Following the Danforth Report

foreign policy in May 2001. The President appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan in September 2001. The Administration has also taken several steps to alleviate the humanitarian crisis of the Sudanese people, particularly through the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), whose Administrator Andrew Natsios has been designated by the President as Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan. Let me take this opportunity to commend Administrator Natsios and Assistant Administrator Roger Winter for their dedication in bringing U.S. humanitarian and developmental assistance to the suffering people of Sudan.

On May 14, the White House released Special Envoy John Danforth's much-awaited report on his efforts to end the civil war in Sudan. The Commission was one of the first to call for the creation of a special envoy. Senator Danforth concluded "this is the time for a major push for a compromise settlement."

The Commission welcomes Senator Danforth's efforts and his willingness to continue in the envoy post to pursue a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

Senator Danforth is to be commended for his success in getting humanitarian aid to the Nuba Mountains, where the Khartoum regime has for years engaged in genocidal actions. His efforts have also resulted in the recently concluded investigation by the International Eminent Persons Group into slavery, abduction, and forced servitude in Sudan. The report of the Eminent Persons Group includes the horrifying determination that and I quote: "The pattern of slave taking that has developed since the start of the civil war is, to a substantial degree, the product of a counterinsurgency strategy pursued by successive governments in Khartoum." [Note: At the same time as the release of this finding, the U.S. named a charge d'affaires to head the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum and reportedly to become the first resident diplomat to the Sudanese capital since 1996.]

Senator Danforth, like the Commission, has found that the development of Sudan's oil wealth has become an increasingly important factor in the intensification of the conflict and one that must be addressed in order to achieve a lasting peace. But Senator Danforth's proposals do not yet point to a serious policy by the Bush Administration to bring peace to Sudan and contain a serious flaw in the premise that neither the Khartoum regime nor the rebel alliance can win the war.

Whether or not Khartoum can win the war is not the question. The point is that Khartoum thinks it can win the war, especially with hundreds of millions of dollars in oil revenue pouring in. It thus currently has no incentive to end the fighting, and neither Senator Danforth nor the Bush Administration has provided one. Meanwhile, the horrors of war go on, with Khartoum over the past few months purchasing additional warplanes and escalating deployment of helicopter gun ships.

The only way to get Khartoum's attention is to curtail its oil revenues, the only asset that is keeping it from bankruptcy. The United States has at hand the means to do so through capital market reforms recommended by the Commission and included in the House passed version of the Sudan Peace Act. Two key provisions would:

-First, bar any foreign company doing business in the Sudanese petroleum fields from raising funds in U.S. capital markets. (U.S. companies are already prohibited from investing in Sudan.)

-Second, require any company doing business in Sudan to disclose the nature of that business in any filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Sudan Peace Act now languishes in limbo as the Senate, reportedly at the Administration's behest, refuses to go to a conference committee.

The international oil companies are watching closely. Already deeply involved— perhaps implicated is a better word-they cannot afford to be cut off from U.S. capital markets, the world's most lucrative.

Even more will be needed, however, for a just peace. There must be a fair apportionment and just expenditure of oil revenues for both south and north. Senator Danforth found that "Any peace process should address the oil issue in order to resolve a major cause of conflict and to serve as the basis for a just peace." The Commission has recommended that any peace agreement or, in the interim, a comprehensive cease-fire in Sudan be conditioned on placing the country's oil revenues in an internationally administered trust fund. These revenues would be expended solely for developmental and humanitarian purposes on an equitable basis in both the north and the south.

Without such an arrangement over oil revenues the regime will be far less likely to engage in good faith bargaining over power-sharing. Regimes in Khartoum have time and again manipulated well-meaning peace initiatives, in the process repeatedly making and later breaking solemn promises of fair treatment to the people of southern Sudan. It has been five years since both parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles under the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The

people of southern Sudan cannot afford five more years of delay by a Khartoum government that is heedless of the human costs.

The Commission also strongly believes that any peace talks for Sudan must be based on the Declaration of Principles that I just mentioned. Two of these principles are core issues that have to be addressed in order to establish a just peace. These are self-determination for the south and a secular state that would ensure religious freedom for all individuals, north and south.

What is most needed right now is a policy on Sudan-one in which the United States is a central player in the effort for a just peace. A first step in such a policy should be for the Bush Administration and the Senate to drop their opposition to a conference committee on the Sudan Peace Act and to accept the House version of the bill.

This is the logical extension of the findings by the President's own special envoy that oil is the key to peace in Sudan. Millions of lives depend on it. Failure to act now on Sudan will also have global implications. Failure by the United States to pursue with vigor a just peace in Sudan will send a signal to Khartoum and to other regimes that as long as they do not export terror outside their own borders they can persecute their own people with impunity.

In May 2001, President Bush pledged that his administration "will continue to speak and act for as long as the persecution and atrocities in the Sudan last." Much has admittedly happened since then: the events of September 11, the war in Afghanistan, and our ongoing campaign against international terrorism. What hasn't changed is the suffering of the Sudanese people. If the Administration fails to vigorously pursue a just peace in Sudan, it will send a signal to Khartoum and to other regimes that as long as they do not export terror outside their own borders, the United States will leave them a free hand to persecute their own people.

In hopes that the United States will prove otherwise, the Commission recommends the following steps for United States policy toward Sudan:

1. The U.S. government should urge the government of Sudan to abide by its international obligations to protect and ensure the right to freedom of religion. Specifically, the U.S. government should urge the government of Sudan to:

1.a unequivocally affirm that Shariah-based criminal code provisions do not apply to Sudan's southern states or to non-Muslims throughout Sudan and re-affirm its commitment to Section 3.4 of the Declaration of Principles of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);

1.b allow all religious groups to conduct their activities freely without interference or burdensome regulation by the state, including the selection and training of religious leaders, the content of sermons, and the distribution of religious literature, subject only to restrictions provided for by international standards;

1.c ensure that all religious groups are free to build, repair, and operate houses of worship and social service ministries without delay or harassment, subject to land-use regulations that are applicable to all, regardless of religion;

1.d ensure the protection of religious properties, return confiscated religious properties, and compensate religious groups for demolished or damaged properties; and

1.e repeal any laws that punish changing one's faith or encouraging another to do so (e.g., Article 126 of the Sudan Penal Code), and release any persons convicted of or detained on account of any such law.

2. The U.S. government's diplomatic effort in Sudan should have as its major goal encouraging the government of Sudan, including all its allied militia, to enter into a comprehensive and conditioned cease-fire with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that would apply to all areas of the country and be subject to monitoring by international observers.

The U.S. government should urge the government of Sudan, as an essential condition of the cease-fire, to agree either to cease the extraction of oil in the country, or to place its oil revenues in an internationally-administered trust fund to be expended solely for development and humanitarian purposes on an equitable basis in both the north and the south.

3. The U.S. government should strengthen economic sanctions against Sudan and should urge other countries to adopt similar policies. Specifically, the United States should:

3.a require companies doing business in Sudan to disclose the nature and extent of that business in connection with their access to U.S. capital markets,

3.b prohibit any foreign company from raising capital or listing its securities in U.S. markets as long as it is engaged in the development of oil and gas fields in Sudan, and

3.c deny licenses for the importation of gum arabic from Sudan to the United States.

The Administration and the Senate should support the adoption of the House-passed version of the Sudan Peace Act.

4. The U.S. government should urge the government of Sudan to demonstrate a good-faith commitment to and participation in internationally-recognized and -monitored peace talks based upon the Declaration of Principles developed under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and previously agreed to by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.

The re-establishment of full diplomatic relations with Sudan or the opening of a USAID mission in Khartoum should be conditional upon the government of Sudan demonstrating a fundamental change in its policies.

5. In fostering such peace talks, the U.S. government should work to ensure the inclusion of Sudan's civil society, including its various political parties and religious leaders from the north and the south.

6. The U.S. government should urge all parties to the conflict to include as an element of the peace settlement a full accounting for crimes against humanity, such as the systematic aerial bombardment of civilians. Moreover, the parties to the conflict should undertake efforts now to investigate reports of war crimes and other human rights abuses and to prosecute those individuals responsible.

7. The U.S. government should continue to increase the amount of its humanitarian assistance that passes outside of the UN humanitarian relief mission, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), and should press OLS to deliver aid wherever it is needed, especially to the Nuba Mountains, with or without the approval of the Sudanese government.

8. The U.S. government should increase its non-lethal assistance to southern Sudan and to the National Democratic Alliance. As provided for by law, this assistance should include, but not be limited to, "communications equipment to notify civilians of aerial bombardment."

9. The U.S. government should work to increase human rights and media reporting on abuses in Sudan, including supporting, diplomatically and financially, the placement of human rights monitors in southern Sudan and in surrounding countries where refugee populations are present.

10. The U.S. government should further promote grassroots reconciliation among Sudanese as an essential building block toward a lasting peace settlement in Sudan.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT ON SUDAN-APRIL 2002

SUDAN

A. Introduction

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its past two annual reports, found the government of Sudan to be the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The Commission also found that religion is a major factor in Sudan's ongoing civil war, and that religious persecution by the Khartoum regime is intertwined with other human rights and humanitarian violations in Sudan, including aerial bombardment of civilians and of humanitarian facilities, deliberate denial of international humanitarian assistance, abduction of women and children into conditions of slavery, and the forcible displacement of populations from oil-producing areas. (Further discussion of the religious dimension of the conflict is found under Section C, Recommendation 1.)

As was graphically demonstrated in the bombing of the World Food Program's feeding center in Western Upper Nile on February 20, 2002, and the April 2002 denial of access for humanitarian relief flights on which almost 2 million people de

pend, Sudan's government continues to commit genocidal atrocities against civilian populations in the south and central parts of the country. With the Sudan conflict now in its 19th year, over 2 million people have died and some 4 million have been driven from their homes, mostly in the southern and central regions of Sudan, in a nation with a population of approximately 36 million.1

The government of Sudan violates the religious freedom of Christians and followers of traditional African religions, as well as of Muslims who dissent from the government's interpretation of Islam. The State Department has repeatedly adopted the Commission's recommendation to designate Sudan a "country of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).

Over the past three years, the Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan, several of which have been adopted. President Bush prominently raised the situation in Sudan in a major address in May 2001. The President appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan in September 2001. The Administration has also taken several steps to alleviate the humanitarian crisis of the Sudanese people, including designation of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Andrew Natsios as Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan and several reforms undertaken by USAID. All of these efforts implement directly or indirectly prior recommendations of this Commission. The U.S._ government should build upon the Danforth Mission and take a central role in seeking a just and lasting peace in Sudan. The Commission urges implementation of its additional recommendations, particularly those directed toward ending the civil war.

The Commission has found that the development of Sudan's oil wealth has become an increasingly important factor in the intensification of the conflict. Thus, the United States should make as an essential condition of any comprehensive ceasefire the placement of Khartoum's oil revenues in an internationally-administered trust fund to be expended solely for developmental and humanitarian purposes on an equitable basis in both the north and the south. A cease-fire without such an arrangement will make the regime far less likely to engage in good faith bargaining over power-sharing. It is crucial that Khartoum be given this incentive to cooperate in the successful and prompt completion of an agreement for a just peace. The Commission sees the Sudan Peace Act as a crucial part of American diplomatic efforts to achieve a conditioned cease-fire. The Commission supports the Sudan Peace Act as passed by the House of Representatives, with its important disclosure requirements and the provision limiting access to American capital markets by foreign oil companies involved in Sudan's oil industry. These provisions were first proposed by the Commission in its 2000 annual report.

The Commission is cognizant of the need for international cooperation in the war against terrorism, even from regimes, such as that in Khartoum, that are violators of religious freedom and other human rights. As stated in the Commission's letter of October 5, 2001 to President Bush, the Commission is concerned that in working with such regimes "the United States not compromise its commitment to human rights—including religious freedom-and democracy. We oppose such policy tradeoffs." 2 The Commission believes that respect for human rights and religious freedom is central to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Sudan and thus necessary for lasting security and stability in the region. Certain Administration actions—including a lack of support for the Sudan Peace Act, acquiescence in the lifting of UN sanctions, and public praise for Khartoum's cooperation in the war against terrorism-may, however, have signaled otherwise.

B. Background

Following the Commission's establishment by IRFA, Sudan was one of first three countries to be the focus of the Commission's attention. A Commission member traveled to southern Sudan in January 2000. A Commission fact-finding mission was set for late September 2001 but had to be postponed after the events of September 11. As detailed in the Commission's 2000 and 2001 reports, oil development has both exacerbated the civil war in Sudan and given it an added international dimension with the involvement of foreign oil companies. In addition to the increased revenue given to Khartoum to prosecute the war effort, oil wealth, both actual and potential, provides a material incentive for Khartoum to assert control of the oil region. Suda

1 Population estimate from the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2001, "Sudan" (http.odci.gov/cia/publications/Factbook/geos/sz.html, accessed April 26, 2002). 2U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom press release, "Commission Urges President to Continue to Defend Human Rights, Religious Freedom," October 8, 2001.

nese security forces have displaced large numbers of civilians from oil areas, employing shocking brutality in the process.3

Having concluded that the government of Sudan is responsible for egregious human rights abuses, including widespread bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets, abduction and enslavement by government-sponsored militias, banning or impeding relief operations, and severe restrictions on religious freedom, the Commission has included policy recommendations on Sudan in both of its previous annual reports.

Among the Commission's recommendations in its 2001 annual report was a call for the appointment of a prominent special envoy to work for an end to Sudan's civil war. In early September 2001, President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as the Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan. Prior to his first trip to Sudan, the Commission wrote Senator Danforth with a four-point set of policy recommendations for his talks with that country's government, which were reflected in the proposals subsequently presented by Senator Danforth to the government of Sudan.

Senator Danforth's efforts have resulted in agreement by the warring parties to a set of confidence-building measures, including a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains allowing for delivery of humanitarian aid, an international commission to investigate slavery, temporary cease-fires (referred to as days and zones of "tranquility") to permit humanitarian interventions such as disease-eradication campaigns, and a reported agreement on a verification mechanism to monitor bombardment of civilians, including humanitarian and relief operations. (Despite denials to the contrary, bombardment of civilians is a deliberate tactic employed by the government of Sudan, which has a monopoly on air power in the conflict.)

C. Recommendations

Secretary of State Colin Powell stated to Congress last spring: "There is perhaps no greater tragedy on the face of the earth today than the tragedy that is unfolding in Sudan." President Bush has pledged that his "administration will continue to speak and act for as long as the persecution and atrocities in the Sudan last." The Commission commends this resolve, but urges the Administration to give it content by taking firm measures so that a just and lasting peace can be achieved. In light of this, the Commission makes the following recommendations.

1.d ensure the protection of religious properties, return confiscated religious properties, and compensate religious groups for demolished or damaged properties; and

The right to religious freedom is guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the government of Sudan is a party. According to the ICCPR, the

3 U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Sudan," March 4, 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8405pf.htm, accessed April 15, 2002); Georgette Gagnon and John Ryle, Report of an Investigation into Oil Development, Conflict and Displacement in Western Upper Nile, Sudan, October 2001 (http://www.freedom-quest.ca/ Sudan Reportfinal 101601.pdf, accessed April 15, 2002); Karl Vick, "Oil Money is Fueling Sudan's War," The Washington Post, June 11, 2001; International Crisis Group, God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan (January 2002), 132–133.

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