and is addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, upon the designated subject "Proposals on Naval Disarmament." References are made to the following

papers:

(a) State Dept. Conf. Ltr. of July 18, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tel. 190 of July 15 and 194 of July 16.

(b) State Dept. Conf. Ltr. of July 18, 1929, enclosing State's Tel. 180 of July 17.

(c) State Dept. Conf Ltr. of July 22, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tels. 197 of July 18 and 199 of July 20. (d) State Dept. Conf. July 21. (e) State Dept. Conf. Ltr. of July 24, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tels. 201 of July 22 and 202 of July 23; and State's Tels. 186 and 187 of July 23. (f) State Dept. Conf. Ltr. of July 28, 1929, enclosing State's Tels. 189 and 190 of July 24 and American Embassy's Tel. 204 of July 25.

Ltr. of July 22, 1929, enclosing State's Tel. 182 of

(g) State Dept. Conf. Ltr. of July 29, enclosing American Embassy's Tel. 192 of July 26. G. B. No. 438-1 (Serial No. 1444).

(h) State Dept. Ltr. of July 30, 1929, enclosing American Embassy Tokyo Tel. 80 of July 27.

(i) State Dept. Ltr. of July 30, enclosing American Embassy's Tels. 209 of July 29 and 211 of July 30.

(3) State Dept. Ltr. of August 2, 1929, enclosing State's Tels. 194 of July 30 and 195 and 196 of July 31 and American Embassy's Tel. 58 of July 31.

(k) State Dept. Ltr. of August 2, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tels. 215 and 216 of August

(1) State Dept. Ltr. of August 5, 1929, enclosing State's Tel. 201 of August 2. (m) State Dept. Ltr. of August 5, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tels. 218 of August 3, 220 of August 4, and 221 of August 5.

(n) State Dept. Ltr. of August 6, 1929, enclosing State's Tel. 206 of August 5. (0) State Dept. Ltr. of August 7, 1929, enclosing American Embassy's Tel. 223 of August 6.

(p) State Dept. Ltr. of August 8, 1929, enclosing State's Tels. 209 of August 6 and American Embassy's Tel. 225 of August 7.

(q) State Dept. Ltr. of August 9, 1929, enclosing American embassy's Tel. 228 of August 9.

(r) Secretary of Navy's letter of August 17, 1929, Op-13A-LMS, enclosing paraphrase of telegram dated 13 August, 1929, addressed American Embassy, London, England. Enclosures: (A) 4 Tables, I to IV, inclusive.

Obviously with the publicity given to these papers by the insertion of the said documents in the public record, there can be no valid objection to the Foreign Relations Committee having these specific papers, despatches, telegrams, etc., and making them a part of the Foreign Relations Committee record.

The exact case is presented as well by the present record of the Foreign Relations Committee, where the signers of the Treaty put into the public record a part of the despatches passing between Great Britain and our country, the remainder of which I have asked the production of, and all of which should, after being furnished to the Foreign Relations Committee, be inserted in the public record of the committee.

I ask, please, that the State Department be requested to furnish the Foreign Relations Committee the telegrams and papers as described herein, contained in the public record 'now of the evidence taken before the Naval Affairs Committee. I think these should have been furnished under the original request made from the committee to the State Department. Certainly under the second request that I made, there should have been no hesitancy in sending them. Now, however, with fragments of the telegrams and communications put into the public record, and with a particular description given now of some of these dispatches, I respectfully submit that there can exist no valid reason why all letters, papers, documents, telegrams, dispatches, communications of every sort leading up to or relating to the London conference and London Treaty should not be transmitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, and I very respectfully ask that this shall be done.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

HIRAM W. JOHNSON.

At the instance of Senator Moses, of New Hampshire, the Foreign Relations Committee requested from the Secretary of State all of the papers and documents relating to the Geneva Naval Disarmament

Conference of 1927. Subsequently, on the 6th day of June, 1930, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee received from the Secretary of State the following communication:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington, June 6, 1930.

DEAR SENATOR BORAH: I am in receipt of your letter of June third, requesting on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations certain papers relative to the Geneva Conference of 1927. I am also in receipt of your favors of June third and June fourth, transmitting copies of letters of Senator Johnson of the same dates respectively, in which he makes certain inquiries and also asks for certain confidential telegrams of the Department and also for "all letters, papers, documents, telegrams, dispatches, and communications of every sort leading up to or relating to the London Conference and London treaty."

I am sending you by hand a set of all of the records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, held at Geneva in 1927, which have been made public. I am also sending you a confidential memorandum which will answer as far as possible the questions contained in Senator Johnson's letter of June 3. Respecting the other papers called for, I am directed by the President to say that their production would not in his opinion be compatible with the public interest. These requests call for the production and possible publication of informal and confidential conversations, communications, and tentative suggestions of a kind which are common to almost every negotiation and without which such negotiations can not successfully be carried on. If the confidence in which they were made to the American delegation in London is broken it would materially impair the possibility of future successful negotiations between this Government and other nations. The necessity of preserving such confidences was made clear by President Washington at the very beginning of this Government. In reply to a resolution of the House of Representatives of March 24, 1796, he said:

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers."

Both the Secretary of the Navy and I have been before your committee and have been examined at length. Officers of the Navy have also freely given their views to your committee. Moreover, two members of your committee were members of the American delegation at London and are familiar with every phase of the negotiations from beginning to end, and stand ready to make their knowledge available to interested members of your committee. The question whether this treaty is or is not in the interest of the United States and should or should not be ratified by the Senate must in the last event be determined from the language of the document itself and not from extraneous matter. There have been no concealed understandings in this matter, nor are there any commitments whatever except as appear in the treaty itself and the interpretive exchange of notes recently suggested by your committee, all of which are now in the hands of the Senate.

Very respectfully,

(Signed.)

United States Senate.

The Hon. WILLIAM E. BORAH,

HENRY L. STIMSON.

In answer to this letter from the Secretary, the writer issued the following statement:

STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES SENATOR HIRAM W. JOHNSON SATURDAY, JUNE 7, 1930.

The power of the President to negotiate treaties is derived from the Constitution, which says:

"He shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

In the making of treaties, therefore, the duty of the Senate is as important and solemn as that of the President. Apparently this is forgotten in the present

discussion. The Secretary of State goes back to the famous Washington message of 1796 and quotes it as follows:

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other Powers."

This message was to the House of Representatives, not to the Senate. The point then at issue has been misunderstood by the Secretary of State and his quotation by a singular oversight stops short of what makes plain Washington's meaning. Immediately following the quotation, Washington's message proceeds: "The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

11* * * I repeat that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my station will permit or the public good shall require to be disclosed; and in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the Senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice."

Thus, it will be observed that the denial of the papers by President Washington was to the House of Representatives, which was not a part of the treaty-making power, but that all the papers and documents, were laid before the Senate, which was a part of the treaty-making power.

May I commend to the very able representatives of the State Department the study of the controversy between the House of Representatives and the President, which arose in relation to the Jay Treaty, and which has been a source of debate among statesmen and comment among historians and writers from the time of Washington to the present. The question there was not at all like that here involved.

I might add the Foreign Relations Committee has ever in the past jealously guarded such confidential information as has been transmitted to it, and to-day, as in days gone by, if it be compatible with the public interest to maintain as confidential some State documents upon which the treaty was founded, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate itself will be course maintain that confidence inviolate.

In the case of the London treaty a very different proposition is presented, that either lawyer or layman can readily understand. In the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, the signers of the treaty themselves introduced into the public record a document wherein the Premier of Great Britain is quoted most intimately concerning the negotiations, and the contents of various dispatches between the British Government and our own are discussed and referred to. When the signers of the treaty saw fit thus not only to introduce in evidence, but to make public a part of the telegrams and communications passing between the British Government and our own, the Foreign Relations Committee at once were entitled to all of the details, and everything relating to the subject matter. It is silly, and worse, for any individual to contend that he can put into the public record and publish broadcast in the press of the country a part of the correspondence bearing upon the treaty and then, holding up his hands in holy horror at a request for all of the correspondence, pretend that while a part of the record, upon which he relies, may be by him given to the public, the giving of all of it to his partner in treaty making would be incompatible with the public interest.

This is the question that is at issue in the demand that I have made for the papers relating to the London Treaty, and it can not be avoided by a half quotation from Washington, which is utterly set at naught by the full context, nor by an pretense of safeguarding delicate international secrets."

The question of the right of the Foreign Relations Committee to the papers, documents, and communications used in the negotiation and consummation of the treaty was discussed in a regular meeting of the

Foreign Relations Committee and finally, after full consideration, the following resolution was passed by the committee:

"Whereas this committee has requested the Secretary of State to send to it the letters, minutes, memoranda, instructions and dispatches which were made use of in the negotiations prior to and during the sessions of the recent conference of London; and

"Whereas the committee has received only a part of such documents; and "Whereas the Secretary of State, by direction of the President, has denied a second request from this committee for all of the papers above described; and in his letter to the chairman of this committee has apparently attempted to establish the doctrine that the Treaty of London must be considered by the Senate 'from the language of the document itself and not from extraneous matter;' therefore be it

"Resolved, That this committee dissents from such doctrine and regards all facts which enter into the antecedent or attendant negotiations of any treaty as relevant and pertinent when the Senate is considering a treaty for the purpose of ratification, and that this committee hereby asserts its right, as the designated agent of the Senate, to have free and full access to all records, files and other information touching the negotiation of any treaty, this right being based upon the constitutional prerogative of the Senate in the treaty-making process; and be it further

"Resolved, That the chairman of this committee transmit a copy of these resolutions to the President and to the Secretary of State.”

A response was made by the Secretary of State to the resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, June 12, 1930

DEAR SENATOR BORAH: I have received your favor of to-day transmitting a copy of a resolution of the Committee on Foreign Relations in respect to letters and documents in the recent negotiations of the naval treaty.

I did not, in my letter to you of June 6th, attempt to define the duties of the Senate or the scope of its power in passing upon treaties. My statement in that letter that "the question whether this treaty is or is not in the interest of the United States and should or should not be ratified by the Senate must in the last event be determined from the language of the document itself and not from extraneous matter," was intended to call attention to the fact that the obligations and rights arising from the treaty, as in the case of any other contract, must be measured by the language of the document itself.

Very respectfully,

HENRY L. STIMSON.

Thereafter the writer moved in the Foreign Relations Committee that until the production of the documents and communications in accordance with the resolutions passed by the Foreign relations Committee, action upon the treaty be deferred. The committee, however, defeated this motion by a vote of 16 to 4.

In the course of the discussion before the Foreign Relations Committee respecting the papers and documents, the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Reed, stated that he had full copies which he would permit any member of the Foreign Relations Committee to see in confidence, but which could not be in any fashion referred to nor used in discussion of the terms of the treaty.

The writer refused to accept any such offer and asserted the right of any Senator to be as full and complete as that of the Senator from Pennsylvania-to read and see and have all data relating to the treaty, to discuss that deemed appropriate and fitting with his fellows and, in conjunction with the terms of the treaty, to use with due circumspection and propriety, either in open session or, if deemed advisable, executive session of the Senate, all matter pertinent to the provisions of the treaty.

After this Senate shall have passed from recollection and another Foreign Relations Committee shall sit, the matter of the right of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate to data bearing upon a treaty, doubtless, again will be a matter for consideration and determination. It is because of this and that what transpired in respect to the London treaty may be preserved, and the precedent, if any, established by the incident may be accurately understood, that this statement of facts is annexed to the views of the minority.

MEMORANDUM

While concurring generally with the conclusions reached by my associates in the Committee on Foreign Relations who have signed a minority report upon the London naval treaty I wish particularly to record my dissent to the proceedings with reference to this treaty by reason of what I regard as the indecent haste with which its consideration is being pressed.

It is now nearly a year since the initial steps were taken for the negotiation of this treaty; and the delegates to the London Conference consumed 14 weeks in formulating the instrument.

We are asked to pass upon it without sufficient time to study its provisions and under the handicap of being denied information which it is our constitutional right to possess.

Accordingly, I can not assent to the program thus presented.

O

GEORGE H. MOSES.