humanitarian access, and improved human rights and religious freedom. These goals represent a complex balancing act which I will try to make a bit clearer through my remarks. What I hope is immediately clear is the need for your continued support as we aggressively pursue an end to the suffering which has tragically marked the lives of too many Sudanese people. Protecting the American people from any and all threats that may emanate from Africa must be a primary policy focus. The events of September 11 and Africa's own sad experience with the terrorist attacks against our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania necessitate that counter-terrorism concerns remain front and center as an issue in our diplomatic relations with the Government of Sudan. The Department's recent release of the Patterns of Global Terrorism report points to our sustained vigilance. While the report does refer to a measurable increase in counter-terrorism cooperation with Sudan, we remain concerned by the government's ongoing tolerance of and support for groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, due to the sensitive nature of this subject and ongoing discussions, I recommend a different forum for detailed briefings on this matter. As important as our counter-terrorism efforts remain in Sudan, our quest for a just peace, sustained_humanitarian access, and dramatic improvements in human rights are a direct reflection of the principles embraced by the American people and pursued through the leadership of President Bush. In September 2001, President Bush named Senator John Danforth the Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan. In fulfilling his mandate, Senator Danforth has advised that the parties to the conflict have shown sufficient will to engage in a peace process. We must now work diligently to demand deeds rather than mere words, and in this regard the government in Khartoum will have much to prove. President Bush has asked Senator Danforth to continue on as his envoy for peace in Sudan as we push for a just peace. The United States considers the onus of ending the civil war squarely on the shoulders of the government. The road to peace will be arduous and long, and President Bush has clearly articulated an immediate need for relief for the millions of Sudanese who suffer needlessly. In support of that effort, the President appointed USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, Special Humanitarian Coordinator and tasked him with developing and implementing strategies that would alleviate the dire humanitarian situation at hand. In this vein, I will add that USAID, particularly OFDA under the leadership of Roger Winter, has played a critical and outstanding role in moving forward on Sudan. His value as a partner in our efforts cannot be overstated. There is an inextricable link between our search for peace and more proximate gains in the areas of humanitarian access and respect for human rights. These gains will be incremental but represent an essential operationalization of our overall efforts. We seek sustained and measurable achievements in pursuing: 1. A cease-fire and humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains area; 2. Zones and periods of tranquility for humanitarian access; 3. The introduction of an international commission to investigate slavery, abductions and forced servitude; and 4. The cessation of attacks on civilians. The commitments that the parties have made to implement these agreements will necessarily represent ongoing tests of their will to cooperate in good faith. While not perfect, these tests represent unprecedented progress which, most importantly, continue to save lives. The United States remains the leading donor of humanitarian relief to Sudan and we will continue to take this lead-including to northern victims of drought-whenever and wherever possible. We are working to move through barriers to our relief efforts, whether imposed by Khartoum or other parties to the conflict. I note again the Administration's clear view that cooperation on humanitarian delivery cannot be de-linked from our overall understanding of the parties' commitment to work with the United States and others to advance peace. My colleague, Roger Winter, will address this issue in greater detail, but I would like to highlight an important accomplishment in our engagement so far. We have secured access to areas that have been previously “off limits,” like the Nuba Mountains. This area has not seen significant humanitarian relief in more than eight years. The cease-fire, coupled with scaled-up humanitarian access, has breathed life into a devastated area and allowed the people of Nuba to reach some measure of equilibrium. Maintaining our commitment to those that suffer at the hands of the government in Khartoum also means forthrightly denouncing the egregious human rights violations that occur in Sudan. The practice of slavery in the Sudan cannot be denounced strongly enough and the Sudanese Government's tolerance for the practice is simply unacceptable. The recently completed findings by the U.S.-led International Commission to Investigate Slavery, Abductions and Forced Servitude, demonstrate that there is no question that slavery continues to occur in Sudan today and that it is perpetrated by people who, when not acting in concert with government forces, at least enjoy government forbearance. No one has been arrested, much less prosecuted, for this crime. The message of the Sudanese government is not that this horror must end, but that Sudan's critics fail to appreciate the unique cultural circumstances that give rise to "abductions". We do not, nor will we ever, accept this argument. The findings of the Commission address this cynical and unacceptable response and deny the government semantic latitude when answering for their actions in international fora. The report also lays out a series of recommendations that the Sudanese government must take to stop the attacks, free the victims, and punish the guilty. This is merely one example of the pervasive violations of human rights that typify Sudan. All the belligerents, to one degree or another, have made civilians targets in this war, but no party bears a heavier responsibility than the Sudanese government. The most contentious of the Danforth initiatives addressed this issue specifically. In February 2002, the government and the SPLA agreed to cease attacks on civilians in accordance with the rules of war as outlined in the Geneva Convention. We are in the process of installing an on-the-ground monitoring mechanism to determine the belligerents' commitment to this agreement. Although reported violations of this agreement by both sides have been cataloged, we will persist in establishing the monitoring mechanism simply because it allows the international community unprecedented access and a clearer picture of the situation. We thank you for your cooperation and participation in making funding available to implement these mechanisms and will keep Congress informed as this process evolves. The human rights and humanitarian crisis in Sudan has its basis in the ongoing civil war. The environment in which the humanitarian crises, the religious persecution, and the disregard for human rights exist results from government and opposition resolve to settle their differences militarily. The duration and nature of the civil war, however, make it clear that neither the government nor the opposition can win militarily. Without a strong international role, it is doubtful the parties to the conflict possess the initiative necessary to resolve the differences of their own accord. This is where we have focused our diplomatic efforts. We appreciate that none of Sudan's problems exist in a vacuum. So long as the civil war goes on, the suffering of the civilians will continue. I cannot put it more directly or forcefully than has Deputy Secretary Armitage: we have got to try to stop the war. The release of Senator Danforth's report a few weeks ago marks the initial step to determine if we can indeed stop the war. His initial mandate, as I mentioned earlier, was to determine if the parties to the conflict are earnest in their stated desire for peace. Senator Danforth found that while the parties have demonstrated an ability to reach agreement on contentious issues, the difficulty of achieving these agreements underscores the necessity of outside intermediaries. Specifically, and in short, he notes that the time is right for the United States to participate and act as a catalyst in a peace process. The Administration agrees with his conclusion. In charting a course for a peace process, the United States is closely coordinating with Kenya, the United Kingdom, Norway Switzerland, Egypt and others. The consensus among the parties to the conflict and countries coordinating with the United States is that instead of introducing an entirely new proposal, peace negotiations will only develop momentum and succeed if they are undertaken through an existing framework to which both parties are agreed in principal. The nascent Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) framework is the only vehicle for peace that fits this need at this time. Having stalled in the past due to a lack of broad participation, both the parties to the conflict and the coordinating partners agree that the IGAD framework, with several key points of the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (ELI) included, is the strongest and most viable forum for peace discussions. More importantly, the IGAD framework is the only agreement signed by both parties to the conflict that resolves and acknowledges critical issues like self-determination for the south, religion and state, and governance. When we talk about the prospects for peace in Sudan, we must be realistic, and we must be prepared for a long-term commitment. The latest iteration of this war is 19 years old. Achieving a just peace will require resolution of difficult questions such as the role of religion in the state, boundaries, sharing of oil revenue, and guaranteeing respect for the south's legitimate right to self-determination. Peace negotiations will require sustained effort and the demonstration of a will to peace that appears so far to be less than enthusiastic. Although a comprehensive cease-fire would be an important milestone on the way to a just peace, it must be a viable, negotiated cease-fire that advances the search for a comprehensive settlement. The Sudanese government's frequent calls for a cease-fire appear to be tactical posturing rather than indications of a move toward a just peace. A serious cease-fire would, first and foremost, be integrated into a peace process. It would also address the mili tary issues on the ground such as re-supply of troops, importation of arms, and monitoring of troop movements. A cease-fire that does not speak to those sorts of issues will be as short-lived as the various humanitarian cease-fires or bombing halts that have come and quickly gone over the years. Humanitarian relief, human rights, and peace are three critical keys to our Sudan policy. We must work on all three simultaneously, but we must insist on concrete progress by all the parties. To achieve our goals, we must be prepared to aggressively advocate our positions in Khartoum. We have been looking at re-staffing our Embassy in Khartoum to provide the presence we need to advance our interests there and to support an engagement on the issue of peace. Our efforts to do so have been with our eyes wide open. The Sudanese conflict has gone on too long. Along with key allies-the United Kingdom, Norway, Kenya, Switzerland, and others-we are committed to pushing all of the key actors to a serious, comprehensive and hopefully lasting, peace process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINIS- Mr. WINTER. Thank you for having me here. I should say, because I have been before this Committee before I joined the government, that I have a public record on Sudan; I stand by it, but I want to be clear that today I am here representing USAID, and I also served as a member of the Danforth team working in Sudan. Sudan is at a critical juncture. It is a time for some hope, but not too much. One of the best assets we have in approaching the issue of Sudan is the personal interest of the President. That is a huge asset. But the obstacles to overcome are also huge. The government of Sudan continues to send contradictory signals on its commitment to a just peace and to humanitarian assistance for all Sudanese in need. Our government declarations suggest official support for such assistance. The government of Sudan regularly creates bureaucratic restrictions and operational barriers that impede the delivery of assistance to those in need. Aid agencies are routinely denied access to many areas and civilians are directly targeted in some instances. These obstacles are so consistent as to amount to a deliberate strategy. It belies GOS assertions of wanting a just peace. The U.S. approach so far, I believe and having been a member of the team and familiar with the internal discussions-has been balanced and fair. We have made some progress but the truth of the matter is we have been nickled and dimed by the government of Sudan all the way. If we are going to make the leap that we want to make toward a just peace, it will require on our part, and we recognize it, a full court press and constant and vigorous enforcement of agreements reached with the government. I am not going to delineate what we are doing programmatically as USAID in Sudan. It is all in the written statement. I would like to focus only on one issue, and that is of humanitarian access. In late 1988, the international community agreed to a program called Operation Lifeline Sudan. The then government of Sudan signed the Agreement. The SPLA, the rebel group, signed it, and U.N. signed it. And basically what it did was it set down an arrangement by which civilians regardless in whose territory they were located could receive international humanitarian assistance to meet their needs. That was enabled by the fact that there was a peace process then in motion with the former government. In 1989, on June 30, the current government's party staged a coup, and shortly after that, the whole policy toward humanitarian assistance began to change. A number of us met, in later 1989, with representatives of what was called the Revolutionary Command Council. What they told us was, very plainly, there will not be humanitarian programs in Sudan that do not meet the military strategy needs of the government. Since then we have found manipulation of humanitarian programs to be a regular pattern. We have taken a number of steps to try to get around that manipulation, but the truth of the matter is that manipulation continues to be a significant problem. What do I mean by manipulation? Well, just to give you a couple of examples. In January 1998, in Bahr el Ghazal, one of the three principal provinces of the south, as a famine was beginning in the area, the government denied flights of humanitarian assistance into the region. The consequence of that was the famine was much more dramatic than it needed to be. We could have headed off much of the death that resulted. In fact, 100,000 people died because of that action. Or take Equatoria, one of the other provinces in the south. Much of Equatoria has been closed to humanitarian flights for 4 years, even though there has not been a lot of military activity in the area. It is an obstacle that has terrible consequences on the ground. Currently, in what we call Western Upper Nile, part of the third historical province of the south, the government of Sudan is seeking to consolidate control of the oil fields. As a result of their military initiatives, they have banned flights for humanitarian purposes into the region. There are no flights of a humanitarian nature officially going into that region right now at all. In addition, the government has announced that it wants to change the basic framework that we have had for the last 13 years for this more or less neutral access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. What they are proposing is that they would take control of all humanitarian programming. The stress is on "control," not on "humanitarian." What they would do is they would require all flights to pass through government-controlled locations. They are talking about closing the southern sector base in Lokichokio, Kenya. They are talking about requiring visas for humanitarian workers even if they are working the south. The U.N. is resisting on all of these efforts by the government, and we are supporting the U.N. in that regard, but there are limits to what the U.N. can do when it is dealing with a member state of the United Nations system. If these kinds of things were put in place, it would be the ultimate manipulation. It would be the end of Operation Lifeline Sudan as we know it, and of course we here in the U.S. support a major non-Operation Lifeline Sudan program. The Sudanese government would simply target that program militarily. Administrator Andrew Natsios has called the proposal of the government absolutely unacceptable. We need, frankly, and this is the recommendation from USAID, an entirely new arrangement to avoid the government of Sudan being able to veto humanitarian access to the conflict zones in Sudan. We need to have a process which is neutral; we need to have a process which is transparent; we need to have a process that serves all conflict areas, the needs of civilians that are caught up in those areas, not the Joint Military Commission that we have in the Nuba Mountains, but something similar in which the international community can independently play a clear role in deciding what flights for humanitarian access go in and which do not. This is our highest priority in the way we proceed with negotiations with the government. And to my friends in the government in Khartoum, I would say the best thing that they can do to move a peace process forward is start to treat people who are caught up in this conflict as they ought to. It would move the peace process forward very nicely. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today about the next steps on what I hope will be the path to peace in Sudan. As many of you know, I have testified many times before Congress on Sudan, but this is my first time doing so as Assistant Administrator of USAID. The timing of this hearing is very important. Sudan is riding a fine line between disaster and opportunity. In the last eleven months, I have traveled to Sudan seven times, including all of Senator John Danforth's visits, and two trips with USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios in his capacity as the President's U.S. Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan. During that time, I have witnessed several very successful initiatives. For example, last month during a meeting with civil society groups of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM)-held Nuba Mountains region, I was encouraged to hear about the positive changes in daily life brought about by U.S. humanitarian advocacy and diplomatic activities. Local residents mentioned to me that the sound of airplanes overhead once brought a fear of coming bombs, but now is welcomed as announcing new shipments of food or other needed assistance. This sort of practical improvement in safety, nutrition, and quality of life is what USAID is working toward in Sudan. While recent developments give cause for hope and justify energetic U.S. engagement toward a just peace, any optimism must be tempered. The Government of Sudan (GoS) continues to send contradictory signals on its commitment to supporting humanitarian efforts. While government declarations suggest official support for such aid, the GoS too often creates bureaucratic restrictions and operational barriers that impede the delivery of assistance to those in need. Aid agencies are denied official access to some areas, and civilians are directly targeted in some instances. These obstacles are so consistent as to amount to a deliberate strategy. It belies the GoS assertions of wanting a just peace. Mr. Chairman, in my testimony here today, I will discuss three successes that the United States has achieved in Sudan over the last eleven months, several serious concerns that remain to be addressed, and a vision for future USAID humanitarian and developmental assistance in Sudan in the months to come. The first and greatest achievement has been the remarkable progress made by USAID in preparing southern Sudan for an eventual peace. USAID has sharply increased its investment in education, agriculture, and small business, to lay the groundwork for a stable postwar society. This new long-term development assistance is coordinated and linked with our ongoing humanitarian programs. During his July trip to Sudan last year, Administrator Natsios heard repeatedly from southern Sudanese of their desire to be self-reliant and reduce their dependency on foreign humanitarian assistance. In response, the Administrator announced two major new development programs focusing on basic education and agriculture, intended to help southern Sudanese help themselves. These initiatives are valued at $42.5 million 80-060 D-2 |