5

(2) strongly urges the Arab League to agree and pass a resolution at their next meeting to sup

port and accept United Nations peacekeepers as the

best option to enforce the ceasefire, protect civilians,

ensure access to humanitarian assistance in Darfur; and

(3) strongly urges the Arab League to work with the United Nations, the African Union and the United States Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan,

Andrew Natsios, to bring about real and lasting peace and stability to Darfur, the refugee camps, and along the Chadian border.

H.L.C.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

TO H. CON. RES. 7

OFFERED BY MR. LANTOS

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas in July 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate declared that the atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan constitute genocide, and the Bush administration reached the same conclusion in September 2004, when then Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that "the evidence leads us to the conclusion that genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur"; Whereas estimates indicate that 400,000 people may have been killed by the Government of Sudan and its Janjaweed allies since the crisis began in 2003, more than 2,000,000 people have been displaced from their homes, and more than 250,000 people from Darfur remain in refugee camps in Chad;

Whereas the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, in late August 2006 stated that "[i]nsecurity is at its highest level since 2004, access at its lowest levels since that date, and we may well be on the brink of a return to all-out war";

Whereas despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, violence against civilians, peacekeepers, and humanitarian workers continues unabated, including the killing of an estimated 12 humanitarian workers and 16 African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeepers;

Whereas in August 2006, the Government of Sudan began to deploy thousands of government troops for a major offen

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H.L.C.

sive in Darfur, once again threatening a major humanitarian catastrophe and risking the safety and security of millions of civilians;

Whereas, according to the Government of Sudan's plan, in a document submitted to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Kofi Annan, the Government of Sudan planned to deploy approximately 26,500 additional troops and 7,050 additional police to Darfur;

Whereas the objectives of this deployment were "to deal with the threats posed by the activities of groups that have rejected the Darfur Peace Agreement and to gain control over the security situation and achieve stability in Darfur";

Whereas on August 31, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1706, expanding the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for the additional deployment of 17,300 peacekeeping troops and 3,300 civilian police personnel as well as 16 formed police units to Darfur;

Whereas implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is slow, raising serious concern about the commitment of the Government of Sudan to fulfill its responsibilities;

Whereas President Omar Hassan El-Bashir of Sudan rejected the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to Darfur, even as First Vice President Salva Kiir publicly stated his support for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Darfur;

Whereas in March 2006, at the Khartoum summit, Arab

leaders worked against a plan to transform the African

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H.L.C.

Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) into a United Nations protection force with a mandate to protect civilians;

Whereas on August 20, 2006, in Cairo, Egypt, the League

of Arab States met and backed Sudan's refusal of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the war-wracked Darfur region;

Whereas in September 2006, a resolution passed by the League of Arab States Council of Foreign Ministers called for the United Nations Security Council to give the Sudanese Government more time to implement its "plan to improve conditions and preserve security" in Darfur; Whereas on November 30, 2006, the Peace and Security

Council of the African Union approved a decision to extend the mandate of AMIS in Darfur through July 2007; Whereas, although the United Nations was authorized and prepared to send peacekeeping forces to Darfur under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), the League of Arab States worked to obstruct the deployment of such forces or had sought to reduce their mandate;

Whereas the November 30, 2006, Abuja Communique of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union endorsed the deployment a hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force and stated the following:

(1) The Special Representative shall be jointly appointed by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, after appropriate consultations as per the practice. (2) The Force Commander, who should be an African, shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Com

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H.L.C.

mission in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(3) The Mission shall benefit from United Nations backstopping and command and control structures and systems.

(4) The size of the force shall be determined by the African Union and the United Nations, taking into account all relevant factors and the situation on the ground, as well as the requirements for it to effectively discharge its mandate.

Whereas in March 2007, ongoing negotiations between the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and President Omar Hassan El-Bashir of Sudan took place under the auspices of the League of Arab States Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and with the encouragement of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the head of the League of Arab States;

Whereas on April 16, 2007, Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol announced that Sudan fully accepts a "heavy support" package from the United Nations, including significant additional logistical and military support, which represents the second phase of a three-step plan to create a hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force of approximately 17,000 troops and 3,000 police; and

Whereas the support of the League of Arab States and each. Member State individually will be critical to end the genocide in Darfur: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the fol

lowing: