Now, that can be interpreted two ways; that the President, the administration, will see that those rights are not impaired, or that we can nail it down in the Constitution. Now, I am sure Senator Bricker had in mind that that meant nailing it down beyond all peradventure of court construction or doubt of any kind. That was my own interpretation of the matter, although I admit it does lend itself to two interpretations.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I was one of those who worked on that platform as you may recall. Certainly it is a language which lends itself to either interpretation. I myself would have had no objection to the legalistic approach to the matter, if actually when you come to put the words down you find it is possible to have a constitutional amendment which does just that, but does not go beyond that, and do a lot of other things which I do not think we can afford to do at this time. That is where I had to come to grips with this matter. When I originally heard this resolution, I was very sympathetic to it. I have no doubt if I had been in the Senate at that time, I would have been among those who sponsored it. But when I began to study what the practical effects of it would be, and the curtailment of what I think is necessary power in the area of foreign relations at a very critical time, I just felt that the new risks that we are assuming were greater than the old risks that we were trying to avoid. I tried myself to draw alternative language. Senator Bricker, with whom I have . had, I hope, and will continue to have, the closest working relations on this whole subject, we talked about it quite a bit together. I told him I would try to see if I could think up something that would serve the purpose. I do not see that it is possible to do yet, but I do say I do not think we have found the correct answer yet.

In my statement here I pointed out the difficulties and dangers which I felt were inherent in the present language. But what did I say? I said I believe this is a matter which we need to study more before we act. I do not exclude the possibility of finding a solution. I just do not think we have found it as yet, Senator Dirksen.

Mr. SMITHEY. I would like to ask the Secretary some questions with relation to the International Labor Organization if I might, That has been much discussed in the hearings.

Again I would like to give him an opportunity to reply to those statements. Has the Department of State participated in the formulation and adoption of any of the ILO conventions?

Secretary DULLES. Not so far as I am aware, since I have been Secretary of State.

Mr. SMITHEY. Does the Department advise the American delegation on whether a proposed convention constitutes a proper subject for international agreement?

Secretary DULLES. If the committee wants to get the more authoritative answers to these very pertinent questions, I would ask leave to substitute at this point my Legal Adviser, Mr. Fhleger, who can give you more authoritative answers than I can myself. Can he take a place here at the table?

Mr. SMITHEY. I would be happy to have him, sir, if it is agreeable with the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. PHLEGER. The International Labor Office really is operating under the Department of Labor, and the Department of Labor will

to study this matter. There is no great urgency. I would like to see a committee, a Bricker committee, if you will, which would have on it representatives of the Judiciary Committee, of the Foreign Relations Committee, perhaps of the House, some leading jurists in the country, give further study to this problem.

I think there is time to do that. The very fact there have been made around this table today a number of new proposals which I never heard before, certainly seems to suggest that the resolutions in their present form do not represent necessarily the final word. If the committee should come up with new and different proposals, I believe that it would be appropriate, given the gravity of this subject, there should be an opportunity to see what those are, what their significance is. I should think you would want to have further expression of views from the Executive if a new and different constitutional proposal is submitted.

Mr. SMITHEY. You are not advocating a government of men rather than of laws?

Secretary DULLES. Advocating a government of men rather than laws?

Mr. SMITHEY. By saying, "Trust in us"?

Secretary DULLES. No. I think I said earlier-if I did not make it clear, I will say it again-I think I did say that perfectly clear, that I do not for one minute come to this committee and say not to take this action because of the personality of the present President of the United States. I think I said that emphatically, and I say it again emphatically.

Mr. SMITHEY. I am not unaware, sir, that you may not consider Mr. Jefferson a very appropriate person from whom to comment, but I have a statement here of Mr. Jefferson which was quoted by John W. Davies, in the steel-seizure case; I would like to have your opinion of it. sir, and see if you agree with it.

In questions of power, let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.

Secretary DULLES. What is your question?
Mr. SMITHEY. Would you agree with that?

Secretary DULLES. I very rarely agree with any statement that is taken out of context. As I said to you today, if you apply that literally, you take away all power from the President, and from the Congress. If you are going on the theory that you can never trust any individuals, then you give them no power. Now certainly that is reductio ad absurdum which I do not think this committee wants to follow. Therefore, you have to put some trust in them. The only way to apply that literally, if you are not willing to trust anybody, is to have a Constitution which says no representative of government shall have any power at all. Then you will not have any abuses.

Mr. SMITHEY. You do not mean to infer that I took it out of context when I quoted?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; not deliberately, but I say if you will take that statement in the whole context of Jefferson's writings, and in his participation in the making of the Constitution, I do not think it leads to the inference which just taken alone might be drawn from it, namely, there should be no delegation of power.

TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator William Langer, chairman, presiding. Present: Senators Langer, Watkins, Hendrickson and Dirksen. Also present: Senator Bricker.

Wayne H. Smithey, subcommittee counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Attorney General, we are delighted to have you with us this morning.

I take it you have a prepared statement.

Mr. BROWNELL. I have, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity of being here.

The CHAIRMAN. You can have all the time you want. Just go ahead and take your own time and tell us your opinion, if you will, about Senator Bricker's resolution and also that introduced by Senator Watkins.

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY J. LEE RANKIN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attorney General BROWNELL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on one premise I am sure we all agree, both the proponents and opponents of the resolutions which are before you for consideration, namely, that our Nation or any nation, cannot maintain itself successfully in the family of nations unless it enjoys fully and coequally the capacity to make and stand by its treaties. The foremost deficiency of our Government under the Articles of Confederation was a weakness in our treatymaking power. It led to the formation of our present Union under a Constitution which committed to the National Government the whole of the treaty power and forbade its exercise by the States.

The Articles of Confederation, it is true, purported to confer upon the Federal Government the exclusive power to make treaties. But there was a qualification that no such treaty should restrain the legislative power of the respective States to impose certain imposts and duties or to prohibit certain exportations or importations. Furthermore, any treaty required the assent of nine States. Article VI provided that no State without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, could "enter into any conference, agreement, alliance