on for aerial navigation and as they pleased. This caused perating abroad. Moreover, af quarantine measures has -me countries of the outmoded es to bring the regulations bing on many more countries. of sanitary controls which

hey for the administration of Hand of ships and aircraft which vernments, were anxious to find gron of up-to-date regulations witha might be called to the following Sas Delegation to the International institution of the WHO was formu

tory power of the Organization ent of State and the Public Health a mechanism in the international field on of new scientific techniques in the This was done in pursuance of Relations Committee that some way ng that committee to consider highly at the mechanism incorporated in the most cases, it will only be necessary within the scope of the executive requirements of international health Government can reserve its position

deed, therefore, there were included in the 21 and 22) drafted so as to provide a po přection of international regulations which barn. Seids. Thus, article 21 of the constitu2 assembly shall have authority to adopt tary and quarantine requirements and the international spread of disease. Ac1ch the assembly may adopt shall enter into POLLIS, ON Except those as may notify the Director ons within the period stated in the notice miccon of the regulations.

WHO in its constitution to adopt regulations at de Congress when it was considering United ed Niealth Organization. In the report, submitted

the Committee on Foreign Relations to the Cong., 1st sess.), it is stated that "The health La eus concerning sanitary quarantine requirements car nooded in conventions and could be changed only ***** ** ** The adoption of such regulations and wes majority vote of the health assembly. This cd has been granted to other international organizahas the International Civil Aviation Organization. reject such regulations and standards and their them into effect. The committee recognizes the y in the provisions of the constitution which heath assembly." It might be pointed out that the The limitation of the WHO's regulatory authorsuch as sanitary and quarantine requirements, ber government to reject the regulations which shopt or to make reservations with respect to such

ee on Foreign Affairs (No. 979, 80th Cong., 1st sess.) Actes, which was presented by Congressman Judd, The United States of membership in the WHO refers expected to be derived from the Organization's power to

sease at epidemic centers abroad will give the United en against incursion of disease.

The United States and United States ships at sea will receive a more constant of reliable epidemiological information of use in quarantine procedures and alable to commerce.

The hazard of importation of disease and disease vectors by air carriers will be reduced, or eliminated, through improved controls at foreign origins of

Unsound and unecessary foreign quarantine impediments to United States mmerce and interference with free movement of United States air carriers will be eliminated by the establishment of common international regulations, Conforming at all times with technical developments and the progressive removal of health hazards."

In the spirit of, and in fulfillment of the purposes outlined above, the WHO Edertook to develop a single set of international quarantine or sanitary regulatons to replace the existing international sanitary conventions. The interna*tal sanitary regulations were in preparation over a period of 5 years. During *hat time, not only were the regulations considered at periodic and open meetings of the constituent bodies of the Organization, in which the United States parteipated officially, but each member government was invited to make known its news concerning the regulations during different stages of their development. For example, the original draft regulations, as prepared by the WHO Expert mittee on Epidemiology and Quarantine, were received by the Department of State and the United States Public Health Service in April 1950. They were died by an interdepartmental committee called together by the Department of State, on which nine different Government departments and agencies were represeated. As a consequence of this study, several changes in the draft regulations were recommended in the communication which the Department of State on September 6, 1950, sent to the WHO as the observations of the United States Government. Revised draft regulations were similarly circulated and studied advance of a meeting of a special committee which was convened in Geneva April 1951 to prepare a final draft. Private aviation and shipping companies were at this stage given an opportunity to study and make recommendations cerning the draft regulations. The United States was officially represented at this meeting, and at the Fourth World Health Assembly, which on May 25, 1951, adopted the regulations.

After the adoption of the regulations by the Health Assembly by a unanimous rote of the representatives of the state members of the WHO on May 25, 1951, each government had an opportunity during a period of 9 months to review the regulations for the purpose of determining their acceptability to that government of the United States on June 15, 1951, and were reviewed by all the Government departments and agencies concerned, as well as by private shipping and aviaa interests with a view to deciding whether any reservations should be made. The WHO was notified by the Secretary of State on behalf of this Governzent on March 10, 1952, that the United States would make no reservations. On October 1, 1952, the regulations came into force for 55 countries which had Tade no reservations and for 5 countries which had made certain reservations. might be pointed out that these reservations were all aimed at allowing bese countries to apply stricter quarantine measures, in one field or another, than are permitted by the regulations.

It can thus be seen that the WHO, in adopting the new regulations, did exactly what it was authorized to do by its constitution and what it was expected to do by the United States Government. On the basis of the above record it should e quite clear that at no stage of the development, consideration, or acceptance these regulations was there any bypassing of the Government of the United Yates or of the interested agencies thereof. Also, in view of the numerous reews which these regulations received from the interested government and tommercial groups, any inference that these regulations were sprung on an unsting government by the WHO, with the connivance of the Public Health ice, is completely unwarranted.

It might also be pointed out that during this period the United States deleons to the meetings of the Health Assembly, at which progress in the dePeoplent of the regulations was discussed, included Members of Congress (in 148 Congressman Fenton; in 1949 Senator Ellender and Congressman Pfeifer; ± 150, Congressman Judd; and in 1951 (when the regulations were adopted), tators Lehman and Nixon and Congressman Morgan and Angell).

In adopting the regulations under discussion, the state members of the WHO ed to give to each country observing the regulations the maximum security gainst the international transmission of epidemic disease with the minimum

This weakness is especially obvious in the discussion of the WHO's alleged invasion of national sovereignty. An effort is made to show that Congress approved such minor invasion as has occurred and that adequate safeguards exist to prevent major invasion in the future.

The fact that Congress was bypassed in the present instance and could be again is never challenged. The State Department memorandum does make the very weak contention (p. 2) that a "suggestion" had been made in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that "some way" be found to delegate authority over "specialized technical matters" and that the WHO constitution was drafted with this in mind. The purpose, it is asserted, was to "create a mechanism in the international field which would permit rapid general application of new scientific techniques in the international control of the spread of disease." This very statement of purpose serves to confirm the misgivings of those who see dangers in the WHO program. Is it wise to place such an area of activity in the hands of the administrative branch of the Government, out of the effective supervision of Congress?

A stronger contention is that Congress was aware of the delegation of power it made to WHO in 1948 when the WHO constitution was approved. As evidence, a report by Senator Vandenberg on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is cited (p. 3). However, if the quoted excerpt is an accurate reflection of its contents, the report can well serve to prove the opposite; that Congress was not adequately alerted to the decision it was making.

The report as quoted minimizes the wide range of WHO authority and suggests that a mere streamlining of treatymaking procedure is involved. It says, dealing with a highly important point:

"Fach government will be free to reject such regulations and standards and their consent is not necessary to bring them into effect for governments which have not rejected or made reservations to them."

It would have presented the actual situation much more clearly had it said, "Each government will be free to reject such regulations and standards, but their assent is not necessary to bring them into effect. * * *” The report appears less than candid at some points and actually misleading. At best it was clumsily

drafted.

To cite another example, the following statement from the report evidently is

unsound:

"This power is similar to that which has been granted to other international organisations in technical fields, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization."

At least it has been refuted by the office of the Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs who reports that no specialized agency of the United Nations except the World Health Organization has this power.

The Vandenberg report says: "The committee recognizes the safeguards to national sovereignty in the provisions of the constitution which confer these powers on the health assembly." The State Department memorandum spells out the safeguards (p. 3), but they are something less than reassuring. The phrase "sanitary and quarantine requirements" could be indeed already has beeninterpreted to cover a very broad field; and "the right of any member government to reject the regulations which the health assembly may adopt" is not very persuasive if Congress is not notified when a regulation is adopted.

If the Monitor article and editorial have alerted Congress to the need of making certain it is notified, they have served a useful purpose.

The State Department memorandum repeatedly points to the close cooperation of the State Department, the Public Health Service, and WHO, as if this were a reassuring state of affairs, Actually, of course, this is precisely the state of affairs which has caused concern. The danger has been that the Public Health Service would seek to accomplish through WHO what it could not accomplish through Congress,

Of course, it is possible for men of good faith to place widely varying interpretations on the same set of facts. It is not surprising that the medical fraternity should look upon the WHO sanitary regulations as innocent and constructive. It is not surprising that men in whose hands power is placed should see no danger that it will be abused.

The result in the present instance is that the State Department criticism does not constitute a successful rebuttal of the article or editorial. Actually, the very interpretations it employs in support of the desirability and legality of the WHO procedures may serve to further stress the fact that Americans should "Stop, Look, and Question."

Senator DIRKSEN. Now that we have those in the record, have you any other comment to make?

Mr. WATT. No. I have been very, very interested in the hearings. I have been able to be here throughout and I have been impressed with the testimony that has been given. We sincerely hope that from this will come a very splendid amendment to the Constitution.

Senator DIRKSEN. Thank you for your expression of interest.

1- Mr. Will Maslow, of the American Jewish Congress, here? Mr. Maslow, will you come forward?

STATEMENT OF WILL MASLOW, GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

Senator DIRKSEN. Would you like to read your statement, Mr. Maslow, or submit it and comment upon it?

Mr. MASLOW. With your leave, sir, I would like to have it introduced. in the record, and comment briefly on it.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is fine, sir. That will be done at this point. The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS IN OPPOSITION TO THE BRICKER RESOLUTION (S. J. RES. 1) TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LIMIT THE TREATY-MAKING POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES

The American Jewish Congress is a national organization representing about 0000 American Jews. It was founded in 1918 by such American Jewish ders as Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, Judge Mack and the late Rabbi Septen S. Wise for the purpose of preserving Jewish values and maintaining and extending the democratic way of life.

The American Jewish Congress is vitally concerned with the proposed contutional amendment embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 1, limiting the cometency of the United States to enter into treaties and international agreeZests. We share its sponsors' desire to safeguard our precious democratic fdoms from encroachment by any body, foreign or domestic, national or erational. However, it is our view that the Constitution of the United States provides today, as it has for 160 years, ample protection from such croachment. We fear that the proposed constitutional amendment by disaring the United States from participating in various instrumentalities of world peration may well, under the guise of protecting our cherished rights, be *ing their doom. These rights cannot survive either successful armed aggres»,. against our territorial borders or a prolonged state of military emergency in h we find ourselves a lone outpost in a world engulfed by communism. Ctive defense based on treaties of international cooperation with the other tons of the free world provides, in the last analysis, the only true protection ** our own precious rights.

Moreover, the American Jewish Congress feels that the proposed amendment, * miting the power of our Government to enter into such agreements as the seant on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention designed to insure al standards of human rights throughout the world, will prevent us from ling the obligations we have already assumed under the United Nations I. Articles 55 and 56 of that charter pledge all members to “take joint and -rate action in cooperation with the [United Nations] for the achievement

universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda¤-stal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Its our firm conviction that the United States has thus assumed a moral and responsibility to insure that other peoples enjoy the same rights and redoms that we have so zealously protected in our own country. We believe ** we must honor this responsibility not only because failure on our part to do forfeit our claim to leadership of the free world but also because only in atosphere of "universal respect for an observance of human rights and damental freedoms” can our own rights and freedoms be safeguarded and

eat wavieron the World Jewish Congress of which the American sa onsalient part has prepared and transmitted a series of e various preparatory bodies set up by the United Nations to weer (@Convection, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the gal Rights In the interest of the United States as well as Apierici Zew sà Congress opposes all attempts to disable our counBone name pation in international efforts to insure that what has y a few nations will become a standard of conduct for all. hat the present impetus for an amendment limiting the rea 2 sower arises to a large extent out of grave misconceptions (onisetrovnal uitations on that power; an entirely unmerited

de Sevara and President of the United States and existing vostres governing the exercise of that power; and a misundernovisions of recent international proposals to safeguard karo a la yung the individual sections of Senate Joint Resoluwe dould like to take up these misconceptions as we under

he trea'y power is not limited in any way by the Constitution is power the President and Senate could cripple or destroy es undermine its basic constitutional structure, and abridge he Bi" of Rights. This is not the case. Although the Suhas never held a treaty to be unconstitutional, this has not been redly nower is above the Constitution but solely because no treaty ~ vinarvadi agreement to which the United States has been a party unds grasanteed by the Constitution to individuals. The courts voca a. 2 cðipà isi ́ed that a treaty may not offend specific prohibitions of he classic statement being that in the case of Geofroy v. Riggs 267 47890)).

cacy wwer, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited exPOR TENER(Ps which are found in that instrument against the action of or of ts departments, and these arising from the nature of the ted and that of the States. It would not be contended that it exLo awhorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the Ac Gocerument or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any errstory of the latter, without its consent (Fort Leavenworth Railnice, Pat. §. 323, 341). * * [Emphasis supplied.]

sose of Missouri v. Holland (252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920)) the Supreme though ruling that a treaty and legislation pursuant thereto overrides ows was careful to point out that treaties could not contravene specific Sous of the Constitution. The Court in that case stated "We do not mean

hat there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power ***" The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be he Constitution” (see also U. S. v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 208 (1926); City of Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924); The Cherokee Tobacco, WNY 6'6 620-21 (1870)).

ght of these Supreme Court pronouncements the fact that article The Constitution declares laws made "in pursuance" of the Constitution vices made “under the authority of the United States" to be the supreme how of the land, does not imply that treaties are above the Constiuion. The i recelice in phraseology resulted solely from the fact that the framers wanted The supremacy clause to apply not only to treaties made in the future under The Coast Dtion but also to treaties which had already been made under the A clow of Confederation. Certainly no implication can be drawn from this Plac varios are not subject to constitutional limitations.

Vorher argument advanced in support of the proposition that treaties can bridge our basic liberties without constitutional recourse is based on the fact that Pe #st amendment, unlike the rest of the Bill of Rights, refers only to Congress. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

However, the courts have assumed that the amendment applies to actions by all branches of the Federal Government impairing freedom of speech, press, or religion or the rights of assembly or petition. (See e. g.; Watson v. Jones, 14 Wal. 679) Specifically the amendment has been thought to limit the actions of the President (Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 135136, 13, 199 200 (1951); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d, 46, 59-60, 71-74, (D. C. Cir. 1950)). Treaties being the result of Presidential action in conjunc