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inclusion of "ethnical" in exchange for the omission of "politwhen "ethnical" in its ordinary meaning is synonymous with 1," already included, was termed the "acceptance of a stale, ling cracker for a carload of fine smoked hams," by Mr. EberP. Deutsch when he spoke before this committee on March 10,

ABA POSITION

agree, and we urge you to read again his splendid presentation alf of the American Bar Association of their reasons for opn to the convention.

ur opinion, his arguments still hold, and we wonder what the would have been if it had been taken at the meeting of the ation's House of Delegates in February 1976, when, according to arren Christopher's report to you earlier this week, May 24, a vote approved the convention and, "recommended the same tandings and declaration that this committee had previously ed to the proposed resolution of ratification." This action rethe ABA's previous position against ratification voted Sep8, 1949 and February 27, 1970, both following extended debate. le we regret this reversal by the ABA's house of delegates, we that of course many of the association members still oppose enocide Convention, just as many members of the National tion Association and of other large organizations are in comisagreement with some of the stands taken by their respective s governing body.

are grateful for the carefully researched and well reasoned rey Mr. Deutsch and by Mr. Alfred J. Schweppe, the two delewho spoke to your committee on behalf of the ABA at the hearMarch 10, 1971, subsequent to the committee's proposal of the tandings and declaration.

also find very valuable Mr. Schweppe's previous statement to ommittee on January 24, 1950, attached as appendix A to his atement. In his 1950 report, Mr. Schweppe shared the results study of the United Nations record on the Genocide Convenboth the ad hoc committee, which drafted the initial text, and th or legal committee, which prepared the final draft approved General Assembly. His well chosen quotations and precise dates ferences, gleaned from the day-by-day and month-by-month lings of the committees make very clear the great difference n what was recommended by the U.S. representatives on the tees and what was finally adopted by the majority of the tees.

U.S. ROLE IN DRAFTING CONVENTION

Senator Proxmire referred in his testimony before your com2 days ago in support of ratification to "the important role by the United States in the drafting of the convention," citing: xample, it was John Maktos of the United States who chaired hoc committee of the Economic and Social Council of the Nations, which drafted the convention's text," we therefore statement by Mr. Maktos reported by Mr. Schweppe on page e committee hearing report for March 10, 1971, from appendix is 1950 statement:

T

The Chairman, speaking as the U.S. representative, proposed adding to the definition of genocide, which had been agreed upon at the previous meeting, the words, "with the complicity of the Government." The U.S. delegation felt in fact that genocide could not be an international crime unless a Government participated in its perpetration. In introducing this amendment, Mr. Maktos in no way wished to exempt from responsibility or excuse from punishment individuals not directly connected with a government. But the common law of every country covered crimes not committed with the complicity of the Government. Here was a condition sine qua non of genocide which should be inserted in the definition.

In these words, Chairman Maktos put the official U.N. position into the record on April 15, 1948. Although this position was also later the British position, it was voted down.

We wish that all supporters of ratification would read the various examples from the record which caused Mr. Schweppe to comment in 1971:

Far from being an exercise in leadership by the United States, the cold record shows it to have been a pathetic case of abject follower-ship—so pathetic as almost to drive one to tears.

The U.S. delegation consistently caved on important matters of principle, and in order to get some kind of an agreement-any kind-abjectly acquiesced in a draft that is so faulty and confused that it does not prevent genocide where it regularly goes on (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Africa, Asia) but, in a welter of confusion, creates new international crimes (the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land) that will make endless trouble for the United States. This was taken from your committee hearing of March 10, 1971, pages 59 and 60.

COMMITTEE'S PROPOSED UNDERSTANDINGS

We will conclude with a brief reference to the committee's proposed understandings. We realize that they are made so as to lessen ambiguities in the convention and to make its provisions more acceptable. However, we believe that instead the convention itself should be amended to include such items as political grounds and complicity of government, revised committee understandings, and other points mentioned in previous hearings by opponents to ratification-or by other opponents in the present hearings.

Understanding No. 1: Who would decide what constitutes a "substantial part" of the "national, ethnical, racial, or religious group" of article II, what percent is "substantial," and of what value is this provision as long as the words "as such" are included?

Understanding No. 2: Would not "the permanent impairment of mental faculties" as the meaning of "mental harm" in article II(b) still make U.S. citizens open to the charge of genocide in view of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Board of Education:

That separation of Negro children from others of similar age and qualification solely because of their race, generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone *** has a tendency to retard their education and mental development ***? (347 U.S. 483, 493, 494 (1954); Committee Hearing, March 10, 1971, pages 33 and 34.)

Understanding No. 3: Even if "*** nothing in article VI shall affect the right of any State to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the State," could not a nation's citizens abroad charged with genocide also be tried in "the State in the

territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction” as called for in article VI?

Could not a citizen charge his own government with genocide and request a hearing before an international tribunal? Time magazine in its issue of December 12, 1969, reported the intention of the Black Panthers to "go before the United Nations and charge the United States with genocide against the Panthers."

A similar charge of genocide committed by the Government of the United States "against the Negro people of the United States" was placed before the United Nations by a petition said to be supported by Paul Robeson, Mrs. Coretta Scott King, the Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy, and others. The petition was published in 1970 in the book, "We Charge Genocide,” of which a copy was filed with this committee in 1971 by ABA Delegate Deutsch. (Committee hearing, March 10, 1971, pages 31 and 32.)

GENOCIDE CONVENTION'S THREAT TO EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES

Finally, we strongly urge rejection of the Genocide Convention as a threat to the effectiveness of our Armed Forces. We repeat the rhetorical question raised by Mr. Ben R. Miller, a member of the council of the section of individual rights and responsibilities of the American Bar Association, in reference to the convention article IV providing:

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.

Mr. Miller asked in his dissent:

Would not the military strength of this Nation and hence the Nation itself be endangered if in following orders of a superior officer in the heat of battle, subordinates would be faced with instant decision of whether to risk court martial for refusing to follow orders, or punishment for genocide if a tribunal in the calm aftermath of a war could consider the result of following a particular order to have been genocide? For the treaty abolishes the defense of subordinates that they were but following orders of their superior officers.

This is from page 40 of Committee hearing of March 10, 1971. Mr. Miller was not speaking then, but his question was quoted by a speaker.

The failure of the Nuremberg defense has been mentioned by a number of opponents to the Convention in previous hearings.

UNFAVORABLE REPORT URGED AND REVISION RECOMMENDED

We of the Voters Interest League urge this committee to give an unfavorable report to the Genocide Convention as presently drafted and to recommend its revision along the lines mentioned earlier. Until its provisions would truly accomplish its noble intentions without dangerous side effects, please protect the United States from this proposed treaty. Now is certainly not the time to agree to something harmful to us just to please others. Remember that in September 1970, the Communists' official theoretical journal, "Political Affairs." carried a directive on page 1 "Against Genocide" stating that: "Every Communist and progressive, every reader of 'Political Affairs,' should be involved fully in this campaign."

It reported on those supporting the campaign to distribute 25,000 petitions to urge the United Nations to force the United States to ratify the Convention. Refer to the news release of September 17, 1970, from the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation. This was printed in committee hearing of March 10, 1971, pages 50 to 52.

Remember that the Communist nations ratified the Convention after it omitted political grounds, but with a reservation "against jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over disputes under the Convention." This is from page 47 of the hearing of March 10, 1971.

Our preference would be for the United States to explain to the world its reasons for objecting to the Genocide Convention and its intention to punish in our courts, with the usual constitutional safeguards for the accused, anyone found guilty of the act of genocide. After all, of what use would the Convention be to restrain another Hitler or Stalin even if he had signed it?

[Miss Zimmerman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MISS MAUD-ELLEN ZIMMERMAN, CHAIRMAN, VOTERS INTEREST LEAGUE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Miss Maud-Ellen Zimmerman. I thank you for the opportunity to present to you this morning the reasons of Voters Interest League, of which I am chairman, for opposing the proposed ratification of the Genocide Convention. My statements are my personal views as well as those of the League.

Of course, we are against genocide, a horrible crime, but we believe that the proposed treaty is not the way to prevent it or to stop it.

The omission from the text of the Convention of political grounds and of complicity by government to make a crime be genocide renders the treaty, in our opinion, of no value in adopting the chief kind of genocide going on in various parts of the world this very hour. Think of Cambodia, Angola, and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the United States' representatives on the ad hoc committee framing the Convention in 1948 gave in to Communist opposition and allowed the words describing acts of genocide in the original United States declaration adopted by the General Assembly in December 1946 to be changed from, quote: "committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds" to, in Article II of the Convention, quote: "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such." The inclusion of "ethnical" in exchange for the omission of "political " when "ethnical" in its ordinary meaning is synonymous with "racial," already included, was termed the "acceptance of a stale, crumbling cracker for a carload of fine smoked hams," by Mr. Eberhard P. Deutsch when he spoke before this Committee on March 10, 1971. We agree, and we urge you to read again his splendid presentation on behalf of the American Bar Association of their reasons for opposition to the Convention. In our opinion, his arguments still hold, and we wonder what the count would have been had it been taken at the meeting of the Association's House of Delegates in February 1976 when, according to Mr. Warren Christopher's report to you earlier this week, May 24, a voice vote approved the Convention and, quote, "recommended the same understandings and declaration that this Committee had previously attached to the proposed resolution of ratification." This action reversed the ABA's previous position against ratification voted September 8, 1949 and February 27, 1970, both following extended debate.

While we regret this reversal by the ABA's House of Delegates, we realize that, of course, many of the Association members still oppose the Genocide Convention, just as many members of the National Education Association and of other large organizations are in complete disagreement with some of the stands taken by their respective group's governing body.

We are grateful for the carefully researched and well reasoned reports by Mr. Deutsch and by Mr. Alfred J. Schweppe, the two delegates who spoke to your Committee on behalf of the ABA at the hearing of March 10, 1971, subsequent to the Committee's proposal of the understandings and declaration. We also find very valuable Mr. Schweppe's previous statement to your Committee on Janu

ary 24, 1950, attached as Appendix A to his 1971 statement. In his 1971 statement. In his 1950 report, Mr. Schweppe shared the results of his study of the United Nations record on the Genocide Convention, in both the Ad Hoc Committee, which drafted the initial text, and the Sixth or Legal Committee, which prepared the final draft approved by the General Assembly. His well chosen quotations and precise dates and references, gleaned from the day-by-day and month-by-month proceedings of the committees, make very clear the great difference between what was recommended by the U.S. representatives on the committees and what was finally adopted by the majority of the committees.

Since Senator Proxmire referred in his testimony before your Committee two days ago in support of ratification, to “the important role played by the United States in the drafting of the Convention," citing: "For example, it was John Maktos of the United States who chaired the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which drafted the Convention's text," we quote a statement by Mr. Maktos reported by Mr. Schweppe on page 70 of the Committee Hearing Report for March 10, 1971 (from Appendix A, his 1950 statement):

"The chairman, speaking as the United States representative, proposed adding to the definition of genocide, which had been agreed upon at the previous meeting, the words, 'with the complicity of the Government'. The United States delegation felt in fact that genocide could not be an international crime unless a Government participated in its perpetration. In introducing this amendment, Mr. Maktos in no way wished to exempt from responsibility or excuse from punishment individuals not directly connected with a Government. But the common law of every country covered crimes not committed with the complicity of the Government. Here was a condition sine qua non of genocide which should be inserted in the definition."

In these words, Chairman Maktos put the official United States position into the record on April 15, 1948. Although this position was also later the British position, it was voted down.

We wish that all supporters of ratification would read the various examples from the record which caused Mr. Schweppe to comment in 1971:

Far from being an exercise in leadership by the United States, the cold record shows it to have been a pathetic case of abject follower-ship-so pathetic as almost to drive one to tears.

The United States delegation consistently caved on important matters of principle, and in order to get some kind of an agreement-any kind-abjectly acquiesced in a draft that is so faulty and confused that it does not prevent genocide where it regularly goes on (Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Poland, Africa, Asia) but, in a welter of confusion, creates new international crimes (the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land) that will make endless trouble for the United States. (Committee Hearing March 10, 1971, pp. 59-60.)

We will conclude with a brief reference to the Committee's proposed understandings. We realize that they are made so as to lesson ambiguities in the Convention and to make its provisions more acceptable. However, we believe that instead the Convention itself should be amended to include such items as political grounds and complicity of Government, revised Committee understandings, and other points mentioned in previous hearings by opponents to ratification— or by other opponents in the present hearings.

UNDERSTANDING NO. 1

Who would decide what constitutes a "substantial part" of the "national, ethnical, racial or religious group" of Article II, what percent is "substantial,” and of what value is this provision as long as the words "as such" are included?

UNDERSTANDING NO. 2

Would not "the permanent impairment of mental facilities" as the meaning of "mental harm" in Article II (b) still make U.S. citizens open to the charge of genocide in view of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Board of Education that separation of Negro children, quote: "From others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race, generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . and has a tendency to (retard their) education and mental development. . . ." (347 U.S. 483, 493, 494 (1954), committee hearing, March 10, 1971, pp. 33 and 34.)

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