over five years. USAID development funding in opposition-held areas of Sudan increased from $4 million last year to $18 million this year.

To address the fact that two generations of southern Sudanese have had minimal access to education, USAID has designed a basic education program to support the creation of elementary schools, secondary schools, and teacher training colleges in southern Sudan. One effect of the ongoing civil war and displacement of civilians in Sudan has been the severe disruption of the business and agricultural sectors. The second program will provide technical training to farmers to increase their entrepreneurial skills, and also will support the provision of small loans to individuals, especially women who make up over 60 percent of the farming population, thereby encouraging the development of the southern Sudanese economy. A few days ago when we were traveling in southern Sudan with Administrator Natsios, I saw the production of shea butter, a local commodity that is processed by women who are the "poorest of the poor." Shea butter is a cooking oil that can replace imported food aid oil, and is also a highly valued export commodity. Most of all, support to the shea network will benefit thousands of women as the shea nut tree grows wild in Southern Sudan.

Parallel to our efforts to improve the southern Sudanese society and economy over the long term, USAID continues to address the pressing shorter-term humanitarian needs of Sudanese, north and south. The continued high level of our humanitarian assistance primarily reflects the unfortunate continuing humanitarian need in waraffected areas. We are also supporting what Administrator Natsios calls "developmental relief" programs-those which mitigate the impacts of conflict and encourage people to move along on the path to self-sufficiency. USAID funds relief organizations working both within and outside the framework of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). OLS has been the primary channel for humanitarian assistance to Sudan, but we do not limit ourselves to providing assistance only to areas cleared by the GOS under the OLS framework. The percentage of USAID non-food assistance in southern Sudan going to organizations outside OLS has increased from 13 percent in 1998 to 45 percent last year. Currently, in Western Upper Nile, where needs are most acute and where GoS is denying access, USAID is giving both food and nonfood aid to agencies outside OLS, and will continue to do so.

A second major achievement has been the improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Nuba Mountains over the past year. Nuba had been the area of greatest humanitarian need in Sudan caused by conflict and isolation, but the region was receiving little humanitarian aid due to blanket denials of access from the GoS. To meet the overwhelming needs in Nuba, the United States led negotiations for a military ceasefire and humanitarian access. This effort succeeded. Clearance of flights is now done by the Joint Military Commission (composed of GoS, SPLM, and international monitors) and not by GoS. People are enjoying a new freedom of movement, and an economic revitalization is beginning. There is an overall feeling of optimism among the people of Nuba, and some hope to use this successful initiative as a model for zones of tranquility elsewhere in Sudan. The Nuba initiative has not been an unmitigated success, but I will address that later.

A third achievement has been the close cooperation between USAID and the State Department in developing and implementing the tests from the Danforth initiative. One of the tests relates to eradication of slavery, abductions, and forced servitude. State led the formation of an investigation by an international team of eminent persons. USAID is designing a program to normalize inter-communal relations in the geographic area most affected by slavery. The program will focus on conflict transformation activities that enable people to earn their livelihoods from peaceful economic opportunities rather than from the war economy that involves abductions of civilians.

USAID and the State Department have also worked closely on improving humanitarian access. USAID developed the Nuba Mountains operational plan for the World Food Program 30-day food distribution in SPLM areas in November. The plan was presented to GoS diplomatically by the State Department. This pattern has been repeated in a number of instances throughout the last year.

Despite these successes, we at USAID remain disturbed at the intensification of conflict and humanitarian crises in other areas and feel the U.S. government still has to overcome significant challenges in order to catalyze a just peace. The GoS continually obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of programs in opposition areas. It delays operations, violates agreements, and denies access for humanitarian flights.

The Nuba Mountains have seen positive changes, as I mentioned earlier, but there are reasons to question the commitment of GoS to guaranteeing humanitarian access in the Nuba Mountains because of its actions to date. For example, after the GoS agreed in January to unfettered humanitarian access to Nuba, it continued to

delay and deny flights into the SPLM-controlled areas until mid-May, only weeks before the rainy season would make airstrips inaccessible. The government finally acquiesced only after sustained U.S. pressure. Lack of humanitarian assistance from early December to mid-May did little to encourage people to return to the Nuba Mountains and in certain locations, civilian movement and markets continue to be restricted. Also, a collapse of, or failure to renew, the agreement is not without risk. Under the terms of the ceasefire, all sides gained access to detailed maps of population centers, military positions, and locations of humanitarian activities.

The problem of restricted humanitarian access to war-affected regions is not limited to the Nuba Mountains. In the war zones of Western Upper Nile, in parts of Central and Eastern Upper Nile, in northern Bahr el Ghazal, in southern Blue Nile, and in Eastern Equatoria, flights continue to be denied. As recently as last week, the GoS insisted that all relief for Western Upper Nile be out of El-Obeid rather the OLS base in Lokichokio. The United Nations (UN) is engaged in continued negotiations with GoS and SPLM on this.

In a recent query on the GoS proposal to restrict access to Western Upper Nile, Administrator Natsios stated, "The principle of Operation Lifeline Sudan since it was created in 1988, was to allow the government-held areas to be served from the North and the opposition-held areas to be served through Lokichokio in Northern Kenya. Any change will disrupt the relief effort and endanger people's lives, and we would not accept it."

My third concern is that the frequency of attacks on civilians is increasing. In Western Upper Nile, credible reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies indicate that the GoS military campaign is directly targeting civilians and food stocks through intensified, high-altitude bombings and helicopter gunship attacks.

An attack on civilians in Bieh on February 17 in which 24 people were killed was witnessed by World Food Program (WFP) staff. On the Administrator's recent trip, we met with six chiefs from Western Upper Nile, a number of whose home areas were bombed that evening. In addition to these attacks, dozens of GoS assaults on civilian populations go unwitnessed by international observers.

The UN and NGOs estimate that between 150,000 and 300,000 people have been displaced in Western Upper Nile between January and May 2002. Due to restrictions on access to the area, information on displaced populations is imprecise. By all accounts the humanitarian needs of the displaced are enormous. Veteran aid workers have described the state of internally displaced persons in Western Upper Nile as the worst they have ever seen.

Finally, I would like to present preliminary plans for future USAID priorities and actions that will improve the humanitarian situation and prepare Sudan for a just peace. These plans follow directly from successes achieved under the initiatives of Special Envoy Danforth.

One of the Danforth tests is to encourage "periods or zones of tranquility," in which military actors temporarily stand down to allow humanitarian access. During the Danforth negotiations, we obtained political approval from both GoS and SPLM for special humanitarian programs in the cross-line area of Abyei and Twic for the eradication of guinea worm. I visited Abyei and Twic counties last month, and met with local authorities, community leaders, and international partners. If USAID efforts to transform the war economy in this region are successful, improved relations among north-south communities could have two impacts. One is a reduction in slave raiding and abductions since this is where these practices historically occur, and a second is an increase in return of displaced people to their home areas in the South from squatter camps in northern cities. This potential initiative is still being vetted. Similarly, Eastern Equatoria will also be a priority for USAID programs in the coming year. This is a very complex region with a multiplicity of ethnic groups, GoSSPLA front lines, south-south divisions, and a regional dimension that includes Ugandan dissidents. The impact of all this on ordinary Sudanese is huge, with many displaced within the region and many others living as refugees in Uganda. We will attempt to use U.S. political leverage and the State-USAID partnership to support the UN in its efforts to negotiate cross-line access and eliminate GoS access denials. Success in these efforts will enable USAID to fund infrastructure projects, conflict transformation, and community rehabilitation activities.

Second, USAID will work to consolidate the ceasefire and the recovery effort in the Nuba Mountains. Popular expectations remain high and much remains to be done here to sustain the initial successes so that people achieve self-reliance and economic recovery.

Third, we are considering ways that the current flight clearance system can move beyond GoS unilateral ability to veto humanitarian flights. We intend to explore the creation of an internationally monitored flight clearance mechanism to ensure objec

tivity and transparency in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This would be a major change in the current approach that could improve the lives of thousands of Sudanese in the south, who live in areas not directly affected by fighting but who are now routinely denied humanitarian access by GoS for political reasons.

I believe the U.S. initiative has the potential to move the warring parties towards a just peace. In that regard, the United States is the only game in town. Yet Khartoum seems of two minds, poised on the edge between a peace and war mentality. The surest way for Khartoum to prove the genuineness of its intentions is to fully collaborate with the U.S. and U.Ñ. humanitarian initiatives by providing unrestricted international humanitarian access to civilians in need. Failure to do so risks years of more war.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Winter.

Mr. Young.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. YOUNG, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Mr. YOUNG. Chairman Hyde, Mr. Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning, and thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

Just yesterday the Commission released a report on Afghanistan that I hope to present to you in a hearing such as this one in the near future. In the meantime, I want to express our sincere thanks to the Committee for holding this hearing at a very critical time when we need to focus U.S. efforts on bringing a just peace to Sudan.

Following the Commission's establishment by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Sudan was one of the first three countries to become a focus of our Commission's attention. For the past 3 years, the Commission has found the government of Sudan to be the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. Over the past 3 years the Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan, a number have been taken up both by the Administration and by the Congress.

On May 14th, the White House released Special Envoy John Danforth's much awaited report on his efforts in the civil war in Sudan. The Commission was one of the first to call for the creation of a special envoy. The Commission welcomed Senator Danforth's efforts and his willingness to continue in the envoy post to pursue a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

Senator Danforth is to be commended for his success in getting humanitarian aid to the Nuba Mountains where the Khartoum regime has for years engaged in genocidal actions. His efforts have also resulted in the recently concluded investigation by the International Eminent Persons Group into slavery, abduction and forced servitude in Sudan. The report of the Eminent Persons Group includes the horrific conclusion, and I quote,

"The pattern of slave taking that has developed since the start of the civil war is, to a substantial degree, the product of a counter-insurgency strategy pursued by successive governments in Khartoum."

Senator Danforth, like the Commission, has found that the development of Sudan's oil wealth has become an increasingly important

factor in the intensification of the conflict and one that must be addressed in order to achieve a just and lasting peace.

But Senator Danforth's proposal, in our judgment, does not yet point to a serious policy for the Bush Administration to bring peace to Sudan. It contains a serious flaw in the premise that neither the Khartoum regime nor the rebel alliance can win the war.

Whether or not Khartoum can win the war is not the question. The point is that Khartoum thinks it can win the war, especially with the hundreds-of-millions of dollars in oil revenue pouring into it. It thus currently has no incentive to end the fighting and neither Senator Danforth nor the Bush Administration has yet pointed to one. Meanwhile, the horrors of the war go on, with Khartoum over the past few months alone purchasing warplanes and escalating deployment of helicopter gun ships.

The only way to get Khartoum's attention is to curtail its oil revenues, the only asset that is keeping it from bankruptcy. The United States has at hand the means to do so through capital market reform recommended by the Commission and included in the House-passed version of the Sudan Peace Act. Two key provisions would:

First, bar any foreign company doing business in the Sudanese petroleum fields from raising funds in U.S. capital markets. U.S. companies, of course, are already prohibited from doing business in Sudan.

Second, require any company doing business in Sudan to disclose the nature of that business in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These relatively modest changes would have extraordinary impact.

The international oil companies are watching closely. Already deeply involved, perhaps implicated is a better word, they cannot afford to be cut off from U.S. capital markets, the world's most lucrative and efficient.

Even more will be needed, however, for a just peace. There must be a fair apportionment and a just expenditure of oil revenues for both south and north. Senator Danforth found that any peace process should address the oil issue in order to resolve a major cause of conflict and to serve as the basis for a just peace.

The Commission has recommended that a peace agreement or, in the interim, a comprehensive cease-fire in Sudan be conditioned on placing the country's oil revenues in an internationally administered trust fund. These revenues would be expended solely for developmental and humanitarian purposes on an equitable basis in both the north and the south.

Without such an arrangement for oil revenues; the regime will be far less likely to engage in good-faith bargaining over powersharing. Regimes in Khartoum have time and again manipulated well-meaning peace initiatives, and in the process, repeatedly making, and later breaking, solemn promises of fair treatment to the people of southern Sudan. It has been 5 years since both parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles under the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, or IGAD. The people of southern Sudan cannot afford another 5 years of delay by a Khartoum government that is heedless of the human costs.

The Commission also strongly believes that any peace talks for Sudan must be based on the Declaration of Principles that I just mentioned. Two of these principles are core issues that have to be addressed in order to establish a just peace. These are self-determination for the south and a secular state that would ensure religious freedom for all individuals, north and south.

What is most needed right now is a policy on Sudan-one in which the United States is a central player in an effort for a just peace. A first step in such a policy should be for the Bush Administration and the Senate to drop their opposition to a conference committee on the Sudan Peace Act and to accept the House version of the bill.

This is the logical extension of the findings by the President's own special envoy that oil is the key to peace in Sudan. Millions of lives depend on it.

The Commission has made several other specific recommendations for U.S. policy to promote religious freedom in Sudan that are presented in our prepared statement. I would be happy to discuss them during the questions, if that would be helpful.

In the meantime, I will conclude here and respectfully request that the Commission's April 2002 report on Sudan, along with my prepared remarks, be enter into the records of this hearing.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young and the Commission's April 2002 Report on Sudan follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. YOUNG, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Chairman Hyde and distinguished Members of the Committee: Good morning and thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. I want to thank the Committee for holding this hearing at a very critical time when we need to focus U.S. efforts to bring a just peace to Sudan.

Following the Commission's establishment by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (the IRFA), Sudan was one of the first three countries to be the focus of this Commission's attention.

For the past three years, the Commission has found the government of Sudan to be the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The Commission also has found that religion is a major factor in Sudan's ongoing civil war, a conflict that has taken over 2 million lives and left 4 million homeless.

Sudanese have long known from bitter experience what Americans know now, post 9/11, about the human costs of intolerance and fanaticism. The people of Sudan know because they have so long witnessed the results of policies pursued by successive regimes in the north to Arabize and Islamicize a largely African Christian and animist population in the south. These well-documented polices include aerial bombardment of civilians and of humanitarian facilities, deliberate denial of international humanitarian assistance, abduction and enslavement of women and children, and the forcible displacement of populations from oil-producing areas. The people of Sudan have also witnessed the restrictions on religious freedom and the abuses of human rights of Christians and Muslims alike in the north. And finally, the Sudanese people have witnessed the strong resistance from Muslims and nonMuslims alike to Khartoum's attempts to enforce cultural and religious conformity on non-Arab tribal peoples in the Nuba Mountains, in Sudan's eastern regions, and elsewhere.

Over the past three years, the Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan. A number have been taken up by the Administration and the Congress. The State Department has repeatedly adopted the Commission's recommendation to designate Sudan a "country of particular concern" for religious freedom violations under the IRFA. The Commission called on President Bush to use his "bully pulpit" to raise international awareness of the ongoing atrocities in Sudan, and President Bush did so in a major speech on religion and U.S.