insurance policy. They en These Senators are very gs last year he never would satte had had time to read them. scritional shield so that when there ere right, my widow's lawyers articular provision of this treaty rosion of the United States Conmade. It is merely a shield so that macminal treaty works just the same. They when there is fine print that affects ti we have a provision in the Constison to say that provision is ineffective w seu in the Constitution. sveiking now more of section 1? La speaking along the same line that waeres nothing in section 3 that incorporates ecause the Congress is limited. In section d in that sense they get a second look Chewn gets to negotiate a treaty, the Parliament Cada, which is a real illustration with us, Socers. Government. When Canada negotiates a fete rights of a single Canadian citizen until slation. Super Bricker in this, as I understand it, is that ne dass in this country that Canada is on. take the Senate. How is the Constitution? Have a treaty by the Executive and have it impleor Houses. That will be the parallel. sedbe if you would be willing to do that either. seeds some implementation, Mr. Pearson, as to that is only as to its internal effects. The treaty be Executive and Senate as in the past so far as they 6. Yes, but the parallel is there if you want to get it, Pase be Senate vote twice. I do not know that there is any e world that provides, to be facetious, for legislative stut Pres. Under section 3 there are, of course, three possiorst of all, a treaty or treaties that are always self-executna wou'd be one. Then secondly, treaties that would never wo executing under limitations of section 3. You see a middle vand, nevey, a treaty that contains within its own terms a requireseran implementation. 1 hought you referred to that. Did you not say that the Execuveyore a treaty is consummated, might well insist that there be a Con to that effect so that you leave it right at that point? Is that PARSON. That is right. You could provide in any particular way at it was not to be self-executing. You could write in the the same words in section 3. Senator DIRKSEN. It is that ground on which you rest, that you d prefer to follow that course, namely, leave the constitutional vision as it is and then depend on the Executive in every case where re are rights involved to insist that a clause be inserted to the 5t that it is not self-executing? Mr. PEARSON. The Executive or the Senate by reservation, and I eve it is generally agreed that there is no doubt about the power of Senate to produce that effect as it can other reservations by propriate reservation. Mr. HOLMAN. May I disagree with that position? We disagree that. We disagree with that because that was the rule that operrai when you had bilateral treaties between nations under dispute. 5 in these multipartite agreements when you get, as in genocide, 23 tons ratified, the United Nations has taken the definite position at the United States cannot impose any reservation on that treaty ause it cannot change the terms of that treaty as to the 23 nations at have ratified. So the rule you are invoking is an old rule and outdated rule. Senator DIRKSEN. I want to pursue the matter just a little further. When you speak of legislative stuttering, what you mean there is that "e appropriate legislative authority acts twice on the same subject Zitter? Mr. PEARSON. That is right. Senator DIRKSEN. I want to examine that a little bit for this reason: bless you have familiarity with all these conventions that show in the international field. Mr. PEARSON. I do not purport to have read them. Serator DIRKSEN. You are familiar with the fact that they are done ften in very, very general language. I think as a practical matter we are confronted with this situation: Here is an international body wich we are a signatory operating under a charter and broken down o many groups and commissions that are working furiously to get gs on paper for submission, whether the figure is right or wrong; at some 200 or more of these so-called conventions are prepared or Process of preparation, I do not know. But this fact remains, those wing carpentered together by people who have never submitted the electorate of the country to be elected to public office. They h them in very general terms and in those terms they come to one ch of the legislative authority of this country, the Senate. Manifestly it is so difficult to spell out ofttimes all of the implications -vis the pressures that are involved in modern-day life. That was reason among others why I am one of those individuals who fed to assent to the Japanese treaty. There were so many things - I could not spell out and I simply refused to take it on faith. I must say for the record that I talked to some of my senatorial ges at the time. I said, "What are you going to do about the These Treaty?" They said, "We are going to vote for it." I said, Are you familiar with it and have you read the testimony?" "No, -ven't had time to read the testimony, but we are going to accept ause maybe it is the thing to do and then there are things in this 1 you have to accept on faith." Now you see, I am remarking upon practical legislative existence and the physical impossibility of taking all that is there. 72-5315 hings can be deputized. Beyond that sponsibility of a person who has been surge of the voters in his State to envision in every case everything and cloaked by that general lanand it is spelled out in the form then come back to the legislative that would be the more secure process s of the people of this country? comments. Of course in a number at perhaps not so much so now but Son was substantially the same as the practical difficulties of a legislator in very sympathetic, would apply equally treaty is pending. It is true you get essentially the same problem. probably the generalities are spelled hout doing violence to the treaty language. pements the particular clause and has a tion, Mr. Pearson, is to leave that in the determine whether or not a self-executing be inserted in the treaty and then leave the and as is! the executive in negotiating the treaty and the anting to it, the reservation could be made to the problems that were mentioned here we put an "if" on it or "provided" and have signed it do not have any such thing. As tion, that amounts to a counteroffer on our simple contract law, and then it is up to de whether they will take our reservation or all around. If they do not, it is not a deal. me point out what I think is the practical wholly in the field of philosophy, I think, umber of countries have subscribed to a conIt contains no self-executing clause and comes You mean it contains no clause preventing self That is right. So it comes to the floor of the makes a suggestion, maybe it might come from themselves, that that ought to be interposed. ow the force of the argument on the floor of the you should not make that change, you should not So for many reasons. First, other countries have wd you give evidence of bad faith with other mazing to me and I think Senator Smith will bear ake that can be when it is said to you, "Look, we ework our will on this document. We have not got days to discuss it. The clock is running out on the You have to consider the practical aspects of this matter as well as Ly other when you are dealing with this question of legislative im pementation. Mr. PEARSON. Then I think I would say this is my second answer to the question, that if for practical or any other reasons, and I agree th you that the problems in this are practical problems, what is the t way to run a railroad, that is about it. If for practical reasons is so important to be able to pass treaties without really considerthem and to reserve the question of local effect for legislative ation, then I should think the proposal should be in the form that ether do not have the Senate act at all in the first instance, which Tould be like the situation in England or some other place, or else *provide that the treaty shall be approved by both Houses and that ey have the power to implement it as local legislation if that is erdied. In other words, it would seem to me to not only fail to bring us up parity with the rest of the world, because we already have it, but would put us in a much worse position than anybody else in dealing ith foreign nations. One friend of mine went so far as to say that he thought we would a laughing stock if we wrote into our Constitution a bumbling achine, once by the President, once by two-thirds of the Senate, once a majority of the Senate and once by a majority of the House. The ast two steps being done all over again with not necessarily the same. Sment. If it is really so essential to avoid any self-executing Teaties, which I do not see, it seems to me the last way in the world to do it. I think it is perhaps more than just a criticism of the form t. It brings us back to the basic problem that we have the divided ers in our Government under which one of our legislative bodies ats on a treaty before it is a treaty at all. That is the basic difference. If you seek that, then naturally you have to have different arrangeets later on. Senator DIRKSEN. I do not believe that is the nub of the problem e. The nub of the problem is what I evaluate to be a growing ded on the part of the American people that their rights not be ardized by people clustered around the mahogany tables of an ernational organization who are not subject to the electorate who t take those rights down the river. Do you not believe that is sue that is involved here? Mr. PEARSON. It is hard for me to phrase it that way because rights er such an awful lot of things. I was thinking awhile ago of one fe questions here. Rights, are we speaking of personal rights, the As the Secretary spoke of when he meant freedoms, or are we King of rights to run automobiles around a Newfoundland base not have our boys in the local courts, and so forth? There are arts of rights and some of them, if you want to get a right out mebody else, you have to give up a right of our own. You have watch how broad a word you use in making any such blanket bition because you might lay an awful example sometime when :want to do one of those. Lator DIRKSEN. There is a pencil that symbolizes the right to expression under the Constitution of the United States, so long you respect the rights of the other fellow and do not lie about him under the libel laws. Take for instance the pubilicity code from time to time. The estimate of what constitutes the right of people to speak freely and the right to speak freely in the other countries is quite different from our own countries. Mr. PEARSON. That is right. Senator DIRKSEN. Shall we let them impress those things upor America and abridge those rights? Mr. PEARSON. I would not want to. Senator DIRKSEN. There might be some danger, however, in it. Senator DIRKSEN. Not any danger I might not vote down but the dangers of interpretation, the dangers of application, and the dangers of surrendering a little something just to get them to go along with an international concept and then suddenly discover we have tied our hands in that field. Mr. PEARSON. That is right. Senator DIRKSEN. I want to be on the secure end of the bargain for my country where these rights are involved. Mr. PEARSON. I have tried to meet your question, sir, as best understood it. Senator DIRKSEN. I understand. The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you this question: When we adopted the United Nations Charter it was debated week after week, you know A great many Senators were not at San Francisco and we were assured both by the leader of the Republican Party and the leader of the Democratic Party who represented us there, we were not surrendering any sovereignty at all. The question was asked not once, if you wil read the record, but time and again, what about the power to declare war? Can the United Nations take our boys and send them anywher in the world or can't they? We were assured they could not. Ye we find our boys over in Korea, not by any action taken by the Congress at all. We were relying on the Constitution that the Chief Executive could not declare war, he had no power under the Constitution, it had to be declared by Congress. What do you say as to that? Do you think the President ought to have a right to send our boys over to Korea without submitting that question to the Congress? Mr. PEARSON. That is a very hard question. At the time that was done I think it is fair to say that it was widely supported. Now, with the benefit of what has happened, certainly a number of people fee as you do that it was a great mistake. The CHAIRMAN. Whom was it supported by? Was it supported by Congress? Mr. PEARSON. I do not think that that power or, as you say, lack of it, would be affected by this. We have section 4 here that deal with Executive agreements, but I do not think there is anything in this resolution that really deals with that problem. If you assumed that President Truman did have the power under the Constitution and you do not want him or any other President to have it, then I think it would take a different amendment to the Constitution than this to prevent it. Of course, if you say President Truman acted un constitutionally, that is another question. |