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if third countries should make significant headway in developing and deploying these new weapons systems while the United States and the U.S.S.R. remained constrained. If this happened, the United States and Soviet Union would likely want to reevaluate their positions.

It is also possible that the Soviet Union will strive to match the United States in whatever hardware is authorized in forthcoming agreements. Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly stressed that United States introduction of new cruise missiles will cause another costly spiral in the arms race. Past experience indicates that the Soviet Government, if for no other reason than prestige, might not willingly let the United States long retain an advantage in weapons development, at least not without some counter effort.

APPENDIX

EXCERPT FROM THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED*

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

SEC. 36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for

(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons.

(2) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having

(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or (B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or (3) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1) or (2), or

(B) any program described in subsection (a)(3) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotations.

(3) Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise such committee on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).

*As amended by Public Law 94-141.

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