1

To get rid of a hypothetical mouse rized on a case-by-case basis, on

are not negatively, before the vers which every sovereign nation ne. am quite prepared to trust eirs merits and to yield a verdict Curces.

Lee, in support of the resolution, 2. abent the International Labor hey upon misrepresentation and spect the ILO-facts which show

zion, the ILO and its procedures seither necessary nor desirable. y have nothing to fear from the ization whose charter at the onship existing in member states LC Constitution specifically provides seif decide whether a convention gem for federal action" or whether ozon by the constituent states."

gits are not involved, is the possiary, our Federal-State relationships

are self-executing. Even if ratified, sacre enactments by both Houses of are cases would action by the Senate is country—and if, in those few cases, guable, the Senate has in its hands a very ae resent, plus one, can kill a convention entions which this country has ratiy danger that they may be "slipped s mapping. It would be much easier to

is of Social Security, adopted at the last mple of sinister "socialistic" influences her nonsense; the convention makes no procedure on any nation. In the first

matary-any country that doesn't like 1. Secondly, the means by which the conhe free choice of the individual nations American system and practice. Full recogveluntary social-insurance programs as he standard set forth in the convention.

y the convention may do so by endorscurity covered by it. If it does not like ngie, it does not have to adopt it, even if it nat de convention will be judged appropriate , action and will be referred, as a recomse steps they may choose to take, instead of he Senate. And finally, even if it is judged Sate, it is not self-executing, so that legisCass would be necessary to give effect to the

shine # checks, balances, and safeguards already dus id particularly so with respect to the ILO. ve alleged, then it can only be said that

ratified any appreciable number of For we have, in this country, already another, to standards of life and labor templated in the vast majority of the Pin de 20 is primarily an avenue through which efforts of other nations to improve their

or to give full cooperation and support to etect, one way or the other, upon the domestic wwe now enjoy. But it would seriously

y of support, encouragement, and assistance

to other nations in their efforts to elevate and enlarge their own domestic standards, rights, and liberties. We have everything to gain from the successful operation of the ILO and nothing to lose.

And therein lies much of the danger inherent in the philosophy of the proposed resolution, that "domestic issues should not be the subject of international cooperation." Subhuman conditions of life and labor, and the denial of the basic liberties, in other nations are matters of grave concern to us, and we must be free to join in concerted action with other nations to deal with these problems.

For our own standards do not exist in a vacuum, insulated from external forces and pressures. We can never be confident of our ability to maintain them, time of economic stress, in the face of unfair competition from abroad from products turned out by sweated labor, under subhuman conditions of work. Furthermore, we have an interest in the promotion of those higher levels of employment and prosperity which can only come with expanding world markets for our products, and expanding world markets can only come with steady and consistent improvements in the condition of the peoples of other lands.

We have a vital interest in the preservation of world peace and world freedom. Yet we know that neither peace nor freedom can be established on a foundation of world poverty and unrest. Nor can they grow out of conditions where the basic human rights and liberties are denied.

Times and conditions have thrust the role of leadership in the free world upon the United States. In our dealings with other nations we must be able to geak with the authority which should properly go with that responsibility. We should have the same power to engage in international negotiations and dertakings as do other nations; we should not be handicapped where they are

I would not undertake to pass judgment upon the motives and intent behind the posed resolution; I assume they are of the highest and most praiseworthy rler, though misquided in their direction. But when all is said and done, the zendment, if adopted, could have but this effect-to place new impediments, new handicaps, and new delays in the course of our relations with other nations, and to strip ourselves of a portion of that sovereignty which other nations assert fall measure, leaving only a vacuum of irresponsibility in the vacated area. The adoption of the proposed amendment would be interpreted, throughout the rid, as, what it does in fact appear to me to be, a long step backward, toward sationism, and away from a mature acceptance of our national responsibility. The path of leadership is difficult enough without undertaking, through the adoption of this amendment, to negotiate it in a straitjacket of our own creation. Senator DIRKSEN. Is Mr. Mitchell here? Did you want to make statement, or did you want to file a statement?

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to explore it a little, Mr. Chairman. have a statement to submit, but I would like to refer to some passes in it.

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes, sir. Are you here in the city, or do you me from outside?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am in the city.

nator DIRKSEN. Is Mr. Dumbauld here?

Mr. DUMBAULD. Yes, Senator. I have a statement here, and I raid like to return home today if I could file that.

nator DIRKSEN. I believe I met you in Uniontown.

Mr. DUMBAULD. Yes, I recall your very excellent address to our association last year, Senator.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Dumbauld, how long will you take?
Mr. DUMBAULD. I have just six points here.

ator DIRKSEN. I think we can bear with you for a few minThen, if you are going back to Pennsylvania.

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would be equivalent to burning down the house to get ri that does not yet exist. Treaties should be judged or their substance as they are presented to the Senate fact-through any blanket abdication of powers whi requires and should rightfully have. I, for one, an two-thirds of the Senate to judge each treaty on its m compatible with our constitutional rights and liberties

Various witnesses have come before the committee, i with horror stories of one sort or another, about Organization. Their testimony has relied heavily 1 distortion, and has ignored the essential facts about that, far from being a case in support of the resolution provide a good example of why the resolution is neit

The rights of the individual states certainly hav ILO. It is the only major international organiza present time recognizes the federal-state relationsh having a federal type of government. The ILO Con that the government of such nations shall itself is "appropriate under its constitutional system for it is "appropriate, in whole or in part, for action by Only in the former case, where States' rights : bility of ratification considered. Consequently, o are fully protected.

Furthermore, very few ILO conventions are se their implementation would require legislative Congress in the usual manner. Only in rare cas alone give effect to ILO conventions in this count the subject matter happens to be objectionable, the simple remedy. One-third of the Senate present completely. The very small number of conventio fied does not appear to give evidence of any da through" wholesale, while the Senate is nappin slip a camel through the eye of a needle.

The Convention on Minimum Standards of So conference, has been pointed to as an example operating through the ILO. This is sheer no effort to "impose" any rigid pattern or proce place, of course, ratification is wholly volunta the convention does not have to take it. Seco vention would be implemented is up to the fre and are entirely compatible with the America nition is given both State and private volun well as Federal programs, in meeting the sta Third, a member nation wishing to ratify th ing only 3 of the 9 branches of social securit the maternity-benefit aspect, for example, it does elect to ratify.

Furthermore, the chances are that the co' in part for State, rather than Federal, acti mendation, to the States for whatever steps being submitted for ratification by the Sens appropriate for ratification by the Senate, lative action by both Houses of Congress w convention.

I submit that a superabundance of chec exists under our present procedures, and p If the ILO is socialistic, as some have the United States today, without having conventions, is already even more so. F committed ourselves, by one means or a which are well in excess of those cont conventions of the ILO. To us, the ILO we can, without intrusion, support the e own standards and conditions.

Any failure on our part to continue the ILO would have little, if any, effect, standards, rights, and liberties which handicap us in the pursuit of a policy of

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necessary. We should remember, as Chief Justice John Marshall said, it is a Constitution we are dealing with, intended to endure for ages to come. It is not something transient and changeable like an appropriation bill or a revenue act. The Constitution should remain an object of reverence for our citizens, towering above partisan strife and untouched by the controversial issues that come and go which mark every epoch of our history. The Constitution is our fundamental law. It should not be cluttered up with trivialities and excrescences. I think it has been loaded down with too many unnecessary amendments already. We should avoid adding another.

3. The particular provision of the Constitution which is being attacked is one that was adopted unanimously by the Founding Fathers. Experience has demonstrated the necessity of Federal power to ensure compliance by the States with treaty provisions entered into by authority of the United States. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Jay, to name a few leading statesmen of the period, believed that as a matter of law, even under the Articles of Confederation, before adoption of the Constitution, treaty provisions were binding on the individual States. But everyone agreed that an explicit declaration to that effect was necessary and desirable and should be included in the Constitution.

The Continental Congress had on March 21, 1787, adopted resolutions declaring that national treaties "become in virtue of the confederation part of the law of the land and are not only independent of the will and power of such (State) legislatures but also binding and obligatory on them." Accordingly the Congress called upon the States to repeal, by description rather than by enumeration, any and all State laws which conflicted with national treaty obligations. These resolutions, accompanied by the circular letter of April 13, 1787, to the States, followed a comprehensive report of October 13, 1786, by John Jay reviewing State laws claimed by the British as violations of the Treaty of Peace which terminated the Revolution. It was upon such alleged violations, John Adams reported in a letter of March 4, 1786, that Great Britain based its refusal to return the military posts along the Canadian frontier as required by the Treaty of Peace. (Journals of the Continental Congress XXXII, pp. 124–125, 176-184, 781-874.)

As a result of this embarrassment in the conduct of foreign affairs by reason of State legislation, there was strong support in the Constitutional Convention of a proposal to give the Federal Government a general negative or veto on all State laws. Jefferson wrote from Paris to Madison that this proposal went too far: "It fails in an essential character, that the hole and the patch should be commensurate" (Charles Warren, the Making of the Constitution (1928), pp. 168-169, 318; Brant, James Madison (1948), II, pp. 219, 379, 408; Brinton Coxe, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation (1893), pp. 274-292; Jefferson to Madison, June 20, 1787, Works of Jefferson (Federal edition), V, pp. 284–285). Instead of a general veto power which would enable the Federal Government to negative acts of State legislation "in all cases whatsoever," as had been proposed in the Constitutional Convention, Jefferson urged the adoption of a provision extending the Federal judicial power to cases where a treaty or Federal law was controlling. This would be "as effectual a remedy, and exactly commensurate with the defect." So the present provision was adopted, making treaties entered into under the authority of the United States and laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution "the supreme law of the land," applicable in the courts. It was this very provision of the Constitution which gave rise to judicial review as a method of enforcing these obligations, as Jefferson had suggested.

Those who favor abolition of article VI. clause 2, are apparently oblivious of its venerable pedigree. It was not placed in the Constitution by accident, but by design. Our Founding Fathers thought it was important. (Regarding the origin of art. VI, cl. 2, see Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911), I, pp. 21, 162, 245 ; II, pp. 22, 183, 389, 409, 603).

It is true, as proponents of the amendment say, that international law does not oblige us to incorporate treaty obligations automatically as part of our own domestic law. In England the opposite rule prevails. But why at this late date should we ape England in the matter? Rather than regarding it as a defect in our Constitution, should we not take pride in the fact that the United States shows such a high regard for its pledged faith that it gives our international promises the force of internal law? Also, is not judicial review one of our cherished institutions?