ination by the parties, and an interim arrangement that will be close to that. But you see my preference would be to avoid labels because if we say "federation," what is in Khartoum today is federation. This is not acceptable to the south.

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. DENG. If we say "confederation," they hear you say separation. But if you take people in western Sudan, even the Nuba, who in the first war were fighting on behalf of the north and actually seen as Arabs, today they are, you know, obviously sharing that point of view. I think it is a matter of time. People in western Sudan, therefore, would easily accept that kind of a framework, but the political part is right now, I do not see anyone that would accept that.

On the other hand

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay.

Mr. DENG [continuing]. In private discussions they tell you, short of breaking up the country, we would accept.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much.

By the way, I have had those same discussions with representatives of the north, only to be at some point down the path disabused of the idea that they are serious about that. But I guess we can hope. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Payne, very briefly.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Deng, very nice to see you again, and I will not hold you up. I understand you have to leave, but I would just also like to say that, as Mr. Tancredo, every time there was someone who seems like they were trying to make concessions or discuss things with the government of Khartoum, they would show their true face. When former President Carter was in Khartoum he felt that, you know, there could be a possibility that Khartoum would understand and that perhaps they would be more sympathetic to the plight of the people in the south. But as he went to visit a feeding site, they bombed the area.

When special envoy under President Clinton, former Congressman Jack Johnson, who chaired the Subcommittee, went, as he sat in the government's office in Khartoum; they bombed.

Three or four months ago when people were standing in line, just unarmed civilians, 40 people were killed at the time with Sudan's new helicopters, when Senator Danforth was there talking about, or his people were there trying to see about some kind of appease

ment.

So I just question whether this government has the ability to really—I just think that there is something radically wrong, something essentially evil, something malfunctioning in the body politic. And so I certainly respect, I know of no one who is more thoroughly acquainted with the problem, and I just hope you will continually work on trying to come up with a solution.

Thank you very much.

Mr. DENG. Congressman, if I may just say, I think I could take the lead from something you said earlier referring to September 11, and the dramatic changes that took place as a result of the clear message that went out of here. I think it is also a question of how committed the international community, and in particular the

United States working with others, how committed they are to pressure for a just peace in the country.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Dr. Deng, and I do want to thank our other panelists for your courtesy in extending this additional time because of the schedule.

Our next panelist is John Prendergast, who is Co-Director of the Africa Program at the International Crisis Group. He has worked as special advisor on African conflicts at the Department of State, and Director of African Affairs at the National Security Council.

Mr. Prendergast has worked for a number of NGOs on issues of human rights and humanitarian assistance in Africa, and has authored a number of books and journals on Africa.

Ken Isaacs is the International Director of Projects for Samaritan's Purse; he has been associated with the Christian-based relief organization since 1987. He manages five national offices and 12 international field offices with a national staff numbering more than 1,200 people in activities including shelters, rehabilitation, refugee care, orphanages, AIDS program, hospitals and public health clinics, and much more.

He also recently assumed responsibility for the world medical mission, the medical arm of Samaritan's Purse, where medical professionals are sent around the world on short-term humanitarian assignments.

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Eric Reeves of Smith College in North Hampton, Massachusetts. Although an academic by training, Dr. Reeves is now in his 4th year of full-time work as a Sudan analyst and human rights advocate. He has written extensively on Sudan and especially on the consequences of oil development in that country.

Dr. Reeves has served as a consultant to a number of humanitarian and nongovernmental organizations, and has been widely published as a result of his growing research and has been interviewed on various issues relating to Sudan by leading news organizations around the world. He has testified on Sudan and oil development before our Committee before, and we welcome you back, Dr. Reeves.

Mr. Prendergast, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think none of us have ever seen Francis Deng talk for such a short time, so I think you can assume that we will be similarly disciplined in our efforts here today to try to comply with the clock's demands. I just returned this week from a visit to the oilfields in western upper Nile, which is really the front line now in the war in Sudan. This is the fifth visit that I have made in the last year since I left the State Department. And I have got to say the figure of 2 million dead that everyone this morning has cited really is just a warm up. I think the real game is beginning now.

Casualty rates are skyrocketing on the battlefield today because of the increased lethality of weapons that are being purchased, particularly by Khartoum, the increasing stakes for which this war is

being fought, the increasing commitment of the government to clearing civilians out of the oilfields, and the increasingly intense conventional engagements that we are seeing represented in the war today.

Is peace possible in Sudan? That is certainly the question that underlies the answer, which would dictate what U.S. policy ought to pursue over the next few months.

I would agree with Walter and the Administration's team, we really do not know and we really must try, to try to make peace. But it is fantasy, I think, to believe that any solution is possible without extremely serious, diligent, and concerted international pressure on Khartoum.

The most visible missing ingredient right now of a potentially successful peace process in Sudan through the IGAD peace process is any coordination whatsoever or organization of the pressures that need to be placed on the parties, again particularly Khartoum. To be effective, this leverage has to be multilateral. The U.S. has to organize this. This may be the most important thing that the United States can do in the context of the peace process in Sudan. Now, I have outlined a number of carrots and sticks in the paper here in the written testimony. I will just highlight a couple of them right now.

It is crucial that we maintain the counterterrorism pressure that we have built up over the last 8 years on Khartoum. Fundamental change on the issue of counterterrorism is not going to occur until the kind of change that occurs through a comprehensive peace agreement happens.

Secondly, this issue that was raised earlier about the opposition of our assistance through the World Bank and IMF to the regime in Khartoum, this is also a crucial element, particularly because the government needs debt relief. Every weapon system they purchase increases the debt expidientially, as does interest on the debt. It is growing rapidly. They need Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief. They are not going to get it as long as the United States votes against it on the board of the IMF and World Bank. We need to hold the line on that, and I think the Representative that spoke earlier about that was absolutely right.

Third, pressure on investors in the oil industry clearly translates into indirect pressure on the government. Therefore, as all three of you have articulately, I think, presented today, passage of the capital market sanctions provisions of the Sudan Peace Act is a critical leverage point for the United States and needs to at least be continued to be pressed with the Senate.

Fourth, diplomatically, and I want to build here on what Francis was talking about, support for self-determination with the full scope of possible outcomes, meaning independence as one of the possible outcomes of self-determination, is a crucial lever to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached for the interim period that will inevitably occur if a peace agreement is reached in Sudan.

And, fifth and finally, another issue that has direct implications for the Congress, only a fraction of the $20 million that Congress has authorized in economic support funds for protection of civilians in southern Sudan and for a number of other purposes has been

utilized in the way that you originally intended. And I would urge you just as diligently as you are working on this issue of capital market sanctions to look at that issue because if that assistance is used in the way that Congress intended, that becomes a very, very potent tool, a very potent form of leverage that you can use in the future. And this can be done, I think, through support for the governing capacity in opposition-controlled areas as well as providing vehicles and fuel and other kinds of things to the civil administration in those opposition-controlled areas where civilian populations are being protected and supported.

I will leave it there, Mr. Chairman. Thanks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify at this propitious moment in Sudan's history. With a dramatically escalating civil conflict and a makeor-break peace process about to get underway, the timing of this hearing is impeccable. Decisive U.S. action holds the potential for moving the parties to peace. Anything less will ensure that war and famine will only intensify.

I just returned this week from a visit to the oilfields of Western Upper Nile in southern Sudan, the civil war's most prominent front line and its new epicentre. This is the fifth visit I have made there since I left the State Department a year ago. The evidence of death and destruction was omnipresent in every location I visited, in the wake of the Sudan government's efforts to depopulate the areas of new oil exploration in a classic scorched-earth counter-insurgency operation.

And yet as horrible as this war is, the worst is yet to come, ensured by the everincreasing lethality of weaponry.

And as difficult as it has been to strike a compromise on the fundamental issues, the worst is yet to come here too, as the divergence widens between the government and the SPLA over the issue of self-determination. The commitment of southern Sudanese to an independence referendum deepens, matched only by the growing commitment of the government to prevent just such an outcome.

FRESH HELL FOR SUDANESE CIVILIANS

Casualty rates are skyrocketing because of this increased lethality of weaponry, the increasing stakes for which this war is fought, and increasingly intense conventional engagements. The bloodiest battles of the war have been fought during this past dry season, as small skirmishes with AK-47s have been replaced by more conventional slugfests with heavy modern weaponry, and as Khartoum continues to escalate the use of its most significant and deadly comparative advantage, air power. The government launched a massive dry season offensive in the oilfields at the beginning of this year, aided by thousands of its forces redeployed as a result of the Nuba Mountains ceasefire. By clearing civilian populations out of Western Upper Nile, the government intended to secure further areas for oil expansion, build allweather roads that could facilitate rainy season military operations and oil company movements, and construct a defensive perimeter around existing and new oilfields. The SPLA, however, held its ground and prevented these things from happening, at a huge cost in terms of manpower and resources. (The government lost even larger numbers of soldiers and irregular militia.) As the SPLA fights what is largely an interdiction operation, and if it cannot mount a significant counter-offensive in the current rainy season, its capacity to defend against the government's next dry season offensive—with more and better heavy weapons-will begin to erode.

HARDENING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The issue of state and religion will be an extremely difficult one at the negotiating table. It is the issue of self-determination, however, that threatens to be the ultimate deal-killer in the upcoming IGAD negotiations or in any peace process. In my frequent trips throughout southern Sudan, I have found a growing determination to sacrifice whatever is required to achieve an independence referendum. The attitude is not, “We have sacrificed so much; therefore we must compromise." Rather it is, "We have sacrificed so much; therefore we cannot compromise."

The International Crisis Group has argued since shortly after Senator Danforth was appointed that a window of opportunity existed for peace in Sudan. We argued that if we did not immediately take advantage of that window by addressing the root causes of the war in serious negotiations, the window would inevitably close. Senator Danforth's efforts resulted in moderate successes on symptomatic humanitarian issues, but eight months have gone by in which root causes haven't been negotiated, our leverage is slowly eroding, the positions of the parties are hardening, and the willingness of the parties to compromise is dissipating. Consequently, the window of opportunity for peace is closing.

IGAD'S LAST STAND

To try to pry this window of opportunity back open, and after nine years of trying to resolve the Sudanese civil war, IGAD is trying to stake a new course. President Moi's Special Envoy General Sumbeiywo has outlined a strict agenda and timeline that will be pursued over the next four or five months in a do-or-die negotiating effort, with the U.S. and its troika partners Britain and Norway as observers.

Left to its own devices, IGAD cannot succeed. Negotiating peace in Sudan will require an enormous effort on the part of the broader international community, in close partnership with regional states. So far, evidence of this necessary level of political will is erratic.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES: STRATEGY AND LEVERAGE

To resolve a war the length and magnitude of Sudan's, key members of the international community will have to pull their weight and pull in the same direction. If peace is to come to Sudan, the U.S. will have to carry the heaviest weight of all, and take the lead in ensuring everyone else that matters is on board. Just as in the Middle East and Afghanistan, such an investment and commitment of diplomatic resources by the U.S. must be substantial. No one else can do it.

The lessons of peace-making in Africa have demonstrated that only with highlevel engagement, a well-developed negotiating strategy, and multilateral leverage can the U.S. help broker peace between determined belligerents. The previous administration demonstrated this in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace settlement, on which I had the privilege of working. That relatively straightforward conflict took over two years of intensive U.S. and African diplomacy to resolve. Sudan's war is far more complex.

The train wreck inherent in the upcoming negotiations is already evident. The issue of self-determination, with secession at its core, will at some point paralyze the talks. A well-developed strategy and serious leverage needs to be ready to be deployed, which means intensive preparations must begin now.

President Bush concluded his recent Oval Office meeting with Senator Danforth a few weeks ago with a firm, "Let's get this done!" What the U.S. is doing thus far to act on that instruction is useful, but not sufficient.

WANTED: A ROBUST PEACE STRATEGY

Because the divergent positions of the parties are so entrenched and will not be reconcilable through conventional facilitation alone, a more forceful and proactive diplomatic intervention is needed, backed by much more leverage than is currently envisioned. A comprehensive plan is needed which involves the following elements: how to move the parties on key issues

when and what leverage will be deployed;

what substantive proposals will be presented at what junctures in the talks; what back-up plans exist when impasses are reached;

how Egypt will be engaged by the U.S. at the highest levels to ensure buyin, which will require extensive discussions on the issue of self-determination; how to engage both Khartoum and Cairo on what they are willing to do to make unity attractive to southern Sudanese;

how to engage Russia and China on playing a constructive role, which is at present undermined by their provision of military aid to the government;

how to coordinate Track II peace initiatives-particularly competing ones funded by the U.S. and European Union-and utilize them more directly in the service of the current process;

what technical aid to provide to help the parties develop their positions before and during the talks;

when and how to get the National Democratic Alliance parties, the Umma Party, and elements of broader civil society into the discussions about Sudan's future.