Mr. Chairn tee's conside. 57, which I . you will sul

I have be duced Hous tion 57 in follows:

"Treatie

agreement United St subordina teed to e

In reat objection istration that Ser interfer

further My states. clause. and a with States

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out express authority from Conthe courts are bound to recognize aw of the land."

right to annul or disregard provieneral convenience, or substantial

made a treaty is the supreme law and in respect of which no authority dicial tribunal."

treaty, assuming it to be made conand form, has the effect of repealing whether unwritten, as law of nations is acts of Congress."

it as a treaty ratified by the United is a part of the supreme law of the ted States (D. C. Cal., 1950, 90 F.

stands on the same footing of supreme United States."

ard to the supreme law of the land proSupreme law of the land unless they shall institution. But a treaty is the supreme authority of the United States; that is, ier authorized officer or agent of the ale. Since the people are assumed to have ir duly elected officials in a treaty which ng the subject must conform to the ad a good and sufficient reason to make the → land and consequently a matter of honor phold. They did not envision the United n the many and complex treaties, compacts, en we have become party to in recent years which could threaten our civil rights and the he United States Constitution and our Bill

portance of the "supreme law of the land" new Americans realize that within this one Great to their civil rights, to their individual

on which I propose is simple in form, direct, purpose alone-to protect the rights and freeitizen as guaranteed under the Constitution Odgment, abrogation, nullification, subordina

spite of the supreme-law-of-the-land para

se with the present treatymaking procedure as It will not raise questions as to whether a oubts as to its validity when ratified. It will aoie treaties. It will not hamper the President ers or agencies of the United States from conI not have any effect upon our participation ae United Nations.

national agreements and treaties to which the ee within the United Nations or with individual aht be included which could be construed as edoms as guaranteed under the Constitution woad, therefore, have no effect. All other parts vadi agreement would be valid and would become. od, rightfully binding as a legitimate contract

Letean citizen takes great pride in the United Metal basic law of this great Nation. I have winds of people come to the Congressional Library here eat reverence as they look upon the original Aquarantees our liberties and freedoms, of the press, by jury, of the right to peaceable assembly and to

petition the Government for redress of grievances, and protect us against excessive bail or excessive fine or cruel or unusual punishment for crimes committed. I am also aware of the fact that too few American people realize that the United States Constitution must be protected or the liberties and freedoms we enjoy because of it may be lost.

Our Constitution is the best plan ever made to assure freedom and to release the creative powers of men. It guarantees all the freedoms. Its guarantees of life, liberty, and property made possible the American way of life. They stimulated more new enterprise and invention and gave us in this country a higher standard of living, better housing, more food, and greater freedom in our civil, religious, and personal lives than any other people in history have enjoyed.

I have proposed this amendment to the Constitution which will assure that these rights and freedoms shall continue to bring their blessings to the people of the United States and to the world.

Hon. WILLIAM LANGER,

United States Senate.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 30, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR LANGER: It occurred to me that in the consideration by your committee of the bill making changes with regard to the matter of executive agreements, which are now so often used in place of treaties, it might be useful to say a word as to the attitude of the State Department in the matter during the years I was there, particularly under Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson.

I entered the Department when Wilson was still President and therefore served under Lansing and Colby. But there is very little I can say about those days since I was learning myself and only held the position of Assistant Chief and later Chief of the Western European Division. I had very little to do at that time with treaties and of course during the whole time I was in the Department, ending with the inauguration of Roosevelt, I had only to consider legal matters, which were handled in the Solicitor's Office, from the political and sometimes economic point of view. What Lansing thought about such agreements I do not know but believe from what I knew of him that he would have taken a very legalistic point of view and would have realized that no attempt must be made to get around the Senate. Colby was all for hurrying things along and probably did not look into the question at all.

With the advent of Hughes, we had a great lawyer at the head of the Department. I worked very closely with him in getting the agreement with Germany, which seemed necessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the Senate would not consent to the ratification of the Versailles Treaty. The Secretary studied the matter with the utmost care, and when he had decided that the best thing to do was to come to an agreement with Germany which would enable us to carry on relations without any formal peace treaty, he fully understood that this agreement would go to the Senate for ratification. I remember his saying that in any important matters, especially affecting the future of this country, it was obvious that ratification must be made, that the people must be able to read the agreements in their final form as treaties. He had no desire to bypass the Senate. Nevertheless, as I remember, he felt that occasional executive agreements on comparatively minor matters might be a very useful thing, as saving time and thereby expediting the work of the Department of State. It would never have occurred to him to substitute executive agreements for treaties.

When Kellogg became Secretary he came to the Department from the Senate and felt strongly that no attempt should be made to bypass the Senate. I often discussed the matter with him as we walked down to the Department every morn. ing, and know his ideas in the matter. He felt, with Mr. Hughes, that there might be many instances where a treaty was not necessary, but he would have leaned over backward to include the Senate and therefore the people of the United States in any agreement binding this country for a period of time. I do not remember any particular executive agreement made during his administration of the Department. His Pact on the Renunciation of War was of course submitted to the Senate for its consent to ratification. Kellogg always had as Under Secretary men who were lawyers, and everything that was done at the time was scrutinized carefully to be certain that there was no stretching of the laws which might conflict with the Constitution.

Stimson took a somewhat different attitude. He had less respect for the Congress than had either Mr. Hughes or Mr. Kellogg, but he knew that Hoover would

never agree to anything which infringed on the meaning of the Constitution and, so far as I remember, made no executive agreements covering a long period of time, although I have often heard him say that it was a nuisance to have to submit such agreements to the Senate.

In general, I may say that the Department of State, during the time I was there, recognized the necessity of executive agreements, in matters of comparative unimportance or in matters covering only an immediate issue, whereas it would not countenance the substitution of such agreements for treaties, which must be public property and must have the consent of the Senate to ratification. The Department recognized, I believe, that without this proviso there might be a real danger of proceeding according to what one individual believed to be right and ignoring the wishes of the people of the United States. In other words, we knew the great value of Senate consent to ratification. Under no circumstances would such agreements as those made at Yalta have been passed by the Department of State as valid documents in the conduct of foreign relations unless they had been phrased as treaties and received the assent of the Senate for ratification. Yours very truly,

WILLIAM R. CASTLE.

THE BRICKER RESOLUTION RESTRICTING CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN

RELATIONS

Statement of the Subcommittee on Juridical Institutions-The Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington 5, D. C.

Certain amendments to the United States Constitution proposed by Senator Bricker (Senate Joint Resolution 1) seek to limit the treatymaking power vested in the President and Senate and to limit the executive-agreement power of the President. The fundamental moral principle involved is that of public faith necessary to the conduct of all national and international relations. The proposed amendments would seriously undermine public faith in actions of the United States Government. Nothing is more necessary to the achievement of peaceful, fruitful relations among men and nations than good faith. Good faith among civilized nations means that pledges given or received can be trusted. The stated purposes of such amendments are primarily (1) to prevent the powers delegated by the United States Constitution to the Federal Government from being curtailed by or transferred to any international or supranational authority, (2) to prevent the powers reserved by that Constitution to the States from being similarly abrogated or modified and (3) to prevent "the fundamental civil or political rights of citizens of the United States" from being similarly affected.

The juridical institutions subcommittee feels that these limitations would make United States participation in any program of enforceable disarmament through international control of atomic weapons and other forms of atomic energy virtually impossible, inasmuch as any such program would of necessity call for some form of international supervision of all atomic energy and would therefore be prohibited by the terms of section 2 of the Bricker resolution.

We maintain not only that such amendments would seriously handicap the future development of the United Nations, but that they would prevent or hamper the development and codification of international law. If they had been in force earlier they would probably have made impossible the approval or ratification of many necessary and useful treaties or conventions already adopted.

Not only would they actually impair the sovereignty of the United States in its nation-to-nation dealings; they would imply acceptance of the false assumption that an individual state has no obligation to world society. Moral law requires that states establish and accept such international law as is necessary for the achievement of the international common good. Progress in the formulation of international law has been made primarily through international treaty. Even if the present treaty bases for international law are so attacked and crippled, no sound structure of international law and order can be developed.

Furthermore, such amendments would handicap the United States at a time when speedy action in the field of cooperative military action may be necessary to guarantee its safety and that of the free world in the face of threatened Communist aggression.

Section 2 of the Bricker resolution is so loosely and vaguely worded that it is bound to cause conflicting and confusing interpretations which might alter

our traditional constitutional system. Sections 3, 4, and 5 with reference to the subjection of United States foreign relations (including executive or other agreements) to “appropriate legislation" would bring control of the Executive's function completely under Congress and would immediately make foreign policy a matter of partisan politics. It would, for instance, permit Congress to pass further restrictive legislation allowing executive agreements to expire at the end of every Executive's term.

There is no present threat to the constitutional liberties of United States citizens which renders the amendments necessary or desirable. The President and the Senate, which now ratifies all treaties by a two-thirds vote, can be relied upon to see that the treaty powers are prudently and wisely exercised, and to protect the freedom and interests of United States citizens in the future as in the past.

However praiseworthy may be the motives of the proponents and however important may be the principles they seek to reassert, nevertheless, the adoption of any such amendments would prejudice the domestic security and foreign relations of the United States.

This subcommittee is therefore opposed to the adoption of the Bricker resolution because it would place unnecessary restrictions upon the United States Government. It urges furthermore that this attempt be repudiated in the interests of the United States and its citizens in a just world order based on the development of true international law and procedure and on the maintenance of public faith.

DEL MAR, CALIF., April 6, 1953.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,

United States Capitol, Washington, D. C.:

La Jolla unit of Pro-America believing a government of law is safer than a Government of men urges the ratification of Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 to protect our Constitution and Bill of Rights for all future times.

Mrs. M. R. FRANCIS, Chairman.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY NATIONAL COTTON COMPRESS AND COTTON WAREHOUSE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING AT NEW ORLEANS, APRIL 14, 1953 Whereas our priceless heritage of individual freedom is guaranteed only by constitutional limitations on the powers of our Federal Government;

Whereas the Constitution of the United States provides that international treaties, negotiated by the executive branch of our Federal Government and ratified by the Senate, are the supreme law of the land, overriding and countermanding not only laws enacted by the Congress but also the very terms of the Constitution itself; and

Whereas international treaties are now being prepared or proposed, such as the United Nations Covenant on Human Rights, which, by reason of their terms and the above-mentioned provision of our Constitution, would undermine and destroy the very concept of our individual freedoms which otherwise are guaranteed to the people of the United States under the Constitution: It is hereby Resolved, That Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 of the 83d Congress, as sponsored by two-thirds of the membership of the Senate, should be promptly adopted by the Congress in order that the several States may have the earliest possible opportunity to adopt the constitutional amendment proposed therein, which would subordinate all treaties to our Federal Constitution, and invalidate any treaty which would abridge or deny, or which is in any way inconsistent with, the full and complete protection of the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by or under that Constitution.

APRIL 9, 1953.

Hon. JOHN M. BUTLER,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: During the course of my appearance before the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee yesterday, I stated that in my opinion the authority of the United States Congress to enact legislation controlling the growth of opium popies depended upon the treatymaking powers and the fact

that a treaty actually had been executed by the United States relating to this subject.

You asked me for the citation of the case in which this proposition was established. I believe, in fact, you asked me specifically with reference to the case of Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics. I stated that the citation was in the memoranda attached to my statement.

I find that the case referred to is Stutz et al. v. Bureau of Narcotics of Depart ment of Treasury of United States et al. (56 F. Supp. 810), a decision by a three-judge court.

You will find this case bases the constitutionality of the Opium Poppy Control Act exclusively on the treatymaking power.

Since my testimony yesterday, I have read an article on page 778 of the American Bar Association Journal for September 1952, written by Richard Young, editor in charge, dealing with this subject of narcotics control by international agreement. This article concludes by saying: "But it seems clear that they [steps to pass proposed amendments to the Constitution] should not be taken in ignorance of the impact they may have on international arrangements, the benefits of which are not always well known or fully appreciated." It was for the purpose of bringing to the committee's attention the possible impact that the Treasury presented its testimony yesterday.

Respectfully yours,

ELBERT P. TUTTLE, General Counsel.

MEMORANDUM ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1, 83D CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

(Prepared by Dr. Salo Engel, the University of Tennessee)

Subject to the following observations I agree with the statement of the New York City Bar Association in opposition to Senate Joint Resolution 1, 83d Congress, 1st session.

Section 1 of the resolution

1. Under the terms of this section "a provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." Is such a provision to be considered without force or effect both internationally and nationally or is it to be invalid only nationally but valid internationally? According to section 3 of the resolution “a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by Congress." In the absence of such legislation a treaty is therefore effective only internationally but not nationally. Hence, the words "without force or effect" in section 1 probably mean ineffective even internationally since the internal effect depends in any case upon enabling legislation. Accordingly, treaty provisions which deny or abridge constitutional rights do not bind the United States even internationally. Whether a treaty containing such provisions would, therefore, be entirely ineffective or partially effective and partially not would probably depend upon the relative importance of the provisions in question. The resulting inconveniences, to say the least, are obvious in view of the dominant international law doctrine according to which the nonobservance of national constitutional limitations affects the international validity of a treaty. 2. Section 1 does not specify whose rights may not be denied or abridged by treaties. Is this to protect only the rights of United States citizens as expressly stated in section 2 of the resolution or any rights granted by the Constitution to whoever may be concerned? If only the former are to be protected, the latter, by argumentum a contrario, could be interfered with by treaties. This the sponsors of the resolution hardly intended. If, on the contrary, section 1 is interpreted literally and any treaty provision denying any right enumerated in the Constitution is without force, it seems doubtful whether such an attempt to freeze the Constitution from an international angle will prove more effecive than similar efforts undertaken in the internal sphere. In view of the evergrowing interdependence of nations the experience of a "living" constitution is likely to be repeated internationally.

Moreover, section 1 thus interpreted would constitute a radical departure from the original constitutional system and the practice thereunder. According to article 6, section 2, of the Constitution, the latter, Federal legislation and