of civilians that are caught up in those areas, not the Joint Military Commission that we have in the Nuba Mountains, but something similar in which the international community can independently play a clear role in deciding what flights for humanitarian access go in and which do not. This is our highest priority in the way we proceed with negotiations with the government.

And to my friends in the government in Khartoum, I would say the best thing that they can do to move a peace process forward is start to treat people who are caught up in this conflict as they ought to. It would move the peace process forward very nicely.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today about the next steps on what I hope will be the path to peace in Sudan. As many of you know, I have testified many times before Congress on Sudan, but this is my first time doing so as Assistant Administrator of USAÏD.

The timing of this hearing is very important. Sudan is riding a fine line between disaster and opportunity. In the last eleven months, I have traveled to Sudan seven times, including all of Senator John Danforth's visits, and two trips with USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios in his capacity as the President's U.S. Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan.

During that time, I have witnessed several very successful initiatives. For example, last month during a meeting with civil society groups of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM)-held Nuba Mountains region, I was encouraged to hear about the positive changes in daily life brought about by U.S. humanitarian advocacy and diplomatic activities. Local residents mentioned to me that the sound of airplanes overhead once brought a fear of coming bombs, but now is welcomed as announcing new shipments of food or other needed assistance. This sort of practical improvement in safety, nutrition, and quality of life is what USAID is working toward in Sudan.

While recent developments give cause for hope and justify energetic U.S. engagement toward a just peace, any optimism must be tempered. The Government of Sudan (GoS) continues to send contradictory signals on its commitment to supporting humanitarian efforts. While government declarations suggest official support for such aid, the GoS too often creates bureaucratic restrictions and operational barriers that impede the delivery of assistance to those in need. Aid agencies are denied official access to some areas, and civilians are directly targeted in some instances. These obstacles are so consistent as to amount to a deliberate strategy. It belies the GoS assertions of wanting a just peace.

Mr. Chairman, in my testimony here today, I will discuss three successes that the United States has achieved in Sudan over the last eleven months, several serious concerns that remain to be addressed, and a vision for future USAID humanitarian and developmental assistance in Sudan in the months to come.

The first and greatest achievement has been the remarkable progress made by USAID in preparing southern Sudan for an eventual peace. USAID has sharply increased its investment in education, agriculture, and small business, to lay the groundwork for a stable postwar society. This new long-term development assistance is coordinated and linked with our ongoing humanitarian programs. During his July trip to Sudan last year, Administrator Natsios heard repeatedly from southern Sudanese of their desire to be self-reliant and reduce their dependency on foreign humanitarian assistance. In response, the Administrator announced two major new development programs focusing on basic education and agriculture, intended to help southern Sudanese help themselves. These initiatives are valued at $42.5 million

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over five years. USAID development funding in opposition-held areas of Sudan increased from $4 million last year to $18 million this year.

To address the fact that two generations of southern Sudanese have had minimal access to education, USAID has designed a basic education program to support the creation of elementary schools, secondary schools, and teacher training colleges in southern Sudan. One effect of the ongoing civil war and displacement of civilians in Sudan has been the severe disruption of the business and agricultural sectors. The second program will provide technical training to farmers to increase their entrepreneurial skills, and also will support the provision of small loans to individuals, especially women who make up over 60 percent of the farming population, thereby encouraging the development of the southern Sudanese economy. A few days ago when we were traveling in southern Sudan with Administrator Natsios, I saw the production of shea butter, a local commodity that is processed by women who are the "poorest of the poor." Shea butter is a cooking oil that can replace imported food aid oil, and is also a highly valued export commodity. Most of all, support to the shea network will benefit thousands of women as the shea nut tree grows wild in Southern Sudan.

Parallel to our efforts to improve the southern Sudanese society and economy over the long term, USAID continues to address the pressing shorter-term humanitarian needs of Sudanese, north and south. The continued high level of our humanitarian assistance primarily reflects the unfortunate continuing humanitarian need in waraffected areas. We are also supporting what Administrator Natsios calls "developmental relief" programs-those which mitigate the impacts of conflict and encourage people to move along on the path to self-sufficiency. USAID funds relief organizations working both within and outside the framework of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). OLS has been the primary channel for humanitarian assistance to Sudan, but we do not limit ourselves to providing assistance only to areas cleared by the GoS under the OLS framework. The percentage of USAID non-food assistance in southern Sudan going to organizations outside OLS has increased from 13 percent in 1998 to 45 percent last year. Currently, in Western Upper Nile, where needs are most acute and where GoS is denying access, USAID is giving both food and nonfood aid to agencies outside OLS, and will continue to do so.

A second major achievement has been the improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Nuba Mountains over the past year. Nuba had been the area of greatest humanitarian need in Sudan caused by conflict and isolation, but the region was receiving little humanitarian aid due to blanket denials of access from the GoS. To meet the overwhelming needs in Nuba, the United States led negotiations for a military ceasefire and humanitarian access. This effort succeeded. Clearance of flights is now done by the Joint Military Commission (composed of GoS, SPLM, and international monitors) and not by GoS. People are enjoying a new freedom of movement, and an economic revitalization is beginning. There is an overall feeling of optimism among the people of Nuba, and some hope to use this successful initiative as a model for zones of tranquility elsewhere in Sudan. The Nuba initiative has not been an unmitigated success, but I will address that later.

A third achievement has been the close cooperation between USAID and the State Department in developing and implementing the tests from the Danforth initiative. One of the tests relates to eradication of slavery, abductions, and forced servitude. State led the formation of an investigation by an international team of eminent persons. USAID is designing a program to normalize inter-communal relations in the geographic area most affected by slavery. The program will focus on conflict transformation activities that enable people to earn their livelihoods from peaceful economic opportunities rather than from the war economy that involves abductions of civilians.

USAID and the State Department have also worked closely on improving humanitarian access. USAID developed the Nuba Mountains operational plan for the World Food Program 30-day food distribution in SPLM areas in November. The plan was presented to GoS diplomatically by the State Department. This pattern has been repeated in a number of instances throughout the last year.

Despite these successes, we at USAID remain disturbed at the intensification of conflict and humanitarian crises in other areas and feel the U.S. government still has to overcome significant challenges in order to catalyze a just peace. The GoS continually obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of programs in opposition areas. It delays operations, violates agreements, and denies access for humanitarian flights.

The Nuba Mountains have seen positive changes, as I mentioned earlier, but there are reasons to question the commitment of GoS to guaranteeing humanitarian access in the Nuba Mountains because of its actions to date. For example, after the GoS agreed in January to unfettered humanitarian access to Nuba, it continued to

delay and deny flights into the SPLM-controlled areas until mid-May, only weeks before the rainy season would make airstrips inaccessible. The government finally acquiesced only after sustained U.S. pressure. Lack of humanitarian assistance from early December to mid-May did little to encourage people to return to the Nuba Mountains and in certain locations, civilian movement and markets continue to be restricted. Also, a collapse of, or failure to renew, the agreement is not without risk. Under the terms of the ceasefire, all sides gained access to detailed maps of population centers, military positions, and locations of humanitarian activities.

The problem of restricted humanitarian access to war-affected regions is not limited to the Nuba Mountains. In the war zones of Western Upper Nile, in parts of Central and Eastern Upper Nile, in northern Bahr el Ghazal, in southern Blue Nile, and in Eastern Equatoria, flights continue to be denied. As recently as last week, the GoS insisted that all relief for Western Upper Nile be out of Él-Obeid rather the OLS base in Lokichokio. The United Nations (UN) is engaged in continued negotiations with GoS and SPLM on this.

In a recent query on the GoS proposal to restrict access to Western Upper Nile, Administrator Natsios stated, "The principle of Operation Lifeline Sudan since it was created in 1988, was to allow the government-held areas to be served from the North and the opposition-held areas to be served through Lokichokio in Northern Kenya. Any change will disrupt the relief effort and endanger people's lives, and we would not accept it."

My third concern is that the frequency of attacks on civilians is increasing. In Western Upper Nile, credible reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies indicate that the GoS military campaign is directly targeting civilians and food stocks through intensified, high-altitude bombings and helicopter gunship attacks.

An attack on civilians in Bieh on February 17 in which 24 people were killed was witnessed by World Food Program (WFP) staff. On the Administrator's recent trip, we met with six chiefs from Western Upper Nile, a number of whose home areas were bombed that evening. In addition to these attacks, dozens of GoS assaults on civilian populations go unwitnessed by international observers.

The UN and NGOs estimate that between 150,000 and 300,000 people have been displaced in Western Upper Nile between January and May 2002. Due to restrictions on access to the area, information on displaced populations is imprecise. By all accounts the humanitarian needs of the displaced are enormous. Veteran aid workers have described the state of internally displaced persons in Western Upper Nile as the worst they have ever seen.

Finally, I would like to present preliminary plans for future USAID priorities and actions that will improve the humanitarian situation and prepare Sudan for a just peace. These plans follow directly from successes achieved under the initiatives of Special Envoy Danforth.

One of the Danforth tests is to encourage "periods or zones of tranquility," in which military actors temporarily stand down to allow humanitarian access. During the Danforth negotiations, we obtained political approval from both GoS and SPLM for special humanitarian programs in the cross-line area of Abyei and Twic for the eradication of guinea worm. I visited Abyei and Twic counties last month, and met with local authorities, community leaders, and international partners. If USAID efforts to transform the war economy in this region are successful, improved relations among north-south communities could have two impacts. One is a reduction in slave raiding and abductions since this is where these practices historically occur, and a second is an increase in return of displaced people to their home areas in the South from squatter camps in northern cities. This potential initiative is still being vetted. Similarly, Eastern Equatoria will also be a priority for USAID programs in the coming year. This is a very complex region with a multiplicity of ethnic groups, GoSSPLA front lines, south-south divisions, and a regional dimension that includes Ugandan dissidents. The impact of all this on ordinary Sudanese is huge, with many displaced within the region and many others living as refugees in Uganda. We will attempt to use U.S. political leverage and the State-USAID partnership to support the UN in its efforts to negotiate cross-line access and eliminate GoS access denials. Success in these efforts will enable USAID to fund infrastructure projects, conflict transformation, and community rehabilitation activities.

Second, USAID will work to consolidate the ceasefire and the recovery effort in the Nuba Mountains. Popular expectations remain high and much remains to be done here to sustain the initial successes so that people achieve self-reliance and economic recovery.

Third, we are considering ways that the current flight clearance system can move beyond GoS unilateral ability to veto humanitarian flights. We intend to explore the creation of an internationally monitored flight clearance mechanism to ensure objec

tivity and transparency in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This would be a major change in the current approach that could improve the lives of thousands of Sudanese in the south, who live in areas not directly affected by fighting but who are now routinely denied humanitarian access by GoS for political reasons.

I believe the U.S. initiative has the potential to move the warring parties towards a just peace. In that regard, the United States is the only game in town. Yet Khartoum seems of two minds, poised on the edge between a peace and war mentality. The surest way for Khartoum to prove the genuineness of its intentions is to fully collaborate with the U.S. and U.Ñ. humanitarian initiatives by providing unrestricted international humanitarian access to civilians in need. Failure to do so risks years of more war.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Winter.

Mr. Young.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. YOUNG, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Mr. YOUNG. Chairman Hyde, Mr. Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning, and thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

Just yesterday the Commission released a report on Afghanistan that I hope to present to you in a hearing such as this one in the near future. In the meantime, I want to express our sincere thanks to the Committee for holding this hearing at a very critical time when we need to focus U.S. efforts on bringing a just peace to Sudan.

Following the Commission's establishment by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Sudan was one of the first three countries to become a focus of our Commission's attention. For the past 3 years, the Commission has found the government of Sudan to be the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. Over the past 3 years the Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan, a number have been taken up both by the Administration and by the Congress.

On May 14th, the White House released Special Envoy John Danforth's much awaited report on his efforts in the civil war in Sudan. The Commission was one of the first to call for the creation of a special envoy. The Commission welcomed Senator Danforth's efforts and his willingness to continue in the envoy post to pursue a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

Senator Danforth is to be commended for his success in getting humanitarian aid to the Nuba Mountains where the Khartoum regime has for years engaged in genocidal actions. His efforts have also resulted in the recently concluded investigation by the International Eminent Persons Group into slavery, abduction and forced servitude in Sudan. The report of the Eminent Persons Group includes the horrific conclusion, and I quote,

"The pattern of slave taking that has developed since the start of the civil war is, to a substantial degree, the product of a counter-insurgency strategy pursued by successive governments in Khartoum."

Senator Danforth, like the Commission, has found that the development of Sudan's oil wealth has become an increasingly important